FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Chapter 18: Climate Resilient Development Pathways 3 4 Coordinating Lead Authors: E. Lisa F. Schipper (Sweden/United Kingdom), Aromar Revi (India), 5 Benjamin L. Preston (Australia/USA) 6 7 Lead Authors: Edward. R. Carr (USA), Siri H. Eriksen (Norway), Luis R. Fern醤dez-Carril (Mexico), 8 Bruce Glavovic (South Africa/New Zealand), Nathalie J.M. Hilmi (France/Monaco), Debora Ley 9 (Mexico/Guatemala), Rupa Mukerji (India/Switzerland), M. Silvia Muylaert de Araujo (Brazil), Rosa Perez 10 (Philippines), Steven K. Rose (USA), Pramod K. Singh (India) 11 12 Contributing Authors: Paulina Aldunce (Chile), Aditya Bahadur (India), Nat醠ia Barbosa de Carvalho 13 (Brazil), Ritwika Basu (India), Donald A. Brown (USA), Anna Carthy (Ireland), Vanesa Cast醤 Broto 14 (Spain/United Kingdom), Ralph Chami (USA), John Cook (USA), Daniel de Berr阣o Viana (Brazil), Frode 15 Degvold (Norway), Shekoofeh Farahmend (Iran), Roger Few (United Kingdom), Gianfranco Gianfrate 16 (France), H. Carina Keskitalo (Sweden), Florian Krampe (Germany/Sweden), Rinchen Lama (South Africa), 17 Julia Leventon (Czech Republic/United Kingdom), Rebecca McNaught (New Zealand), Yu Mo 18 (China/United Kingdom), Marianne Mosberg (Norway), Michelle Mycoo (Trinidad and Tobago), Johanna 19 Nalau (Australia/Finland), Karen O'Brien (Norway), Meg Parsons (New Zealand), Alain Safa (France), 20 Zoha Shawoo (Pakistan/United Kingdom), Marcus Taylor (Canada/United Kingdom), Mark G.L. Tebboth 21 (United Kingdom), Bejoy K. Thomas (India), Kirsten Ulsrud (Norway), Saskia Werners (The 22 Netherlands/Germany), Keren Zhu (China), Monika Zurek (Germany/United Kingdom) 23 24 Review Editors: Diana Liverman (USA), Nobuo Mimura (Japan) 25 26 Chapter Scientists: Ritwika Basu (India/United Kingdom), Zoha Shawoo (Pakistan/United Kingdom), Yu 27 Mo (China/United Kingdom) 28 29 Date of Draft: 1 October 2021 30 31 Notes: TSU Compiled Version 32 33 34 Table of Contents 35 36 18.1 Ways Forward for Climate Resilient Development ..............................................................................8 37 18.1.1 Understanding Climate Resilient Development..............................................................................8 38 18.1.2 Pathways for Climate Resilient Development.................................................................................9 39 18.1.3 Policy Context for Climate Resilient Development .......................................................................13 40 18.1.4 Assessing Climate Resilient Development.....................................................................................14 41 18.1.5 Chapter Roadmap .........................................................................................................................15 42 Box 18.1: Transformations in Support of Climate Resilient Development Pathways .............................15 43 Box 18.2: Visions of Climate Resilient Development in Kenya ..................................................................17 44 18.2 Linking Development and Climate Action...........................................................................................18 45 18.2.1 Implications of Current Development Trends...............................................................................19 46 18.2.2 Understanding Development in Climate Resilient Development..................................................19 47 18.2.3 Scenarios as a Method for Representing Future Development Trajectories................................22 48 18.2.4 Climate Change Risks to Development.........................................................................................25 49 18.2.5 Options for Managing Future Risks to Climate Resilient Development.......................................26 50 Box 18.3: Climate Resilient Development in Small Islands ........................................................................30 51 Box 18.4: Adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals .................................................................31 52 18.3 Transitions to Climate Resilient Development ....................................................................................42 53 18.3.1 System Transitions as a Foundation for Climate Resilient Development.....................................43 54 Box 18.5: The Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Climate Resilient Development.45 55 Box 18.6: The Role of Ecosystems in Climate-Resilient Development ......................................................49 56 Cross-Chapter Box GENDER: Gender, Climate Justice and Transformative Pathways.......................57 57 18.3.2 Accelerating Transitions...............................................................................................................63 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-1 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.4 Agency and Empowerment for Climate Resilient Development........................................................64 2 18.4.1 Political Economy of Climate Resilient Development ..................................................................65 3 18.4.2 Enabling Conditions for Near-Term System Transitions..............................................................66 4 Box 18.7: `Green' Strategies of Institutional Investors...............................................................................70 5 18.4.3 Arenas of Engagement...................................................................................................................72 6 Cross-Chapter Box INDIG: The Role of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge in 7 Understanding and Adapting to Climate Change ...............................................................................74 8 Box 18.8: Macroeconomic policies in support of Climate-Resilient Development ...................................82 9 18.4.4 Frontiers of Climate Action ..........................................................................................................85 10 Box 18.9: The Role of the Private Sector in Climate Resilient Development via Climate Finance, 11 Investments and Innovation. .................................................................................................................86 12 18.5 Sectoral and Regional Synthesis of Climate Resilient Development .................................................86 13 18.5.1 Regional Synthesis of Climate-Resilient Development .................................................................86 14 18.5.2 Sectoral Synthesis of Climate-Resilient Development ..................................................................91 15 18.5.3 Feasibility and Efficacy of Options for Climate-Resilient Development......................................92 16 18.6 Conclusions and Research Needs ........................................................................................................104 17 18.6.1 Knowledge Gaps .........................................................................................................................104 18 18.6.2 Conclusions.................................................................................................................................105 19 FAQ18.1: What is a climate resilient development pathway?..................................................................106 20 FAQ18.2: What is climate resilient development and how can climate change adaptation (measures) 21 contribute to achieving this?................................................................................................................106 22 FAQ18.3: How can different actors across society and levels of government be empowered to pursue 23 climate resilient development? ............................................................................................................108 24 FAQ18.4: What role do transitions and transformations in energy, urban and infrastructure, 25 industrial, land and ocean ecosystems, and in society, play in climate resilient development? ....108 26 FAQ18.5: What are success criteria in climate resilient development and how can actors satisfy those 27 criteria? .................................................................................................................................................109 28 References......................................................................................................................................................110 29 30 Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB: Feasibility Assessment of Adaptation Options: An Update of the SR1.5 31 ................................................................................................................................................................ 154 32 33 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-2 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Executive Summary 2 Climate resilient development (CRD) is a process of implementing greenhouse gas mitigation and 3 adaptation options to support sustainable development for all (18.1). Climate action and sustainable 4 development are interdependent processes and climate resilient development is possible when this 5 interdependence is leveraged. Pursuing these goals in an integrated manner increases their effectiveness in 6 enhancing human and ecological well-being. Climate resilient development can help build capacity for 7 climate action, including contributing to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions while enabling the 8 implementation of adaptation options that enhance social, economic and ecological resilience to climate 9 change as the prospect of crossing the 1.5癈 global warming level in the early 2030s approaches (WG1 10 Table SPM1). For example, incorporating clean energy generation, healthy diets from sustainable food 11 systems, appropriate urban planning and transport, universal health coverage and social protection, can 12 generate substantial health and wellbeing co-benefits (very high confidence1) (7.4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 13 HEALTH in Chapter 7). Similarly, universal water and energy access can help to reduce poverty and 14 improve well-being while making populations less vulnerable and more resilient to adverse climate impacts 15 (very high confidence) (18.1, Box 4.7). 16 17 Current development pathways combined with the observed impacts of climate change, are leading 18 away from, rather than toward, sustainable development, as reported in recent literature (moderate 19 agreement, robust evidence). While demonstrable progress has been made on some of the SDGs, significant 20 gains across a range of targets are still necessary, as is enhancing synergies and balancing and managing 21 trade-offs. Severe risks to natural and human systems are already observed in some places (high confidence), 22 and could occur in many more systems, worldwide before mid-century (medium confidence), by end-century 23 at all scales, from the local to the global, and at all latitudes and altitudes (high confidence). The COVID-19 24 pandemic revealed the vulnerability of development progress to shocks and stresses, potentially delaying the 25 implementation of the 2030 Agenda for all (8.1, Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). Various global 26 trends including rising income inequality, continued growth in greenhouse gas emissions, land use change, 27 food and water insecurity, human displacement, and reversals of long-term increasing life expectancy trends 28 in some nations run counter to the SDGs (very high confidence) as well as efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas 29 emissions and adapt to a changing climate (18.2). These development trends contribute to worsening 30 poverty, injustice and inequity, and environmental degradation. Climate change can exacerbate these 31 conditions by undermining human and ecological well-being (18.2). 32 33 Social and economic inequities linked to gender, poverty, race/ethnicity, religion, age, or geographic 34 location compound vulnerability to climate change and have created and could further exacerbate 35 injustices, and constrain the implementation of CRD for all (very high confidence). Climate change 36 intensifies existing vulnerability and inequality, with adverse impacts of climate change on the most 37 vulnerable groups, including women and children in low-income households, Indigenous or other minority 38 groups, small-scale producers and fishing communities, and low-income countries (high confidence). Most 39 vulnerable regions and population groups, such as in East, Central and West Africa, South Asia, Micronesia 40 and Melanesia and in Central America, present the most urgent need for adaptation (high confidence) (Ch 41 10, 12, 15). Climate justice initiatives explicitly address these multi-dimensional distributional issues as part 42 of climate change adaptation. However, adaptation strategies can worsen social inequities, including gender, 43 unless explicit efforts are made to change those unequal power dynamics, including spaces to foster 44 inclusive decision-making. Drawing upon Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can contribute to 45 overcoming the combined challenges of climate change, food security, biodiversity conservation, and 46 combating desertification and land degradation. (18.2; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER; Cross-Chapter Box 47 INDIG} 48 49 Opportunities for climate resilient development vary by location (very high confidence). Over 3.3 50 billion people live in regions that are very high and highly vulnerable to climate change, while 2 billion 51 people live in regions with low and very low vulnerability. Response to global greenhouse gas emissions 1 In this Report, the following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increasing levels of evidence and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing confidence. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-3 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 trajectories, regional and local development pathways, climate risk exposure, socio-economic and ecological 2 vulnerability, and the local capacity to implement effective adaptation and greenhouse gas mitigation 3 options, differ depending on local contexts and conditions (Table 18.3). As an example, underlying social 4 and economic vulnerabilities in Australasia, exacerbate disadvantage among particular social groups and 5 there is deep underinvestment in adaptation, given current and projected risks (Ch 11). There is also 6 significant regional heterogeneity in climate change, exposure, and vulnerability, indicating different starting 7 points for CRD, as well as mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development opportunities, synergies, and 8 trade-offs (18.5). 9 10 There are multiple possible pathways by which communities, nations and the world can pursue 11 climate resilient development. Moving toward different pathways involves confronting complex 12 synergies and trade-offs between development pathways, and the options, contested values, and 13 interests that underpin climate mitigation and adaptation choices (very high confidence). Climate 14 resilient development pathways are trajectories for the pursuit of climate resilient development and 15 navigating its complexities. Different actors, the private sector, and civil society, influenced by science, local 16 and Indigenous knowledges, and the media are both active and passive in designing and navigating CRD 17 pathways (18.1, 18.4). Increasing levels of warming may narrow the options and choices available for local 18 survival and sustainable development for human societies and ecosystems. Limiting warming to Paris 19 Agreement goals will reduce the magnitude of climate risks to which people, places, the economy and 20 ecosystems will have to adapt. Reconciling the costs, benefits, and trade-offs associated with adaptation, 21 mitigation, and sustainable development interventions and how they are distributed among different 22 populations and geographies is essential and challenging, but also creates the potential to pursue synergies 23 that benefit human and ecological well-being. For example, in parts of Asia sustainable development 24 pathways that connect climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction can reduce climate vulnerability 25 and increase resilience (Table 18.3. 10.6.2). Different actors and stakeholders have different priorities 26 regarding these opportunities, which can exacerbate or diminish existing social, economic and ecological 27 vulnerabilities and inequities. For example, in parts of Africa, intensive irrigation contributes to the 28 development of agriculture but has come at a cost to ecosystem integrity and human well-being (Table 18.3., 29 9.15.2). Careful and explicit consideration for the ethical and equity dimensions of policies and practices 30 associated with a climate resilient development pathway can help limit these negative externalities. 31 32 Prevailing development pathways are not advancing climate resilient development (very high 33 confidence). Societal choices in the near-term will determine future pathways. Some low-emissions 34 pathways and climate outcomes are unlikely2 to be realized (very high confidence). Rapid climate change is 35 affecting every region across the globe and affecting natural and human systems relevant to the pursuit of the 36 SDGs (18.1, 18.2, Fig. 18.1). Even the most ambitious greenhouse gas mitigation scenarios indicate climate 37 change will continue for decades to centuries (WGI, 18.2). Increasing mitigation effort across multiple 38 sectors exhibits opportunities for synergies with sustainable development, but also trade-offs that increase 39 with mitigation effort that need to be balanced and managed (high confidence). The uncertainty associated 40 with achieving specific pathways and climate outcomes is a risk factor to consider in planning, with 41 plausibility and transformational challenges, as well as trade-offs and synergies, affected by technology, 42 policy design, and societal choices (18.2). For instance, restrictions on utilization of individual mitigation 43 options to manage trade-offs (e.g., bioenergy with CCS, afforestation, nuclear power) can also affect the 44 mitigation cost to households (e.g., energy security, commodity prices) and the likelihood of a desired 45 climate outcome being realized. Developing and transitional economies are estimated as low-cost mitigation 46 opportunities, but are often at high risk from climate change due to their regional and development context 47 (high confidence) (18.2,18.5). For example in Africa, competing uses for water such as hydropower 48 generation, irrigation, and ecosystem requirements can create trade-offs among different management and 49 development objectives (9.7.3). In Asia, intensive irrigation and other forms of water consumption can 50 have a negative effect on water quality and aquatic ecosystems (Ch 10.6.3). Developed countries also, 2 In this Report, the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain 99�100% probability, Very likely 90�100%, Likely 66�100%, About as likely as not 33�66%, Unlikely 0�33%, Very unlikely 0�10%, and Exceptionally unlikely 0�1%. Additional terms (Extremely likely: 95� 100%, More likely than not >50�100%, and Extremely unlikely 0�5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely). This Report also uses the term `likely range' to indicate that the assessed likelihood of an outcome lies within the 17-83% probability range. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-4 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 face trade-offs, including in Australasia where adapting to fire risk in peri-urban zones introduces potential 2 trade-offs among ecological values and fuel reduction in treed landscapes (Ch 11.3.5) and in North America 3 where new coastal and alpine developments generate economic activity but enhance local social inequalities 4 (15.4.10). 5 6 Systems transitions can enable climate resilient development, when accompanied by appropriate 7 enabling conditions and inclusive arenas of engagement (very high confidence). Five systems transitions 8 are considered: energy, industry, urban and infrastructure, land and ecosystems, and societal. Advancing 9 climate resilient development in specific contexts may necessitate simultaneous progress on all five 10 transitions. Collectively, these system transitions can widen the solution space and accelerate and deepen the 11 implementation of sustainable development, adaptation, and mitigation actions by equipping actors and 12 decision-makers with more effective options. For example, urban ecological infrastructure linked to an 13 appropriate land use mix, street connectivity, open and green spaces, and job-housing proximity provides 14 adaptation and mitigation benefits that can aid urban transformation. (Table 18.4, Cross-Working Group Box 15 URBAN in Chapter 6) These system transitions are necessary precursors for more fundamental climate and 16 sustainable-development transformations; but can simultaneously be outcomes of transformative actions. 17 However, the way they are pursued may not necessarily be perceived as ethical or desirable to all actors. 18 Hence, enhancing equity and agency are cross-cutting considerations for all five transitions. Such transitions 19 can generate benefits across different sectors and regions, provided they are facilitated by appropriate 20 enabling conditions including effective governance, policy implementation, innovation, and climate and 21 development finance, which are currently insufficient (18.3, 18.4). 22 23 There is a rapidly narrowing window of opportunity to implement system transitions needed to enable 24 CRD. Past choices have already eliminated some development pathways, but other pathways for 25 climate-resilient development remain (very high confidence). In spite of a growth in national net-zero 26 commitments, the current prospects of surpassing 1.5癈 global mean temperatures by the 2030s are high 27 (WG1 Table SPM1). There is strong evidence of the worsening of multiple climate impact drivers 28 in all regions, that will place additional pressures on ecosystem services that support food and water 29 systems, increasing the risks of malnutrition, ill-health and poverty in many regions (WG1 Fig 30 SPM9, Table 18.4). This implies that significant additional adaptation will be needed. Over the 31 near-term, implementing such transformational change could be disruptive to various economic and 32 social systems. Over the long-term, however, they could generate benefits to human well-being and 33 planetary health. Strengthening coordinated adaptation and mitigation actions can enhance the 34 potential of local and regional development pathways to support CRD. Planning for CRD can 35 support both adaptation and decarbonization via effective land-use, promoting resilient and low- 36 carbon infrastructure; protecting biodiversity and integrating ecosystem services (Table 18.4), 37 assuming advancing just and equitable development processes. 38 39 Prospects for transformation towards climate resilient development increase when key governance 40 actors work together in inclusive and constructive ways to create a set of appropriate enabling 41 conditions (18.4.2) (high confidence). These enabling conditions include effective governance and 42 information flow, policy frameworks that incentivize sustainability solutions; adequate financing for 43 adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development; institutional capacity; science, technology and 44 innovation; monitoring and evaluation of climate resilient development policies, programs, and practices; 45 and international cooperation. Investment in social and technological innovation, could generate the 46 knowledge and entrepreneurship needed to catalyze system transitions, and their transfer. The 47 implementation of policies that incentivize the deployment of low-carbon technologies and practices within 48 specific sectors such as energy, buildings, and agriculture could accelerate greenhouse gas mitigation and 49 deployment of climate resilient infrastructure, in urban and rural areas. Civic engagement is an important 50 element of building societal consensus and reducing barriers to action on adaptation, mitigation, and 51 sustainable development. (18.4) 52 53 CRD pathways are determined through engagement in different arenas degree to which the emergent 54 pathways foster just, and climate resilient development depends on how contending societal interests, 55 values and worldviews are reconciled through inclusive and participatory interactions between 56 governance actors in these arenas of engagement (18.4.3) (high confidence). These interactions occur in Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-5 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 many different arenas (e.g., governmental, economic and financial, political, knowledge, science & 2 technology, and community) that represent the settings, places, and spaces in which societal actors interact to 3 influence the nature and course of development. For instance, the Agenda 2030 highlights the importance of 4 multi-level adaptation governance, including non-state actors from civil society and the private sector. This 5 implies the need for wider arenas and modes of engagement around adaptation that facilitate coordination, 6 convergence, and productive contestation among these diverse actors to collectively solve problems and to 7 unlock the synergies between adaptation and mitigation and sustainable development. 8 9 Regional and national differences mean different capacities for pursuing climate resilient development 10 pathways. Economic sectors and global regions are exposed to different opportunities and challenges 11 in facilitating climate resilient development, suggesting adaptation and mitigation options should be 12 aligned to local and regional context and development pathways (very high confidence). Given their 13 current state of development, some regions may prioritize poverty and inequality reduction, and economic 14 development over the near-term as a means of building capacity for climate action and low-carbon 15 development over the long-term. For example, Africa, South Asia, and Central and South America are highly 16 exposed, vulnerable and impacted by climate change, which is amplified by poverty, population growth, land 17 use change and high dependence on natural resources for commodity production. In contrast, developed 18 economies with mature economies and high levels of resilience may prioritize climate action to transition 19 their energy systems and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Some interventions may be robust in that they 20 are relevant to a broad range of potential development trajectories and could be deployed in a flexible 21 manner. For example, conservation of land and water could be achieved through a variety of means and offer 22 benefits to populations in the global North and South alike. However, other types of interventions, such as 23 those that are dependent upon emerging technologies, may require a specific set of enhanced enabling 24 conditions or factors including infrastructure, supply chains, international cooperation, and education and 25 training that currently limit their implementation to certain settings (18.5). Notwithstanding national and 26 regional differences, development practices that are aligned to people, prosperity, partnerships, peace and the 27 planet as defined in Agenda 2030, could enable more climate resilient development (see Figure 18.1). 28 29 People, acting through enabling social, economic and political institutions, are the agents of system 30 transitions and societal transformations that facilitate climate resilient development founded on the 31 principles of inclusion, equity, climate justice, ecosystem health, and human well-being (very high 32 confidence). While much literature on climate action has focused on the role of technology and policy as the 33 factors that drive change, recent literature has focused on the role of specific actors � citizens, civil society, 34 knowledge institutions (including local and Indigenous Peoples and science), governments, investors and 35 businesses. Greater attention to, and transparency of, which actors' benefit, fail to benefit, or are impacted by 36 mitigation and adaptation choices actions could better support climate-resilient and sustainable development. 37 For example, grounding adaptation actions in local realities could help to ensure that adaptive actions do not 38 worsen existing gender and other inequities within society (e.g., leading to maladaptation practices) (high 39 confidence). Differences in the ability of different actors to effect change ultimately influence which 40 interventions for sustainable development or climate action are implemented and thus what development 41 outcomes are achieved. Recent literature has focused on the social, political, and economic arenas of 42 engagement, in which these different actors interact. More focused attention on these arenas of engagement 43 could prove beneficial to reconciling divergent views on climate action, integrating Indigenous knowledge 44 and local knowledges, elevating diverse voices that have historically been marginalized from the policy 45 discourse, thereby reducing vulnerability, deepening adaptive capacity and the ability to implement CRD 46 (18.4; Cross-Chapter Box GENDER; Cross-Chapter Box INDIG) 47 48 Pursuing climate resilient development involves considering a broader range of sustainable 49 development priorities, policies and practices, as well as enabling societal choices to accelerate and 50 deepen their implementation (very high confidence). Scientific assessments of climate change have 51 traditionally framed solutions around the implementation of specific adaptation and mitigation options as 52 mechanisms for reducing climate-related risks. They have given less attention to a fuller set of societal 53 priorities and the role of non-climate policies, social norms, lifestyles, power relationships and worldviews in 54 enabling climate action and sustainable development. Because climate resilient development involves 55 different actors pursuing plural development trajectories in diverse contexts, the pursuit of solutions that are 56 equitable for all requires opening the space for engagement and action to a diversity of people, institutions, 57 forms of knowledge, and worldviews. Through inclusive modes of engagement that enhance knowledge Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-6 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 sharing and realize the productive potential of diverse perspectives and worldviews, societies could alter 2 institutional structures and arrangements, development processes, choices and actions that have precipitated 3 dangerous climate change, constrained the achievement of SDGs, and thus limited pathways to achieving 4 CRD (Box 18.1, 18.4). There are only a few decades remaining to chart CRD pathways that catalyze the 5 transformation of prevailing development practices and offer the greatest promise and potential for human 6 well-being and planetary health. 7 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-7 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.1 Ways Forward for Climate Resilient Development 2 3 The links between climate change and development have been long recognized by various research 4 communities (Nagoda, 2015; Winkler et al., 2015; Webber, 2016; Carr, 2019) and have been assessed by 5 Working Group II in every IPCC Assessment Report since AR3 (Smit et al., 2001; Yohe et al., 2007; Denton 6 et al., 2014). For the AR1-3 reports, these links were largely framed in the context of sustainable 7 development, a concept that has been well described in the literature for decades (Brundtland, 1987). The 8 AR5 introduced the framing of climate resilient pathways, which narrowed the discussion around sustainable 9 development to specifically address the contributions of mitigation and adaptation actions to the reduction of 10 risk to development and the various institutions, strategies, and choices involved in risk management 11 (Denton et al., 2014). That assessment concluded that identifying and implementing appropriate technical 12 and governance options for mitigation and adaptation as well as development strategies and choices that 13 contribute to climate resilience are central to the successful implementation of such strategies. The AR5 also 14 recognized that transformation of current development pathways in terms of wider political, economic and 15 social systems may be necessary (Denton et al., 2014). 16 17 The literature presenting research findings on climate resilient development (CRD) and pathways and 18 processes for successfully achieving CRD has expanded significantly in the several years since the AR5 19 (very high confidence). This includes both qualitative studies of development as well as illustrative, 20 quantitative analyses of development trajectories linked to specific scenarios, such as the Shared 21 Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (18.2.2). Furthermore, the literature describing the role of system 22 transitions and societal transformation in enabling climate action (Box 18.1, 18.3), compliance with the Paris 23 Agreement (18.1.3, 18.2.1), and achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (18.1.3; Box 18.4) has 24 expanded significantly (very high confidence). This expansion is comprised of studies spanning a broad 25 range of disciplinary perspectives, some of which have been underrepresented in prior IPCC assessments 26 (high agreement, limited evidence) (Minx et al., 2017; Pearce et al., 2018b)). 27 28 This chapter therefore focuses on assessing this more recent literature and the diverse scientific 29 understandings of CRD and the pathways for pursuing it. Notably, this chapter takes off where Chapters 16 30 and 17 end: recognizing the decision-making context to address the representative key risks and their 31 intersections with development, among others. This chapter therefore highlights not only how climate risk 32 undermines CRD, but also how current patterns of development contribute to climate risk, both generally 33 and in different sectoral and regional contexts. In particular, the chapter focuses on achieving CRD through 34 systems transitions, discussing these in relation to societal transformation, and how different actors engage 35 one another in order to pursue policy and practice consistent with CRD. 36 37 18.1.1 Understanding Climate Resilient Development 38 39 Past IPCC Assessment Reports have consistently examined an extensive literature on the links between 40 climate change, adaptation, and sustainable development (Smit et al., 2001; Klein et al., 2007; Yohe et al., 41 2007). However, studies that explicitly refer to CRD as a concept or a guide for policy and practice remain 42 modest (very high confidence). The concept of CRD appeared in scholarly literature as well as development 43 program documents over a decade ago (Kamal Uddin et al., 2006; Garg and Halsn鎠, 2007) and has been 44 used in more recent IPCC assessment reports and special reports (e.g., Denton et al., 2014; Roy et al., 2018). 45 Similarly, the use of the term climate resilient development pathways dates to 2009 (Ayers and Huq, 2009), 46 but its use accelerated after appearing in UNFCCC publications around the launch of the Green Climate 47 Fund (UNFCCC, 2011). While this chapter prioritizes the CRD literature, it also recognizes a broad range of 48 literature, disciplinary expertise, and development practice is relevant to the concept of CRD. 49 50 Much of this literature is assessed in recent IPCC Special Reports (Rogelj et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018; 51 Bindoff et al., 2019; Hurlbert et al., 2019; Oppenheimer et al., 2019), but new studies have continued to 52 emerge. More specific uses of CRD found in the literature describe development that seeks to achieve 53 poverty reduction and adaptation to climate change simultaneously without explicit mention of mitigation 54 (USAID, 2014)), as well as mitigation and poverty reduction, described as `low-carbon development,' 55 without explicit mention of adaptation (Alam et al., 2011; Fankhauser and McDermott, 2016). Other similar 56 terms include `climate safe', `climate compatible' and `climate smart' development (Huxham et al., 2015; 57 Kim et al., 2017b; Ficklin et al., 2018; Mcleod et al., 2018), each with varying nuances. Climate-compatible Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-8 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 development coined by Mitchell and Maxwell (2010) specifically describes a `triple win' of adaptation, 2 mitigation and development (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017; Favretto et al., 2018) (see also 8.6). In this spirit, 3 AR5 specifically referred to climate-resilient development as "development trajectories that combine 4 adaptation and mitigation to realize the goal of sustainable development" (Denton et al., 2014). This chapter 5 builds on the AR5 and, for the purposes of assessment, formally defines CRD as a process of implementing 6 greenhouse gas mitigation and adaptation measures to support sustainable development for all. This 7 extension of the earlier definition reflects the emphasis in recent literature on equity as a core element of 8 sustainable development as well as the objective of the SDGs to "create conditions for sustainable, inclusive 9 and sustained economic growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into account different 10 levels of national development and capacities" (United Nations, 2015: 3/35). 11 12 Past, present, and future concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are the direct result of both 13 natural and anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions which are, in turn, a function of past and current 14 patterns of human and economic development (very high confidence, WGI SPM). This includes development 15 processes that drive land use change, extractive industries, manufacturing and trade, energy production, food 16 production, infrastructure development, and transportation. These patterns of development are therefore 17 drivers of current and future climate risk to specific sectors, regions, and populations (Byers et al., 2018), as 18 well as the demand for both mitigation and adaptation as a means of preventing climate change from 19 undermining development goals. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) represent targets for 20 supporting human and ecological well-being in a sustainable manner. Yet, while progress is being made 21 toward a number of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), success in achieving all of the SDGs by 22 2030 across all global regions remains uncertain (high agreement, medium evidence) (United Nations, 2021). 23 Moreover, current commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are not yet consistent with limiting 24 changes in global mean temperature elevation to less than 2癈 or 1.5癈 (very high confidence) (IPCC, 25 2018a) (see also 18.2). 26 27 Atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are just one of a number of planetary boundaries which 28 define safe operating spaces for humanity and therefore opportunities for achieving sustainable and climate- 29 resilient development. Exceeding these boundaries poses increased risk of large-scale abrupt or irreversible 30 environmental changes that would threaten human and ecological well-being (very high confidence) 31 (Rockstr鰉 et al., 2009a; Rockstr鰉 et al., 2009b; Butler, 2017; Schleussner et al., 2021). Other planetary 32 boundaries reported in the literature such as biodiversity loss, changes in land systems, and freshwater use 33 are also directly influenced by patterns of development as well as climate change (18.2; 18.5). Current rates 34 of species extinction, conversion of land for crop production, and exploitation of water resources exceed 35 planetary boundaries, thereby undermining CRD. Moreover, studies indicate that achievement of the 36 sustainable development goals, while consistent with maintaining some planetary boundaries, could 37 undermine others (O'Neill et al., 2018; Hickel, 2019; Randers et al., 2019) (18.2), suggesting significant 38 shifts in current patterns of development are necessary to maintain development within planetary boundaries. 39 40 Exceedance of planetary boundaries contributes to human and ecological vulnerability to climate change and 41 other shocks and stressors. People and regions that already face high rates of natural resource use, ecosystem 42 degradation, and poverty are more vulnerable to climate change impacts, compounding existing development 43 challenges in regions that are already strained (IPCC, 2014a; Hallegatte et al., 2019). The International 44 Monetary Fund, for example, found that for a medium and low-income developing country with an annual 45 average temperature of 25癈, the effect of a 1癈 increase in temperature is a reduction in economic growth 46 by 1.2% (Acevedo et al., 2018). Countries whose economies are projected to be hard hit by an increase in 47 temperature account for only about 20% of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016, but are home to 48 nearly 60% of the global population. This is expected to rise to more than 75% by the end of the century. 49 These economic impacts are a function of the underlying vulnerability of low- and middle-income 50 developing economies to the impacts of climate change (see 18.5). Such vulnerability was also evidenced 51 and enhanced by the COVID-19 pandemic which slowed progress on the SDGs in multiple nations (Naidoo 52 and Fisher, 2020; Srivastava et al., 2020; Bherwani et al., 2021). 53 54 18.1.2 Pathways for Climate Resilient Development 55 56 One approach for operationalizing the concept of climate-resilient development in a decision-making context 57 is to link the concept of CRD to that of pathways (Figure 18.1). A pathway can be defined as "a trajectory in Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-9 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 time, reflecting a particular sequence of actions and consequences against a background of autonomous 2 developments, leading to a specific future situation" (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Bourgeois, 2015). As such, a 3 pathway represents changes over time in response to policies and practices as well spontaneous and 4 exogenous events. For example, the SR1.5 report suggested that CRD pathways are "a conceptual and 5 aspirational idea for steering societies towards low-carbon, prosperous and ecologically safe futures" (Roy 6 et al., 2018: 468), and a way to highlight the complexity of decision-making processes at different levels. 7 Here, consistent with the aforementioned definition of CRD, we define CRD pathways as development 8 trajectories that successfully integrate mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development to achieve 9 development goals. 10 11 As illustrated in Figure 18.1, the ultimate aim of CRD pathways is to support sustainable development for 12 ensuring planetary health and human well-being. CRD is both an outcome at a point in space and time, as 13 observed through SDG achievement indicators, but also a process consisting of actions and social choices 14 made by multiple actors--government, industry, media, civil society, and science (18.4). These actions and 15 social choices are performed within different dimensions of governance--politics, institutions (norms, rules), 16 and practice, and bounded by ethics, values and worldviews. The development outcomes and processes 17 pertain to political, economic, ecological, socio-cultural, knowledge-technology, and community arenas 18 (Figure 18.2). A CRDP will, for example, aspire to achieve ecological outcomes in terms of planetary health 19 and achievement of Paris Agreement goals as well as human well-being, solidarity and social justice, in 20 addition to political, economic, and science-technology outcomes. These outcomes are enabled by achieving 21 progress in core system transitions that catalyze broader societal transformations (Figure 18.3). 22 23 While there are many possible successful pathways to future development in the context of climate change, 24 history has shown that pathways that are positive for the vast majority, often induce notable impacts and 25 costs, especially on marginal and vulnerable people (Hickel, 2017; Ramalho, 2019), placing them in direct 26 contradiction with the commitment to `leave no one behind' (United Nations, 2015). Similarly, 27 contemporary scenario analyses find that there are plausible development trajectories that lead toward 28 sustainability (Figure 18.1, 18.2.2). Yet, a number of plausible trajectories that perpetuate or exacerbate 29 unstainable forms of development also appear in the literature (Figure 18.1, 18.2.2). A significant challenge 30 lies in identifying pathways that address current climate variability and change, while allowing for 31 improvements in human well-being. Furthermore, while a given pathway might lead to a set of desired 32 outcomes for one region or set of actors, the process of getting there may come at high environmental, socio- 33 and economic cost to others (very high confidence) (Raworth, 2017; Faist, 2018). Frequently, considerations 34 of social difference and equity are not prioritized in the evaluation of different development choices. The 35 assumption that a growing economy lifts opportunity for all, could for example, further marginalize those 36 who are the most vulnerable to climate change (Matin et al., 2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019; Hickel et 37 al., 2021). 38 39 Placing pathways and climate actions within development processes implies a broadening of enablers to 40 include the ethical-political quality of socio-environmental processes that are required to shift such processes 41 in directions that support CRD and the pursuit of sustainability outcomes. This chapter therefore departs 42 from the AR5s alignment of CRD with adaptation pathways and the emphasis on decision points that enable 43 one to manage (or fail to manage) climate risk towards a framing that integrates a range of possible futures 44 each offering different opportunities, risks, and trade-offs to different actors and stakeholders (see WGII 45 AR5, IPCC, 2014b, Figure SPM.9). Instead, CRD emerges from everyday formal and informal decisions, 46 actions, and adaptation or mitigation policy interventions. This is inclusive of system transitions, increased 47 resilience, environmental integrity, social justice, equity, and reduced poverty and vulnerability, all facets of 48 human well-being and planetary health. Rather than encompassing a formula or blueprint for particular 49 actions, sustainable development is a process that provides a compass for the direction that these multiple 50 actions should take (Anders, 2016). This creates opportunities for actors to apply a diverse toolkit of 51 adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development interventions, thereby opening up the solution space. 52 53 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-10 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 18.1: Climate Resilient Development Pathways. Climate resilient development is a process that takes place 3 through societal choices towards (green pathways) or away from (red pathways) five development dimensions (people, 4 prosperity, partnership, peace, planet) on which the SDGs build. Some societal choices have mixed outcomes for CRD 5 (orange pathways). This figure builds on figure SPM.9 in AR5 WGII depicting climate resilient pathways) by 6 describing how CRDPs emerge from societal choices within multiple arenas � rather than solely from discrete decision 7 points. Societal choices, often contested, are made in these arenas through interactions between key actors in civil 8 society, the private sector and government (see Figure 18.2). The quality of interactions between these actors in these 9 arenas determine whether societal choices shift development towards or away from CRD. For example, inclusion vs 10 exclusion and influence over choices shapes the quality of these interactions, and the outcomes of emergent societal 11 choices. These qualities thus also characterize alternative futures resulting from different pathways, along five 12 development dimensions (people, prosperity, partnership, peace, planet) on which the SDGs build. five CRD 13 dimensions underline the close interconnectedness between the biosphere and humans, the two necessarily intertwined 14 in interactions, actions, transitions, and futures (Figure 18.3). There is a narrow and closing window of opportunity to 15 make transformational changes to move towards and not away from development futures that are more climate-resilient 16 and sustainable. Pathways not taken (dotted line) show that the pathways towards the highest CRD futures are no longer 17 available due to past societal choices and increasing temperatures. Present societal choices determine whether we shift 18 towards CRD in future or whether pathways will be limited to less CRD. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-11 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 3 4 Figure 18.2: Societal choices in arenas of engagement shaping actions and systems. The settings, places and spaces 5 in which key actors from government, civil society and the private sector interact to influence the nature and course of 6 development can be called arenas of engagement, including political, economic, socio-cultural, ecological, knowledge- 7 technology and community arenas. For instance, political arenas include formal political settings such as voting 8 procedures to elect local representatives as well as less formal and transparent political arenas. Streets, town squares 9 and post-disaster landscapes can become sites of interaction and political struggle as citizens strive to have their voices 10 heard. Arenas exist across scales from the local to national level, and beyond. Arenas of engagement can take the form 11 of "struggle arenas" � in which power and influence are used to include/exclude, set agendas, and make and implement 12 decisions � with inevitable winners and losers. The quality of interactions in these arenas leads to development 13 outcomes that can be characterized as CRD dimensions that underpin the SDGs � people, prosperity, partnership, peace, 14 planet (see Figure 18.1). a) Interactions characterized by inequitable relations and domination of some actors over 15 others may lead to societal choices away from CRD, including exacerbating disempowerment and vulnerability among 16 marginalized groups. b) Prospects for moving towards CRD increase when governance actors work together 17 constructively in these different arenas. Interactions and actions that are inclusive and synchronous, as opposed to 18 fragmented or contradictory, enable system transitions and transformational change towards CRD (Figure 18.3b, Box 19 18.3). b) Well-intentioned efforts often fail to be transformative, but instead entrench inequities. Instead, marginalized 20 groups and future trends in vulnerability need to be placed at the center of efforts to chart CRDPs. Unlocking the 21 productive potential of conflict that often characterizes interactions in these arenas of engagement is central to 22 advancing human well-being and planetary health. Moreover, the window for doing so is closing rapidly to avert 23 dangerous climate change and unsustainable development. 24 25 26 27 Figure 18.3: Transformative actions and system transitions a) Societal choices that generate fragmented climate action 28 or inaction and unsustainable development perpetuate business as usual development. b) Societal choices that support 29 CRD involve transformative actions that drive five systems transitions (energy, land and other ecosystems, urban and 30 infrastructure, industrial and societal). There is close interdependence between these systems. The system transition Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-12 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 framework allows for a comprehensive assessment of the synergies and trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and 2 sustainable development. For example, land and water use in one system impacts the other systems and their 3 surrounding ecosystems, thus reflecting how agricultural practices can have an impact on energy usage in urban centers. 4 Finally, societal system transitions within each of the other systems enable the transitions to occur 5 6 7 This understanding of CRD implies that different actors � governments, businesses, and civic organizations 8 � will have to design and navigate their own CRD pathways toward climate resilient and sustainable 9 development. This includes determining the appropriate balance of adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable 10 development actions and investments that are consistent with individual actors' development circumstances 11 and goals while also ensuring that the collective actions remain consistent with global agreements and goals 12 (such as the SDGs, Sendai Framework, and the Paris Agreement; 18.1.3), planetary boundaries, and other 13 principles of CRD including social justice and equity (Roy et al., 2018). Empowering individual actors to 14 pursue CRD in context-specific manner while coordinating action among actors and a diversity of scales, 15 local to global, is a key challenge associated with achieving CRD (high agreement, limited evidence). 16 17 18.1.3 Policy Context for Climate Resilient Development 18 19 As reflected in Chapter 1 of the AR6 WGII report, CRD is emerging as one of the guiding principles for 20 climate policy, both at the international level (Denton et al., 2014; Segger, 2016), as reflected in the Paris 21 Agreement (Article 2, UNFCCC, 2015), and within specific countries (Simonet and Jobbins, 2016; Kim et 22 al., 2017b; Vincent and Colenbrander, 2018; Yalew, 2020). This framing of development recognizes the 23 risks posed by climate change to development objectives (18.2; see also Chapter 16); the opportunities, 24 constraints and limits associated with reducing risk through adaptation; synergies and trade-offs between 25 mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development (18.2.5, 18.5, Box 18.4); and the role of system 26 transitions in enabling large-scale transformations that limit future global warming to less than 1.5癈 while 27 boosting resilience (IPCC, 2018a) (18.3, Box 18.1). 28 29 Since the AR5, the volume of research at the nexus of climate action and sustainable development has 30 changed markedly (very high confidence). A rapidly growing, multi-disciplinary literature has emerged on 31 climate resilient development (Mitchell et al., 2015; Clapp and Sillmann, 2019; Hardoy et al., 2019; Yalew, 32 2020) and associated pathways (Naess et al., 2015; Winkler and Dubash, 2016; Brechin and Espinoza, 2017; 33 Solecki et al., 2017; Ellis and Tschakert, 2019) (18.2.2). Nevertheless, the concept of resilience generally, 34 and climate resilient development specifically, has come under increasing criticism in recent years (very high 35 confidence) (Joakim et al., 2015; Schlosberg et al., 2017; Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019), suggesting 36 the need to enhance understanding of how resilience is being operationalized at the program and project 37 level and the net implications for human and ecological well-being. 38 39 This expansion of research has been accompanied by a shift in the policy context for climate action including 40 an increasingly strong link between climate actions and sustainable development. In particular, the SDGs 41 represent a near-term framework linking sustainability and human development in a manner that not only 42 addresses planetary health and human wellbeing, but also help better plan and implement mitigation and 43 adaptation actions to achieve these linked goals (Conway et al., 2015; Griscom et al., 2017; Allen et al., 44 2018b; Roy et al., 2018; P.R. Shukla E. Calvo Buendia, 2019). The SDGs explicitly identify climate action 45 (SDG 13) among the goals needed to achieve sustainable development. Meanwhile, the text of the Paris 46 Agreement makes explicit mention of the importance of considering climate "in the context of sustainable 47 development" (Articles 2, 4, 6) or as "contributing to sustainable development" (Article 7) (Article 7, 48 UNFCCC, 2015). Similarly, sustainable development appears prominently within the text of the Sendai 49 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, 2015), and the Global Assessment Reports on Disaster 50 Risk Reduction (Undrr, 2019). At the micro-level, a growing literature recognizes that climate impacts tend 51 to exacerbate existing inequalities within societies, even at the level of gender inequalities within households 52 (Sultana, 2010; Arora-Jonsson, 2011; Carr, 2013). Thus, climate change impacts threaten even short-term 53 gains in sustainable development, which could be rolled back over longer adaptation and mitigation 54 horizons. For example, the COVID-19 pandemic is estimated to have reversed gains over the past several 55 years in terms of global poverty reduction (very high confidence) (Phillips et al., 2020; Sultana, 2021; 56 Wilhelmi et al., 2021) (Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7), reflecting the risks posed by global, 57 systemic threats to development. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-13 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 The WGII AR5 Report noted that adapting to the risks associated with climate change becomes more 3 challenging at higher levels of global warming (IPCC, 2014a). This was evidenced by contrasting impacts 4 and adaptive capacity for 2� and 4癈 of warming. This relationship between levels of warming, climate risk, 5 and reasons for concern (see Chapter 16) is also relevant to the concept of CRD. For example, recent 6 literature on CRD emphasizes the urgency of climate action that achieve significant reduction in greenhouse 7 gas emissions as well as the implementation of adaptation options that result in significant gains in human 8 and natural system resilience (very high confidence) (Haines et al., 2017; Shindell et al., 2017; Xu and 9 Ramanathan, 2017; Fuso Nerini et al., 2018). This was explored extensively in the IPCC's SR1.5 report in its 10 comparison of impacts associated with 1.5癈 versus 2癈 climate objectives and synergies and trade-offs 11 with the SDGs (IPCC, 2018a). However, the SR1.5 report and other literature also identified potential trade- 12 offs between aggressive mitigation and the SDGs (see also Frank et al., 2017; Hasegawa et al., 2018). This 13 indicates that while future magnitudes of warming are a fundamental consideration in climate-resilient 14 development, such development involves more than just achieving temperature targets. Rather, CRD 15 considers the possible transitions that enable those targets to be achieved including the evaluation of 16 different adaptation and mitigation options and how the implementation of these strategies interacts with 17 broader sustainable development efforts and goals. This interdependence between patterns of development, 18 climate risk, and the demand for mitigation and adaptation action is fundamental to the concept of CRD 19 (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2016). Therefore, climate change and sustainable development cannot be 20 assessed or planned in isolation of one another. 21 22 18.1.4 Assessing Climate Resilient Development 23 24 In operationalizing the aforementioned definitions of CRD and CRD pathways this chapter builds its 25 assessment around five core elements that provide insights relevant to policymakers actively pursuing the 26 integration of climate resilience into development. First, as noted above, climate change poses a potential 27 risk to the achievement of development goals, including global goals such as the SDGs, as well as 28 nationally- or locally-specific goals. Accordingly, Chapter 16's discussion of key risks, their implications for 29 the SDGs, and the options for risk management are fundamental to the pursuit of CRD. This includes the 30 opportunities for implementing adaptation, mitigation, or other risk management options. Yet, the 31 management of climate risk must be accompanied by interventions that address social and ecological 32 vulnerabilities that enhance climate risk. 33 34 Second, CRD is dependent on achieving transitions in key systems including energy, land and ecosystem, 35 urban and infrastructure, and industrial systems (very high confidence) (Box 18.1, Figure 18.3). In this 36 context, CRD links to the discussion of system transitions in the SR1.5 report (IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2018a). 37 However, in building on the SR1.5, here the assessment of CRD also recognizes the importance of 38 transitions in societal systems that drive innovation, preferences for alternative patterns of consumption and 39 development, and the power relationships among different actors that engage in CRD. In particular, the rate 40 at which actors can achieve system transitions has important implications for the pursuit of CRD. Transitions 41 that are slow to evolve or that are more incremental in nature may not be sufficient to enable CRD in 42 comparison with faster transitions that contribute to more fundamental system transformations. 43 44 Third, equity and social justice are consistently identified in the literature as being central to climate resilient 45 development (very high confidence; 18.1.1, 18.3.1.5, 18.4, 18.5). This includes designing and implementing 46 adaptation, resilience, and climate risk management options in a manner that promotes equity in the 47 allocation of the costs and benefits of those options. Similarly, the literature on CRD emphasizes equity 48 should be pursued in the implementation of options for greenhouse gas mitigation, transitions in energy 49 systems, and low-carbon development. This emphasis on equity is consistent with the SDGs which place an 50 emphasis on reducing inequality and achieving sustainable development for all. 51 52 Fourth, success in CRD and alignment of development interventions to CRD pathways (CRDPs) is 53 contingent on the presence of multiple enabling conditions (very high confidence, 18.4.2), that operate at 54 different scales ranging from those that provide capacity to implement specific adaptation options to those 55 that enable large-scale transformational change (Box 18.1). The qualities that describe sustainable 56 development processes (e.g., social justice, alternative development models, equity and solidarity as 57 described above and in Figure 18.1) lead to short-term outcomes and conditions, such as those represented Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-14 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 by SDGs, that in an iterative fashion enable or constraint subsequent efforts toward CRD. For example, 2 success or failure in achieving the SDGs or the Paris Agreement would shape future efforts in pursuit of 3 CRD and the options available to different actors. 4 5 Fifth, CRD involves processes involving diverse actors, at different scales operating within an 6 environmental, developmental, socio-economic, cultural, and political context, as typified in the SDG and 7 the Paris Agreement negotiations (very high confidence) (Kamau et al., 2018) (18.4). The dependence of 8 CRD on processes of negotiation and reconciliation among diverse actors and interests leads to the dismissal 9 of the notion that there is a single, optimal pathway that captures the objectives, values, and development 10 contexts of all actors, even for a particular sector, country or region. Rather, preferences for different 11 pathways and specific actions in pursuit of those pathways will be subjected to intense scrutiny and debate 12 among diverse actors within various arenas of engagement (18.4), meaning the settings, places and spaces in 13 which key actors from government, civil society and the private sector interact to influence the nature and 14 course of development. 15 16 18.1.5 Chapter Roadmap 17 18 This chapter engages with understanding CRD and the pathways to achieving it by building on the concepts 19 introduced in Chapter 1 of this Working Group II report as well as the regional and sectoral context 20 presented in other chapters (18.5). Notably, this chapter takes off where Chapters 16 and 17 end: recognizing 21 the significance of the representative key risks for CRD as well as the decision-making context of different 22 actors who are implementing policies and practices to pursue different CRD pathways and manage climate 23 risk. Therefore, the chapter assesses options for pursuing CRD as well as the broader system transitions and 24 enabling conditions in support of CRD. 25 26 This chapter hosts three Cross-Chapter Boxes, which have their natural home here. The Cross-Chapter Box 27 on Gender, Justice and Transformative Pathways (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER) assesses literature 28 specifically on gender and climate change to uncover the importance of a justice focus to facilitate 29 transformative pathways, both toward CRD, as well as a means to achieving gender equity and social justice. 30 The Cross-Chapter Box on The Role of Indigenous Knowledge in Understanding and Adapting to Climate 31 Change (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG) highlights that achieving CRD requires confronting the uncertainty of a 32 climate change future. There are many perspectives about what future is desired and how to reach it. 33 Integrating multiple forms of knowledge is a strategy to build resilience and develop institutional 34 arrangements that provide temporary solutions able to satisfy competing interests (Grove, 2018). Indigenous 35 knowledge is proven to enhance resilience in multiple contexts (e.g., Chowdhooree, 2019; Inaotombi and 36 Mahanta, 2019). Meanwhile, Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB acts as an appendix to the WGII report, 37 synthesizing information on the feasibility associated with different adaptation options for reducing risk. 38 39 In assessing the opportunities and constraints associated with the pursuit of sustainable development, this 40 chapter proceeds in Section 18.2 to assess the links between sustainable development and climate action, 41 including examination of current patterns of development and consideration for synergies and trade-offs 42 among different strategies and options. Then, in Section 18.3, the chapter assesses five systems transitions to 43 identify the shifts in development that would enable CRD. Section 18.4 assesses the role of different actors 44 in the pursuit of CRD as well as the public and private arenas in which they engage. Section 18.5 synthesizes 45 CRD assessments from different WGII sectoral and regional chapters to identify commonalities and 46 differences. The chapter concludes in Section 18.6 with a summary of key opportunities for enhancing the 47 knowledge needed to enable different actors to pursue CRD. 48 49 50 [START BOX 18.1 HERE] 51 52 Box 18.1: Transformations in Support of Climate Resilient Development Pathways 53 54 Transformational changes in the pursuit of CRDPs involve interactions between individual, collective, and 55 systems change (see Figures 18.1�18.3). There are complex interconnections between transformation and 56 transition (Feola, 2015; H鰈scher et al., 2018), and they are sometimes used as synonyms in the literature 57 (H鰈scher et al., 2018). Much of the transitions literature focuses on how societal change occurs within Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-15 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 existing political and economic systems. Transformations are often considered to involve deeper and more 2 fundamental changes than transitions, including changes to underlying values, worldviews, ideologies, 3 structures, and power relationships (G鰌el, 2016; O'Brien, 2016; Kuenkel, 2019; Waddock, 2019). Systems 4 transitions alone are insufficient to achieve the rapid, fundamental and comprehensive changes required for 5 humanity and planetary health in the face of climate change (high confidence). Transformative action is 6 increasingly urgent across all sectors, systems and scales to avert dangerous climate change and meet the 7 SDGs (Pelling et al., 2015; IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2021b; Shi and Moser, 2021; Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) 8 (high confidence). The SR1.5 identified transformative change as necessary to achieve transitions within 9 land, water and ecosystems systems; urban and infrastructural systems; energy systems; and industrial 10 systems. This box summarises key points in the transformations literature relevant to climate resilient 11 development. 12 13 Transformative actions aimed at `deliberately and fundamentally changing systems to achieve more just and 14 equitable outcomes', (Shi and Moser, 2021: 2) shift pathways towards CRD (high confidence). 15 Transformative action in the context of CRD specifically concerns leveraging change in the five dimensions 16 of development (people, prosperity, partnership, peace, planet) that drive societal choices and climate actions 17 towards sustainability (18.2.2; Figure 18.1). Climate actions that support CRD are embedded in these 18 dimensions of development; for example, social cohesion and equity, individual and collective agency, and 19 democratising knowledge processes have been identified as steps to transform practices and governance 20 systems for increased resilience (Ziervogel et al., 2016b; Nightingale et al., 2020; Colloff et al., 2021; Vogel 21 and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence). Transformative actions toward sustainability and increased well- 22 being, which are dominant components of climate resilient development, include those that explicitly redress 23 social drivers of vulnerability, shift dominant worldviews, decolonialise knowledge systems, activate human 24 agency, contest political arrangements, and insert a plurality of knowledges and ways of knowing (G鰎g et 25 al., 2017; Fazey et al., 2018a; Brand et al., 2020; Gram-Hanssen et al., 2021; Shi and Moser, 2021). They 26 alter the governance and political economic arrangements through which unsustainable and unjust 27 development logics and knowledges are implemented (Patterson et al., 2017; Shi and Moser, 2021) by 28 shifting the goals of a system or altering the mindset or paradigm from which a system arises, e.g from 29 individualism and nature-society disconnect to solidarity and nature-society connectedness along the CRD 30 dimensions in figure 18.1, and connecting inner and external dimensions of sustainability, (G鰌el, 2016; 31 Abson et al., 2017; Wamsler and Brink, 2018; Fischer and Riechers, 2019; Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019; 32 Wamsler, 2019). 33 34 There is no blueprint for how transformation is generated. An expanding literature suggests that 35 transformation takes place through diverse modalities and context-dependent actions (O'Brien, 2021). 36 Transformation may require actions that disrupt moral or social boundaries and structures that are 37 perpetuating unsustainable systems and pathways (Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence). Extreme 38 events and long-term climatic changes can trigger a realigning of practices, politics and knowledges (Carr, 39 2019; Schipper et al., 2020b) (high confidence). While some see opportunities for generating social and 40 political conditions needed for CRD in such actions and events (Beck, 2015; Han, 2015; Shim, 2015; 41 Mythen and Walklate, 2016; Domingo, 2018), this is not guaranteed. Climate shocks, when managed within 42 socio-political systems in ways that safeguard rather than alter practices and structures, can also reinforce 43 rather than shift the status quo (Mosberg et al., 2017; Carr, 2019; Marmot and Allen, 2020; Arifeen and 44 Nyborg, 2021) (high confidence). Further, in the absence of equitable and inclusive decision-making and 45 planning, realignments resulting from disruptive actions and events can limit inclusiveness and lead to poor 46 or coercive decision-making processes that undermine the equity and justice foundations of sustainable 47 development (Orlove et al., 2020; Shi and Moser, 2021) and lead to adverse socio-environmental outcomes 48 that generate transformations away from CRD (Vogel and O'Brien, 2021) (high confidence, see also CCP2). 49 50 Evidence for transformative actions largely exists at the community or city level. While identifying how to 51 rapidly and equitably generate transformations at a global scale has remained elusive, there is high 52 agreement but limited evidence from studies of ecosystem services that suggest facilitating a wide range of 53 locally-appropriate management decisions and actions can bring about positive global-scale outcomes 54 (Millennium Ecosystem, 2005). Diverse local efforts to transform towards sustainability in the face of 55 climate change have been observed, such as community mobilization for equitable and just adaptation 56 actions and alternative visions of societal well-being (Shi, 2020b) and farmer-led shifts in agricultural 57 production systems (Rosenberg, 2021). There has been an increase in transformative actions taking place Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-16 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 through city-level resilience building aimed at shifting inequitable relations and opening up space for a 2 plurality of actors (Rosenzweig and Solecki, 2018; Ziervogel et al., 2021) (high confidence). 3 4 Prospects for transformation towards climate resilient development increase when key governance actors 5 work together in inclusive and constructive ways through engagement in political, knowledge-technology, 6 ecological, economic, and socio-cultural arenas (high confidence,18.4.3). Yet, the interactions between key 7 governance actors involve struggles and negotiations in addition to collaborations (Kakenmaster, 2019; 8 Muok et al., 2021). Transformative actions meet resistance by precisely the political, social, knowledge and 9 technical systems and structures they are attempting to transform (Blythe et al., 2018; Shi and Moser, 2021) 10 (high confidence). There is expanding evidence that many adaptation efforts have failed to be transformative, 11 but instead entrenched inequities, exacerbated power imbalances and reinforced vulnerability among 12 marginalized groups, and that, instead, marginalized groups and future trends in vulnerability need to be 13 placed at the center of adaptation planning (Atteridge and Remling, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019; Owen, 2020; 14 Eriksen et al., 2021a; Eriksen et al., 2021b; Garschagen et al., 2021) (high confidence). Beyond the enablers, 15 drivers, or modalities, another question tackled in the literature is how to evaluate transformation by 16 establishing criteria for transformation assessments (Ofir, 2021; Patton, 2021; Williams et al., 2021), 17 experience-based lessons on managing transformative adaptation processes (Vermeulen et al., 2018), climate 18 policy integration (Plank et al., 2021), investment criteria (Kasdan et al., 2021), political economy analysis 19 frameworks for climate governance (Price, 2021). 20 21 [END BOX 18.1 HERE] 22 23 24 [START BOX 18.2 HERE] 25 26 Box 18.2: Visions of Climate Resilient Development in Kenya 27 28 The Government of Kenya's (GoK) ambition is to transform Kenya into a `newly industrializing, middle- 29 income country providing a high-quality life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment' 30 (Government of Kenya, 2008). Dryland regions in Kenya occupy 80-90 per cent of the land mass, are home 31 to 36% of the population (Government of Kenya, 2012) and contribute about 10 per cent of Kenya's Gross 32 Domestic Product (GDP) (Government of Kenya, 2012) which includes half of its agricultural GDP 33 (Kabubo-Mariara, 2009). In dryland regions, pastoralism has long been the predominant form of livelihood 34 and subsistence (Catley et al., 2013; Nyariki and Amwata, 2019). The GoK seeks to improve connectivity 35 and communication infrastructure within the drylands to better exploit and develop livestock, agriculture, 36 tourism, energy, and extractive sectors (Government of Kenya, 2018). It argues that the transformation of 37 dryland regions is crucial to enhance the development outcomes for the more than 15 million people who 38 inhabit these areas (Government of Kenya, 2016: 17) and to help the country to realize its wider national 39 ambitions including a 10 percent year on year growth in GDP (Government of Kenya, 2012). A key element 40 within this vision is the promotion and implementation of the Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia (LAPSSET) 41 project, a 2,000km long, 100 km wide economic and development corridor extending from Mombasa to 42 Sudan and Ethiopia (Enns, 2018). Supporters of the LAPSSET project argue that it will help achieve 43 priorities laid out in the Vision 2030 by opening up poorly connected regions, enabling the development of 44 pertinent economic sectors such as agriculture, livestock and energy, and supporting the attainment of a 45 range of social goals made possible as the economy grows (Stein and Kalina, 2019). 46 47 However, the development narrative surrounding LAPSSET remains controversial in its assumptions, not 48 least because it is being promoted in the context of a highly complex and dynamic social, economic and 49 biophysical setting (Cervigni and Morris, 2016; Atsiaya et al., 2019; Chome, 2020; Lesutis, 2020). Some of 50 the key trends driving contemporary and likely future change in dryland regions are changing household 51 organization, evolving customary rules and institutions at local and community levels, and shifting cultures 52 and aspirations (Catley et al., 2013; Washington-Ottombre and Pijanowski, 2013; Tari and Pattison, 2014; 53 Cormack, 2016; Rao, 2019). Dryland regions are also witnessing demographic growth and change in land- 54 use patterns linked to shifts in the composition of livestock (for example from grazers to browsers), a 55 decrease in nomadic and increase in semi-nomadic pastoralism, and transition to more urban and sedentary 56 livelihoods (Mganga et al., 2015; Cervigni et al., 2016; Greiner, 2016; Watson et al., 2016). At a landscape 57 level, land is becoming more fragmented and enclosed, often associated with increases in subsistence and Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-17 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 commercial agriculture, and the establishment of conservancies and other group or private land holdings 2 (Reid et al., 2014; Carabine et al., 2015; Nyberg et al., 2015; Greiner, 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016). In 3 addition, there are political dynamics associated with Kenya Vision 2030 and decentralization, the influence 4 of international capital, foreign investors and incorporation into global markets (Cormack, 2016; Kochore, 5 2016; Mosley and Watson, 2016; Enns and Bersaglio, 2020), as well as increasing militarization and conflict 6 in the drylands (Lind, 2018). Allied to these social and political dynamics are ongoing processes of habitat 7 modification and degradation and biophysical changes linked in part to climate variability (Galvin, 2009; 8 Mganga et al., 2015). The interconnected nature of these drivers will intersect with LAPSSET in myriad 9 ways. For example, the implementation of LAPSSET may accentuate some trends, such as increases in land 10 enclosure and a shift towards more urban and sedentary livelihoods (Lesutis, 2020). Conversely, the 11 perceived threat LAPSSET could pose to pastoral lifestyles may lead to greater visibility, solidarity and 12 strength of pastoralist institutions (Cormack, 2016). 13 14 There is a recognized need to adapt and chose development pathways that are resilient to climate change 15 whilst addressing key developmental challenges within dryland regions, notably, poverty, water and food 16 insecurity, and a highly dispersed population with poor access to services (Government of Kenya, 2012; 17 Bizikova et al., 2015; Herrero et al., 2016). The current vision for development of dryland regions comes 18 with both opportunities and threats to achieve a more climate resilient future. For example, the growth in and 19 exploitation of renewable energy resources, made possible through increased connectivity, brings climate 20 mitigation gains but also risks. These risks include the uneven distribution of costs in terms of where the 21 industry is sited compared with where benefits primarily accrue, and may exacerbate issues around water 22 and food insecurity as strategic areas of land become harder to access (Opiyo et al., 2016; Cormack and 23 Kurewa, 2018; Enns, 2018; Lind, 2018). Whilst LAPSSET will bring greater freedom of movement for 24 commodities, benefitting investors, improving access to markets and urban centers, supporting trade, or ease 25 of movement for tourists supporting economic goals, it can also result in the relocation of people and impede 26 access to certain locations for the resident populations. Mobility is a key adaptation behavior employed in 27 the short and long term to address issues linked with climatic variability (Opiyo et al., 2014; Muricho et al., 28 2019). With modelled changes in the climate suggesting decreases in income associated with agricultural 29 staples and livestock-dependent livelihoods, development that constrains mobility of local populations could 30 retard resilience gains (Ochieng et al., 2017; ASSAR, 2018; Enns, 2018; Nkemelang et al., 2018). The likely 31 increase in urban populations and the growth in tourism and agriculture may lead to increases in water 32 demand at a time when water availability could become more constrained owing to the reliance on surface 33 water sources and the modelled increases in evapotranspiration due to rising mean temperature, more 34 heatwave days and greater percentage of precipitation falling as storms (ASSAR, 2018; Nkemelang et al., 35 2018; USAID, 2018). These pressures could make it harder to meet basic health and sanitation goals for rural 36 and poorer urban populations, issues compounded further by likely increases in child malnutrition and 37 diarrheal deaths linked to climate change (WHO, 2016; ASSAR, 2018; Hirpa et al., 2018; Nkemelang et al., 38 2018; Lesutis, 2020). Development must pay adequate attention to these interconnections to ensure that costs 39 and benefits of achieving climate mitigation and adaptation goals are distributed fairly within a population. 40 41 [END BOX 18.2. HERE] 42 43 44 18.2 Linking Development and Climate Action 45 46 The AR5 examined the relationship between climate and sustainable development in Chapter 13 (Olsson et 47 al., 2014) and Chapter 20 (Denton et al., 2014) in Working Group II and Chapter 4 (Fleurbaey et al., 2014) 48 in Working Group III. It concluded that dangerous levels of climate change would limit efforts to reduce 49 poverty (Denton et al., 2014; Fleurbaey et al., 2014). Since the AR5, the adoption of the Paris Agreement 50 and Agenda 2030 have demonstrated increased international consensus regarding the need to pursue climate 51 change as a component of sustainable development. For example, climate change impacts "undermine the 52 ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development" (United Nations, 2015) and can reverse or erase 53 improvements in living conditions and decades of development (Hallegatte and Rozenberg, 2017). However, 54 recent analysis shows that actions to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement can undermine progress toward 55 some SDGs (high agreement, medium evidence) (Pearce et al., 2018b; Liu et al., 2019; Hegre et al., 2020) 56 (18.2.5.3). Meanwhile efforts to achieve the SDGs can contribute to worsening climate change (high 57 agreement, medium evidence) (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018). These findings in the literature highlight the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-18 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 importance of identifying clear goals and priorities for both climate action and sustainable development as 2 well as mechanisms for capitalizing on potential synergies between them and for managing trade-offs. In 3 assessing literature relevant to the intersection between climate action and development, we first explore the 4 implications of different patterns of development and development trajectories followed by more focused 5 assessment of the links between development and climate risk. 6 7 18.2.1 Implications of Current Development Trends 8 9 Understanding the interactions between climate change, climate action, and sustainable development 10 necessitates consideration for the current development context in which different communities, nations, and 11 regions find themselves. For example, wealthy economies of the global North will encounter different 12 opportunities and challenges vis-�-vis climate change and sustainable development than developing 13 economies of the global South. Moreover, all economies are already following an existing development 14 trajectory that has implications for the type and scale of interventions associated with pursuing CRD and 15 managing climate risk. Some nations may experience particular challenges with reducing greenhouse gas 16 emissions due to the carbon-intensive nature of their energy systems (very high confidence) (18.3.1.1). 17 Others may experience acute challenges with adaptation due to existing vulnerability associated with poverty 18 and social inequality (very high confidence) (18.2.5.1). Overcoming such challenges is fundamental to the 19 pursuit of CRD. 20 21 While demonstrable progress has been made toward the SDGs and improving human well-being, globally 22 and in specific nations, some observed patterns of development are inconsistent with sustainable 23 development and the principles of CRD (very high confidence) (van Dooren et al., 2018; Eisenmenger et al., 24 2020; Leal Filho et al., 2020). A significant literature, for example, links development to the loss of 25 biodiversity and the extinction crisis (Ceballos et al., 2017; Gon鏰lves-Souza et al., 2020; Oke et al., 2021). 26 Meanwhile, in human systems, indicators such as the limited convergence in income, life expectancy, and 27 other measures of well-being between poor and wealthy countries (with notable outliers such as China) 28 (Bangura, 2019), and the increase in income inequality and the decline in life expectancy and well-being in 29 rich countries (Rougoor and van Marrewijk, 2015; Alvaredo et al., 2017; Goda et al., 2017; Harper et al., 30 2017; Goldman et al., 2018), suggest limitations of the current development paradigm to successfully deliver 31 universal human and ecological well-being, by the 2030s or even mid-century (TWI, 2019). 32 33 18.2.2 Understanding Development in Climate Resilient Development 34 35 Development in this report is defined as efforts, both formal and informal, to improve standards of human 36 well-being, particularly in places historically disadvantaged by colonialism and other features of early global 37 integration. Development is not limited to the SDGs, however these represent an internationally agreed sub- 38 set of goals. Prior IPCC reports employed development as a typological framing of the current state of a 39 given country or population (IPCC, 2014a) (Section 1.1.4). Such framings frequently rest upon measures of 40 economic activity, using them as proxies for the wider well-being of the population whose activity is 41 measured. For example, the level of gross domestic product (GDP) is often equated with levels of social 42 welfare, even though as a measure of market output it can be an inadequate metric for gauging well-being 43 over time particularly in its environmental and social dimensions (Van den Bergh, 2007; Stiglitz et al., 44 2009). 45 46 The result of this broad framing linking economic growth to human well-being has been decades of policies, 47 programs, and projects aimed at growing economies at scales from the household to regional and global. 48 However, linking development to past and current modes of economic growth creates significant challenges 49 for CRD, as it implies that the very processes that have contributed to current climate challenges, including 50 economic growth and the resource use and energy regimes it relies upon, are also the pathways to 51 improvements in human well-being. This places climate resilience and development in opposition to one 52 another. 53 54 While there are many possible successful pathways to future development in the context of climate change, 55 history shows that pathways positive for the vast majority of people, typically induce significant impacts and 56 costs, especially on marginal and vulnerable people (Hickel, 2017). Frequently, considerations for social 57 difference and equity are side-lined in these processes, for example through the assumption that a growing Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-19 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 economy lifts opportunity for all, further marginalizing those who are the most vulnerable to climate change 2 (Matin et al., 2018; Diffenbaugh and Burke, 2019). 3 4 The Agenda 2030 and its 17 SDGs and 169 targets seeks to `leave no one behind' through five pillars (5Ps): 5 People, Planet, Prosperity, Peace and Partnership (United Nations, 2015). The five pillars align with the 6 dimensions of development that influence motion toward or away from CRD. The focus on people refers to 7 inclusion rather than exclusion, and the extent to which people are empowered or disempowered to make 8 decisions about their well-being, determine their futures and be in a position to assert their rights. This means 9 being able to make decisions that determine whether people are on a pathway toward or away from CRD 10 (Figures 18.1�18.3. The focus on planet refers to protecting the planet, ensuring a balance of ecosystems, 11 biodiversity and human activities, and giving equal space and respect for its integrity. The focus on 12 prosperity refers to equity in well-being grounded in unanimity over shared goals and resources, rather than 13 individualism, and economic, social and technological progress grounded in stewardship and care, rather 14 than exploitation. The focus on partnership refers to mutual respect embedded in solidarity that recognizes 15 multiple worldviews and their respective knowledges, rather than singular or hierarchy of knowledge, and 16 acknowledges inherent nature-society connections, rather than posing nature as opposites or competitors. 17 The focus on peace emphasizes the need for just and equitable societies. These five pillars are interrelated 18 but local and national contexts situate current status differently around the world. Successful achievement of 19 Agenda 2030 is aligned with a safe climate with adequate mitigation and adaptation, and effective and 20 inclusive systems transitions. With these conditions, a high CRD world can be attained, noting that when 21 approached individually, the transformative potential of the SDGs is limited (Veland et al., 2021). 22 The need for transformational changes across sectors and scales to address the urgency and scope of action 23 needed to enable a climate resilient future in which goals like the SDGs might be realized requires attention 24 to the specific ways in which development action is defined and enacted (Box 18.1). 25 26 18.2.2.1 Development Perspectives 27 28 Development is about `improvement'. However there have been different and oftentimes conflicting 29 viewpoints on the improvement of `what' and `how' to improve. The diversity of positions has resulted in a 30 multitude of metrics to track development, some more influential than others on policy. Alternative measures 31 of development, while numerous, generally seek to nuance the connection between economic growth and 32 human well-being. Because they maintain core notions of progress and, in some cases, economic growth 33 seen in more mainstream models of development, they are less vehicles for transformation than 34 continuations of thinking and action fundamentally at odds with the needs of climate resilient development. 35 These include the Measure of Economic Welfare (Nordhaus and Tobin, 1973), the Index of Sustainable 36 Economic Welfare (Cobb and Daly, 1989), the Genuine Progress Indicator (Escobar, 1995), the Adjusted 37 Net Saving Index or the Genuine Savings Index (GSI), The Human Development Index (HDI), the 38 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (UNDP, 2016a), the Gender Development Index, the Gender 39 Inequality Index, and the Multidimensional Poverty Index, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare 40 (ISEW) (Daly and Cobb, 1989), the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) (Kubiszewski et al., 2013), Gross 41 National Happiness (GNH) (Ura and Galay, 2004), Measures of Australia's Progress (MAP) (Trewin and 42 Hall, 2004), the OECD Better Life Index (OECD, 2019a), and the Happy Planet Index (NEF, 2016). 43 44 In terms of their historical trajectory, different perspectives on development can be broadly divided into five 45 categories. 46 a) Development as economic growth (1950s onwards): Equating development with economic growth 47 was a natural outcome of the dominance of economics as the major discipline to study problems of 48 newly independent countries in the 1950s (Escobar, 1995), measured through GDP. Environment was 49 not a policy concern in the immediate period after decolonization. The GDP measure has withstood 50 the test of time, in spite of being an inexact measure of human well-being, and is the widely used 51 metric globally to track development. Recent improvements to GDP have tried to account for 52 environmental factors (Gundimeda et al., 2007; United Nations, 2021). 53 b) Development as distributional improvements (1970s onwards): That economic growth does not 54 automatically result in decline in poverty and improved distribution of income became apparent in the 55 1970s. Welfare measures were thus promoted that involved `redistribution with growth' (Chenery, 56 1974). These distributional concerns have re-emerged in the last two decades with the widening gap 57 between the richer and poorer groups of the population (Chancel and Piketty, 2019) and also the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-20 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 increased attention to `ecological distribution conflicts' (Martinez-Alier, 2021). The political economy 2 perspective, highlighting continued dependencies of countries in the Global South on the Global 3 North, now evolved into political ecology highlighting environmental concerns between and within 4 countries. Environment was not yet a policy priority, despite that the links between development and 5 environment were becoming clearer. 6 c) Development as participation (1980s onwards): Bottom-up responses emphasizing sustainable 7 livelihoods and local-level development emerged in the 1980s. The movement which involved 8 independent and uncoordinated efforts by grassroots activists, social movements and NGOs became 9 `mainstreamed' into development in the 1990s (Chambers, 2012). The multidimensional nature of 10 poverty was acknowledged at the global policy level (World Bank, 2000) and there was wider 11 acceptance of the role of non-economics social sciences as well as critical approaches in research on 12 development and poverty (Thomas, 2008). Participatory development involved decentralization and 13 local planning, emphasizing protection of local natural resources in addition to improving living 14 standards. 15 d) Development as expansion of human capabilities (1980s onwards): The human development and 16 capabilities approach was the first formidable response to the GDP-centric view of development (Sen, 17 2000; Deneulin and Shahani, 2009). Studies showed that improvements in income did not necessarily 18 improve human well-being in other dimensions such as health and education, or more broadly put, 19 `freedoms' (Ruggeri Laderchi et al., 2003). The capabilities idea was influential in global policy 20 making through Human Development Reports and metrics such as Human Development Index (HDI) 21 and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI). However, environmental sustainability was not a major 22 component in this approach until much later (Alkire and Jahan, 2018). Recent improvements to HDI 23 such as the Planetary pressures-adjusted HDI (United Nations, 2020) is a step in this direction. 24 e) Development as post-growth (2010 onwards): The late 1980s saw a big push towards taking the 25 environment to the center of the global policy agenda (World Commission on Environment and 26 Development, 1987). However, progress in addressing environmental questions has been slow. As 27 compared to Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), SDGs aim to tackle environmental concerns 28 by explicitly tracking progress on multiple indicators. Nevertheless, the approach in these policy 29 propositions sits largely within the economic growth framework itself. The climate change challenge 30 and the financial crisis of 2008 led many scholars, ecological economists and environmental social 31 scientists in particular, to argue for a post-growth world. Post-growth (Jackson, 2021), degrowth 32 (Kallis, 2018; Hickel et al., 2021) and other environmentalist scholarship takes inspiration from 33 critiques of development such as post-development (Escobar, 1995). The argument here is not for 34 better metrics but for imagining and working towards systemic change in the wake of the climate 35 crisis. The challenge however is how to account for historical differences in economic growth and 36 living standards between Global North and Global South and to protect the interests of Global South 37 in the spirit of `common but differentiated responsibilities' to climate change adaptation and 38 mitigation. As empirical studies in Global South have demonstrated (Lele et al., 2018), developing 39 countries face multiple stressors, climate change being just one among them, and there are multiple 40 normative concerns in developing country contexts, such as equity and justice, and not merely 41 resilience (very high confidence). 42 To achieve climate resilient development requires framings of development that move away from linear 43 paradigms of development as material progress by focusing on diversity and heterogeneity, wellbeing and 44 equality, not only in contemporary practices, but also pathways of change over time (Gibson-Graham, 2005; 45 Gibson-Graham, 2006). Such approaches, which are fundamentally aligned with ecological and ecosystem- 46 based environmental assessments which identified heterogeneity of approaches and actions as the most 47 effective path to a sustainable world (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005), emphasize the importance 48 of cultural, linguistic and religious diversity, not merely as alternative sources of information about the world, 49 but as different paradigms of well-being (Kallis, 2018). These include indigenous and local knowledges that 50 provide alternatives to these framings of the world (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG). This broad reframing of 51 development includes a focus on visions such as `buen vivir' (Cubillo-Guevara et al., 2014; Walsh, 2018; 52 Acosta et al., 2019), ecological Swaraj (Kothari et al., 2014; Demaria and Kothari, 2017; Shiva, 2017), and 53 Ubuntu (Dreyer, 2015; Ewuoso and Hall, 2019), among others. All are linked by relationships with nature 54 radically different from the Western mechanistic vision, presenting not only framings of development and the 55 environment that yield locally-appropriate climate resilient development pathways, but serve as examples of 56 alternative ways of living in balance with nature that might inform similar thinking in other places. 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-21 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.2.2.2. Complexity of Development and Climate Action 2 Differing perspectives on development are in part determined by the multiple diverse priorities held by 3 different actors and nations. Another reason is that development is not a linear process with a single goal, 4 and active development planning requires simultaneously taking multiple processes and factors into account. 5 This is well illustrated by growing attention to climate security. The AR5 delivered conflicting messages 6 regarding climate change and security (Gleditsch and Nord錽, 2014), yet the understanding of climate-related 7 security risks has made substantial progress in recent years (von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021). Although 8 there remains a considerable research gaps in certain regions (Adams et al., 2018), a large body of qualitative 9 and quantitative studies from different disciplines provides new insight into the relationship of climate 10 change and security (Buhaug, 2015; De Juan, 2015; Brzoska and Fr鰄lich, 2016; Abrahams and Carr, 2017; 11 Sakaguchi et al., 2017; Moran et al, 2018; Scheffran, 2020). Though not the only cause (Sakaguchi et al., 12 2017; Mach et al., 2019), climate change undermines human livelihoods and security, because it increases 13 the populations vulnerabilities, grievances, and political tensions through an array of indirect � at times non- 14 linear � pathways, thereby increasing human insecurity and the risk of violent conflict (van Baalen and 15 Mobj鰎k, 2018; Koubi, 2019; von Uexkull and Buhaug, 2021). Indeed, context, as well as timing and spatial 16 distribution matter and need to be accounted for (Abrahams, 2020). 17 18 In line with this better understanding, climate change and security have been reframed in the political space, 19 to focus more on human security. The solutions to climate-related security risks cannot be military, but are 20 linked to development and people's vulnerabilities in complex social and politically fragile settings 21 (Abrahams, 2020). This has resulted in integration of climate-related security risk into institutional and 22 national frameworks (Dellmuth et al., 2018; Scott and Ku, 2018; Aminga and Krampe, 2020), including 23 several NDCs (Jernn鋝 and Linn閞, 2019; Remling, 2021). One example is the UN Climate Security 24 Mechanism � set up in 2018 between UNDP, UNEP and UN DPPA to help the UN more systematically 25 address climate-related security risks and devise prevention and management strategies. Yet, work remains 26 in bridging these concerns with practical responses on the ground (Busby, 2021). Especially since emerging 27 research building on the maladaptation literature, shows that this practice cannot just mean adding adaptation 28 and mitigation to the mix of development strategies in a given location, as this may have unintended and 29 unanticipated effects and might even backfire completely (Dabelko et al., 2013; Magnan et al., 2020; 30 Mirumachi et al., 2020; Schipper, 2020; Swatuk et al., 2021). In extremely underdeveloped, fragile contexts 31 such as Afghanistan, the local-level side effects of climate adaptation and mitigation projects might result in 32 different development outcomes and question the potential for sustainable peace (Krampe et al., 2021). 33 Given the clearer understanding of the intertwined nature of climate change, security, and development � 34 especially in fragile and conflict affected regions � a rethinking of how to transfer this knowledge into policy 35 solutions is necessary for the formulation of climate resilient development. 36 37 18.2.3 Scenarios as a Method for Representing Future Development Trajectories 38 39 Sustainable development represents specific development processes and priorities that can affect climate 40 risk. As a result, sustainable development both shapes the context in which different actors experience 41 climate change and represents a potential opportunity, particularly by reducing climate risk by addressing 42 vulnerability, inequity, and shifting development toward more sustainable trajectories (IPCC, 2012; Denton 43 et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014b; IPCC, 2014a; IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b). As assessed in past IPCC special 44 reports and assessment reports, this same literature has also illustrated how different socioeconomic 45 conditions affect mitigation options and costs. For example, variations in future economic growth, 46 population size and composition, technology availability and cost, energy efficiency, resource availability, 47 demand for goods and services, and non-climate-related policies (e.g., air quality, trade) individually and 48 collectively have all been shown to result in different climates and contexts for mitigation and adaptation. 49 50 One common approach for exploring the implications of different development trajectories is the use of 51 scenarios of future socioeconomic conditions, such as the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (O'Neill 52 et al., 2017). The SSPs represent sets of future global societal assumptions based on different societal, 53 technological, and economic assumptions that result in different development trajectories. Such scenarios 54 often correspond to a small set of scenario archetypes (Harrison et al., 2019; Sitas et al., 2019; Fergnani and 55 Song, 2020) in that they reflect core themes regarding the future of development such as sustainability versus 56 rapid growth. Scenarios with assumptions more closely aligned with sustainability agendas (e.g., SSP1- 57 Sustainability) commonly imply lower greenhouse gas emissions and projected climate change (see WGIII Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-22 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 AR6 Chapter 3), lower mitigation costs for ambitious climate goals (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3), lower 2 climate exposure due in large part to the size of society (see Chapter 16), and greater adaptive capacity (Roy 3 et al., 2018) (see also Chapter 16). In contrast, scenarios with rapid global economic and fossil energy 4 growth (e.g., SSP5-Fossil-Fueld Development) imply higher emissions and project climate change, higher 5 mitigation costs, as well as greater social and economic capacity to adapt to climate change impacts (Hunt et 6 al., 2012) (Table 18.1). 7 8 The SSPs incorporate various assumptions regarding population, GDP, and greenhouse gas emissions, for 9 example, that are relevant to development and climate resilience. In addition, the SSPs have been used to 10 explore a broad range of development outcomes for human and ecological systems (Table 18.1), including 11 multiple studies explore futures for food systems, water resources, human health, and income inequality. 12 Limited, top-down modelling studies have used the SSPs to explore issues such as societal resilience 13 (Schleussner et al., 2021) or gender equity (Andrijevic et al., 2020a). Such studies indicate that different 14 development trajectories have different implications for future development outcomes, but results vary 15 significantly among different climate (e.g., representative concentration pathways [RCPs]) and development 16 contexts, resulting in limited agreement among different SSPs (Table 18.1). Nevertheless, for some 17 outcomes, SSPs are associated with generally similar outcomes. Over the near-term (e.g., 2030), those 18 outcomes are strongly influenced by development inertia and path dependence, reducing differences among 19 SSPs. Outcomes diverge later in the century, but fewer studies explore futures beyond 2050. Collectively, 20 the scenarios reflect trade-offs associated with different development trajectories (Roy et al., 2018), with 21 some SSPs foreshadowing outcomes that are positive in some contexts, but negative in others (Table 18.1). 22 For example, pathways that lead to poverty reduction can have synergies with food security, water, gender, 23 terrestrial and ocean ecosystems that support climate risk management, but also poverty alleviation projects 24 with unintended negative consequences that increase vulnerability (e.g., Ley, 2017; Ley et al., 2020). 25 26 Table 18.1: Implications of different socioeconomic development pathways for CRD indicators. Studies presented in 27 the above table include qualitative storylines and quantitative scenarios for two or more SSPs. Arrows and color coding 28 reflect the positive or negative impacts on sustainability based on aggregation of results for the 2030-2050 time horizon 29 across the identified studies. Confidence language reflects the number of studies upon which results are based 30 (evidence) and the agreement among studies regarding the direction of change (agreement). Shared Socioeconomic Pathway Developmen Releva Sustainabili Middl Region Inequalit Fossil- Confiden References t Indicator nt SDG ty e of al y fueled ce the Developme (SSP1) Road Rialry (SSP4) Evidence/ (SSP3) nt Agreeme (SSP2 (SSP5) ) nt (Hasegawa et al., 2015; Agriculture, Palazzo et Food, & al., 2017; Forestry Riahi et al., � Agriculture Low 2017; Duku production Agreemen et al., 2018; � Forestry SDG 2 & 1 ( ( ( t/ Chen et al., production Robust 2019; � Food Evidence Daigneault security et al., 2019; � Hunger Mitter et al., 2020; Mora et al., 2020) (Chen et al., Health & 2017; Mora Well-Being Medium et al., 2017; � Exces 1 1 1 ( ( Agreemen Aleluia s mortality SDG 3 t/ Robust Reis et al., � Air Evidence 2018; quality Asefi- Najafabady Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-23 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report � Vecto et al., 2018; r-borne disease Chen et al., � Life Satisfaction 2018; Harrington and Otto, 2018; Marsha et al., 2018; Sellers and Ebi, 2018; Ikeda and Managi, 2019; Rohat et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019; Chae et al., 2020) (Wada et al., 2016) Water & (van Sanitation Puijenbroek � Water use High et al., 2014; � Sanitation SDG 6 & ( ( 1 1 Agreemen Yao et al., access t/ Medium 2017) � Sewage Evidence (Mouratiad discharge ou et al., 2016; Graham et al., 2018) (Rao et al., 2019b; Medium Emmerling Inequality Agreemen and Tavoni, t/ Limited 2021; � Gini SDG 10 & & & 1 & coefficient Evidence Gazzotti et al., 2021) Ecosystems (Li et al., and 2017; Chen Ecosystem et al., 2019; Services Li et al., � Aquatic 2019b; resources High Chen et al., � Urban 2020b; Agreemen expansion SDG 14 ( ( ( ( ( Song et al., t/ Medium � Habitat SDG 15 Evidence 2020b; provision McManama � Carbon y et al., sequestrati 2021; on Pinnegar et � Biodiversit al., 2021) y Legend $ Balance of studies suggest large increasing threat to sustainable development ( Balance of studies suggest moderate increasing threat to sustainable development 1 Studies suggest both threats and benefits to sustainable development & Balance of studies suggest moderate increasing benefit to sustainable development # Balance of studies suggest large increasing benefit to sustainable development Table Notes: Studies presented in the above table include qualitative storylines and quantitative scenarios for two or more SSPs. Arrows and color coding reflect the positive or negative impacts on sustainability based on aggregation of results for Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-24 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report the 2030-2050 time horizon across the identified studies. Confidence language reflects the number of studies upon which results are based (evidence) and the agreement among studies regarding the direction of change (agreement). 1 2 While the scenarios literature is useful for characterizing the potential climate risk implications of different 3 global societal futures, important limitations impact their use in climate risk management planning (very 4 high confidence). The first is the often highly geographically aggregated nature of the SSPs and other 5 scenarios, which, in the absence of application of nesting or downscaling methods, often lack regional, 6 national, or sub-national context, particularly regarding social and cultural determinants of vulnerability (van 7 Ruijven et al., 2014). Furthermore, there is limited understanding of the cost and what is required to 8 transform from today into each socioeconomic future, or the opportunity to shift from one pathway to 9 another (18.3). Furthermore, the characteristics of the pathways suggest that they are not equally likely, there 10 are relationships implied in assumptions that are uncertainties to consider (e.g., land productivity 11 improvements are land saving), it is difficult to identify the role of different development characteristics, and 12 policy implementation is stylized. In general, global assessments are not designed to inform local planning 13 given that there are many local circumstances consistent with a global future and unique local development 14 context and uncertainties to manage--demographic, economic, technological, cultural, policy. 15 16 Overall, pursuing sustainable development in the future is shown to have synergies and trade-offs in its 17 relationships with every element of climate risk: the emissions and mitigation determining hazard, the size, 18 location, and composition of development determining exposure; and the adaptive capacity determining 19 vulnerability. Importantly, the scenarios literature overall has found trade-offs such that none of the global 20 societal projections achieve all the sustainable development goals (very high confidence) (Roy et al., 2018) 21 (18.2.5.3). Historical evidence supports this as well, for example, finding low-cost energy and food access 22 historically associated with higher emissions but greater adaptive capacity, and energy efficiency innovation 23 contributing to lower emissions and greater adaptive capacity (e.g., Blanford et al., 2012; Blanco et al., 2014; 24 Mbow et al., 2019; USEPA, 2019). The literature suggests that trade-offs in the pursuit of sustainable 25 development are inevitable. Managing those trade-offs, as well as capitalizing on the synergies, will be 26 important for CRD, particularly given trade-offs have distributional implications that could contribute to 27 inequities (18.2.5.3). 28 29 18.2.4 Climate Change Risks to Development 30 31 Over the next decade, additional climate change is expected regardless of the scale of greenhouse gas 32 mitigation efforts (IPCC, 2021a). Across the global scenarios analyzed in the AR6, global average 33 temperature changes relative to the reference period 1850-1900 range from 1.2癈 to 1.9癈 for the period 34 2021�2040 and 1.2癈 to 3.0癈 for the period 2041-2060 (WGI AR6 SPM very likely range). However, the 35 feasibility of emissions pathways (particularly, RCP8.5) affect the plausibility of the associated climate 36 projections, potentially lowering the upper end of these ranges (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3). There is 37 significant overlap between climate scenario ensemble ranges from different emissions scenarios through 38 2050, more so than through 2100 (Lee et al., 2021). There is also overlap between emissions scenario 39 ensembles consistent with different temperature outcomes (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3). Emissions pathway 40 ranges represent uncertainties for policy-makers and organizations to consider and manage (Rose and Scott, 41 2018, 2020) regarding, among other things, economic growth and structure, available technologies, markets, 42 behavioral dynamics, policies, and non-CO2 climate forcings (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3), while climate 43 pathway ranges represent bio-physical climate system and carbon cycle uncertainties (Lee et al., 2021). For 44 all climate projections and variables, there is significant regional heterogeneity and uncertainty in projected 45 climate change (very high confidence) (IPCC, 2021a). Figure 18.4 (left panel) presents examples for average 46 and extreme temperature precipitation change (see also 18.5 and Tables 18.4�18.5 for more regional detail). 47 Similarly, for all emissions projections, there is significant regional, sectoral, and local heterogeneity and 48 uncertainty regarding potential pathways for climate action (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Not 49 all uncertainties are represented in projected emissions pathway ensembles, such as policy timing and design 50 (e.g., Rose and Scott, 2018) or climate projection ensembles. 51 52 The projected ranges for near-term and mid-term global average warming levels are estimated to result in 53 increasing key risks and reasons for concern (Chapter 16). Chapter 16 developed aggregate "Representative 54 Key Risks" (RKRs) as indicators for subsets of approximately one hundred sectoral and regional key risks 55 indicators. The RKRs include risks to coastal socio-ecological systems, terrestrial and ocean ecosystems, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-25 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 critical physical infrastructure, networks and services, living standards and equity, human health, food 2 security, water security, and peace and migration. The majority of these risks are directly linked to 3 sustainable development priorities and the SDGs (Chapter 16, WGII AR6 sectoral and regional chapters; 4 (Roy et al., 2018; IPCC, 2019d; IPCC, 2019b). Therefore, climate risks represent a potential additional 5 challenge to pursuing sustainable development priorities, but also potential opportunities due to geographic 6 variation in climate impacts. In addition, positive synergies have been found between sustainable 7 development and adaptation, but trade-offs are also possible (e.g., Roy et al., 2018). 8 9 For all RKRs, additional global average warming is expected to increase risk. However, the increases vary 10 significantly by RKR, and across the underlying key risks represented within each RKR. Geographic 11 variation in key risk implications is only partially assessed in Chapter 16, but evidence can be drawn from 12 the WGII individual regional chapters. Regionally, key risks are found to be potentially greatest in 13 developing and transition economies (Chapter 16 and sectoral chapters), which is also where the least-cost 14 emissions reductions are shown to be (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 3). See Figure 18.4 for an example of key 15 risk geographic heterogeneity (see also 18.5 for regional detail). Chapter 16 also maps the RKRs to an 16 updated aggregate "Reasons for Concern" (RFC) framing. Thus, increasing RKR risk implies increasing 17 RFC associated with unique and threatened systems, extreme weather events, distribution of impacts, global 18 aggregate impacts, and large-scale singular events. 19 20 Climate risks are found to vary with future warming levels, the development context and trajectory, as well 21 as by the level of investment in adaptation. Together, these three dimensions define risk � with projected 22 climate changes defining the hazard, development defining the exposure, and development and adaptation 23 defining vulnerability. However, how these different dimensions interact and the level of scientific 24 understanding vary significantly among different types of risk. For human systems, in general, the poor and 25 marginalized are found to have greater vulnerability for a given hazard and exposure level. With some level 26 of global average warming expected regardless of mitigation efforts, human and natural systems will be 27 exposed to new conditions, but some level of adaptation should also be expected. 28 29 30 31 Figure 18.4: Regional projected select climate change and sustainable-development-related climate impact variables by 32 global warming level. Sources: WGI and WGII AR6 reports. 33 34 35 18.2.5 Options for Managing Future Risks to Climate Resilient Development 36 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-26 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 The pursuit of CRD requires not only the implementation of individual adaptation, mitigation, and 2 sustainable development initiatives, but also their careful coordination and integration. This section assesses 3 the literature on CRD in the context of key climate change risks (Chapter 16); gaps in adaptation that 4 contribute to risk; potential synergies and trade-offs among mitigation, adaptation and sustainable 5 development; and the mechanisms for managing those trade-offs. 6 7 18.2.5.1 Adaptation 8 9 18.2.5.1.1 Adaptation and climate-resilient development 10 Given adaptation is recognized as a key element of addressing climate risk and CRD, the capacity for 11 adaptation implementation is an important consideration for CRD. The AR5 noted a significant overlap 12 between indicators of sustainable development and the determinants of adaptive capacity, and suggested that 13 adaptation presents an opportunity to reduce stresses on development processes and the socio-ecological 14 foundations upon which they depend (Denton et al., 2014). At the same time, it also noted that building 15 adaptive capacity for sustainable development might require transformational changes that shift impacted 16 systems to new patterns, dynamics, or places (Denton et al., 2014). Thus, adaptation interventions and 17 pathways can further the achievement of development goals such as food security (Campbell et al., 2016; 18 Douxchamps et al., 2016; Richardson et al., 2018; Bezner Kerr et al., 2019) and improvements in human 19 health (Watts et al., 2019) including in systems where animals and humans live in close proximity (very high 20 confidence) (Zinsstag et al., 2018). However, to do so requires not only the avoidance of incremental 21 adaptation actions that extend current unsustainable practices, but also the ability to manage and overcome 22 the barriers which arise when the limits of incremental adaptation are reached (high agreement; medium 23 evidence) (Few et al., 2017; Vermeulen et al., 2018; Fedele et al., 2019). 24 25 Since AR5, the scientific community has deepened its understanding of the relationship between adaptation 26 and sustainable development (very high confidence), particularly with regard to the place of resilience at the 27 intersection of these two arenas. The literature has moved forward in its identification of specific overlaps in 28 sustainable development indicators and determinants of adaptive capacity, how adaptation might reduce 29 stress on development processes and their socio-ecological foundation, and how building adaptive capacity 30 might facilitate needed transformative changes. Broadly speaking, work on these topics comes from one of 31 two perspectives. One perspective speaks to adaptation practices that might further sustainable development 32 outcomes, while another perspective draws on deeper understandings of the socio-ecological dynamics of the 33 systems in which we live, and which we may have to transform in the face of climate change impacts. These 34 two literatures are not yet well-integrated, leaving gaps in our knowledge of how best to implement 35 adaptation in a manner that achieves sustainable development. 36 37 The literature considering adaptation and development in practice since AR5 suggests that efforts to connect 38 adaptation to sustainable development should address proximate and systemic drivers of vulnerability (Wise 39 et al., 2016) while remaining flexible and reversable to avoid the lock-in of undesirable or mal-adaptive 40 trajectories (Cannon and M黮ler-Mahn, 2010; Wise et al., 2016). Such goals require critical reflection on 41 processes for decision-making and learning. In the AR5, more inclusive, participatory adaptation processes 42 were presumed to benefit development planning by including a wider set of actors in discussions of future 43 goals (Denton et al., 2014). The post-AR5 literature expands on these critical perspectives to provide context 44 regarding when participation is most effective. For example, (Eriksen et al., 2015) emphasize the need to 45 build participatory adaptation processes to avoid subsuming adaptation goals to development-as-usual while 46 (Kim et al., 2017b) argues that this practice is most effective when it is focused on development efforts and 47 considers how climate change will challenge the goals of those efforts. Adaptation, while presenting an 48 opportunity to foster transformations needed to address the impacts of climate change on human well-being, 49 is also a contested process that is inherently political (medium agreement, medium evidence) (Eriksen et al., 50 2015; Mikulewicz, 2019; Nightingale B鰄ler, 2019; Eriksen et al., 2021b). How adaptation can challenge 51 development and create a situation where CRD effectively becomes transformative adaptation, adaptation 52 that generates transformation of broader aspects of development, remains unclear (medium agreement, 53 limited evidence) (Few et al., 2017; Schipper et al., 2020c). 54 55 The critical literature on socio-ecological resilience, which has grown substantially since the last AR (very 56 high confidence), speaks to some of these questions. Since AR5, the IPCC and the wider literature on socio- 57 ecological resilience have shifted their use of the term to reflect not only the capacity to cope with a Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-27 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 hazardous event or trend or disturbance, but also the ability to adapt, learn, and transform in ways that 2 maintains a socio-ecology's essential function, identity and structure (WGII Chapter 1, Glossary). This 3 change in usage is significant in that it shifts resilience from an emergent property of complex socio- 4 ecological systems to a deeply human product of efforts to manage ecology, economy, and society to 5 specific ends. This definition of resilience recognizes the need to define what is an essential identity, 6 function, and structure for a given system, questions rooted not in ecological dynamics, but in politics, 7 agency, difference, and power that emerge around the management of ecological dynamics (Cote and 8 Nightingale, 2011; Brown, 2013; Cretney, 2014; Forsyth, 2018; Matin et al., 2018; Carr, 2019). 9 10 By connecting this framing of socio-ecological dynamics to the literature on the principles for adaptation 11 efforts that meet development goals, new work has begun to identify 1) how adaptation can reduce stress on 12 development processes, 2) how it might facilitate transformative change, and 3) where adaptation 13 interventions might either drive system rigidity and precarity, or otherwise challenge development goals 14 (Castells-Quintana et al., 2018; Carr, 2020). For example, Jordan (2019) draws upon these contemporary 15 framings of resilience to highlight the ways in which coping strategies perpetuate the gendered norms and 16 practices at the heart of women's vulnerability in Bangladesh. Forsyth (2018) draws upon this work to 17 highlight the ways in which the theory of change processes used by development organizations tend to 18 exclude local experiences and sources of risk, and thus foreclose the need for transformative pathways to 19 achieve development goals. Carr (Carr, 2019; 2020) draws upon evidence from sub-Saharan Africa to 20 develop more nuanced understandings of the ways in which different stressors and interventions either 21 facilitate or foreclose transformative pathways, while pointing to the existence of yet poorly-understood 22 thresholds for transformation in systems that can be identified and targeted by interventions. 23 24 18.2.5.1.2 Adaptation Gaps 25 Adaptation gaps are defined as "the difference between actually implemented adaptation and a societally set 26 goal, determined largely by preferences related to tolerated climate change impacts and reflecting resource 27 limitations and competing priorities" (UNEP, 2014; UNEP, 2018a). Adaptation deficit is a similar concept, 28 described as an inadequate or insufficient adaptation to current conditions (see Ch 1). Adaptation gaps or 29 deficits arise from a lack of adequate technological, financial, social, and institutional capacities to adapt 30 effectively to climate change and extreme weather events, which are in turn linked to development (very 31 high confidence) (Fankhauser and McDermott, 2014; Milman and Arsano, 2014; Chen et al., 2016; Asfaw et 32 al., 2018) (18.2.2). 33 Currently, there is no consensus around approaches to assess the effectiveness of adaptation actions across 34 contexts and therefore measure adaptation gaps at a global scale (Singh et al., 2021a). UNEP (2021) suggests 35 that comprehensiveness, inclusiveness, implementability, integration and monitoring and evaluation can be 36 used to assess them (see also Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB). However, limited information is available about 37 future trends in national-level adaptation, and the development of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 38 Despite the challenges of measurement associated with adaptation gaps, available evidence from smaller 39 scales across several regions, communities, and businesses suggest that significant adaptation gaps have 40 existed in historical contexts of climate change, while expectations of extreme heat, increasing storm 41 intensity, and rising sea levels will create the context for the emergence of new gaps (very high confidence) 42 (Hallegatte et al., 2018; UNEP, 2018a; Dellink et al., 2019; UNEP, 2021). These adaptation gaps create risks 43 to well-being, economic growth, equity, the health of natural systems, and other societal goals. The negative 44 impacts of these gaps can be compounded by adaptation efforts that are considered maladaptive or by 45 development actions that are labelled as adaptation (see Chapter 16). 46 A higher level of adaptation finance is critical to enhance adaptation planning and implementation and 47 reduce adaptation gaps, particularly in developing countries (very high confidence) (UNEP, 2021) (Cross- 48 Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17, 18.4.2.2). However, adaptation finance is not keeping pace with the 49 rising adaptation costs in the context of increasing and accelerating climate change, as "annual adaptation 50 costs in developing countries alone are currently estimated to be in the range of US$70 billion, with the 51 expectation of reaching US$140�300 billion in 2030 and US$280�500 billion in 2050" (UNEP, 2021). 52 Investment in attaining SDGs helps bridge adaptation gaps (Birkmann et al., 2021), but care needs to be 53 taken to avoid maladaptation through mislabeling. Integration of the indigenous and local knowledge 54 systems is anticipated to reduce existing adaptation gaps and secure livelihood transitions. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-28 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Analysis of investments by four major climate and development funds (the Global Environment Facility, 2 the Green Climate Fund, the Adaptation Fund and the International Climate Initiative) by UNEP (2021) 3 suggests that support for green and hybrid adaptation solutions has been increasing over the past two 4 decades. These could be effective at reducing climate risks and bridging adaptation gaps while 5 simultaneously bringing important additional benefits for the economy, environment, livelihoods (UNEP, 6 2021) (see also Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2). 7 Lately, the evidence of adaptation activity in the health sector has been increasing (Watts et al., 2019), yet 8 substantial adaptation gaps persist (UNEP, 2018a; UNEP, 2021), including gaps in humanitarian response to 9 climate-related disasters (Watts et al., 2019). It is the under-investment in climate and health research in 10 general and health adaptation in particular that has led to adaptation gaps in the health sector (Ebi et al., 11 2017). 12 Costs of implementing efficient adaptation measures and water-related infrastructure in water-deficient 13 regions have received attention at the global and regional level to bridge the `adaptation gap' (Hallegatte et 14 al., 2018; UNEP, 2018a; Dellink et al., 2019; UNEP, 2021). Livelihood sustainability the drylands, which 15 cover more than 40% of land surface area, are home to roughly 2.5 billion people, and support 16 approximately 50% of the livestock and 45% of the food production, is threatened by a complex and 17 interrelated range of social, economic, and environmental changes that present significant challenges to rural 18 communities, especially women (Abu-Rabia-Queder and Morris, 2018; Gaur and Squires, 2018). Adaptation 19 deficits in arid and semi-arid regions are of high order (see CCP 3). In order to reduce adaptation deficit in 20 arid and semi-arid regions comprehensive and efficient adaptation interventions integrating better water 21 management, use of non-traditional water sources, changes in reservoir operations, soil ecosystem 22 rejuvenation, and enhanced institutional effectiveness are needed (18.5) (Makuvaro et al., 2017; Mohammed 23 and Scholz, 2017; Morote et al., 2019). Communities facing the lack of adequate technological, financial, 24 human, and institutional capacities to adapt effectively to current and future climate change often encounter 25 adaptation deficits. In order to address current adaptation barriers and adaptation deficits, there is a need to 26 promote efficient adaptation measures, coupled with inclusive and adaptive governance involving 27 marginalized groups such as indigenous communities and women. 28 Although unevenly distributed urban adaptation gaps exist in all world regions (see Chapter 6). Such gaps 29 are higher in the urban centers of the poorer nations. Chapter 6 identified the critical capacity gaps at city 30 and community levels that are responsible for adaptation gaps are: "ability to identify social vulnerability 31 and community strengths, and to plan in integrated ways to protect communities, alongside the ability to 32 access innovative funding arrangements and manage finance and commercial insurance; and locally 33 accountable decision-making with sufficient access to science, technology and local knowledge to support 34 the application of adaptation solutions at scale". 35 Insufficient financial resources are the main reasons for the coastal adaptation gap particularly in the Global 36 South (see CCP2). Engaging the private sector with a range of financial tools is crucial to address such gaps 37 (see CCP2). An urgent and transformative action to institutionalize locally-relevant integrative adaptation 38 pathways is crucial for closing coastal adaptation gaps. Additional efforts are in place for assessing global 39 adaptation progress (see Cross-Chapter Box PROGRESS in Chapter 17]. 40 18.2.5.1.3 Adaptation implementation 41 As discussed in Chapter 16, adaptation is a key mechanism for managing climate risks (Chapter 16), and 42 therefore for pursuing CRD. The lower estimates in Table 18.2 are associated with higher levels of 43 adaptation and more conducive development conditions. Furthermore, additional adaptation demand is 44 associated with greater levels of climate change. Adaptation is a broad term referring to many different 45 levels of response and options for natural and human systems, from individuals, specific locations, and 46 specific technologies, to nations, markets, global dynamics, and strategies at the system level. Adaptation 47 also includes endogenous reflexive and exogenous policy responses. Perspectives on limits to adaptation, 48 synergies, trade-offs, and feasibility therefore depend on where the boundaries are drawn and the objective. 49 Overall, there are a broad range of adaptation options relevant to reducing risks posed by climate change to 50 development. However, current understanding of how such options are implemented in practice, their 51 effectiveness across a range of possible climate futures, and their potential limits, is modest. 52 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-29 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Past assessments have evaluated individual adaptation options in terms of economic, technological, 2 institutional, socio-cultural, environmental/ecological, and geophysical feasibility (de Coninck et al., 2018). 3 This analysis has been updated for AR6 (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB). These assessments identify types of 4 barriers that could affect an option's feasibility. Among other things, this work finds that every adaptation 5 option evaluated had at least one feasibility dimension that represented a barrier or obstacle. The barriers 6 also imply that there are trade-offs in these feasibility dimensions to consider. Overall, insights from this 7 work are high-level and difficult to apply to a specific adaptation context. The feasibility and ranking of 8 adaptation opportunities, as well as the list of opportunities themselves, for a given location will vary from 9 location-to-location, with different criteria and weighting of criteria that reflect the relevant social priorities 10 and differences in markets, technology options, and policies for managing risks and trade-offs. Integrated 11 evaluation of criteria and options is needed, that accounts for the relevant geographic context and 12 interactions between options and systems (18.5). 13 14 Sustainable development is regarded as generally consistent with climate change adaptation, helping build 15 adaptive capacity by addressing poverty and inequalities and improving inclusion and institutions (Roy et al., 16 2018). Some sustainable development strategies could facilitate adaptation effectiveness by addressing wider 17 socio-economic barriers, addressing social inequalities, and promoting livelihood security (Roy et al., 2018). 18 With a common goal of reducing risks, sustainable development and adaptation are relatively synergistic. 19 However, trade-offs have been found and important to consider and potentially manage. Synergies have been 20 found between adaptation and poverty reduction, hunger reduction, clean water access, and health; while, 21 trade-offs have also been found, particularly when adaptation strategies prioritize one development objective 22 (e.g., food security or heat-stress risk reduction) or promote high-cost solutions with budget allocation and 23 equity implications (Roy et al., 2018) (18.2.5.3, 18.5). There are also opportunities for managing the trade- 24 offs, in particular distributional effects--by recognizing that there are trade-offs and considering alternatives 25 and complementary strategies to offset the trade-offs (Section 18.2.5.3). 26 27 28 [START BOX 18.3 HERE] 29 30 Box 18.3: Climate Resilient Development in Small Islands 31 32 Small Islands are particularly vulnerable to climate change and many are already pursuing climate resilient 33 development pathways that enable integrated responses (Allen et al., 2018a; Mycoo, 2018; Hay et al., 2019; 34 Robinson et al., 2021). Countries, such as Belize, have opted for a systems-approach and are working across 35 the SDGs to increase integration (Allen et al., 2018a). This includes rethinking disaster reconstruction 36 mechanisms in the Caribbean and introducing more diversified and sustainable tourism economies that can 37 better withstand external shocks such as disruptions and loss of markets from COVID-19 (Sheller, 2021). In 38 the Seychelles, various government and tourism industry initiatives are focused on the promotion of 39 sustainable tourism ventures that lower emissions, protect and promote biodiversity conservation (e.g. new 40 marine protected areas with mitigation and adaptation benefits), and are climate resilient (Robinson et al., 41 2021). In 2016 the Seychelles signed the world's first nature-for-debt swap wherein an NGO (The Nature 42 Conservancy) agreed to pay off Seychelles' public debt to the Paris Club (foreign creditors) in return for the 43 Seychelles government establishing marine conservation areas (Silver and Campbell, 2018). 44 45 One key area where enhanced climate risk integration is critical is infrastructure-related decisions especially 46 on coastal areas (World Bank, 2017). However, despite increasing awareness of climate risks and 47 experienced impacts, decisions on for example infrastructure locations still reflect cultural preferences. For 48 example, Hay et al. (2019) report that despite recommendations to relocate the redevelopment site of the 49 Parliamentary Complex in Samoa away from the coast, multiple cultural and historical factors influenced the 50 decisions to redevelop at the original site. In the Solomon Islands, however, emerging evidence suggests that 51 adaptation efforts to enhance the resilience of infrastructure are also serving to help urban areas address 52 problems associated with rapid urbanization and provide new opportunities for sustainable development 53 (Robinson et al., 2021). 54 55 Energy system transitions in small islands can produce synergies with SDG implementation, and can lead to 56 transformational outcomes. The Pacific island territory of Tokelau has demonstrated a nationwide energy 57 transition, sourcing 100% of their energy needs from solar power (Michalena and Hills, 2018), and many Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-30 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 other countries such as Fiji, Niue, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Cook Islands also have 100% 2 renewable energy targets. Benefits of small island distributed energy systems (such as solar photovoltaic 3 (PV) systems) include less need for large, centralized infrastructure; reduced reliance on volatile fossil fuel 4 markets; enhanced international climate negotiations power and enhanced local job markets/skills (Dornan, 5 2015; Cole and Banks, 2017; Weir, 2018). Additionally, renewable systems can enhance resilience to hydro- 6 meteorological disasters (Weir and Kumar, 2020). For example, well secured ground based PV systems 7 withstood cyclones in the Pacific island of Tonga during cyclone Gita and across the Caribbean during 8 Hurricane Maria with power restored in days rather than weeks associated with more centralized systems 9 (Weir and Kumar, 2020). Yet, a multitude of challenges remain. In the Pacific islands region, these include: 10 the high up front capital investment of renewables; lack of private sector investment; limited renewable 11 energy data for policy making; land tenure/rent costs; ongoing infrastructure maintenance skills and 12 requirements; political turnover; failed experimentation; difficulty in obtaining and transporting replacement 13 parts and a highly corrosive environment for equipment (Dornan, 2015; Cole and Banks, 2017; Lucas et al., 14 2017; Weir, 2018; Weir and Kumar, 2020). The example of Pacific energy transitions demonstrates that a 15 nuanced and context specific analysis of synergies and trade-offs for energy transitions is required in order to 16 lessen the impact on fragile economies and maximize benefits for remote populations. 17 18 Labor migration is increasingly recognized as a significant factor that can contribute to climate resilient 19 development pathways for small islands. In the Pacific Islands region, labor mobility schemes are already 20 allowing for climate change adaptation and economic development to occur in labor migrants' countries of 21 origin (Smith and McNamara, 2015; Klepp and Herbeck, 2016; Dun et al., 2020). Dun et al. (2020) 22 demonstrates that temporary or circular migrants from the Solomon Islands, working in Australia under its 23 Seasonal Worker Program (similar programs operate in other developed countries), are using the money they 24 earn to invest in adaptation and development activities back home. Similarly, labor migrants from Vanuatu, 25 Kiribati, and Samoa contribute to development and in-situ climate change adaptation (at a household, 26 village, and regional level) that enable discussions about more resilient futures for their countries (Barnett 27 and McMichael, 2018; Parsons et al., 2018). 28 29 [END BOX 18.3 HERE] 30 31 32 [START BOX 18.4 HERE] 33 34 Box 18.4: Adaptation and the Sustainable Development Goals 35 36 The achievement of the SDGs represents near-term positive sustainability as well as indicating the quality 37 of development processes and actions (inclusion and social justice, degrowth and alternative development 38 models, planetary health, well-being, equity, solidary, plural knowledges and human-nature connectivity) 39 that enable CRD in the long term (18.2.2.2, 18.2.5.3). A key question is the extent to which adaptation 40 actions (or non-action) may contribute to (or undermine) SDG achievement, and in particular to shift the 41 quality of development processes and engagement within the political, economic, ecological, socio- 42 ethical and knowledge-technology arenas and hence contribute to CRDPs. Here, the relationship between 43 adaptation and SDGs is illustrated through an examination of SDG3 good health and well-being and 44 SDG16 peace, justice and strong institutions. These two are foundational to social equity and justice that 45 underpin sustainability outcomes as well as enablers of CRD. 46 47 Table Box 18.4.1 (below) provides a set of examples of how adaptation actions can either contribute to or 48 undermine SDG achievement, for SDGs 2, 3, 6, 11 and 16. In general, evidence suggests positive effects 49 of formal interventions as well as household and community-based adaptation strategies on discrete social 50 variables among target populations, particularly if they are shaped by the local context and needs, with 51 real participation and leadership by target populations (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; Buckwell et al., 52 2020; McNamara et al., 2020; Owen, 2020). For example, integrated adaptation approaches to the Water- 53 Energy-Food (WEF) Nexus aiming to build resilience in those sectors can lead to increased resource use 54 efficiency and coherent strategies for managing the complex interactions and tradeoffs among the water, 55 energy and food SDGs (Mpandeli et al., 2018; Nhamo et al., 2020). One such approach could involve 56 cultivating indigenous crops suited to harsh growing conditions, which would allow for agricultural 57 expansion for food and energy without increased water withdrawals (Mpandeli et al., 2018). Overall, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-31 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 adaptation commitments aiming to build resilience of vulnerable populations have typically shown to 2 contribute to SDGs focused on ending extreme poverty (SDG 1), improving food security (SDG 2), 3 improving access to water (SDG 6), ensuring clean energy (SDG 7), tackling climate change (SDG 13) 4 and halting land degradation and deforestation (SDG 15) (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018). 5 6 However, evidence also suggests limitations of adaptation actions, with the objectives and actions often 7 being too narrow to address social justice and enable CRD. As such, adaptation actions can sometimes 8 undermine SDG achievement through exacerbating social vulnerability, inequity and uneven power 9 relations (Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018; Atteridge and Remling, 2018; Paprocki, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019; 10 Satyal et al., 2020; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). This is due to adaptation practices often not accounting 11 for the differentiated ways in which minority groups are especially vulnerable. For example, designs of 12 emergency shelters should consider the fear of social stigma or abuse faced by women and girls (Pelling 13 and Garschagen, 2019). 14 15 Such maladaptive adaptation practices can undermine SDG achievement through increasing vulnerability 16 of marginalized groups by failing to address the underlying root causes of vulnerability and poverty that 17 are related to political economy, power dynamics and vested interests more broadly, instead treating the 18 symptoms as the cause (Magnan et al., 2016; Ajibade and Egge, 2019; Schipper, 2020). For example, 19 evidence exists of flood defense measures through large scale infrastructure development leading to the 20 violent displacement of poor communities, forcibly resettling people in areas far from their employment 21 or pushing up land and housing costs without providing compensation (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018; Reckien 22 et al., 2018). Moreover, sectoral approaches to adaptation that fail to acknowledge the linkages between 23 SDGs can counter development efforts and generate further tradeoffs (Terry, 2009; Rasul and Sharma, 24 2016; von Stechow et al., 2016; Klinsky et al., 2017; Hallegatte et al., 2019). 25 26 The literature recommends a set of strategies for ensuring that adaptation actions are aligned with SDG 27 achievement and do not further perpetuate poverty and inequality. These include ensuring that 28 marginalized voices are central to adaptation decision-making, with participatory approaches that 29 empower and compensate affected communities (Moser and Ekstrom, 2011; Broto et al., 2015; Pelling 30 and Garschagen, 2019; Palermo and Hernandez, 2020). Gender mainstreaming and gender transformative 31 approaches within climate policies can also help ensure gender-sensitive design of adaptation projects, 32 with appropriate equity analyses of policy (Klinsky et al., 2017) decisions to identify the actual 33 implications of trade-offs for vulnerable groups (Beuchelt and Badstue, 2013; Alston, 2014; Bowen et al., 34 2017; Fuso Nerini et al., 2018). 35 36 In addition, a substantial literature also argues for policy coherence measures that adopt whole-of- 37 government approaches and mainstream and nationalize SDG targets within national climate policies 38 (Nilsson et al., 2012; Le Blanc, 2015; Ari, 2017; Collste et al., 2017; Dzebo et al., 2017; Nilsson and 39 Weitz, 2019). Institutional coordination mechanisms that aim to break down silos between different 40 agencies and actors at the national level are suggested as beneficial for avoiding tradeoffs between 41 adaptation actions and SDGs (Mirzabaev et al., 2015; Howlett and Saguin, 2018; Scherer et al., 2018). 42 However, these need to be paired with an investigation of the deep-seated ideologies and vested interests 43 that are creating goal conflicts and negatively impacting marginalized groups to begin with (Purdon, 44 2014; Bocquillon, 2018). Ultimately, adaptation measures need to acknowledge and address the 45 underlying drivers that make certain groups particularly vulnerable, such as social disenfranchisement, 46 unequal power dynamics and historical legacies of colonialism and exploitation (Magnan et al., 2016; 47 Schipper, 2020) 48 49 50 Table Box 18.4.1: Examples of linkages between adaptation and the SDGs. For several key SDGs aligned with the 51 concept of CRD, the table below identifies evidence from the literature where adaptation policies and practices 52 contribute to achievement of the SDG as well as where they undermine achievement of the SDG. SDG Evidence of adaptation contributing to Evidence of adaptation undermining SDG SDG SDG 2: Zero Adaptation measures implemented by Some adaptation policies can increase land and food Hunger smallholder farmers (e.g. adjustments in prices, negatively impacting smallholder farmers farm operations timing, on-farm (Fuso Nerini et al., 2018; Zavaleta et al., 2018; diversification, soil-water management) Albizua et al., 2019) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-32 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report SDG 3: Good exhibit higher levels of productivity and Potential tradeoffs for food production through Health and technical efficiency in food production adaptation actions within the water or energy sector, if Wellbeing (Bai et al., 2019; Sloat et al., 2020; integrated approaches not taken (Howells et al., 2013; Khanal et al., 2021) FAO, 2014; Biswas and Tortajada, 2016) SDG 6: Clean Water and Some climate smart agriculture Societal measures beyond adaptation required to Sanitation measures (e.g. intercropping) can address underlying causes of inequities that drive poor significantly increase yields and health and well-being, including cuts in public contribute to zero hunger (Lipper et al., spending and neoliberalization and commodification 2014; Arslan et al., 2015; Saj et al., of healthcare (Hall, 2020; Walsh and Dillard-Wright, 2017) 2020) Increased resilience of societies and reduced vulnerability through Potential tradeoffs for water security through investments in public health care and adaptation actions within the food or energy sector, if access (Marmot, 2020; Mullins and integrated approaches not taken (Howells et al., 2013; White, 2020) Rasul and Sharma, 2016; Mpandeli et al., 2018) Adaptation measures that leverage solidarity, equity and nature connectedness contribute to physical and psychological health and wellbeing (Gambrel and Cafaro, 2009; Capaldi et al., 2015; Soga and Gaston, 2016; Woiwode, 2020) Integrated water resources management as an adaptation strategy (Tan and Foo, 2018; Sadoff et al., 2020) Local, regional, or national "grabs" for water from shared resources to with poorly defined property rights (Olmstead, 2014) SDG 11: Vulnerability reducing adaptation Need to ensure that adaptation measures understand Sustainable measures that aim to upgrade informal how power dynamics and cultural norms shape urban Cities and settlements, create affordable housing form and communities' vulnerability and adaptive Communities and protect populations living in disaster capacity (Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2018) prone areas (Major et al., 2018; Sanchez Rodriguez et al., 2018; Ajibade and Risk of built infrastructure aiming to increase Egge, 2019) resilience ignoring local population needs and creating low-skilled jobs that concentrate land, capital and resources in the hands of the elite (Ajibade and Egge, 2019) SDG 16: Potential for adaptation projects to Studies from Bangladesh, Cambodia and Nepal found Peace, Justice support livelihoods incomes and that climate change adaptation-related policies and and Strong resource management, and thereby projects were an underlying cause of natural resource- Institutions reduce tensions and the risk of conflicts based conflicts, as well as land dispossession and (Matthew, 2014; Dresse et al., 2018; exclusion, entrenchment of dependency relations, elite Barnett, 2019) capture, and inequity (Sovacool, 2018; Sultana et al., 2019) Adaptation projects can reinforce top-down knowledge and decision-making processes, asymmetric power relations and elite capture of adaptation resources (Nightingale, 2017; Eriksen et al., 2021b) Need for conflict-sensitive adaptation approaches that aim to `do no harm' (Babcicky, 2013; Ide, 2020) 1 2 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-33 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 [END BOX 18.4 HERE] 2 3 4 18.2.5.2 Mitigation 5 6 Mitigation entails greenhouse gas emissions reductions, avoidance, and removal and sequestration, as well as 7 management of other climate forcing factors (WGIII AR6). There are numerous individual and system 8 mitigation options throughout the economy and within human and natural systems (very high confidence) 9 (Chapter 16; 18.5). Limiting global average warming has been found to reduce climate risks (IPCC, 2018a; 10 IPCC, 2019b), and limiting global average warming to any temperature level has also been found to be 11 associated with broad ranges of emissions pathways representing socioeconomic, technological, market, 12 physical uncertainties (very high confidence) (Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). Pathways 13 consistent with limiting warming to 2癈 and below have been found to require significant deployment of 14 mitigation options spanning energy, land use, and societal transformation (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3 and 15 Chapter 4; 18.3). and substantial economic, energy, land use, policy, and societal transformation (WGIII 16 AR6 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4). Such emissions pathways would represent deviations from current trends that 17 raise issues about their feasibility and therefore plausibility (Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). 18 19 The technical and economic challenge of limiting warming has been found to increase non-linearly with 20 greater ambition, fewer mitigation options, less than global cooperative policy designs, and delayed 21 mitigation action (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3; Table 18.2). Table 18.2 provides a high-level summary of pathway 22 characteristic ranges based on the WGIII AR6 assessment. Global pathways find large regional differences 23 in mitigation potential, as well as the degree of regional non-linearity with greater mitigation ambition. 24 These represent opportunities for mitigation, but how this effort and cost would be facilitated and distributed 25 respectively is a policy question. 26 27 Table 18.2 illustrates that greater climate ambition implies more aggressive emissions reductions in each 28 region, and earlier regional peaking of emissions (if they have not peaked to date). Near-term regional 29 emissions increases are possible, even for 1.5癈 compatible pathways, but significantly lower emissions than 30 today are shown in all regions by 2050. Increases in total regional energy consumption, as well as fossil 31 energy, are observed for many pathways, even in the most ambitious where energy consumption growth is 32 potentially slower compared to less ambitious pathways. By 2050, regional fossil energy declines, but is not 33 eliminated in any region. Regional growth in electricity use is substantial in all pathways, even the most 34 ambitious, with the growth continuing and accelerating with time and regional dependence on electricity 35 (share of total energy consumption) also growing significantly. The broad ranges are an indication of 36 uncertainty and risk for regional transitions, noting that full uncertainty is likely broader than what is 37 captured by emissions scenario databases (Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). Among other things, 38 pathways commonly assume idealized climate policies with immediate implementation; and model 39 infeasibilities (i.e., models unable to solve) increase with climate ambition and pessimism about mitigation 40 technologies (e.g., Clarke et al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Muratori et al., 2020), 41 highlighting the increasing challenge and potential for actual infeasibility with lower global warming targets. 42 Together, Table 18.2 provides insights into the increasingly demanding system and development transitions 43 associated with lower global warming levels, as well as some of the low-carbon transition uncertainties and 44 risks (see also Figure 18.5). 45 46 Past assessment has evaluated representative mitigation strategies in terms of economic, technological, 47 institutional, socio-cultural, environmental/ecological, and geophysical viability, as well as relationships to 48 sustainable development goals (de Coninck et al., 2018). The strategies assessment analysis has been 49 updated for AR6 (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB). These assessments identify types of barriers that could 50 affect an option's feasibility. Among other things, this work finds that, other than public transport and non- 51 motorized transport, every other mitigation option evaluated had at least one feasibility dimension that 52 represented a barrier or obstacle. The barriers also imply that there are trade-offs in these feasibility 53 dimensions to consider. The assessment of mitigation option-sustainable development relationships identifies 54 related literature and derives aggregate characterizations. Concerns about the potential sustainable 55 development implications of some mitigation technologies may be motivation for precluding the use of some 56 mitigation options. For instance, the potential food security and environmental quality implications of 57 bioenergy have received significant attention in the literature (e.g., Smith et al., 2013). However, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-34 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 constraining or precluding the use of bioenergy without or with CCS could have significant implications for 2 the cost of pursuing ambitious climate goals, and potentially the attainability of those goals (e.g., Clarke et 3 al., 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018; Muratori et al., 2020). Bioenergy is not unique in this 4 regard. Social and sustainability concerns have also been raised about the large-scale deployment of many 5 low-carbon technologies, e.g., REDD+, wind, solar, nuclear, fossil with CCS, and batteries. See WGIII 6 Chapter 3 for examples of the potential implications of limiting or precluding different low-carbon 7 technologies. 8 9 Overall, like with adaptation options, insights from this aggregate feasibility and sustainable development 10 mapping work are high-level and difficult to apply to a specific mitigation context. The feasibility, ranking, 11 and sustainable development implications of mitigation options, as well as the list of options themselves, for 12 a given location will vary from location-to-location, with different criteria and weighting of criteria that 13 reflect the relevant social priorities and differences in markets, technology options, and policies for 14 managing risks and trade-offs. Integrated evaluation of criteria and options is needed here as well, that 15 accounts for the relevant geographic context and interactions between options, systems, and implications. 16 17 Analyses of the potential implications of mitigation on sustainable development has various strands of 18 literature--studies exploring general greenhouse gas mitigation feedbacks to society, assessments of 19 mitigation implications on specific societal objectives other than climate, and literature evaluating mitigation 20 implications specifically for sustainable development objectives (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3, Chapter 4, Chapter 21 17). In general, mitigation alters development opportunities by constraining the emissions future society can 22 produce, which affects markets, resource allocation, economic structure, income distribution, consumers, and 23 the environment (besides climate) (very high confidence). Examples of general development feedbacks from 24 mitigation, include estimated price changes, macroeconomic costs, and low carbon energy and land system 25 transformations (e.g., WGIII AR6 Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) (Fisher et al., 2007; Clarke et al., 2014; Popp et 26 al., 2014; Rose et al., 2014; Weyant and Kriegler, 2014; Bauer et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Examples of 27 mitigation implications for specific other variables of societal interest include evaluating potential effects on 28 air pollutant emissions, crop prices, water, and land use change (e.g., McCollum et al., 2018b; Roy et al., 29 2018), while the literature evaluating mitigation implications specifically for sustainable development 30 objectives includes evaluations on energy access, food security, and income equality (e.g., Roy et al., 2018; 31 Arneth et al., 2019; Mbow et al., 2019). Proxy indicators are frequently used to represent whether there 32 might be implications for a sustainable development objective. For example, changes in energy prices are 33 used as a proxy for effects on energy security (e.g., Roy et al., 2018). This is common with aggregate 34 modelling studies, like those associated with global or regional emissions scenarios and energy systems. 35 36 Figure 18.5, derived from WGIII scenarios data, illustrates estimated relationships between mitigation and 37 various sustainable development proxy variables for different global regions. Figure 18.5 illustrates 38 synergies and trade-offs with mitigation, as well as regional heterogeneity, that can intensify with the level 39 of climate ambition--synergies in air pollutants, such as black carbon, NOx, and SO2; and trade-offs in 40 overall economic development, household consumption, food crop prices, and energy prices for electricity 41 and natural gas. For comparison, recent IPCC assessments also observed similar synergies and trade-offs but 42 did not directly make comparisons regarding overall development nor evaluate potential climates above 2癈 43 (Rogelj et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018; Mbow et al., 2019). Regional non-linearity in the economic costs of 44 mitigation with greater climate ambition (i.e., costs rising at an increasing rate with lower warming goals) 45 can be significant within individual models (Rose and Scott, 2018; Rose and Scott, 2020). Figure 18.5 also 46 illustrates transition risks in the potential for significant synergistic and trade-off implications with, for 47 instance, potentially large regional commodity price implications and household consumption losses, as well 48 as more significant air pollution benefits. Note that the 1.5癈 results in Figure 18.5 (and Table 18.2) are 49 biased by model infeasibilities. Many models are unable to solve, especially with less optimistic 50 assumptions, resulting in small sample sizes and a different representation of models compared to the 2癈 51 and higher results. 52 53 Results like those in Figure 18.5 illustrate that mitigation-development trade-offs and balancing of societal 54 priorities are inevitable and need to be considered. For instance, Roy (2018) found that none of the 1.5癈 and 55 2癈 pathways assessed achieved all of the UN's Sustainable Develop Goals (SDGs). A newer literature is 56 developing evaluating the potential for managing SDG trade-offs. For instance, Roy et al. (2018) discuss the 57 potential for policies that address distributional implications, such as payments, food support, revenue Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-35 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 recycling, as well as education, retraining, and technology outreach, subsidies, or prioritization. Recent 2 studies have begun to estimate potential payments to offset trade-offs, such as related to food, water, and 3 energy access (e.g., McCollum et al., 2018a). These analyses estimate investments to address specific trade- 4 offs; however, with mitigation redirecting resources away from other productive activities, there is a need to 5 also evaluate the aggregate economy-wide, distributional, and welfare effects, including the redistribution 6 effects of managing sustainable development trade-offs. 7 8 There are a wide range of mitigation options and systems to consider, with assessment suggesting that a 9 diverse portfolio is practical for pursing climate policy ambitions. However, local context will impact 10 mitigation choices, with unique sustainable development priorities, available mitigation options, sustainable 11 development synergies and trade-offs, and policy design and implementation possibilities. 12 13 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-36 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 18.2: Emissions pathway regional characteristics from WGIII scenarios database for pathways associated with different global warming levels (1.5癈, 2癈, 3癈, and 4癈). 2 Sample sizes: n = 13-15, 151-160, 66, and 34 emissions pathways for 1.5癈, 2癈, 3癈, and 4癈 global warming levels respectively. Sample size ranges for the same warming level 3 indicate that the sample size varies by variable due to differences in model reporting. Sample size varies by warming level due to model infeasibilities and differences in model 4 reporting. Peak Variable global Asia Latin America Middle East / Africa OECD Reforming Economies warming to 2100 1.5癈 2020 2010 to 2030 2010 to 2030 2010 to 2020 2015 to 2030 Peak CO2 emissions 2癈 2015 to 2030 2010 to 2035 2010 to 2030 2010 to 2020 2015 to 2030 year 3癈 2020 to 2080 2010 to 2100 2030 to 2100 2010 to 2002 2015 to 2100 4癈 2030 to 2100 2010 to 2100 2070 to 2100 2010 to 2100 2040 to 2100 Peak Asia Latin America Middle East / Africa OECD Reforming Economies Variable global 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 2030 2050 warming to 2100 1.5癈 -36 to 10% -89 to -55% -61 to 19% -98 to 68% -26 to 40% -73 to -41% -56 to -24% -96 to -78% -42 to 14% -95 to -48% Net CO2 emissions (% 2癈 -31 to 50% -89 to -29% -62 to 31% -98 to -3% -30 to 67% -66 to 8% -50 to -11% -96 to -48% -52 to 33% -105 to -27% from 2010) 3癈 10 to 50% -5 to 69% -58 to 16% -132 to 50% 7 to 84% 37 to 158% -44 to 2% -69 to -12% -18 to 34% -35 to 41% 4癈 26 to 80% 18 to 205% -49 to 26% -41 to 36% 19 to 121% 78 to 225% -30 to 8% -55 to 5% -13 to 36% 0 to 77% 1.5癈 9 to 57% 1 to 87% 18 to 68% 17 to 146% 31 to 57% 51 to 91% -16 to 8% -43 to 3% -21 to 10% -41 to 21% Energy consumption 2癈 17 to 91% 16 to 130% 3 to 72% 8 to 162% 18 to 82% 42 to 145% -16 to 10% -36 to 25% -15 to 37% -33 to 29% growth (% from 2010) 3癈 43 to 80% 70 to 129% -9 to 74% 17 to 170% 21 to 82% 81 to 174% -16 to 13% -28 to 21% -3 to 37% -6 to 86% 4癈 47 to 109% 88 to 245% 20 to 65% 36 to 163% 47 to 95% 94 to 254% -9 to 7% -15 to 31% -8 to 37% -4 to 66% 1.5癈 -23 to 39% -51 to 7% -12 to 47% -66 to 30% -4 to 40% -38 to -2% -47 to -9% -86 to -40% -38 to 5% -85 to -17% Fossil energy use growth 2癈 -33 to 66% -73 to 18% -20 to 65% -78 to 63% -6 to 71% -78 to 61% -47 to -8% -78 to -28% -51 to 31% -84 to 18% (% from 2010 3癈 15 to 70% 29 to 103% -20 to 65% -10 to 124% 7 to 79% 31 to 158% -37 to 3% -61 to 3% -24 to 32% -26 to 43% 4癈 38 to 112% 39 to 264% 12 to 63% 24 to 176% 41 to 115% 103 to 301% -26 to -5% -45 to 10% -14 to 29% -5 to 66% 1.5癈 58 to 178% 141 to 463% 86 to 156% 275 to 430% 95 to 155% 296 to 791% 3 to 26% 32 to 103% 2 to 45% 45 to 173% Electricity consumption 2癈 41 to 232% 109 to 580% 11 to 156% 68 to 489% 27 to 172% 88 to 749% -2 to 35% 16 to 143% -8 to 112% 18 to 187% growth (% from 2010) 3癈 57 to 198% 126 to 472% 34 to 129% 140 to 364% 75 to 175% 260 to 600% -3 to 39% 15 to 128% 3 to 112% 38 to 221% 4癈 107 to 243% 203 to 568% 49 to 127% 157 to 416% 87 to 200% 332 to 752% 10 to 33% 20 to 88% 36 to 83% 78 to 190% Electricity share of 1.5癈 -6 to 67% 12 to 166% 26 to 47% 61 to 181% 24 to 70% 100 to 258% -2 to 21% 23 to 126% -14 to 39% 9 to 145% energy consumption 2癈 -10 to 69% 2 to 156% -13 to 79% -1 to 161% -9 to 72% 10 to 227% -11 to 22% 11 to 121% -18 to 57% -11 to 143% growth (% from 2010) 3癈 -7 to 69% 5 to 134% -9 to 79% 20 to 146% -4 to 80% 42 to 149% -12 to 33% -12 to 57% 6 to 100% 4癈 28 to 66% 40 to 120% 18 to 44% 46 to 95% 30 to 55% 87 to 142% 4 to 25% 7 to 87% 27 to 59% 43 to 98% 13 to 69% 5 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-37 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 18.5: Implications of mitigation for different global mean temperature outcomes on various development and 3 sustainable development proxy variables. Example of 2050 global implications of mitigation for different global mean 4 temperature outcomes on various development and sustainable development proxy variables. Developed from the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-38 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 scenarios associated with (Bauer et al., 2018). Data sample sizes (not shown, but to be added) vary across temperature 2 levels and variables due to model infeasibilities and model differences in reporting. 3 4 5 18.2.5.3 Combining adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development options 6 7 In practice, adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development interventions are likely to be implemented 8 in portfolio packages rather than as individual discrete options in isolation (high agreement, limited 9 evidence). However, there is a dearth of literature estimating optimal portfolios of global adaptation and 10 mitigation strategies. This is not surprising given the geographic-specific nature of climate impacts and 11 adaptation and the information and computational complexity of representing that detail, as well as 12 mitigation options and interactions. There are, however, different literatures relevant to considering potential 13 combinations of adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development. 14 15 At the most aggregate level, there is a long-standing literature exploring economically optimal global trade- 16 offs between climate risks and mitigation (e.g., Manne and Richels, 1992; Nordhaus, 2017; Rose, 2017), as 17 well as global stochastic analysis exploring global risk hedging for a small number of uncertainties (e.g., 18 (Lemoine and Traeger, 2014). Recent work has found optimal global emissions and climate pathways to be 19 highly sensitive to uncertainties and plausible alternative assumptions, with uncertainties throughout the 20 causal chain from society to emissions to climate to climate damages shown to imply a wide range of 21 different possible economically optimal pathways (Rose, 2017). Among other things, this work identifies 22 assumptions consistent with limiting warming to different temperature levels. For example, the combination 23 of potential annual climate damages of 15% of global GDP at 4癈 of warming and a less sensitive climate 24 system were consistent with an economically efficient global pathway limiting warming to 2癈. In addition, 25 this work highlights the importance of characterizing and managing uncertainties. These types of global 26 aggregate analyses inform discussions regarding long-run global pathways and goals but are of limited value 27 to local near-term planning. 28 29 As discussed in Section 18.2.5.3.1, there are synergies and trade-offs mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable 30 development. For instance, the literature on the global cost-effectiveness of mitigation pathways provides 31 insights regarding aggregate synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable development (e.g., 32 Figure 18.5). Furthermore, linkages between mitigation and adaptation options have been shown, such as 33 expected changes in energy demand due to climate change interacting with energy system development and 34 mitigation options, changes in future agricultural production practices to manage the risks of potential 35 changes in weather patterns affecting land based emissions and mitigation strategies, or mitigation strategies 36 placing additional demands on resources and markets which increases pressure on and costs for adaptation, 37 or ecosystem restoration that provides carbon sequestration and natural and managed ecosystem resiliency 38 benefits, but also could constrain mitigation and impact consumer welfare (WGIII AR6). 39 40 Non-linearities are an important consideration in evaluating risk management combinations. Non-linearities 41 have been estimated in global and regional mitigation costs and potential economic damages from climate 42 change (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3; (Clarke et al., 2014; Burke et al., 2015; Rose, 2017). Non-linear mitigation 43 costs mean increasingly higher costs for each additional incremental reduction in emissions (or incremental 44 reduction in global average temperature). Non-linear estimated economic climate damage means 45 increasingly higher damages for each additional incremental increase in climate change (e.g., global average 46 temperature) (very high confidence). Non-linearities are also suggested in estimated changes in key risks and 47 adaptation costs (Chapter 16, WGII sector and regional chapters). However, to date, they have not been as 48 explicitly characterized. These non-linearities imply non-linearities in climate risk management synergies 49 and trade-offs with sustainable development. Not only do trade-offs vary by climate level, as do synergies, 50 but they increase at an increasing rate and their relative importance can shift across climate levels (very high 51 confidence). Some of this is evident in results like those shown in Figure 18.5 for mitigation (keeping in 52 mind differences in sample sizes across temperature levels). Uncertainty about the degree of non-linearity in 53 mitigation, climate damages, key risks, and adaptation costs creates uncertainties in the strength of the trade- 54 offs and synergies, but also represents opportunities. For instance, additional mitigation options and more 55 economically efficient policy designs have been shown to reduce mitigation costs and the non-linearities in 56 mitigation costs (very high confidence) (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3). The same is true for adaptation options and 57 adaptation costs. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-39 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Infeasibilities of mitigation and adaptation options (Section 18.4.2.2.1 and 18.4.2.2.2), as well as global 3 pathways (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3), are also relevant to consideration of combinations of risk management 4 options. Infeasibility of options implies higher costs and greater cost non-linearity due to fewer and/or more 5 expensive options, while infeasibility of pathways bounds some of the uncertainty about the pathways 6 relevant to decision-making and planning. 7 8 18.2.5.3.1 Trade-offs in adaptation, mitigation, and climate-resilient development 9 Since AR5, a growing body of literature has emerged that frames adaptation processes as endogenous 10 socioeconomic dynamics, exogenous driving forces, and explicit decisions (Barnett et al., 2014; Maru et al., 11 2014; Butler et al., 2016; Kingsborough et al., 2016; Werners et al., 2018). Central to this framing is a shift 12 away from viewing adaptation as discrete sets of options that are selected and implemented to manage risk, 13 to thinking about adaptation as a social process that evolves over time, includes multiple decision-points, and 14 requires dynamic adjustments in response to new information about climate risk, socioeconomic conditions, 15 and the value of potential adaptation responses (very high confidence) (Haasnoot et al., 2013; Wise et al., 16 2016). This aligns adaptation with aspects of development thinking, including questions around the capacity 17 and agency of different actors to effect change, the governance of adaptation, and the contingent nature of 18 adaptation needs and effectiveness on the future evolution of society and climate change risk. 19 20 While ensuring development and adaptation produce synergies that allow for the achievement of sustainable 21 development is challenging, modelling exercises suggest that there are pathways where synergies among the 22 SDGs are realized (very high confidence) (Roy et al., 2018; Van Vuuren et al., 2019) (18.5), particularly if 23 longer time-horizons are used. These pathways require progress on multiple social, economic, technological, 24 institutional, and governance aspects of development including building human capacity, managing 25 consumption behavior, decarbonization of the global economy, improving food and water security, 26 modernizing cities and infrastructure, and innovations in science and technology (Van Vuuren et al., 2019) 27 (18.3). In addition, Olsson et al, (Olsson et al., 2014) and Roy et al. (2018) emphasize the importance of 28 integrating considerations for social justice and equity in the pursuit of sustainable development (Gupta and 29 Pouw, 2017). 30 31 The significant overlaps and linkages between development and adaptation practice and a lack of conceptual 32 clarity about adaptation pose a conundrum for scholars (e.g., Bassett and Fogelman, 2013; Webber, 2016), 33 who raise concerns that this potentially leads to trade-offs or mislabeling (Few et al., 2017). This framing of 34 adaptation and development can result in competition between attainment of sustainable development and 35 policies to reduce the impacts of climate change (Ribot, 2011). Such trade-offs are illustrated by (Moyer and 36 Bohl, 2019) who use a baseline development trajectory based on current trends to project progress on SDGs 37 by 2030. This work concluded that only marginal gains are likely to be achieved under that pathway over the 38 next decade (Barnes et al., 2019). 39 40 Emerging evidence also suggests that many adaptation-labelled strategies may exacerbate existing poverty 41 and vulnerability or introduce new inequalities, for example by affecting certain disadvantaged groups more 42 than others, even to the point of protecting the wealthy elite at the expense of the most vulnerable (Eriksen et 43 al., 2019). Pelling et al. (2016) find that adaptation has been conceived and implemented in such a manner 44 that most projects preserve rather than challenge the status quo. Specifically, the potential for knowledge and 45 the goals of adaptation to be contested by different actors and stakeholders and the need to sustain progress 46 over extended periods of time can constrain the ability to effectively implement actions that lead to 47 sustainable development outcomes that are protected from the impacts of climate change while also 48 delivering climate mitigation outcomes, that is, for climate resilient development (Bosomworth et al., 2017; 49 Bloemen et al., 2019). This creates the possibility for specific adaptation actions to result in outcomes that 50 undermine greenhouse gas mitigation and/or broader development goals (Fazey et al., 2016; Wise et al., 51 2016; Magnan et al., 2020). For example, a study in Bangladesh revealed how local elites and donors used 52 adaptation projects as a lever to push vulnerable populations away from their agrarian livelihoods and into 53 uncertain urban wage labour (Paprocki, 2018). These types of outcomes are categorised as maladaptation, 54 interventions that increase rather than decrease vulnerability, and/or undermine or eradicate future 55 opportunities for adaptation and development (Barnett and O'Neill, 2010; Juhola et al., 2015; Magnan et al., 56 2016; Antwi-Agyei et al., 2017; Schipper, 2020). This inadvertent impact on equity appears to 57 fundamentally contradict a benevolent understanding of transformative adaptation that also champions social Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-40 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 justice (Patterson et al., 2018), thus posing long-term maladaptation in opposition to transformative 2 adaptation (Magnan et al., 2020). 3 4 Similarly, mitigation efforts, while reducing emissions, can also increase climate impacts vulnerability and 5 undermine adaptation efforts. The same can be said for some poverty alleviation and sustainable 6 development efforts that increase vulnerability for specific segments of the population. For example, in 7 Central America, an evaluation of twelve rural renewable energy projects (either for CDM, early warning 8 systems or rural electrification goals) found that some mitigation and poverty alleviation projects increased 9 vulnerability to families--by excluding them, not adhering to local safety and quality codes and standards, or 10 significantly altering community power dynamics and contributing to conflict (Ley, 2017; Ley et al., 2020). 11 12 Synergies between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development might be promoted by prioritizing 13 those CRD strategies most likely to generate synergies (very high confidence) (Roy et al., 2018; Karlsson et 14 al., 2020). This could include focusing on poverty alleviation that improves adaptive capacity (e.g., Kaya and 15 Chinsamy, 2016; Kuper et al., 2017; Ley, 2017; S醤chez and Izzo, 2017; Staczuk-Galwiaczek et al., 2018; 16 Ley et al., 2020); renewable energy systems that improve water management and preservation of river 17 ecological integrity (e.g., Berga, 2016; Rasul and Sharma, 2016); or internalizing positive externalities, such 18 as subsidies for mitigation options thought to also improve water use efficiency (e.g., Roy et al., 2018). 19 Similarly, trade-offs might be managed by prioritizing strategies such as disqualifying mitigation options 20 thought to have negative social implications (Section 18.2.5.3.1), internalizing externalities, such as placing 21 a fee or constraint on a negative externality or related activity (e.g., WGIII AR6 Chapter 13) (Bistline and 22 Rose, 2018), or using complementary policies, such as transfer payments to offset negative mitigation, 23 adaptation, or sustainable development strategy implications (very high confidence) (e.g., McCollum et al., 24 2018b). Roy et al. (2018) discusses the latter, noting, for instance, the possibility of complementary 25 sustainable development payments to avoid global energy access, food security, and clean water trade-offs. 26 27 SR1.5 and AR6 assessments of system transitions also find opportunities for synergies and managing trade- 28 offs (18.3; Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB). Within each system, mitigation and adaptation options are assessed 29 for their specific benefits and the impacts they can have on one another, as well as with sustainable 30 development. For example, within energy system transitions, the three adaptation options (power 31 infrastructure resilience, reliability of power systems, efficient water use management) have strong synergies 32 with mitigation. While not all mitigation options have strong synergies, the trade-offs can be managed when 33 adaptation and sustainable development goals are also considered. Under land and other ecosystems system 34 transitions, the main trade-off is the competition for land-use between potential alternative uses, e.g., 35 sustainable agriculture, afforestation/reforestation, purpose-grown biomass for energy. On the other hand, 36 assessment of urban and infrastructure system transitions finds mainly synergies between mitigation and 37 adaptation options with trade-offs that are considered manageable, and there is growing evidence of rural 38 landscape infrastructure benefits to adaptation. 39 40 Overall, this literature is relatively new and still developing. It highlights the importance of sets of societal 41 priorities and policy design. However, it is not well developed in terms of joint optimization of multiple 42 priorities, evaluating alternative mechanisms and shifts in trade-offs, and evaluating redistribution 43 implications with transfers. 44 45 18.2.5.3.2 Risk management combinations with lower to higher climate change 46 The different strands of literature discussed above can be integrated to help inform thinking about 47 combinations of approaches to risk management. Globally, low climate change projections, versus higher 48 climate change projections, imply greater mitigation, lower climate risks, and less adaptation. This implies 49 greater mitigation trade-offs in terms of overall economic development, food crop prices, energy prices, and 50 overall household consumption, but lower climate risk, with sustainable development synergies like human 51 health and lower adaptation trade-offs, and an uneven distribution of effects (very high confidence) (Roy et 52 al., 2018). 53 54 Sustainable development considerations could be used to prioritize mitigation options, but as noted earlier 55 there are trade-offs, with a potentially significant impact on the economic cost of mitigation, as well as a 56 potential trade-off in terms of the climate outcomes that are still viable (WGIII AR6 Chapter 3). For 57 instance, all of the 1.5癈 scenarios used in IPCC (2018a) deploy carbon dioxide removal technologies Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-41 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 (Rogelj et al., 2018). Without these technologies, most models cannot generate pathways that limit warming 2 to 1.5癈, and those that do adopt strong assumptions about global policy development and socioeconomic 3 changes. Sustainable development might also affect the design of policies by prioritizing specific sustainable 4 development objectives. However, there are trade-offs here as well, with costs and the distribution of costs 5 varying with alternative policy designs. For instance, prioritizing air quality has climate co-benefits but does 6 not ensure the lowest cost climate strategy (Arneth et al., 2009; Kandlikar et al., 2009). Similarly, 7 prioritizing land protection has a variety of co-benefits but could increase food prices significantly, as well as 8 the overall cost of climate mitigation (IPCC, 2019b). In this context with lower climate risk and adaptation 9 levels and larger mitigation effort, managing mitigation trade-offs could be a sustainable development 10 priority. Furthermore, sustainable development could also be tailored to facilitate adaptation as well as 11 manage mitigation costs. 12 13 Globally, high climate change projections imply lower mitigation effort, higher climate risks, and greater 14 adaptation. This implies lower mitigation trade-offs, but greater climate risk with greater demand of 15 adaptation and potential for trade-offs in terms of competing sustainable development priorities. Sustainable 16 development considerations could affect adaptation options. For instance, constraining options such as 17 relocation or facilitating adaptation capacity and community resilience. Sustainable development might also 18 be tailored to affect the climate outcome by shaping the development of emissions. In this context with 19 greater climate risk and adaptation levels and less mitigation effort, facilitating adaptation and managing 20 adaptation costs and trade-offs could be a sustainable development priority. 21 22 Locally, there are many qualitative similarities to the global perspective in thinking about risk management 23 combinations across lower versus higher climates. However, there is one very important difference. Local 24 decision makers are confronted with uncertainty about what others will do beyond their local jurisdiction. 25 With future climate a function of the sum of global decisions, sustainable development planning needs to 26 consider the possibility of more and less emissions reduction action globally and the potential associated 27 climates. This implies the need for sustainable development to manage for the possibility of higher climates 28 by further facilitating adaptation and managing adaptation trade-offs. Prioritizing sustainable development 29 locally is also supported by the insight that the impacts on poverty depend at least as much or more on 30 development than on the level of climate change (very high confidence) (Wiebe et al., 2015; Hallegatte and 31 Rozenberg, 2017). 32 33 There is nothing in the current literature to suggest that CRD is necessarily associated with a specific climate 34 outcome, like limiting global average warming 1.5癈 or 2癈, or a specific pathway. Instead, there are many 35 possible pathways for climate-resilient development (medium agreement, limited evidence) (e.g., David 36 T郻ara et al., 2018; O'Brien, 2018). The current literature suggests that different mixes of adaptation and 37 mitigation strategies, and sustainable development and trade-off management priorities, measures, and 38 reallocations (Section 18.5.3.1), will be appropriate for different expected climates and locations (18.1.2); 39 while trade-offs between climates will be dictated by relative non-linearities, feasibilities, shifts in priorities, 40 and trade-off and reallocation options across future climates. 41 42 Finally, it is important to note that there is currently limited information available regarding the following: 43 (1) local implications of 1.5癈 versus warmer futures with respect to avoided impacts and sustainable 44 development implications and interactions and applying global conclusions to local, national, and regional 45 settings can be misleading, (2) local context-specific synergies and trade-offs with respect to adaptation, 46 mitigation, and sustainable development for 1.5癈 futures, and (3) standard indicators for monitoring factors 47 related to CRD (Roy et al., 2018). 48 49 50 18.3 Transitions to Climate Resilient Development 51 52 A key finding emerging from the IPCC SR1.5 is the critical role that system transitions play in enabling 53 mitigation pathways consistent with a 1.5癈 or less world (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b).Such transitions are 54 similarly critical for the broader pursuit of climate-resilient development, and the various AR6 special 55 reports as well as subsequent literature provide new evidence of why such transitions are needed for CRD, as 56 well as both the opportunities for accelerating system transitions and their limitations for delivering on the 57 goals of CRD. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-42 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 18.3.1 System Transitions as a Foundation for Climate Resilient Development 3 4 In the AR6, system transitions are defined as "the process of changing (the system in focus) from one state or 5 condition to another in a given period of time" (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b). In the climate change solution 6 space, system transitions represent an important mechanism for linking and enabling mitigation, adaptation, 7 and sustainable development options and actions (very high confidence). SR1.5C identified the need for 8 rapid and far-reaching transitions in four systems � energy, land and terrestrial ecosystems, urban and 9 infrastructure, and industrial systems (IPCC, 2018b; IPCC, 2018a) (1.5.1 and 18.1). The SRCCL expanded 10 on this with a focus on terrestrial systems, while SROCC added additional evidence from ocean and 11 cryosphere systems. This section assesses the four system transitions discussed in the SR1.5C assessment in 12 the context of CRD, while also extending the assessment to consider societal transitions as a cross-cutting, 13 fifth transition important for climate-resilient development. Literature to support this assessment is also 14 drawn from AR6 regional and sectoral chapters, which is synthesized later in this chapter (18.5). 15 16 As discussed in Box 18.3 (H鰈scher et al., 2018), system transitions are linked to system transformation, 17 which is defined as "a change in the fundamental attributes of a system including altered goals or values" 18 (Figure 18.1) (IPCC, 2018a). In a systems context, transitions focus on `complex adaptive systems; social, 19 institutional and technological change in societal sub-systems', while transformations are "large scale 20 societal change processes ... involving social-ecological interactions" (IPCC, 2018a) (Box 18.1). Although 21 system transitions are often identified in the literature as being necessary processes for large-scale 22 transformations (Roggema et al., 2012; H鰈scher et al., 2018), thereby making them a core enabler of CRD. 23 Yet, they are not necessarily transformative in themselves. 24 25 18.3.1.1 Energy Systems 26 Recent observed changes in global energy systems include continued growth in energy demand, led by 27 increased demand for electricity by industry and buildings (very high confidence) (AR6 WGIII Chapter 2). 28 Growth in energy demand has also been driven by increased demand for industrial products, materials, 29 building energy services, floor space, and all modes of transportation. This growth in demand, however, has 30 been moderated by improvements in energy efficiency in industry, buildings, and transportation sectors (very 31 high confidence) (AR6 WGIII Chapter 2). There is also a trend of moving away from coal towards cleaner 32 fuels, due to lower natural gas prices and lower cost renewable technologies, and structural changes away 33 from more energy-intensive industry. 34 35 Features of sustainable development such as enhanced energy access, energy security, reductions in air 36 pollution, and economic growth continue to be the dominant influence on the evolution of energy systems 37 and decision-making regarding energy investments and portfolios (very high confidence) (WGIII AR6 38 Chapter 6). To date, climate policy has been comparatively less influential in driving energy transitions 39 globally. Yet, there are examples at the local, regional, and national level of policy incentivizing rapid 40 changes in energy systems (very high confidence) (WGIII AR6 Chapter 6). Many sustainable development 41 priorities have co-benefits in terms of climate mitigation, such as air pollution and conservation policies 42 reducing short-lived climate forcers and sequestering carbon respectively, as well adaptation benefits, such 43 as improved energy access and environmental quality enhancing adaptive capacity (very high confidence) 44 (WGIII AR6 Chapter 6) (de Coninck et al., 2018). Alternatively, sustainable development projects can have 45 negative climate implications with, for instance, hydroelectric projects shut down by droughts or floods 46 resulting in greater use of bunker and fuel oil, as well as natural gas. 47 48 In addition to sustainable development priorities driving change in energy systems, observed energy system 49 trends have implications for sustainable development (e.g., IEA et al., 2019). Observed changes in energy 50 system size, rate of growth, composition and operations impact energy access, equity, environmental quality 51 and wellbeing, with both synergies and trade-offs, including recent improvements in global access to 52 affordable, reliable, and modern energy services. For instance, in some countries, such as the United States, 53 there has been a significant shift away from coal as a fuel source for electricity generation in favor of natural 54 gas. More recently, however, renewables have emerged as the dominant form of new electricity generation 55 (Gielen et al., 2019). Similarly, for energy access in developing countries, renewable energy or hybrid 56 distributed generation systems are increasingly being prioritized due to challenges associated with access, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-43 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 costs and environmental impacts from traditional fossil fuel-based energy technologies (Mulugetta et al., 2 2019). 3 4 Energy systems have been a historical driver of climate change, but are also adversely affected by climate 5 change impacts, including short-term shocks and stressors from extreme weather as well as long-term shifts 6 in climatic conditions (very high confidence). The potential for such factors is often incorporated into local 7 system designs, operations, and response strategies. There have been changes in observed weather and 8 extreme event hazards for the energy system, but to date many are not attributable solely to anthropogenic 9 climate change (USGCRP, 2017; IPCC, 2021a). Nevertheless, with observed extremes shifting outside of 10 what has been observed historically, existing design criteria and operations may not be optimal for future 11 climate conditions and contingencies (Chapter 16; sectoral and regional chapters). Overall, there is limited 12 historical evidence on the efficacy of adaptation responses in reducing vulnerability of energy systems (high 13 agreement, limited evidence). However, sustainable development trends, such as improving incomes, 14 reducing poverty, and improving health and education have reduced vulnerability (Chapter 16), and 15 improvements in system resiliency to extreme weather events and more efficient water management have 16 occurred that have synergies with adaptation and sustainable development in general. 17 18 Available literature indicates that greenhouse gas emissions reductions have been achieved in response to 19 climate actions including financial incentives to promote renewable energy, carbon taxes and emissions 20 trading, removal of fossil fuel subsidies, and promotion of energy efficiency standards (very high 21 confidence) (WGIII AR6 Chapter 6). Such policies tend to lead to a lower carbon intensity of GDP, due to 22 structural changes in the use of energy and the adoption of new energy technologies. However, other drivers 23 of change are also present and thus ongoing energy transitions and their future evolution are a response to 24 both climatic and non-climatic considerations, with broader sustainable development priorities being a 25 significant driver of change (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 6). 26 27 18.3.1.2 Urban and infrastructure systems 28 29 Urban areas their associated infrastructure are critical targets for CRD processes. This is a function of urban 30 areas being the dominant settlement pattern with over 55% of the global population living in cities (World 31 Bank, 2021). As a consequence, urban areas are also the focal point for energy use, land use change, and 32 consumption of natural resources, thereby making them responsible for an estimated 70% of global CO2 33 emissions (Johansson et al., 2012; Ribeiro et al., 2019). The trend toward increasing urbanization is 34 anticipated to create both challenges and opportunities for sustainable development, as well as climate action 35 (G黱eralp et al., 2017; Li et al., 2019a). 36 37 The built environment is increasingly exposed to climate stresses and more frequent co-occurrences of 38 climate shocks than in the past. This has the potential to increase rates of building and infrastructure 39 degradation, increase damage from extreme weather events. The existing adaptation gaps and everyday risks 40 within many cities, particularly those of the global South, combined with escalating risk from climate 41 change, makes rapid progress in enhancing urban resilience a high priority for CRD (Pelling et al., 2018; 42 Davidson et al., 2019; Lenzholzer et al., 2020). Strategic investments in disaster risk reduction, including 43 climate-resilient green infrastructure, updated building codes, and land use planning can provide significant 44 long-term cost savings and social benefits. Moreover, evaluating the relative merits of "fail safe" versus 45 "safe to fail" approaches to infrastructure planning can help to identify more design principles that are more 46 robust to the uncertainties of climate change and urbanization (Kim et al., 2017a; Kim et al., 2019). 47 48 Much of the literature on urban resilience and sustainability focuses on addressing discrete challenges for 49 urban infrastructure sub-systems. Climate change has the potential to enhance stress on lifeline infrastructure 50 services such as the provision of electricity, water and wastewater, communications, and transportation � 51 sub-systems which often underdeveloped in many regions of the world (Arku and Marais, 2021; Sitas et al., 52 2021). For example, a warming and more variable climate can increase stress on electricity grids by reducing 53 transmission efficiency, increasing cooling demand requirements, and by increasing exposure to climate 54 shocks such as heat waves, floods, and storms (Bartos and Chester, 2015; Auffhammer et al., 2017; Perera et 55 al., 2020). Accordingly a significant focus on the energy transition is on achieving the dual goals of reducing 56 the carbon footprint of energy while also increasing resilience of energy supply to current and future threats. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-44 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 For example, renewable energy generation and storage technologies that modular and distributed and 2 provide enhanced resilience to shocks and stresses from climate change (Venema and Temmer, 2017a). 3 4 Similarly, building and maintaining urban water systems that are resilient to climate shocks requires 5 significant changes in water demand, infrastructure, and management. Enhancing redundancy in water 6 supply and the flexibility to shift between surface and groundwater options aids adaptation. Decentralized 7 water supply and sanitation options are now feasible and can provide greater resilience than most centralized 8 systems (Parry, 2017), provided they have adequate supply (Leigh and Lee, 2019; Rabaey et al., 2020). 9 Water conservation and green infrastructure options for stormwater management are proven approaches for 10 reducing climate risks (Venema and Temmer, 2017b), with adaptation and mitigation co-benefits. Water 11 demand management and rainwater harvesting contribute to climate change mitigation and increase adaptive 12 capacity by increasing resilience to climate change impacts such as drought and flooding (Paton et al., 2014; 13 Berry et al., 2015). In addition, they can contribute to restoring urban ecosystems that offer multiple 14 ecosystem services to citizens (Berry et al., 2015) (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 8). The context-appropriate 15 development of green spaces, protecting ecosystem services and developing nature-based solutions, can 16 increase the set of available urban adaptation options (IPCC, 2018b), while creating opportunities for more 17 complex and dynamic approaches to urban water management (Franco-Torres et al., 2020). For example, the 18 Netherlands' `Room for the River' policy focuses on ont only achieving higher flood resilience, but also 19 improving the quality of riverine areas for human and ecological wellbeing (Busscher et al., 2019). 20 21 An overarching focus of urban sustainability is the reversal of long-standing trends of ecosystem 22 fragmentation and degradation that have resulted in growing separation between human and natural systems 23 within urban environments (IPBES, 2019) (see WGIII AR6 Chapter 8). Urban ecosystems and the 24 integration of nature-based solutions and green infrastructure into urban areas can yield benefits that 25 facilitate achievement of the SDGs. There has been growing recognition of urban ecosystems as social, 26 cultural, and economic assets that can support economic development while also enhancing resilience to 27 extreme weather events and improving air and water quality (Shaneyfelt et al., 2017; Matos et al., 2019). 28 Investing in urban ecosystems and green infrastructure can provide lower-cost solutions to multiple urban 29 development challenges when compared to traditional infrastructure systems (Terton, 2017). Relatedly, 30 agriculture, while largely a rural system, is increasingly expanding within urban areas. Urban agriculture 31 enables citizens to fulfil some of their food needs, improving urban resilience to food shortages, enhancing 32 biodiversity, and increasing coping capacity during disasters (Demuzere et al., 2014; Clucas et al., 2018) (see 33 WGIII AR6 Chapter 8). Strengthening urban agroecosystems therefore increases resilience to supply shocks 34 from climate change impacts and can contribute to community cohesion (Temmer, 2017a). 35 36 Overall, the discourse in the literature regarding the future of cities emphasizes the importance of viewing 37 cities as more than just their physical infrastructure that can be made more resilient through engineering 38 solutions (Davidson et al., 2019). Rather, urban areas are increasingly conceptualized as complex 39 socioecological or sociotechnical systems (very high confidence) (Patorniti et al., 2017; Patorniti et al., 2018; 40 Visvizi et al., 2018; Savaget et al., 2019). Such frameworks integrate physical, cyber, social, and ecological 41 elements of cities in pursuit of resilience and sustainability transitions, and they recognize the role of 42 governance and engagement processes as being central to system change (Temmer, 2017b). Nevertheless, 43 some authors have cautioned that urban transitions will be associated with synergies as well as trade-offs 44 with respect to sustainable development (very high confidence) (Maes et al., 2019; Sharifi, 2020). 45 46 47 [START BOX 18.5 HERE] 48 49 Box 18.5: The Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for Climate Resilient Development 50 51 In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced plans for a grand transcontinental infrastructure initiative. 52 China would work with partner countries under two programs termed the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 53 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Together, these have come to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative 54 (BRI). Set to encompass 4.4 billion people and a cumulative GDP of around $21 trillion, the BRI has been 55 implemented in over 120 countries with wide infrastructure funding gaps, as exemplified by the China- 56 Myanmar Gas Pipeline, Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Trans-Mongolian Railway, China Belarus Industrial Park, 57 and urban rehabilitation in Ethiopia. Its stated objectives even extend beyond infrastructure connectivity to Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-45 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 include trade promotion, financial integration, policy coordination and cultural dialogue. Having been written 2 into the Communist Party's constitution in 2017, the BRI will be China's flagship international development 3 strategy for years to come. 4 5 The 126 countries participating in the BRI account for 23% of global GDP, but also 28% of global carbon 6 emissions (PBCSF, 2019). By 2050, even based on an optimistic scenario, the total carbon emission by these 7 countries will be 17% higher than what would be allowed under a 2癈 carbon budget (Duan et al., 2018). The 8 BRI covers regions with high reserve of carbon-based fuels and could have significant impact on global energy 9 consumption and carbon emission patterns. For example, according to the EIA statistics, the proven reserves 10 of oil, natural gas, and coal in nations under the BRI make up 58.8%, 79.9%, and 54.0% of the world's total 11 (China Meteorological Administration, 2019). 12 13 Meanwhile, countries along the BRI are highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change, spanning highly 14 diverse climate zones with fragile ecological conditions. Currently, many of the regions have a low level of 15 infrastructure development and high population densities (The People's Republic of China, 2017). Changes in 16 temperature, precipitation, vegetation and hydrological conditions could in turn pose threats to the 17 development and operation of infrastructure projects in these regions. Given the scope and scale of the BRI, a 18 key question is whether it will incentivize continued exploitation of available fossil fuel resources or provide 19 the innovation and economic development needed to transition participating nations to more resilient and less 20 carbon-intensive economies. 21 22 BRI and its commitment to climate resilient development (CRD) 23 24 Recognizing these feedbacks between the BRI and climate change, the Chinese government, included climate 25 change in developing the key guiding documents on BRI development in 2015. These include "taking into 26 consideration the impact of climate change, strengthening exchange and cooperation with countries along the 27 Belt and Road, leveraging the support and guarantee function of Chinese meteorological departments in 28 promoting the BRI" (NDRC, 2015). The second BRI Forum held in 2019 reiterated the importance of green 29 development "as the foundation of the BRI" and promoted green infrastructure development and green 30 investment, in addition to plans for increasing capacity in response to climate change, promoting low-carbon 31 infrastructure, energy source, climate-related disaster alarm system, climate finance integration, as well as 32 low-carbon technology development. 33 34 The Chinese Meteorological Administration, the governmental agency responsible for climate change related 35 issues, responded to BRI official guidelines by establishing BRI integrated meteorological service system and 36 proposed meteorological development plan 2017-2025 (China Meteorological Administration, 2019), which 37 includes policy coordination on climate change, promoting intergovernmental cooperation, completing BRI 38 disaster prevention and relief mechanisms, strengthening climate change support capacity, enhancing 39 prediction and evaluation capacity related with climate change (China Meteorological Administration, 2019). 40 China has established South-South cooperation in support of other countries to mitigate climate change. Efforts 41 have been made to promote joint research with countries along the BRI on regional climate change, climate 42 change prediction, and develop products in response to climate conditions in different regions. 43 44 The China Clean Development Mechanism Fund (CCDMF) is a national climate fund that supports low carbon 45 growth and climate resilience in China (UNFCCC, 2017). More than USD 81 million in grants committed to 46 support over 200 projects. A combination of funding enterprises, mobilizing market capital and achieving 47 verified emission reduction effects contributes to a direct reduction of over seven million tons of CO2 48 equivalent. Government representatives from Brazil, Vietnam, and Cambodia have already visited CCDMF to 49 learn more about this type of climate financing. 50 51 Trade-offs between BRI and CRD 52 Despite the implementation of such financing mechanisms for low-carbon development, their net effect is not 53 necessarily sufficient to offset the carbon footprint generated by overseas fossil fuel projects funded or 54 financed by China. As such, BRI stakeholders must navigate a number of trade-offs among different objectives 55 of the initiative. 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-46 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 For the Chinese government and state-owned enterprises, an immediate trade-off is that between the short- 2 term profits gained through carbon-intensive infrastructure investments overseas and long-term sustainable 3 development with the introduction of low-carbon technology in infrastructure development. On one hand, the 4 energy solutions that China proposes tend to involve carbon-intensive infrastructures such as coal factories, 5 which increases carbon emissions of these countries. But at the same time, China also provides climate finance 6 for these countries in support of renewable energy projects such as hydropower projects and solar panel 7 production facilities. 8 9 For the governments and people hosting BRI projects, the tradeoff is between short-term economic prosperity 10 and long-term sustainable development. Infrastructure development driven by carbon-intensive technologies 11 are cheaper and more consistent for developing countries (for example, electricity generated through coal- 12 based power plants is more consistent than that generated through hydropower stations), which is conducive 13 to more rapid industrialization of these countries, generating immediate urbanization and economic prosperity. 14 Yet the industrialization process would exacerbate carbon emission and accelerate the climate change process, 15 with long-term impact on food security, livelihood, migration, water demand, disease control, posing potential 16 hazards to sustainable development in these regions. 17 18 Winners and losers in incorporating CRD into BRI development 19 20 An emphasis on CRD within the BRI could create a number of opportunities for sustainable development. 21 For example, adherence to CRD principles of low-carbon development would incentive growth of renewable 22 energy, clean technologies, thereby growing the global market for such goods and services. This could have 23 significant benefits for developing nations of the BRI in terms of enabling sustainability transitions that 24 might otherwise not be feasible. However, a CRD orientation of the BRI would also have consequences for 25 fossil fuel and carbon-intensive industries. This could affect both private and state-owned enterprises in BRI 26 nations resulting in stranded assets, loss of some forms of employment. 27 28 [END BOX 18.5 HERE] 29 30 31 18.3.1.3 Land, Oceans, and Ecosystems 32 33 Land, oceans, and terrestrial ecosystems are in transition globally, with anthropogenic factors including 34 climate change being a major driving force (very high confidence) (IPBES, 2019) (Box 6). Seventy-five per 35 cent of the land surface has been significantly altered, 66 percent of the ocean area is experiencing increasing 36 cumulative impacts, and over 85 percent of wetland areas have been lost (IPBES, 2019). Since 1970, only 37 four out of eighteen recognized ecosystem services assessed have improved in their functioning: agricultural 38 production, fish harvest, bioenergy production and material harvests. The other 14 ecosystem services have 39 declined (IPBES, 2019), raising concerns about the capacity of ecosystems and their services to support 40 sustainable and climate-resilient development. 41 42 Given the pressures on land, oceans, and ecosystems, enhancing resilience to climate change and other 43 pressures of human development is a core priority of transition in these systems. Yet, there are a few 44 recorded initiatives that provide evidence of successful improvement in ecosystem resilience (high 45 agreement, limited evidence). Similarly, although there is significant evidence that a broad range of 46 adaptation initiatives have been pursued across global regions and sectors, including a rapid expansion of 47 nature- or ecosystem-based solutions (Mainali et al., 2020), there is limited evidence of how these planned 48 climate adaptation efforts have contributed to enhanced ecosystem resilience. Additional research is 49 necessary to evaluate these efforts in terms of their performance and also to identify mechanisms for scaling 50 them up in different contexts. As an example, Paik (Paik et al., 2020) record the increased diffusion of salt 51 tolerant rice varieties in the Mekong River Delta, which is at risk of sea-level rise and an associated saline 52 intrusion. This is a low-cost adaption to saline ingress, that increases food productivity and reduces the risk 53 of outmigration for this vulnerable agricultural region. 54 55 Evidence of the interactions between ecosystems and resilience come from a range of sources including both 56 regional and sectoral examples (Box 18.2; Tables 18.7�18.8. For example, regional examples suggest that 57 the use of land to produce biofuels could increase the resilience of production systems and address Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-47 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 mitigation needs (Box 2.2). Nevertheless, the potential of BECCS to induce maladaptation needs deeper 2 analysis (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019). Climate Smart Forestry (CSF) in Europe provides an example of the 3 use of sustainable forest management to unlock the EU's forest sector potential (Nabuurs et al., 2017). This 4 is in response to diverse climate impacts ranging from pressure on spruce stocks in Norway and the Baltics, 5 on regional biodiversity in the Mediterranean region, and the opportunity to use afforestation and 6 reforestation to store carbon in forests (Nabuurs et al., 2019). CSF considers the full value chain from forest 7 to wood products and energy and uses a wide range of measures to provide positive incentives to firmly 8 integrate climate objectives into the forestry sector. CSF has three main objectives; (i) reducing and/or 9 removing greenhouse gas emissions; (ii) adapting and building forest resilience to climate change; and (iii) 10 sustainably increasing forest productivity and incomes (Verkerk et al., 2020). 11 12 Other solutions focus on specific subsectors. Mutually supportive climate and land policies have the 13 potential to save resources, amplify social resilience, support ecological restoration, and foster engagement 14 and collaboration between multiple stakeholders. (IPCC, 2019f, C.1). Land-based solutions can combat 15 desertification in specific contexts: water harvesting and micro-irrigation, restoring degraded lands using 16 drought-resilient ecologically appropriate plants, agroforestry, and other agroecological and ecosystem-based 17 adaptation practices (IPCC, 2019f, B.4.1). Reducing dust and sand storms and sand dune movement can 18 lessen the negative effects of wind erosion and improve air quality and health. Depending on water 19 availability and soil conditions, afforestation, tree planting and ecosystem restoration programs, using native 20 and other climate resilient tree species with low water needs, can reduce sand storms, avert wind erosion, 21 and contribute to carbon sinks, while improving micro-climates, soil nutrients and water retention (IPCC, 22 2019f, B.4.2). 23 24 Coastal blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves, salt marshes and seagrasses, can help reduce the risks 25 and impacts of climate change, with multiple co-benefits. Over 150 countries contain at least one of these 26 coastal blue carbon ecosystems and over 70 contain all three. Successful implementation of measures of 27 carbon storage in coastal ecosystems could assist several countries in achieving a balance between emissions 28 and removal of greenhouse gases. Carbon storage in marine habitats can be up to 1,000 tC ha�1, higher than 29 most terrestrial ecosystems. Conservation of these habitats would also sustain a wide range of ecosystem 30 services, assist with climate adaptation by improving critical habitats for biodiversity, enhancing local 31 fishery production, and protect coastal communities from SLR and storm events (IPCC, 2019b). Ecosystem- 32 based adaptation is a cost-effective coastal protection tool that can have many co-benefits, including 33 supporting livelihoods, contributing to carbon sequestration and the provision of a range of other valuable 34 ecosystem services (IPCC, 2019b). 35 36 Diversification of food systems is another component of land, ocean, and ecosystem transitions that are 37 consistent with CRD. Balanced diets, featuring plant-based foods, such as those based on coarse grains, 38 legumes, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal-sourced food produced in resilient, sustainable 39 and low-GHG emission manner, are major opportunities for adaptation and mitigation and improving human 40 health. By 2050, dietary changes could free several million sq. km of land and provide a mitigation potential 41 of 0.7 to 8.0 GtCO2eq yr-1, relative to business-as-usual projections. 42 43 For coastal systems, many frameworks for climate resilience and adaptation have been developed since the 44 AR5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2014; Settele et al., 2014) with substantial variations in approach between and 45 within countries, and across development status. Few studies have assessed the success of implementing 46 these frameworks due to the time-lag between implementation, monitoring, evaluation and reporting (IPCC, 47 2019g). As an example, the Nature-Based Climate Solutions for Oceans initiative has the potential to: 48 restore, protect and manage coastal and marine ecosystems, adapt to climate change, improve coastal 49 resilience, and enhance their ability to sequester and store carbon (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019). 50 51 Polar regions will be profoundly different in the future. The degree and nature of that difference will depend 52 strongly on the rate and magnitude of global climate change, which will influence adaptation responses 53 regionally and worldwide. Future climate-induced changes in the polar oceans, sea ice, snow and permafrost 54 will drive habitat and biome shifts, with associated changes in the ranges and abundance of ecologically 55 important species (IPCC, 2019g). Innovative tools and practices in polar resource management and planning 56 show strong potential in improving society's capacity to respond to climate change. Networks of protected 57 areas, participatory scenario analysis, decision support systems, community-based ecological monitoring that Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-48 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 draws on local and indigenous knowledge and self-assessments of community resilience contribute to 2 strategic plans for sustaining biodiversity and limit risk to human livelihoods and wellbeing. Experimenting, 3 assessing, and continually refining practices while strengthening links with decision making has the potential 4 to ready society for the expected and unexpected impacts of climate change (IPCC, 2019g). 5 6 7 [START BOX 18.6 HERE] 8 9 Box 18.6: The Role of Ecosystems in Climate-Resilient Development 10 11 Ecosystems and their services closely relate to CRD. Climate change has impacted ecosystems across a 12 range of scales, and those impacts have been exacerbated by other ecological impacts associated with human 13 activities. Ecosystem based adaptation strategies have been developed and is crucial to CRD. However, 14 knowledge and evidence still missing, and cultural services--in contrast to provision and regulation services 15 as main benefits and supporting services as co-benefits--are less well addressed in the literature. 16 17 Ecosystems play a key role in CRD 18 19 A key element of CRD is ensuring that actions taken to mitigate climate change do not compromise 20 adaptation, biodiversity, and human needs. Maintaining ecosystem health, linked to planetary health, is an 21 integral part of the goals of CRD. The 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment defined ecosystem services 22 as "the benefits people obtain from ecosystems", and categorized the services in to provisioning, regulating, 23 supporting, and cultural services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; IPBES, 2019). The 2019 24 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) broadened the 25 definition to "the contributions, both positive and negative, of living nature to the quality of life for people", 26 and developed a classification of 18 categories (IPBES, 2019). 27 28 Table Box 18.6.1 demonstrates how ecosystem services connect to sustainable development goals (SDGs) 29 and CRD. MEA's provisioning service generally connects to the IPBES' material services, mostly 30 contributing to the SDG cluster associated with nature's contribution to people (NCP) (Millennium 31 Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; IPBES, 2019) and to "Development" in CRD. MEA's regulating and 32 supporting services connect to IPBES' non-material services, contributing to SDG clusters of Nature and 33 Driver of change in nature and NCP and to "Resilience" in CRD. MEA's cultural services connect to 34 IPBES' non-material services, contributing to SDG clusters of good quality of lift (GQL) and to Enabling 35 conditions for CRD. 36 37 38 Table Box 18.6.1: Ecosystem services (based on the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, MEA, and the 39 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services, IPBES, classifications) and their 40 connections to sustainable development goals (SGCs) and climate resilient development (CRD) (Millennium 41 Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; IPBES, 2019). Ecosystem services SDGs CRD Development MEA IPBES Provision 11 Energy 1 No poverty ing 12 Food and feed 2 Zero hunger services 13 Materials and assistance 3 Good health and well-being 14 Medicinal, biochemical, and genetic 11 Sustainable cities communities resources 7 Affordable clean energy 8 Decent work and economic growth 9 Industry, innovation, and infrastructure 12 Responsible consumption and Regulatin 3 Regulation of air quality production Climate 6 Clean water and sanitation g services 4 Regulation of climate 13 Climate action adaptation 5 Regulation of ocean acidification and 6 Regulation of freshwater quantity, mitigation location, and timing 7 Regulation of freshwater and coastal water quality Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-49 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 9 Regulation of hazards and extreme events 10 Regulation of organisms detrimental to humans 14 Life below water Supportin 1 Habitat creation and maintenance g services 2 Pollination and dispersal of seeds 15 Life on land 8 Formation, protection, and decontamination of soils and sediments 18 Maintenance of options Cultural 15 Learning and inspiration 4 Quality education Enabling services 16 Physical and psychological 5 Gender equality Conditions experiences 10 Reduce inequality 17 Supporting identities 16 Peace, justice, and strong institutions 17 Partnerships for the goals 1 2 3 Climate change impacts on ecosystems and their services 4 5 Climate change connects to ecosystem services through two links: climate change and its influence on 6 ecosystems as well as its influence on services (Chapter 2.2). The key climatic drivers are changes in 7 temperature, precipitation, and extreme events, which are unprecedented over millennia and highly variable 8 by regions (Chapter 2.3, 3.2; Cross-Chapter Box EXTREMES in Chapter 2). These climatic drivers 9 influence physical and chemical conditions of the environment, and worsen the impacts of non-climate 10 anthropogenic drivers including eutrophication, hypoxia, sedimentation (Chapter 3.4). Such changes have 11 led to changes in terrestrial, freshwater, oceanic and coastal ecosystems at all different levels, from species 12 shifts and extinctions, to biome migration, and to ecosystem structure and processes changes (Chapter 2.4, 13 2.5, 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5). Changes in ecosystems leads to changes in 14 ecosystem services including food and limber prevision, air and water quality regulation, biodiversity and 15 habitat conservation, and cultural and mental support (Chapter 2.4, 3.5). Table Box 18.6.2 presents examples 16 of climate change's impact on ecosystems and their services from other chapters in the WGII report. The 17 degradation of ecosystem services is felt disproportionately by people who are already vulnerable due to 18 historical and systemic injustices, including women and children in low-income households, Indigenous or 19 other minority groups, small-scale producers and fishing communities, and low-income countries (Chapter 20 3.5, 4.3, 5.13). 21 22 23 Table Box 18.6.2: Examples of key risks to ecosystems from climate change and their connections to ecosystem 24 services (ES) in the WGII report and cross-chapter papers (CCPs). (See Table 1 for the description of the categories of 25 ES) Climate factors Key risk ES PRS C Terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems (Chapter 2, 4, 5; CCP 1; CCP 7; CCP 3; CCP 5) - Increase in average and extreme Species extinction and range shifts X XX temperatures Ecosystem structure and process change X X - Changes in precipitation amount and timing Ecosystem carbon loss X X - Increase in aridity - Increase in frequency and severity of Wildfire X X X X drought Water cycle & scarcity - Increased atmospheric CO2 Ocean and coastal (Chapter 3; CCP 1; CCP 6) - Ocean warming Species extinction and range shifts X XX - Marine heatwaves Ecosystem structure and process change X X - Ocean acidification Habitat loss X X - Loss of oxygen - Sea level rise Ocean carbon sink less effective X - Increased atmospheric CO2 Erosion and land loss - Extreme events X X Food, Fiber, and other Ecosystem Products (Chapter 5) - Global warming Species distribution X Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-50 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report - Water stress Timing of key biological events change X - Extreme events Corp productivity and quality decrease X - Ocean acidification Diseases and insect X - Salt intrusion 1 2 Adaptation practices and enabling conditions for CRD 3 4 Ecosystem protection and restoration, ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA), and nature-based solution (NbS) 5 can lower climate risk to people and achieve multiple benefits including food and material provision, climate 6 mitigation, and social benefits (Chapter 2.6, 3.6, 4.6, 5.13,6.3, 8.6). Table Box 18.6.3 presents some 7 examples of ecosystem adaptation practices reported in WGII sectoral and regional chapters and CCPs, as 8 well as their co-benefits, potential for maladaptation, and enabling conditions. Many of the strategies focus 9 on integrated systems (managing for multiple objectives and trade-offs) as well as the fair use of resources. 10 However, there is limited evidence of the extent to which adaptation is taking place and virtually no 11 evaluation of the effectiveness of adaptation in the scientific literature (Chapter 2.6, 3.5). Enabling 12 conditions for the successful implementation ecosystem-based practice include regional and community- 13 based based approaches, multistakeholder and multi-level governance approaches, Integration of Local 14 Knowledge and Indigenous Knowledge, finance, and social equity (Chapter 2.6, 3.6). 15 16 17 Table Box 18.6.3: Examples of adaptation practices and their connections to ecosystem services (ES) and climate 18 resilient development pathways (CRDP) in the WGII sectoral and regional chapters and cross-chapter papers (CCPs). 19 (See Table 1 for the description of the categories of ES and CRDP) Adaptation practices (and - Main benefit (and & co-benefit; - trade off; + enabling ES examples) conditions; X barrier and potential maladaptation) P R S C Agroforestry (Table 2.7; Table 5.ES; Food provision Chapter 5.10.4; Chapter 5.12.5.2; Box & Fuel (wood) provision, carbon sequestration, 5.10; Table 16.2) biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, diversification - Climate Adaptation and and improved economic incomes, water and soil Maladaptation in Cocoa and Coffee conservation, and aesthetics Production (Box 5.7) + Secure tenure arrangements, supporting Indigenous *** ** ** knowledge, inclusive networks and socio-cultural values, access to information and management skill X Higher water demand; disruption of hydrology; loss of native biodiversity; reduced resilience of certain plants; degraded soil and water quality; improper and increased use of agrochemicals, pesticides, and fertilizers Forest maintenance and restoration Ecosystem conservation (Box 2.2; Table 16.2; Table Cross- & Food provision, fuel provision, job creation, carbon Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter sequestration, biodiversity conservation, air quality 2) regulation, water and soil conservation, vector-borne - Protected area planning in Thailand disease control, improved mental health, cultural (Chapter 2.6.5.3) benefits, natural resources relative conflict prevention - Conserving Joshua trees in the Joshua National Park (Chapter + Cooperation of indigenous peoples and other local 2.6.5.6) communities ** ** *** ** - Addressing Vulnerability of Peat X Planting large scale non-native monocultures leads to Swamp Forests in South East Asia loss of biodiversity and poor climate change resilience, increased vulnerability to landslide, increased sensitivity (Chapter 2.6.5.10) of new tree species, reduced resilience of certain plants, - Reduce emissions from high water demand, trees planted damaged buildings deforestation and forest degradation during heavy storms, lack of carbon rights in national (REDD+) (Chapter 5.6.3.3; Table legislations 16.2) Traditional practices/indigenous Food and material provision *** ** knowledge and local knowledge & Carbon sequestration (IKLK) (Table 2.7; Chapter 5.6.3; + Partnerships between key stakeholders such as Chapter 5.14.2.2; Table 16.2) researchers, forest managers, and local actors, - Crop and livestock farmers on indigenous and local knowledge observed changes in climate in the Sahel (Box 5.6) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-51 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report - Karuk Tribe in northern California (Chapter 5.6.3.2) Restoring natural fire regimes (Table Fire regulation 2.7) & Biodiversity conservation - Protecting Gondwanan wildfire *** refugia in Tasmania, Australia (Chapter 2.6.5.8) Natural flood risk management (Table Water security, flood regulation, sediment retention 2.7) & Biodiversity and ecosystem conservation - Natural Flood Management (NFM) *** ** in England, United Kingdom (Chapter 2.6.5.2) Coastal protection against sea level rise and storm surges Coastal ecosystem conservation (Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in & Fisheries, carbon sequestration, biodiversity and Chapter 2) (Table 16.2)(Table 2.7) - African penguin on-site adaptation ecosystem conservation, flood regulation, water (Chapter 2.6.5.5) purification, recreation, and cultural benefits ** *** ** Eco-tourism within protected areas X NH4 emissions, digging channels and sand walls around (Table 2.7) homes, loss of recreational value of beaches, shifted the flood impacts to poor informal urban settlers, erosion and degraded coastal lands Tourism *** ** & Habitat protection Aquaculture (Chapter 5.9.4; Table 16.2; Food provision Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 & Biodiversity conservation in Chapter 2) + Farmer incentives, participatory adaptation to context X Lack of financial, technical or institutional capacity; *** * short value chains; productivity varies by system; over- fertilizing; deforestation of mangroves; salt intrusion; increased flood vulnerability Water-energy-food (WEF) nexus (Box Water, energy, and food provision 4.7) X Insufficient data, information, and knowledge in - Food Water Energy Nexus in Asia understanding the WEF inter-linkages; lack of systematic (Chapter 10.6.3) tools to address trade-offs involved in the nexus *** - New Zealand's Land, Water and People Nexus under a changing climate (Box 11.7) Urban greening (Table 2.7; table 16.2; Urban flood management, water savings, urban heat island Table Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL.1 mitigation in Chapter 2) & Reduced carbon emissions, air and noise regulation, - Ecosystem based adaptation in improved mental health, energy savings, recreation, and Durban, South Africa (Chapter aesthetics 2.6.5.7) + Meaningful partnerships, long-term financial commitments, and significant political and *** ** administrative X Storage of large quantities of water in the home; water contamination; increased breeding sites for mosquitoes and flies; vectors and diseases; intensified cultivation of marginal lands; clearing of virgin forests for farmland; frequent weeding; increased competition for water and nutrients; reduced soil fertility, invasive species 1 2 3 [END BOX 18.6 HERE] 4 5 6 18.3.1.4 Industrial systems 7 8 Industrial emissions have been growing faster since 2000 compared to emissions in any other sector, driven 9 by increased extraction and production of basic materials (Crippa et al., 2019; IEA, 2019) (very high 10 confidence). About one-third of the total emissions are contributed by the industry sector, if indirect emissions 11 from energy use are considered (Crippa et al., 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has caused a significant Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-52 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 decrease in demand for fuels, oil, coal, gas, and nuclear energy (IEA, 2020). However, there is concern that 2 the rebound in the crisis will reverse this trend (IEA, 2020). Accordingly, the literature suggests a combined 3 set of measures is beneficial for facilitation a transition of industrial systems in support of CRD. This includes 4 (i) dematerialization and decarbonization of industrial systems, (ii) establishment of supportive governance, 5 policies, and regulations, and (iii) implementation of enabling corporate strategies. 6 Decarbonization and dematerialization strategies have been proposed as key drivers for the transition of 7 industrial systems (Fischedick et al., 2014; Worrell et al., 2016). The former involves limiting carbon 8 emissions from industrial processes (IEA, 2017; Hildingsson et al., 2019), while the latter involves improving 9 material efficiency, developing circular economies, raw material demand management, environmentally 10 friendly product and process innovations, and environmentally friendly supply chain management (Worrell et 11 al., 2016; Petrides et al., 2018). 12 Recent modelling suggests that stocks of manufactured capital, including buildings, infrastructure, 13 machinery, and equipment, stabilize as countries develop and decouple from GDP (high agreement, medium 14 evidence). For instance, Bleischwitz et al. (2018) confirmed the occurrence of a saturation effect for 15 materials in four energy-intensive sectors (steel, cement, aluminum and copper) in five industrialized 16 countries (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States and China). High growth in the supply of 17 materials may still drive global demand for new products in the coming years for developing countries that 18 are still far from saturation levels. Therefore, accelerating industrial transitions to drive the decoupling of 19 industrial emissions from economic growth and facilitate broader transformation in industrial systems can be 20 one component of CRD. 21 22 Continued transitions in the industrial sector will be contingent on technological innovation. Although 23 technologies exist to drive emissions in industrial sectors to very low or zero emissions, but they require 5 to 24 15 years of innovation, commercialization, and intensive policies to ensure uptake (舎man et al., 2017) 25 (high agreement, medium evidence). For instance, several options exist to reduce GHG emission related to 26 steel production process including increasing the share of the secondary route (Pauliuk et al., 2013), 27 hydrogen-based direct reduced iron (Vogl et al., 2018), aqueous electrolysis rout (Cavaliere, 2019), and 28 plasma process (Quader et al., 2016). 29 30 Industrial transitions are also contingent upon consumer behavior in terms of preferences for, and rates of, 31 consumption of industrial products. Sustainable consumption can play an important role in sustainable 32 production (Allwood et al., 2013; Allwood et al., 2019). This suggests feedbacks between industrial 33 production and consumption in driving industrial transitions. For example, sustainable consumption can be 34 triggered and/or enabled through sustainable production processes that provide more sustainable options to 35 consumers as well as public or private promotional campaigns that promote those options. Meanwhile, 36 demand from consumers for more sustainable options helps to drive the expansion of markets and innovation 37 among industrial producers to meet that demand. 38 39 18.3.1.5 Societal systems 40 41 This chapter contributes a fifth system transition in addition to the four which have already been introduced 42 by SR1.5: the societal systems transition. While society and people also feature in the other systems 43 transitions, the purpose of defining a fifth transition is to explicitly highlight the challenges associated with 44 changes in behavior, attitudes, values and consciousness required to achieve CRD. One caveat of considering 45 transitions in societal systems is the limit to which the nature of change is known: transitions accomplish 46 reconfigurations towards a relatively known destination. Historical and current differences between and 47 within nations translate to a multitude of equally valid but diverse priorities for development, for example 48 the understanding of development toward progress as linear has been challenged as being a Western concept 49 by scholars of colonialization (Sultana et al., 2019). Thus societal transitions are understood as being 50 intrinsically diverse for the purpose of achieving climate resilient development. 51 52 The four systems transitions identified in SR1.5 already include a component of societal change � for 53 example, attitude change is part of public acceptance that facilitates shifts in energy including changing 54 electricity to renewables (Ch 4 SR1.5 4.3.1.1) and developing nuclear power (4.3.1.3), and behavioral 55 change is a part of shifting irrigation practices to drive required land and ecosystems transitions (4.3.2.1). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-53 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Extracting societal transitions also allows for a detailed examination of other societal dimensions that 2 facilitate systems transitions, for example justice issues relating to water and energy access and distribution, 3 and land use. Societal transition, sometimes known as `societal transformation', is an established concept in 4 different literatures, as described below. Transformation and transition are terms often used as synonyms 5 (H鰈scher et al., 2018) although different schools of thought understand them as sub-components of each 6 other, eg. transition driving transformation, or transformation driving transition. For a more detailed 7 discussion on the differences between transition and transformation represented in the literature, see Box 8 18.1. 9 10 Societal transitions for the purpose of this report are understood as the collection of shifts in attitudes, values, 11 consciousness and behavior required to move toward CRD. This builds on the SR1.5 (IPCC, 2018a: 599) 12 definition of societal (social) transformation: "A profound and often deliberate shift initiated by communities 13 toward sustainability, facilitated by changes in individual and collective values and behaviors, and a fairer 14 balance of political, cultural, and institutional power in society." This includes accepting IK/LK as an 15 equally valid form of knowledge as compared with Western, scientific knowledge (see Cross-Chapter Box 16 INDIG) and recognition of the role of shifting gender norms to achieve climate resilience (see Cross-Chapter 17 Box GENDER). Changes associated with societal transitions are not specific to defined systems (e.g. energy, 18 industry, land/ecosystems or urban/infrastructure). Rather, these sectoral systems are embedded within 19 broader societal systems, including e.g. political systems, economic systems, knowledge systems, cultural 20 systems (Davelaar, 2021; Turnhout et al., 2021; Visseren-Hamakers et al., 2021). Changes that happen in 21 these broader social systems can therefore prompt changes in all systems embedded within them, meaning 22 that societal transition is key to transforming across a range of sectors and topics (Leventon et al., 2021). 23 Furthermore, societal transition requires changes in individual behaviors, but also in the broader conditions 24 that shape these behaviors. These broader conditions are largely related to questions of power, in enforcing 25 dominant political economies and social-technological mindsets (Stoddard et al., 2021). This section also 26 briefly describes the various trains of research on societal transitions and transformation. 27 28 Because of the multiple sectors, interests and scales that are involved in societal transitions, understanding 29 and creating evidence on transitions requires shifting across system boundaries and finding ways to 30 transcend disciplinary silos. Relevant research includes work within the topic of transformation and 31 transitions (H鰈scher et al., 2018). Transformations literature can be split into multiple sub-concepts and 32 requires engagement with multiple schools of thought (Feola, 2015; Feola et al., 2021). Much focus within 33 transformations research is currently related to biodiversity conservation (Massarella et al., 2021), and 34 transitions work tends towards a focus in urban areas (Loorbach et al., 2017). Though there is also work in 35 both that is more broadly labelled as sustainability transformations or transitions (Luederitz et al., 2017). 36 Furthermore, there is likely to be much relevant literature that does not explicitly label itself as 37 transformations or transitions (Feola et al., 2021). For example, we could look to political science theories on 38 policy change (Leventon et al., 2021) and historical perspectives on social change. Bridging these divides 39 will require a deeper rethinking in the research community to undo power structures that marginalize diverse 40 knowledges (Caniglia et al., 2021; Lahsen and Turnhout, 2021). 41 42 There are a number of concepts proposed as pathways to creating societal transitions; usually centered 43 around the idea of working with individuals and communities to change their mindsets as a way to change 44 the way they manage their local environments or behave. Transformations work explores how values are 45 pathways towards sustainability, for example by changing values, through making values explicit, through 46 negotiation, and by eliciting values (Horcea-Milcu et al., 2019). Human nature connections is a further 47 concept that is identified as a way to shift values and behaviors across a range of disciplines (Ives et al., 48 2017). The role of learning and indigenous knowledge is also explored (Lam et al., 2020). These three 49 concepts have had particular salience in discussions around transformations for biodiversity conservation 50 and restoration, related to the IPBES assessment on Values (Pascual et al., 2017; Peterson et al., 2018). They 51 largely focus on the need to engage with people's values, connections and knowledge to better manage the 52 social-ecological system they are in. 53 54 Focusing on bottom-up and community-led transformations, there is emphasis on the role of grassroots 55 organizations in transformations. Community actions around specific locations or topics have parallels to the 56 idea of transformative spaces. They are sites of innovative activity (Seyfang and Smith, 2007). Grassroots 57 organizations can bridge the local and the political scales by politicizing actors and creating new interactions Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-54 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 between individuals and political processes (Nov醟, 2021). They are a collective approach to pushing for 2 both individual and societal change (Sage et al., 2021). 3 4 Despite a current lack of empirical evidence, there are numerous frameworks emerging for exploring societal 5 transitions across levels. There is focus on pathways for sustainability transitions, which tends to look at 6 projected, normative scenarios for the future, and explore or back-cast the institutional and societal changes 7 that are required to get there (Westley et al., 2011; Sharpe et al., 2016). There is also work that looks at 8 scaling up of smaller sustainability initiatives, through processes of scaling up, scaling out and scaling deep 9 (Moore et al., 2015; Lam et al., 2020). In particular, systems thinking provides an organizing framework for 10 bringing together multiple disciplines and perspectives, to understand problem framings, and normative and 11 design aspects of social systems and behaviors (Foster-Fishman et al., 2007). Within this, Meadows (1999) 12 framework of leverage points for systems transformation has been operationalized within the sustainability 13 transformations debate (Abson et al., 2017). Here, system properties relating to system paradigms and design 14 are leverage points where interventions can create greatest system change; shallower leverage points relate to 15 materials and processes. This framework is increasingly being used across a range of sustainability problems 16 as boundary objects for cross-disciplinary, critical research (Fischer and Riechers, 2019; Leventon et al., 17 2021; Riechers et al., 2021). 18 19 Analyses of societal transitions have had limited engagement with adaptation questions. The focus of the 20 sub-field of sustainability transitions on a few industrialized nations, mostly in North America and Europe, 21 limited the field's development to assumptions born from the experiences in those areas. More recent studies 22 have sought to understand sustainability transitions in other countries, especially emerging economies 23 (Wieczorek, 2018; K鰄ler et al., 2019). In particular, China has received attention from scholars on 24 sustainability transitions (Huang et al., 2018; Lo and Cast醤 Broto, 2019; Cast醤 Broto et al., 2020; Huang 25 and Sun, 2020). As a result, some pressing issues related to societal transitions for adaptation have received 26 limited attention compared with that paid to other system transitions. However, more recently, scholarship 27 has begun examining transitions that have turned to nature and nature-based solutions. Adaptive transitions 28 are an intermediary step towards sustainability transitions whereby multiple actions at material and 29 institutional levels are combined towards improving adaptation outcomes (Pant et al., 2015; Scarano, 2017). 30 31 32 Table 18.3: Specific options for facilitating the five system transitions that can support CRD Transition Examples Reference Energy (Gielen et al., 2019) (Mulugetta et Systems � Fuel switching from coal to natural gas al., 2019) (IEA et al., 2019) AR6 � Expansion of renewable energy technologies WGIII Chapter 2 � Financial incentives to promote renewable energy � Reduced energy intensity of industry � Improvements in power system resilience and reliability � Increased water use efficiency in electricity generation � Energy demand management strategies Urban and � Increased investment in physical and social (IPCC, 2018b): D3.1) infrastructure systems infrastructure Land, Oceans, � Enhance urban and regional planning and � Enhanced governance and institutional Ecosystems capacity supports post-disaster recovery and reconstruction (Kull, 2016) � Expanding access to agricultural and climate (IPCC, 2019f): C2.1) (IPCC, services 2019f): C4.5) (IPCC, 2019f): C4) � Strengthening land tenure security and access to land � Empowering women farmers � Improved access to markets � Facilitating payments for ecosystem services Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-55 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Industrial � Promotion of healthy and sustainable diets systems � Enhancing multi-level governance by supporting local management of natural resources � Strengthening cooperation between institutions and actors � Building on local, indigenous and scientific knowledge funding, and institutional support � Monitoring and forecasting � Education and climate literacy and social learning and participation � Promote material efficiency and high-quality (舎man et al., 2017; Bataille et al., circularity 2018; Material, 2019) (Tanaka, � Materials demand management (IEA 2019, 2011; Schwarz et al., 2020) 2020) (Ciwmb, 2003) (Romero � Application of new processes and Mosquera, 2019) (Tanaka, 2011) technologies for GHG emission reduction (Ryan et al., 2011; Boyce, 2018) (Taylor, 2008) (UNEP, 2018b) � Carbon pricing or regulations with (Kaza et al., 2018) (S鰀erholm and provisions on competitiveness to drive innovation and systemic carbon efficiency Tilton, 2012) (Bataille et al., 2018) � Low-cost, long-term financing mechanisms (Ghisetti et al., 2017) (Taylor, 2008; Fischedick et al., 2014; to enable investment and reduce risk Hansen and Lema, 2019) (Crippa � Better planning of transport infrastructure et al., 2019; IEA, 2019) (Cavaliere, � Labour market training and transition 2019; IEA, 2020)(Vogl et al., 2018)(Pauliuk et al., 2013; Quader support et al., 2016) � Electricity market reform � Regulations � standards and labelling, material efficiency � Mandating technologies and targets � Green taxes and carbon pricing, preferential loans and subsidies � voluntary action agreements, expanded producer responsibilities � information programs: monitoring, evaluation, partnerships, and research and development � government provisioning of services-- government procurements, technology push and market-pull Societal � Inclusive governance (Fazey et al., 2018b; O'Brien, Systems � Empowerment of excluded stakeholders, 2018; Patterson et al., 2018) (MRFCJ, 2015; Dumont et al., especially women and youth 2019) (Popescu et al., 2017; � transforming economies David T郻ara et al., 2018) (de � finance and technology aligned with local Coninck and Sagar, 2015; IEA, 2015; Parikh et al., 2018) needs (Dearing et al., 2014; H鋣h� et al., � overcoming uneven consumption and 2016; Raworth, 2017) (Klinsky and Winkler, 2018), (Hajer et al., production patterns 2015; Labriet et al., 2015; Hale, � allowing people to live a life in dignity and 2016; Pelling et al., 2016; Kalafatis, 2017; Lyon, 2018) enhancing their capabilities (Holden et al., 2017) (Cundill et � involving local governments, enterprises al., 2014; Butler et al., 2016; Ensor, 2016; Fazey et al., 2016; and civil society organisations across different scales Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-56 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report � reconceptualising development around Gorddard et al., 2016; Aipira et al., 2017; Chung Tiam Fook, well-being rather than economic growth 2017; Maor et al., 2017) (O'Brien and Selboe, 2015; Gillard et al., (Gupta and Pouw, 2017), 2016; DeCaro et al., 2017; Harris � rethinking, prevailing values, ethics and et al., 2018; Lahn, 2018; Roy et al., 2018) Sections 5.6.1 and behaviour 5.5.3.1 � improving decision-making processes that incorporate diverse values and world views � creating space for negotiating diverse interests and preferences 1 2 3 [START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX GENDER HERE] 4 5 Cross-Chapter Box GENDER: Gender, Climate Justice and Transformative Pathways 6 7 Authors: Anjal Prakash (India), Cecilia Conde (Mexico), Ayansina Ayanlade (Nigeria), Rachel Bezner Kerr 8 (Canada/USA), Emily Boyd (Sweden), Martina A Caretta (Sweden), Susan Clayton (USA), Marta G. Rivera 9 Ferre (Spain), Laura Ramajo Gallardo (Chile), Sharina Abdul Halim (Malaysia), Nina Lansbury (Australia), 10 Oksana Lipka (Russia), Ruth Morgan (Australia), Joyashree Roy (India), Diana Reckien 11 (Netherlands/Germany), E. Lisa F. Schipper (Sweden/UK), Chandni Singh (India), Maria Cristina Tirado 12 von der Pahlen (Spain/USA), Edmond Totin (Benin), Kripa Vasant (India), Morgan Wairiu (Solomon 13 Islands), Zelina Zaiton Ibrahim (Malaysia). 14 15 Contributing Authors: Seema Arora-Jonsson (Sweden/India), Emily Baker (USA), Graeme Dean (Ireland), 16 Emily Hillenbrand (USA), Alison Irvine (Canada), Farjana Islam (Bangladesh/ United Kingdom), Katriona 17 McGlade (United Kingdom/Germany), Hanson Nyantakyi-Frimpong (Ghana), Nitya Rao (United Kingdom 18 /India), Federica Ravera (Italy), Emilia Reyes (Mexico), Diana Hinge Salili (Fiji), Corinne Schuster-Wallace 19 (Canada), Alcade C. Segnon (Benin), Divya Solomon (India), Shreya Some (India), Indrakshi Tandon 20 (India), Sumit Vij (India), Katharine Vincent (United Kingdom/South Africa), Margreet Zwarteveen (The 21 Netherlands) 22 23 Key Messages 24 25 Gender and other social inequities (e.g., racial, ethnic, age, income, geographic location) compound 26 vulnerability to climate change impacts (high confidence). Climate justice initiatives explicitly address 27 these multi-dimensional inequalities as part of a climate change adaptation strategy. [Box 9.2: 28 Vulnerability Synthesis: Differential Vulnerability by Gender and Age in Ch 9] 29 30 Addressing inequities in access to resources, assets, and services as well as participation in decision- 31 making and leadership is essential to achieving gender and climate justice (high confidence). 32 33 Intentional long-term policy and program measures and investments to support shifts in social rules, 34 norms, and behaviours are essential to address structural inequalities and support an enabling 35 environment for marginalised groups to effectively adapt to climate change (very high confidence). 36 [Equity and Justice box in Ch 17] 37 38 Climate adaptation actions are grounded in local realities so understanding links with SDG 5 is 39 important to ensure that adaptive actions do not worsen existing gender and other inequities within 40 society (e.g., leading to maladaptation practices) (high confidence). [17.5.1] 41 42 Adaptation actions do not automatically have positive outcomes for gender equality. Understanding the 43 positive and negative links of adaptation actions with gender equality goals, (i.e., SDG 5), is important to 44 ensure that adaptive actions do not exacerbate existing gender-based and other social inequalities 45 [16.1.4.4]. Efforts are needed to change unequal power dynamics and 磘o foster inclusive decision- 46 making for climate adaptation to have a positive impact for gender equality (high confidence). 47 48 There are very few examples of successful integration of gender and other social inequities in climate 49 policies to address climate change vulnerabilities and questions of social justice, (Very high confidence). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-57 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 3 Gender, climate justice, and climate change 4 5 This Cross-Chapter Box highlights the intersecting issues of gender, climate change adaptation, climate 6 justice, and transformative pathways. A gender perspective does not centre only on women or men but 7 examines structures, processes, and relationships of power between and among groups of men and women 8 and how gender, particularly in its non-binary form, intersects with other social categories such as race, 9 class, socio-economic status, nationality, or education to create multidimensional inequalities (Hopkins, 10 2019). A gender transformative approach aims to change structural inequalities. Attention to gender in 11 climate change adaptation is thus central to questions of climate justice that aim for a radically different 12 future (Bhavnani et al., 2019). As a normative concept highlighting the unequal distribution of climate 13 change impacts and opportunities for adaptation and mitigation, climate justice (Wood, 2017; Jafry et al., 14 2018; Chu and Michael, 2019; Shi, 2020a) calls for transformative pathways for human and ecological 15 wellbeing. These address the concentration of wealth, unsustainable extraction, and distribution of resources 16 (Schipper et al., 2020a; Vander Stichele, 2020) as well as the importance of equitable participation in 17 environmental decision-making for climate justice (Arora-Jonsson, 2019). 18 19 Research on gender and climate change demonstrates that an understanding of gendered relations is central 20 to addressing the issue of climate change. This is because gender relations mediate experiences with climate 21 change, whether in relation to water (K鰄ler et al., 2019) (see also Sections 4.7, 4.3.3; 4.6.4, 5.3), forests 22 (Arora-Jonsson, 2019), agriculture (Carr and Thompson, 2014; Balehey et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2020) (see 23 also Chapter 4, Section 5.4), marine systems (Mcleod et al., 2018; Garcia et al., 2020) (see also Section 5.9) 24 or urban environments (Reckien et al., 2018; Susan Solomon et al., 2021) (see also Chapter 6). Climate 25 change has direct negative impacts on women's livelihoods due to their unequal control over and access to 26 resources (e.g., land, credit) and because they are often the ones with the least formal protection (Eastin, 27 2018) (see also Box 9.2 in Ch 9). Women represent 43% of the agricultural labour force globally, but only 28 15% of agricultural landholders (OECD, 2019b). Gendered and other social inequities also exist with non- 29 land assets and financial services (OECD, 2019b) often due to social norms, local institutions, and 30 inadequate social protection (Collins et al., 2019b). Men may experience different adverse impacts due to 31 gender roles and expectations (Bryant and Garnham, 2015; Gonda, 2017). These impacts can lead to 32 irreversible losses and damages from climate change across vulnerability hotspots (Section 8.3). 33 34 Participation in environmental decision-making tends to favour certain social groups of men, whether in 35 local environmental committees, international climate negotiations (Gay-Antaki and Liverman, 2018) or the 36 IPCC (Nhamo and Nhamo, 2018). Addressing climate justice reinforces the importance of considering the 37 legacy of colonialism on developing regional and local adaptation strategies. Scholars have criticized climate 38 programs for setting aside forestland that poor people rely on and appropriating the labor of women in the 39 global South without compensatory social policy or rights; where women are expected to work with Non 40 Timber Forest Products to compensate for the lack of logging and for global climate goals but where their 41 work of social reproduction and care is paid little attention (Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2015; Arora- 42 Jonsson et al., 2016). A global ecologically unequal exchange, biopiracy, damage from toxic exports, or the 43 disproportionate use of carbon sinks and reservoirs by high-income countries enhance the negative impacts 44 of climate change, women in LDC's and SIDS also endure the harshest impacts of the debt crisis due to 45 imposed debt measures in their countries (Appiah and Gbeddy, 2018; Fresnillo Sallan, 2020). The austerity 46 measures derived as conditionalities for fiscal consolidation in public services increases gender-based 47 violence (Casta馿da Carney et al., 2020) and brings additional burdens for women in the form of increasing 48 unpaid care and domestic work (Bohoslavsky, 2019). 49 50 Gendered vulnerability 51 52 Land, ecosystem, and urban transitions to climate-resilient development need to address gender and other 53 social inequities to meet sustainability and equity goals, otherwise, marginalised groups may continue to be 54 excluded from climate change adaptation. In the water sector, increasing floods and droughts and 55 diminishing groundwater and runoff have gendered effects on both production systems and domestic use 56 (Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.5.3). Climate change is reducing the quantity and quality of safe water available in 57 many regions of the world and increasing domestic water management responsibilities (high confidence). In 58 regions with poor drinking water infrastructure, it is forcing, primarily women and girls, to walk long Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-58 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 distances to access water, and limiting time available for other activities, including education and income 2 generation (Eakin et al., 2014; Kookana et al., 2016; Yadav and Lal, 2018). Water insecurity and the lack of 3 water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure have resulted in psychosocial distress, gender-based 4 violence, as well as poor maternal and child health and nutrition (Collins et al., 2019a; Wilson et al., 2019; 5 Geere and Hunter, 2020; Islam et al., 2020; Mainali et al., 2020) (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.4.4) (high 6 confidence). Climate-related extreme events also affect women's health � by increasing the risk of maternal 7 and infant mortality, disrupting access to family planning and prevention of mother to child transmission 8 regimens for HIV positive pregnant women (Undrr, 2019) (see also Section 7.2). Women and the elderly are 9 also disproportionately affected by heat events (Section 7.1.7.2.1, 7.1.7.2.3, 13.7.1). 10 11 Extreme events impact food prices and reduce food availability and quality, especially affecting vulnerable 12 groups, including low-income urban consumers, wage labourers, and low-income rural households who are 13 net food buyers (Green et al., 2013; Fao, 2016) (Section 5.12). Low-income women, ethnic minorities, and 14 Indigenous communities are often more vulnerable to food insecurity and malnutrition from climate change 15 impacts, as poverty, discrimination, and marginalisation intersect in their cases (Vinyeta et al., 2016; Clay et 16 al., 2018) (Section 5.12). Increased domestic responsibilities of women and youth, due to migration of men, 17 can increase their vulnerability due to their reduced capacity for investment in off-farm activities and 18 reduced access to information (Sugden et al., 2014; O'Neil et al., 2017) (Section 4.3; 4.6) (high confidence). 19 20 In the forest sector, the increased frequency and severity of drought, fires, pests and diseases, and changes to 21 growing seasons, has led to reduced harvest revenues, fluctuations in timber supply and availability of wood 22 (Lamsal et al., 2017; Fadrique et al., 2018; Esquivel-Muelbert et al., 2019). Climate programs in the global 23 South such as REDD+ have led to greater social insecurity and the conservation of the forests have led to 24 more pressure on women to contribute to household incomes but without enough supporting market access 25 mechanisms or social policy (Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2015; Arora-Jonsson et al., 2016). In countries 26 in the global North, reduced harvestable wood and revenues have led to employment restructuring that has 27 important gendered effects and negatively affects community transition opportunities (Reed et al., 2014). 28 29 Integrating gender in climate policy and practice 30 31 Climate change policies and programs across regions reveal wide variation in the degree and approach to 32 addressing gender inequities (see Table SMCCB GENDER.2). In most regions where there are climate 33 change policies that consider gender, they inadequately address structural inequalities t resulting from 34 climate change impacts, or how gender and other social inequalities can compound risk (high confidence). 35 Experiences show that it is more frequent to address specific gender inequality gaps in access to resources. 36 Regionally, Central and South American countries (section 12.5.8) have a range of gender-sensitive or 37 gender-specific policies such as the intersectoral coordination initiative Gender and Climate Change Action 38 Plans (PAGcc), adopted in Per�, Cuba, Costa Rica, and Panam� (Casas Varez, 2017), or the Gender 39 Environmental policy in Guatemala that has a focus on climate change (B醨cena-Mart韓 et al., 2021). 40 However, countries often have limited commitment and capacity to evaluate the impact of such policies 41 (Tramutola, 2019). In North and South America, policies have failed to address how climate change 42 vulnerability is compounded by the intersection of race, ethnicity, and gender (Radcliffe, 2014; Vinyeta et 43 al., 2016) (see also section 14.6.3). gender is rarely discussed in African national policies or programmes 44 beyond the initial consultation stage (Holvoet and Inberg, 2014; Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019), although 45 there are gender and climate change action strategies in countries such as Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, 46 and Zambia (Mozambique and IUCN, 2014; Zambia and IUCN, 2017). European climate change adaptation 47 strategies and policies are weak on gender and other social equity issues (Allwood, 2014; Boeckmann and 48 Zeeb, 2014; Allwood, 2020), while in Australasia, there is a lack of gender-responsive climate change 49 policies. In Asia, there are several countries that recognize gendered vulnerability to climate change (Jafry, 50 2016; Singh et al., 2021b), but policies tend to be gender-specific, with a focus on targeting women, for 51 example in the national action plan on climate change as in India (Roy et al., 2018) or in national climate 52 change plan as in Malaysia (Susskind et al., 2020). 53 54 Potential for Change and Solutions 55 56 The sexual division of labour, systemic racism and other social structural inequities lead to increased 57 vulnerabilities and climate change impacts for social groups such as women, youth, Indigenous peoples, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-59 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 ethnic minorities. Their marginal positions not only affect their lives negatively but their work in 2 maintaining healthy environments is ignored and invisible in policy affecting their ability to work towards 3 sustainable adaptation and aspirations in the SDGs (Arora-Jonsson, 2019). However, attention to the 4 following has the potential to bring about change: 5 6 Creation of new, deliberative policy-making spaces that support inclusive decision-making processes and 7 opportunities to (re)negotiate pervasive gender and other social inequalities in the context of climate change 8 for transformation (Tschakert et al., 2016; Harris et al., 2018; Ziervogel, 2019; Garcia et al., 2020). (high 9 confidence) 10 11 Increased access to reproductive health and family planning services, which contributes to climate change 12 resilience and socio-economic development through improved health and well-being of women and their 13 children, including increased access to education, gender equity, and economic status (Onarheim et al., 2016; 14 Starbird et al., 2016; Lopez-Carr, 2017; Hardee et al., 2018) (Sections 7.4) (high confidence). 15 16 Engagement with women's collectives is important for sustainable environments and better climate decision- 17 making whether at the global, national, or local levels (Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2018; Agarwal, 2020). 18 The work of such collectives in maintaining their societies and environments and in resisting gendered and 19 community violence is unacknowledged (Jenkins, 2017; Arora-Jonsson, 2019) but is indispensable 20 especially when combined with good leadership, community acceptance, and long-term economic 21 sustainability (Chu, 2018; Singh, 2019) (Section 4.6.4). Networking by gender experts in environmental 22 organizations and bureaucracies has also been important for ensuring questions of social justice (Arora- 23 Jonsson and Sijapati, 2018). 24 25 Investment in appropriate reliable water supplies, storage techniques, and climate-proofed WASH 26 infrastructure as key adaptation strategies that reduce both burdens and impacts on women and girls (Alam et 27 al., 2011; Woroniecki, 2019) (Sections 4.3.3 and 4.6.44). 28 29 Improved gender-sensitive early warning system design and vulnerability assessments to reduce 30 vulnerabilities, prioritising effective adaptation pathways to women and marginalized groups (Mustafa et al., 31 2019; Tanner et al., 2019; Werners et al., 2021). 32 33 Established effective social protection, including both cash and food transfers, such as the universal public 34 distribution system (PDS) for cereals in India, or pensions and social grants in Namibia, that have been 35 demonstrated to contribute towards relieving immediate pressures on survival and support processes at the 36 community level, including climate effects (Kattumuri et al., 2017; Lindoso et al., 2018; Rao et al., 2019a; 37 Carr, 2020). 38 39 Strengthened adaptive capacity and resilience through integrated approaches to adaptation that include social 40 protection measures, disaster risk management, and ecosystem-based climate change adaptation (high 41 confidence), particularly when undertaken within a gender-transformative framework (Gumucio et al., 2018; 42 Bezner Kerr et al., 2019; Deaconu et al., 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2, Section 5.12, 43 Section 5.14). 44 45 For example, gender-transformative and nutrition-sensitive agroecological approaches strengthen adaptive 46 capacities and enable more resilient food systems by increasing leadership for women and their participation 47 in decision-making and a gender-equitable domestic work (high confidence) (Gumucio et al., 2018; Bezner 48 Kerr et al., 2019; Deaconu et al., 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2, Section 5.12, Section 49 5.14) 50 51 New initiatives such as the Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program represent an integrated approach to 52 resilience that promotes coordination among social protection, disaster risk management, and climate change 53 adaptation. Accompanying measures including, health, education, nutrition, family planning, among others 54 (Daron et al., 2021). 55 56 Climate change adaptation and SDG 5 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-60 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Adaptation actions may reinforce social inequities, including gender unless explicit efforts are made to 2 change (Nagoda and Nightingale, 2017; Garcia et al., 2020) (high evidence and high agreement). 3 Participation in climate action increases if is inclusive and fair (Huntjens and Zhang, 2016). Roy et al. (2018) 4 assessed links among various SDGs and mitigation options. Adaptation actions are grounded in local 5 realities especially in terms of their impacts so understanding links with the goals of SDG 5 becomes more 6 important to make sure that adaptive actions do not worsen prevalent gender and other social inequities 7 within society (high evidence, high agreement). In the IPCC 1.5癈 Special Report, Roy et al. (2018) 8 assessed links between various SDGs and mitigation options, adaptation options were not considered. The 9 current SDG 13 climate action targets do not specifically mention gender as a component for action, which 10 makes it even more imperative to link SDG 5 targets and other gender-related targets to adaptive actions 11 under SDG 13 to ensure that adaptation projects are synergistic rather than maladaptive (16.3.2.6, Table 12 16.6) (Susan Solomon et al., 2021). 13 14 This assessment is based on a systematic rapid review of scientific publications (McCartney et al., 2017; 15 Liem et al., 2020) published on adaptation actions in 9 sectors from 2014 to 2020 (see Table SMCCB 16 GENDER.1) and how they integrated gender perspectives impacting gender equity. The assessment is based 17 on over 17,000 titles and abstracts that were initially found through keyword search and were reviewed. 18 Finally, 319 relevant papers on case studies, regional assessments, and meta-reviews were assessed. Gender 19 impact was classified by various targets under SDG 5. Following the approach taken in Roy et al. (2018) and 20 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019), the linkages were classified into synergies (positive impacts or co-benefits) 21 and trade-offs (negative impacts) based on the evidence obtained from the literature review which is finally 22 used to develop net impact (positive or negative) scores (See Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 and 23 Supplementary Material) 24 25 26 Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1: Interrelations between SDG5 (gender equality) and adaptation initiatives 27 in 9 major sectors Adaptation categories Sector Ecosystem- Technological Behavioural based /infrastructure / cultural /information Institutional Terrestrial & freshwater ecosystem Ocean & coastal ecosystem Mountain ecosystem Food, fibre & others Urban water & sanitation Poverty, livelihood & Sustainable Development Cities, settlement & key infrastructure Health, well-being, and changing communities' structure Industrial system transition 28 Colour code Description Confidence levels Symbol Very High All net positive links High All net negative links Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-61 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Number of net positive links > number of net negative links Medium Number of net negative links > number of net positive links Low no literature/options Very low 1 Table Notes: 2 Potential net synergies and trade-offs between a sectoral portfolio of adaptation actions and SDG 5 are shown. Colour 3 codes showing the relative strength of net positive and net negative impacts and confidence levels. The strength of net 4 positive and net negative connections across all adaptation actions within a sector are aggregated to show sector- 5 specific links. The links are only one-sided on how adaptation action is linked to gender equality (SDG5) targets and 6 not vice versa. Adaptation options assessed in Ecosystem-based actions are: 22 in number, options in Technological 7 /infrastructure /information are 10, in Institutional are 17 and in Behavioural/ cultural are 13. The assessment presented 8 here is based on literature presenting impacts on gender equality and equity of various adaptation actions implemented 9 in various local contexts and in regional climate change policies (Table SMCCB GENDER.2). 10 11 12 Adaptation actions being implemented in each sector in different local contexts can have positive (synergies) 13 or negative (trade-offs) effects with SDG5. This can potentially lead to net positive or net negative 14 connections at an aggregate level. How they are finally realized depends on how they are implemented, 15 managed, and combined with various other interventions in particular, place-based circumstances. 16 Ecosystem-based adaptation actions and terrestrial & freshwater ecosystems have higher potential for net 17 positive connections (Roy et al., 2018) (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1 and Supplementary Material). 18 Adaptation in terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems has the strongest net positive links with all SDG-5 19 targets (medium evidence, low agreement). For example, community-based natural resource management 20 increases the participation of women, especially when they are organised into women's groups (Pineda- 21 L髉ez et al., 2015; de la Torre-Castro et al., 2017) (Supplementary Material). For poverty, livelihood and 22 sustainable development sector adaptation actions have generated more net negative scores (low evidence, 23 low agreement) (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1). For example, patriarchal institutions and structural 24 discriminations curtail access to services or economic resources as compared to men, including less control 25 over income, fewer productive assets, lack of property rights, as well as less access to credit, irrigation, 26 climate information, and seeds which devaluate women's farm-related adaptation options (Adzawla et al., 27 2019; Friedman et al., 2019; Ullah et al., 2019) (Supplementary Material). 28 29 Among the adaptation actions, ecosystem-based actions have the strongest net positive links with SDG-5 30 targets (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1, Table SMCCB GENDER.1). In the health, well-being and 31 changing communities' sector, this is with high evidence and medium agreement, while in all other sectors 32 there is medium evidence and low agreement. Net negative links are most prominent in institutional 33 adaptation actions (Table Cross-Chapter Box GENDER.1). For example, in mountain ecosystems, changes 34 in gender roles in response to climatic and socioeconomic stressors is not supported by institutional 35 practices, mechanisms, and policies that remain patriarchal (Goodrich et al., 2019). Additionally, women 36 often have less access to credit for climate change adaptation practices, including post-disaster relief, for 37 example, to deal with salinization of water or flooding impacts (Hossain and Zaman 2018). Lack of 38 coordination among different city authorities can also limit women's contribution in informal settlements 39 towards adaptation. Women are typically underrepresented in decision-making on home construction and 40 planning and home-design decisions in informal settlements, but examples from Bangladesh show they play 41 a significant role in adopting climate-resilient measures (e.g., the use of corrugated metal roofs and partitions 42 which is important in protection from heat) (Jabeen, 2014; Jabeen and Guy, 2015; Araos et al., 2017; Susan 43 Solomon et al., 2021). 44 45 Towards climate-resilient, gender-responsive transformative pathways 46 47 The climate change adaptation and gender literature call for research and adaptation interventions that are 48 'gender-sensitive' (Jost et al., 2016; Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Kristjanson et al., 2017; Pearce et al., 49 2018a) and "gender-responsive", as established in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). In 50 addition, attention is drawn to the importance of `mainstreaming' gender in climate/development policy 51 (Alston, 2014; Rochette, 2016; Mcleod et al., 2018; Westholm and Arora-Jonsson, 2018). Many calls have 52 been made to consider gender in policy and practice (Ford et al., 2015; Jost et al., 2016; Rochette, 2016; 53 Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Kristjanson et al., 2017; Mcleod et al., 2018; Lau et al., 2021; Singh et al., 54 2021b). Rather than merely emphasising the inclusion of women in patriarchal systems, transforming Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-62 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 systems that perpetuate inequality can help to address broader structural inequalities not only in relation to 2 gender but also other dimensions such as race and ethnicity (Djoudi et al., 2016; Pearse, 2017; Gay-Antaki, 3 2020). Adaptation researchers and practitioners play a critical role here and can enable gender- 4 transformative processes by creating new, deliberative spaces that foster inclusive decision-making and 5 opportunities for renegotiating inequitable power relations (Tschakert et al., 2016; Ziervogel, 2019; Garcia et 6 al., 2020). 7 8 To date, empirical evidence on such transformational change is sparse, although there is some evidence of 9 incremental change (e.g., increasing women's participation in specific adaptation projects, mainstreaming 10 gender in national climate policies). Even when national policies attempt to be more gendered, there is 11 criticism that they use gender-neutral language or include gender analysis without proposing how to alter 12 differential vulnerability (Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2019; Singh et al., 2021b). More importantly, the mere 13 inclusion of women and men in planning does not necessarily translate to substantial gender-transformative 14 action, for example in National Adaptation Programmes of Action across sub-Saharan Africa (Holvoet and 15 Inberg, 2014; Nyasimi et al., 2018) and national and sub-national climate action plans in India (Singh et al., 16 2021b). Importantly, there is often an overemphasis on the gender binary (and household headship as an 17 entry point), which masks complex ways in which marginalisation and oppression can be augmented due to 18 the interaction of gender with other social factors and intra-household dynamics (Djoudi et al., 2016; 19 Thompson-Hall et al., 2016; Rao et al., 2019a; Lau et al., 2021; Singh et al., 2021b). 20 21 Climate justice and gender transformative adaptation can provide multiple beneficial impacts that align with 22 sustainable development. Addressing poverty (SDG 1), energy poverty (SDG 7), WaSH (SDG 6), health 23 (SDG 3), education (SDG 4) and hunger (SDG 2) along with inequalities (SDG 5 and SDG 10) - improves 24 resilience to climate impacts for those groups that are disproportionately affected (women, low-income and 25 marginalised groups). Inclusive and fair decision-making can enhance resilience (SDG 16; Section 13.4.4), 26 although adaptation measures may also lead to resource conflicts (SDG 16; Section 13.7). Nature-based 27 solutions attentive to gender equity also support ecosystem health (SDGs 14 and 15) (Dzebo et al., 2019). 28 Gender and climate justice will be achieved when the root causes of global and structural issues are 29 addressed, challenging unethical and unacceptable use of power for the benefit of the powerful and elites 30 (MacGregor, 2014; Wijsman and Feagan, 2019; Vander Stichele, 2020). Justice and equality need to be at 31 the centre of climate adaptation decision-making processes. A transformative pathway needs to include the 32 voice of the disenfranchised (MacGregor, 2020; Schipper et al., 2020a). 33 34 [END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX GENDER HERE] 35 36 37 18.3.2 Accelerating Transitions 38 39 Successfully implementing climate actions and managing trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and 40 sustainable development (18.2.4) has important time considerations that imply significant urgency, making 41 substantive progress in system transitions critical for CRD. Both the SDGs and the Sendai Framework, for 42 example, have target dates of 2030. Meanwhile, the Paris Agreement sets specific time horizons for NDCs 43 and the SR1.5 indicated that limiting warming to 1.5癈 would similarly require substantial climate action by 44 2030 (IPCC, 2018a). While the literature is unambiguous regarding the need for significant system 45 transitions to achieve CRD (Section 18.1.3), the current pace of global emissions reductions, poverty 46 alleviation, and development of equitable systems of governance is incommensurate with these policy time 47 tables (Rogelj et al., 2010; Burke et al., 2016; Oleribe and Taylor-Robinson, 2016; Kriegler et al., 2018; 48 Frank et al., 2019; Sadoff et al., 2020). As noted previously in the AR5, "delaying action in the present may 49 reduce options for climate-resilient pathways in the future" (Denton et al., 2014: 1123). Accordingly, 50 significant acceleration in the pace of system transitions is necessary to enable the implementation of 51 mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development initiatives consistent with CRD (very high confidence). 52 53 Studies since the AR5 directly address the issue of how to accelerate transitions within the broader system 54 transitions, sustainability transitions, and socio-technical transitions literature (Frantzeskaki et al., 2017; 55 Gliedt et al., 2018; Gorissen et al., 2018; Johnstone and Newell, 2018; Kuokkanen et al., 2019; Markard et 56 al., 2020). Such literature explores several core themes to facilitate acceleration, which are aligned with the 57 discussion later in this chapter on arenas of engagement for CRD (Section 18.4.3). One dominant theme is Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-63 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 accelerating the implementation of sustainability or low-carbon policies that target specific sectors or 2 industries (Bhamidipati et al., 2019). For example, Altenburg and Rodrik (Altenburg and Rodrik, 2017) 3 discuss green industrial polices including taxes, mandated technology phase outs, and the removal of 4 subsidies as means of constraining polluting industries. Kivimaa et al. (Kivimaa and Martiskainen, 2018; 5 Kivimaa et al., 2019a; Kivimaa et al., 2019b; Kivimaa et al., 2020) and Vihem鋕i et al. (2020) discuss low- 6 carbon transitions in buildings, noting the important role that intermediaries play in facilitating policy 7 reform. Nikulina et al. (2019) identify mechanisms for facilitating policy change in personal mobility 8 including political leadership, combining carrots and sticks to incentivize behavioral change, and challenging 9 current policy frameworks. These various examples reflect a fragmented approach to system transitions, 10 suggesting a large portfolio of such transition initiatives would be required to accelerate change or more 11 fundamental and cross-cutting policy drivers are needed (high agreement, limited evidence). Policies that 12 seek to promote social justice and equity, for example, could ultimately catalyze a broader range of 13 sustainability and climate actions than policies designed to address a specific sector or class of technology 14 (Delina and Sovacool, 2018; White, 2020). 15 16 In contrast with formal government policies, a second theme in accelerating transitions is that of civic 17 engagement (see also 18.4.3), which is reported to be an important opportunity for driving transitions 18 forward (high agreement, medium evidence). Ehnert et al. (2018) describe local organizations and civic 19 engagement in policy processes as an important engine for sustainability activities in European states. 20 Similarly, Ruggiero et al. (2021) note the potential to use civic organizations to appeal to local identities in 21 order to mobilize citizens to pursue energy transition initiatives among communities in the Baltic Sea region. 22 Gernert et al. (2018) attribute such influence to the ability of grassroots movements to bypass traditional 23 social and political norms and thereby experiment with new behaviors and processes. Moreover, civic 24 engagement is also the foundation for collective action including protest and civil disobedience (Welch and 25 Yates, 2018, Section 18.5.3.7). However, Haukkala (2018) observes that while green-transition coalitions in 26 Finland could be an agent of change driving energy transitions, the diversity of views among the various 27 grassroots actors could make consensus building difficult, thereby slowing transition initiatives. 28 29 A third theme is that of innovation, generally, and sustainability-oriented innovation, specifically (de Vries et 30 al., 2016; Geradts and Bocken, 2019; Loorbach et al., 2020), which creates opportunities for overcoming 31 existing transition barriers (very high confidence). For example, Valta (2020) describes the role of innovation 32 ecosystems � partnerships among companies, investors, governments, and academics � in accelerating 33 innovation (see also World Economic Forum, 2019). Burch et al. (Burch et al., 2016) describe the role of 34 small and medium-sized business entrepreneurship in promoting rapid innovation. Innovation extends 35 beyond pure technology considerations to consider innovation in practices and social organization (Li et al., 36 2018; Psaltoglou and Calle, 2018; Repo and Matschoss, 2020). Zivkovic (2018), for example, discusses 37 "innovation labs" as accelerators for addressing so-called wicked problems like climate change through 38 multi-stakeholder groups. Meanwhile, Chaminade and Randelli (2020) describe a case study where structural 39 preconditions and place-based agency were important drivers of transitions to organic viticulture in Tuscany, 40 Italy. 41 42 The fourth theme is that of transition management (Goddard and Farrelly, 2018), particularly vis a vis, 43 disruptive technologies (I駃go and Albareda, 2016; Kuokkanen et al., 2019) or broader societal disruptions 44 (Brundiers, 2020; Davidsson, 2020; Hepburn et al., 2020; Schipper et al., 2020b). Recent literature has given 45 attention to how actors can use disruptive events, such as disasters, as a window-of-opportunity for 46 accelerating changes in policies, practices, and behaviors (high agreement, medium evidence) (Brundiers, 47 2018; Brundiers and Eakin, 2018). This is consistent with concepts in resilience thinking around `building 48 back better' after disasters (Fernandez and Ahmed, 2019). For example, Hepburn et al. discuss fiscal 49 recovery packages for COVID-19 as a means of accelerating climate action, with a particular influence on 50 clean physical infrastructure, building efficiency retrofits, investment in education and training, natural 51 capital investment, and clean research and development (Andrijevic et al., 2020b). 52 53 54 18.4 Agency and Empowerment for Climate Resilient Development 55 56 As reflected in the discussion of societal transitions (18.3), people and their values and choices play an 57 instrumental role in CRD. The agency of people to act on CRD is grounded in their worldviews, beliefs, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-64 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 values, and consciousness (Woiwode, 2020) and is shaped through social and political processes including 2 how policies and decision-making recognize the voices, knowledges and rights of particular actors over 3 others (very high confidence) (Harris and Clarke, 2017; Nightingale, 2017; Bond and Barth, 2020; Muok et 4 al., 2021). Since the AR5, evidence on diverse forms of engagement by and among social, political and 5 economic actors to support climate resilient development and sustainability outcomes, has increased. New 6 forms of decision-making and engagement are emerging within the formal policy making and planning 7 sphere, including co-production of knowledge, interventions grounded in the arts and humanities, civil 8 participation and partnerships with business (Ziervogel et al., 2016a; Roberts et al., 2020). In addition, the 9 set of actors that drive climate and development actions are recognized to extend beyond government and 10 formal policy actors to include civil society, education, industry, media, science and art (Ojwang et al., 2017; 11 Solecki et al., 2018; Heinrichs, 2020; Omukuti, 2020). This makes the power dynamics among actors and 12 institutions critical for understanding the role of actors in CRD (Buggy and McNamara, 2016; Camargo and 13 Ojeda, 2017; Silva Rodr韌uez de San Miguel, 2018). 14 15 The formal space for national, sub-national and international adaptation governance emerged at COP 16 16 (UNFCCC, 2010) when adaptation was recognized as a similar level of priority as greenhouse gas 17 mitigation. The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) built on this and the 2030 Sustainable Development 18 Agenda (United Nations, 2015) to link adaptation to development and climate justice. It also highlighted the 19 importance of multi-level adaptation governance, including new non-state voices and climate actors that 20 widen the scope of adaptation governance beyond formal government institutions. For example, individuals 21 can act as agents of changes in their own behavior, such as via change in their consumption patterns, but also 22 generate change within organizations, fields of practice, and the political landscape of governance. 23 Accordingly, these interactions among actors across different scales implies the need for wider modes of, 24 and arena for, engagement around adaptation in order to accommodate a diversity of perspectives (high 25 agreement, medium evidence) (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017; Lesnikowski et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a). 26 27 In most regions, such new institutional and informal arrangements are at an early stage of development (high 28 agreement, limited evidence). Further clarification and strengthening are needed to enable the fair sharing of 29 resources, responsibilities, and authorities to enable climate action to enable climate-resilient development 30 (Wood et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a; Reckien et al., 2018). These are strongly linked to contested and 31 complementary worldviews of climate change and the actors that use these worldviews to justify, direct, 32 accelerate and deepen transformational adaptation and climate action. 33 34 18.4.1 Political Economy of Climate Resilient Development 35 36 Political economy studies (i.e., the origins, nature and distribution of wealth, and the ideologies, interests, 37 and institutions that shape it) explicitly addressing CRD are quite limited. Yet, there is an extensive post- 38 AR5 literature on political economy associated with various elements relevant to CRD including climate 39 change and development (Naess et al., 2015); vulnerability, adaptation, and climate risk (Sovacool et al., 40 2015; Sovacool et al., 2017; Barnett, 2020); energy, decarbonization, and negative emissions technologies 41 (Kuzemko et al., 2019; Newell, 2019); degrowth and low-carbon economies (Perkins, 2019; Newell and 42 Lane, 2020); solar radiation management (Ott, 2018); planetary health and sustainability transitions and 43 transformation (Kohler et al., 2019) (Gill and Benatar, 2020). 44 45 Four key insights regarding the nexus of political economy and CRD emerge from this literature. First, 46 political economy drives coupled development-climate change trajectories and determines vulnerability, 47 thereby potentially subjecting those least responsible for climate change to the greatest risk (Sovacool et al., 48 2015; Barnett, 2020). The prevailing political economy is itself now at risk as its legitimacy, viability and 49 sustainability are called into question (Barnett, 2020). Yet, as underpinning ideologies, interests and 50 institutions change, the drivers of vulnerability are often appropriated, the adaptation agenda is depoliticized, 51 and market-based solutions advocated (Barnett, 2020). 52 53 Second, assessment of this literature suggests four attributes of the political economy of adaptation influence 54 development trajectories in diverse settings, from Australia to Honduras and the Maldives (Sovacool et al., 55 2015), as delivered through the Global Environment Facility's Least Developed Countries Fund (Sovacool et 56 al., 2017). These include enclosure (public resources or authority captured by private interests); exclusion 57 (stakeholders are marginalized from decision-making); encroachment (natural systems and ecosystem Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-65 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 services compromised); and entrenchment (inequality exacerbated). These attributes hamper adaptation 2 efforts, and reveal the political nature of adaptation (Dolsak and Prakash, 2018) and by extension CRD. 3 Paradoxically, development initiatives labelled as `risk' reduction or resilience building or `equitable and 4 environmentally sustainable', such as coastal restoration efforts in Louisiana, USA, can compound inequity 5 and climate risk, and perpetuate unsustainable development (Gotham, 2016; Eriksen et al., 2021b). 6 7 Third, a long-held view is that the effects of mitigation are global while those of adaptation are local. A 8 political economy perspective, however, underscores cross-scale linkages, and shows that local adaptation 9 efforts, vulnerability and climate resilience are manifest in development trajectories that are shaped by both 10 local and trans-local drivers, and defined by unequal power relations that cross scales and levels (Sovacool et 11 al., 2015; Barnett, 2020; Newell, 2020), including in key sectors like energy (Baker et al., 2014) and 12 agriculture (Houser et al., 2019), as well as emergent blocs like BRICS (Power et al., 2016; Schmitz, 2017); 13 and sub-national constellations, like cities (Fragkias and Boone, 2016; B閚� et al., 2018). 14 15 Fourth, transitions towards CRD may be technically and economically feasible but are `saturated' with 16 power and politics (Tanner and Allouche, 2011) (18.3), necessitating focused attention to political barriers 17 and enablers of CRD (Newell, 2019). With a narrow window of time to contain dangerous levels of global 18 warming, political economy research calls for CRD trajectories that counter the globalized neoliberal 19 hegemony (Newell and Lane, 2020), especially given the pandemic, and the intersection of economic power 20 and public health, environmental quality, climate change, and human and indigenous rights (Bernauer and 21 Slowey, 2020; Schipper et al., 2020b). 22 23 Given these insights, CRD can be understood as the sum of complex multi-dimensional processes consisting 24 of large numbers of actions and social choices made by multiple actors from government, the private sector, 25 and civil society, with important influences by science and the media (very high confidence). These actions 26 and social choices are determined by the available solution space and options, along with a range of enabling 27 conditions (Section 18.4.2) that are largely bounded by individual and collective worldviews, and related 28 ethics and values. This view is consistent with sustainable development being a process constituted by 29 multiple actions that are contested and have path dependencies and context-sensitive synergies and trade- 30 offs with natural and embedded human systems as well as bounded by multiple and contested knowledges 31 and worldviews (Goldman et al., 2018; Heinrichs, 2020; Nightingale et al., 2020; Schipper et al., 2020b). 32 33 18.4.2 Enabling Conditions for Near-Term System Transitions 34 35 Given actors, institutions, and their engagement is fundamental to supporting system transitions needed for 36 CRD (18.3) this section assesses recent literature with respect to how the values, choices and behaviors of 37 those actors enable or constrain specific enabling conditions. Such enabling conditions represent 38 opportunities for policymakers to pursue actions that contribute to CRD beyond direct risk management 39 options such as climate adaptation and greenhouse gas mitigation (18.2.5.1, 18.2.5.2). 40 41 18.4.2.1 Governance and Policy 42 43 An overarching enabling conditions for achieving system transitions and transformations is the presence of 44 enabling governance systems (very high confidence). Recent literature on the translation of governance into 45 system transitions in practice suggests four key actions are important. The first is the critical reflection on so- 46 called `development solutions,' alternatively framed by some as `empty promises,' that worsen climate risk, 47 inequity, injustice and ultimately lead to unsustainable development (Mikulewicz, 2018; Mikulewicz and 48 Taylor, 2020). Examples include development aid (Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020), large-scale development 49 projects such as biofuel production in Ethiopia (Tufa et al., 2018), and urban growth management in 50 Vietnam (DiGregorio, 2015). The second is the recognition that while the power of different actors and 51 institutions is often tied to access to resources and the ability to constrain the actions of others, other 52 dimensions of power such as its ability to produce knowledge as well as its contingency on circumstances 53 and relationships are also important in enabling energy transitions: (Avelino et al., 2016; Avelino and 54 Wittmayer, 2016; Lockwood et al., 2016; Ahlborg, 2017; Avelino and Grin, 2017; Partzsch, 2017; Smith and 55 Stirling, 2018). Third, governance systems can help to develop productive interactions between formal 56 government institutions, the private sector, and civil society including the provision `safe arenas' for social 57 actors to deliberate and pursue transitional and transformational change (Haukkala, 2018; T鰎nberg, 2018; Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-66 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Strazds; Ferragina et al., 2020; Koch, 2020) (18.3.1, Box 18.1). Fourth, governance can address challenges 2 such as climate change from a systems perspective and pursue interventions that address the interactions 3 among development, climate change, equity and justice, and planetary health (Harvey et al., 2019; H鰈scher 4 et al., 2019). This is evidenced by recent experience with the COVID-19 pandemic response as well as 5 ongoing escalation of disaster risk associated with extreme weather events (Walch, 2019; Cohen, 2020; 6 Schipper et al., 2020b; Wells et al., 2020). 7 8 One output from systems of governance is formal policy frameworks and policies that influence processes 9 and outcomes of system transitions that support CRD (18.1.3). The Paris Agreement, for example, provides a 10 framework for CRD by defining a mitigation-centric goal of `limiting warming to well below 2癈 and 11 enabling a transition to 1.5癈' (UNFCCC, 2015). It also provides for a broadly defined global adaptation 12 goal (UNFCCC, 2015: Art. 7.1). The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are the core mechanism 13 for achieving and enhancing climate ambitions under the Paris Agreement. However, the pursuit of a given 14 NDC within a specific country will likely necessitate a range of other policy interventions that have more 15 immediate impact on technologies and behavior, implicating transitions in energy, industry, land, and 16 infrastructure (very high confidence (18.3.1). SDG-relevant activities are increasingly incorporated into 17 climate commitments in the NDCs (at last count 94 NDCs also addressed SDGs), contributing to several 18 (154 out of the 169) SDG targets (Brandi and Dzebo; Pauw et al., 2018). This reflects the potential of the 19 NDCs as near-term policy instruments and sign-posts for progress toward CRD (medium agreement, limited 20 evidence) (McCollum et al., 2018b). 21 22 As reflected by the SDGs (and SDG 13 specifically), the mainstreaming of climate change concerns into 23 development policies is one mechanism for pursuing sustainable development and CRD (very high 24 confidence). However, such mainstreaming has also been critiqued for perpetuating `development as usual', 25 reinforcing established development logics, structures and worldviews that are themselves contributing to 26 climate change and vulnerability (O'Brien et al., 2015) and for obscuring and depoliticizing adaptation 27 choices into technocratic choices (Murtinho, 2016; Webber and Donner, 2017; Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 28 2018; Khatri, 2018; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). The coordinated implementation of sustainable 29 development policy and climate action is nonetheless crucial for ensuring that the attainment of one does not 30 come at the expense of others (Stafford-Smith et al., 2017). For example, aggressive pursuit of climate 31 policies that facilitate transitions in energy systems can undermine efforts to secure sustainability transitions 32 in other systems (18.3.1.1, 18.2.5.3, Table 18.7). 33 34 Several non-climate international policy agreements provide context for CRD such as the 1948 UN 35 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Hjerpe et 36 al., 2015); the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD; UNFCCC, 1992) as well as the more recent Sendai 37 Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, 2015) and the `new humanitarianisms' which seeks to 38 reduce the gap between emergency assistance and longer term development (Marin and Naess, 2017). 39 Collectively they provide a global policy framework that protects people's rights that are potentially 40 threatened by climate change (Olsson et al., 2014). These policies are relevant to transitions across multiple 41 systems, particular in societal systems toward more equitable and just development. 42 43 18.4.2.2 Economics and Sustainable Finance 44 45 18.4.2.2.1 Economics 46 System transitions toward CRD is contingent on reducing the costs of current climate variability on society 47 while making investments that prepare for the future effects of climate change. Climate change and 48 responses to climate change will affect many different economic sectors both directly and indirectly (Stern, 49 2007; IPCC, 2014a; Hilmi et al., 2017). As a consequence, the characteristics of economic systems will play 50 an important role in determining their resilience (very high confidence). These effects will occur within the 51 context of other developments, such as a growing world population, which increases environmental 52 pressures and pollution (Gonz醠ez-Hidalgo and Zografos, 2019; Gonz醠ez-Hidalgo and Zografos, 2020). 53 This impact is higher for developing countries than for high-income countries (Liobikien and Butkus, 54 2018). While looking for sustainable climate-resilient policies, many complex and interconnected systems, 55 including economic development, must be considered in the face of global-scale changes (Hilmi and Safa, 56 2010). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-67 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Miller (2017) discusses some of the planning for, and application of, adaptation measures that improve 2 sustainability noting the importance of considering a range of factors including complexities of 3 interconnected systems, the inherent uncertainties associated with projections of climate change impacts, and 4 the effects of global-scale changes such as technological and economic development for decision 5 makers. For example, addressing climate impacts in isolation is unlikely to achieve equitable, efficient, or 6 effective adaptation outcomes (very high confidence). Instead, integrating climate resilience into growth and 7 development planning allows decision makers to identify what sustainable development policies can support 8 climate resilient growth and poverty reduction and understand better how patterns and trends of economic 9 development affect vulnerability and exposure to climate impacts across sectors and populations, including 10 distributional effects (Doczi, 2015). Markkanen and Anger-Kraavi (2019) highlighted that climate change 11 mitigation policy can influence inequality both positively and negatively. Although higher levels of poverty, 12 corruption and economic and social inequalities can increase the risk of negative outcomes, these potential 13 negative effects would be mitigated if inequality impacts were taken into consideration in all stages of policy 14 making (very high confidence). 15 16 The primary objective of economic and financial incentives around carbon emissions is to redirect 17 investment from high to low carbon technologies (Komendantova et al., 2016). Recent years have seen 18 policy interventions to incentivize transitions in energy, land, and industrial systems to address climate 19 change and sustainability focus on price-based, as opposed to quantity-based, interventions. Price-based 20 interventions aim at leveraging market mechanisms to achieve greater efficiency in the allocation of 21 resources and costs of mitigating climate change. For example, carbon pricing initiatives around the world 22 today cover approximately 8 gigatons of carbon dioxide emissions, equivalent to about 20% of global fossil 23 energy fuel emissions and 15% of total carbon dioxide greenhouse gas emissions (Boyce, 2018). Meanwhile, 24 environmental taxes and green public procurement push producers to eliminate the negative environmental 25 effects of production (Danilina and Trionfetti, 2019). There are several advantages for environmental 26 taxation including environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, the ability to raise public revenue, and 27 transparency (very high confidence). These gains can provide more resource-efficient production 28 technologies and positively affect economic competitiveness (Costantini et al., 2018). 29 30 Policies encouraging eco-innovation, defined as "new ideas, behavior, products, and processes that 31 contribute to a decreased environmental burden" (Yurdakul and Kazan, 2020), can positively affect 32 economic competitiveness. By implementing policies to encourage eco-innovation, countries enhance their 33 energy efficiency. These gains can provide more resource-efficient production technologies and positively 34 affect economic competitiveness (very high confidence) (Liobikien and Butkus, 2018) (Costantini et al., 35 2018). Other than eco-innovation, it is important to also consider exnovation, meaning the phasing out of old 36 technologies, as otherwise the expansion of supply could lead to a rebound due to cheaper prices for carbon- 37 based products (Arne Heyen et al., 2017; David, 2017). Hence, decarbonization strategies that set limits to 38 carbon-based trajectories can be beneficial. Quantity-based interventions--or so-called `command-and- 39 control' policies--involve constraints on the quantity of energy consumption or greenhouse gas emissions 40 through laws, regulations, standards and enforcement, with a focus on effectiveness rather than efficiency. 41 42 For a transition from dirty (more advanced) technologies to clean (less advanced) ones, market-based 43 instruments such as carbon taxes should be considered alongside subsidies and other incentives that 44 stimulate innovation (Acemoglu et al., 2016). Research and development in energy technologies, for 45 example, can help reduce costs of deployment and therefore the costs of operating in a carbon-constrained 46 world. H閙ous (2016) indicates that a unilateral environmental policy which includes both clean research 47 subsidies and trade tax can ensure sustainable growth, but unilateral carbon taxes alone might increase 48 innovation in polluting sectors and would not generally lead to sustainable growth. 49 50 18.4.2.2.2 Climate finance 51 Achieving progress on system transitions will be contingent on the ability of actors and institutions to access 52 the financing they need to invest in innovation, adaptation and mitigation, and broader system change (very 53 high confidence). By greening their investment portfolios, investors can support reduction in vulnerability to 54 the consequences of climate change and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Finance can contribute 55 to the reduction of GHG emissions, for example, by efficiently pricing the social cost of carbon, by 56 reflecting the transition risks in the valuation of financial assets, and by channeling investments in low- 57 carbon technologies (OECD, 2017). At the same time, there is a growing need to spur greater public and Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-68 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 private capital into climate adaptation and resilience including climate-resilient infrastructure and nature- 2 based solutions to climate change. For instance, the Green Climate Fund, established within the framework 3 of the UNFCCC, is assisting developing countries in adaptation and mitigation initiatives to counter climate 4 change. 5 6 Recent evidence sheds light on the magnitude and pervasiveness of climate risk exposure for global banks 7 and financial institutions. According to Dietz et al. (2016), up to about 17% of global financial assets are 8 directly exposed to climate risks, particularly the impacts of extreme weather events on assets and their 9 outputs. However, when indirect exposures via financial counterparts are considered, the share of assets 10 subject to climate risks is much larger (40-54%) (Battiston et al., 2017). Hence, the magnitude of climate- 11 change-related risks is substantial, and similar to the ones that started the 2008 financial crisis (high 12 agreement, limited evidence). 13 14 Financial actors increasingly recognize that the generation of long-term, sustainable financial returns is 15 dependent on a stable, well-functioning and well-governed social, environmental and economic systems 16 (very high confidence) (Shiller, 2012; Schoenmaker and Schramade, 2020). Institutional approaches to a 17 variety of environmental domains (Krueger et al., 2019), which seek to integrate the pursuit of green 18 strategies with financial returns include targeted investments in green assets (e.g., green bonds, clean energy 19 public equity) and specialized funds/vehicles for as renewable energy infrastructure (Tolliver et al., 2019; 20 Gibon et al., 2020); cleantech venture capital and alternative finance (Gianfrate and Peri, 2019); investment 21 screening to steer capital to green industries (Nielsen and Skov, 2019; Ambrosio et al., 2020); and active 22 ownership to influence organizational behavior (Silvola and Landau, 2021). 23 24 Despite the expansion of green mandates across the investment chain, definitions of some of the asset classes 25 associated with green investing are ambiguous and poorly defined. The EU taxonomy for sustainable 26 activities is a promising step in the right direction. For example, a "green" label for bonds is often stretched 27 to encompass financing facilities of issuers that misrepresent the actual environmental footprint of their 28 operations (the so-called risk of "greenwashing"). Even in cases where the bonds' proceeds are actually used 29 to finance green projects, investors often remain exposed to both the green and "brown" assets of the issuers 30 (Gianfrate and Peri, 2019; Flammer, 2020). The heterogeneity of metrics and rating methodologies (along 31 with inherent conflict of interests between issuers, investors and score/rating providers) results in 32 inconsistent and unreliable quantification of the actual environmental footprint of corporate and sovereign 33 issuers (Battiston et al., 2017; Busch et al.). 34 35 In order to promote financial climate-related disclosures for companies and financial intermediaries, the 36 financial system could play a key role in pricing carbon and in allocating capital toward low-carbon emission 37 companies (Aldy and Gianfrate, 2019; Bento and Gianfrate, 2020; Aldy et al., 2021). Stable and predictable 38 carbon-pricing regimes would significantly contribute to fostering financial innovation that can help further 39 accelerate the decarbonization of the global economy even in jurisdictions which are more lenient in 40 implementing climate mitigation actions (very high confidence) (Baranzini et al., 2017). A growing number 41 of financial regulators are intensifying efforts to enhance climate-related disclosure of financial actors. In 42 particular, the Financial Stability Board created the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 43 (TCFD) to improve and increase reporting of climate-related financial information. Several countries are 44 considering implementing mandatory climate risk disclosure in line with TCFD's recommendations. Central 45 Banks are also considering mandatory disclosure and climate stress-testing for banks. For instance, in 46 November 2020 the European Central Bank (ECB) published a guide on climate-related and environmental 47 risks explaining how the ECB expects banks to prudently manage and transparently disclose such risks under 48 current prudential rules. The ECB also announced that banks in the Euro-zone will be stress tested on their 49 ability to withstand climate change related risks. In addition to disclosure requirements and stress-testing, 50 some Central Banks are considering the possibility of steering or tilting the allocation of their assets to favor 51 the less polluting issuers (Schoenmaker, 2019). This, in turn, would translate into lower cost of capital for 52 cleaner sectors, significantly accelerating the greening of the real economy. 53 54 55 [START BOX 18.7 HERE] 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-69 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Box 18.7: `Green' Strategies of Institutional Investors 2 3 Negative and positive screening. Investors assess the carbon footprint of issuers and identify the best and 4 worst performers (Boermans and Galema, 2019). The issuers with excessive carbon footprint are divested 5 and fall into the "exclusion lists" (negative screening). Alternatively, the investors commit to pick only the 6 best in class (positive screening). As a bare minimum, screening approaches force more transparent 7 environmental reporting from issuers. In the most optimistic scenario, in order to avoid exclusion lists issuers 8 may progressively divest their non-green operations. In the long term, the combination of positive and 9 negative screening will reward sustainable issuers relative to non-green sectors, thus reducing the cost of 10 capital for less polluting entities. 11 12 Active ownership. Equity investors can exercise the voting rights at shareholders' meetings in relation to 13 governance and business strategy, including the environmental performance. In addition, institutional 14 investors engage with the management and the boards of directors of investee companies. Active ownership 15 is therefore defined as the full exercise of the rights that accrue to the "owners" of the securities issued by 16 companies (Dimson et al., 2015; Dimson et al., 2020). Active owners are entitled to question and challenge 17 the robustness of financial analyses and the risk assessment behind strategic decisions including the 18 environmental footprint ones. For instance, since fossil fuel businesses face the prospect of dramatic 19 business decline (Ansar et al., 2013) and must revisit their business model to survive, active ownership by 20 institutional investors may foster the transition to cleaner production and supply chain. Companies more 21 exposed to carbon risks particularly need the active support of long-term shareholders. In turn, investors 22 adopting an active ownership approach can manage their holdings' exposure to climate change risks, thus 23 protecting the value of their investments on a long-term horizon (Krueger et al., 2019). 24 25 Specialized financial instruments and investors. New asset classes have been created to address the climate 26 change challenge. Also specialized investment funds and vehicles came to life with the primary objective of 27 addressing climate issues. While these financial instruments and funds prioritize the achievement of climate 28 objectives, they do not sacrifice financial returns and are able to attract private capital. To mention a few 29 examples: 30 31 Green bonds are typically issued by companies, banks, municipalities, and governments with the 32 commitment to use the proceeds exclusively to finance or refinance green projects, assets or business 33 activities. These bonds are equivalent to any other bond issued by the same entity except for the label of 34 "greenness" that ideally is verified ex-ante at the launch and ex-post when the proceeds are actually used 35 by the issuer. Early evidence show that green bonds do not penalize financially issuers (Gianfrate and 36 Peri, 2019; Flammer, 2020). 37 Carbon funds are designed to help countries achieve long-term sustainability typically financing forest 38 conservation. They are intended to reduce climate change impacts from forest loss and degradation. 39 Project finance. New renewable energy initiatives are likely to recur more and more to project finance. 40 Project finance relies on the creation of a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which is legally and 41 commercially self-contained and serves only to run the renewable energy project. The SPV is financed 42 without (or very limited) guarantees from the sponsors (typically energy companies: investors are 43 therefore paid back on the basis only of SPV's future cash flows only and cannot recourse on the 44 sponsors' assets (Steffen, 2018). 45 Cleantech venture capital. These funds invest exclusively in early-stage companies working on 46 innovative but not yet fully tested clean technologies. The risk profile of such investments is usually 47 very high. The extent to which this segment of the financial industry can successfully support "deep" 48 energy innovations is still debated (Gaddy et al., 2017). When cleantech start-ups develop hardware 49 requiring a high upfront investment, support from the public sector seems necessary in order to attract 50 further investments from large corporations and patient institutional investors. 51 Crowdfunding and alternative finance are emerging as a channel to both finance small-scale clean 52 energy projects as well as fund early stage innovative clean technologies (Cumming et al., 2017; Bento 53 et al., 2019). 54 55 [END BOX 18.7 HERE] 56 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-70 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.4.2.3 Institutional capacity 2 3 Institutional capacity for system transitions refers to the capacity of structures and processes, rules, norms, 4 and cultures to shape development expectations and actions aimed at durable improvements in human well- 5 being. The AR5 highlighted the need for strong institutions to create enabling environments for adaptation 6 and greenhouse gas mitigation action (Denton et al., 2014). Institutions stand within the social and political 7 practices and broader systems of governance that ultimately drive adaptation and development processes and 8 outcomes. They are thus produced by them and can become tools by which some actors constrain the actions 9 of others (Gebreyes, 2018). As a consequence, they and can become a significant barrier to change, whether 10 incremental or more transformational (very high confidence). The post-AR5 focus on transformational 11 adaptation and resilience present in the literature suggests that institutions that enable system transitions 12 toward CRD are secure enough to facilitate a wide range of voices, and legitimate enough to change goals or 13 processes over time, without reducing confidence in their efficacy. 14 15 The limited literature on institutions and pathways relevant to system transitions and CRD suggests that 16 institutions are most effective when taking a development-first approach to adaptation. This is consistent 17 with the principles of CRD which emphasizes not simply reducing climate risk, but rather making 18 development processes resilient to the changing climate. There is agreement in this literature that such an 19 approach allows for the effective integration of climate challenges into existing policy and planning 20 processes (very high confidence) (Pervin et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017b; Mogelgaard et al., 2018). However, 21 this approach generally rests on an incremental framing of institutional change (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009) 22 based on two critical assumptions. The first is that existing processes and institutions are capable of bringing 23 about system transitions that generate desired development outcomes and thus can be considered appropriate 24 vehicles for the achievement of CRD. A large critical literature questions the efficacy of formal state and 25 multilateral institutions. The evidence for the ability of local, informal institutions to achieve development 26 goals remains uneven, with robust evidence of positive impacts on public service delivery, but more 27 ambiguous evidence on behavior changes associated with strengthened institutions (Berkhout et al., 2018). 28 The second is that the mainstreaming of adaptation will bring about changes to currently unsustainable 29 development practices and pathways, instead of merely strengthening development-as-usual by subsuming 30 adaptation to existing development pathways and allowing them to endure in the face of growing stresses 31 (Eriksen et al., 2015; Godfrey-Wood and Otto Naess, 2016; Scoville-Simonds et al., 2020). There is 32 evidence that countries with poor governance have limited adaptation planning or action at the national level, 33 even when other determinants of adaptive capacity are present (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014). This suggests 34 that, in these contexts, adaptation efforts are likely to be subsumed to existing government goals and actions, 35 rather than having transformational impact. 36 37 18.4.2.4 Science, Technology & Innovation 38 39 Ongoing innovations in technology, finance, and policy have enabled more ambitious climate action over the 40 past decade, including significant growth in renewable energy, electrical vehicles, and energy efficiency. 41 However, access to, and the benefits of, that innovation have not been evenly distributed among global 42 regions and communities and continued innovation is needed to facilitate climate action and sustainable 43 development (very high confidence). Policymakers need useful science and information (Kirchhoff et al., 44 2013; Calkins, 2015; IPCC, 2019f) to make informed decisions about possible risks, and the benefits, costs, 45 and trade-offs of available adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development solutions (i.e., Article 4.1 of 46 the Paris Agreement; UNFCCC, 2015). Moreover, recent literature has emphasized the need for deep 47 technological, as well social, changes to avert the risks of conventional development trajectories (Gerst et al., 48 2013; IPCC, 2014a). 49 50 An effective and innovative technological regime is one that is integrated with local social entities across 51 different modes of life, local governance processes (Pereira, 2018; Nightingale et al., 2020); and local 52 knowledge(s), which increasingly support adaptation to socio-environmental drivers of vulnerability 53 (Schipper et al., 2014; Nalau et al., 2018; IPCC, 2019f). These actors and their knowledge are often ignored 54 in favor of knowledge held by experts and policymakers, exacerbating uneven power relations (Naess, 2013; 55 Nightingale et al., 2020). For example, achieving sustainability and shifting towards a low carbon energy 56 system (e.g., hydropower dams, wind farms) remains a contested space with divergent interests, values and 57 prospects of future (Bradley and Hedr閚, 2014; Avila, 2018; Mikulewicz, 2019), and potential impacts on Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-71 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 human rights as embodied by the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015). A number of studies have emphasized 2 the limits of relying upon technology innovation and deployment (e.g., expansion of renewable energy 3 systems and/or carbon capture) as a solution to challenges of climate change and sustainable development 4 (18.3.1.2). This is because such solutions may fail to consider the local historical contexts and barriers to 5 participation of vulnerable communities, restricting their access to land, food, energy, and resources for their 6 livelihoods. 7 8 18.4.2.5 Monitoring and Evaluation Frameworks 9 10 Enabling system transitions toward CRD is dependent in part on the ability to monitor and evaluate system 11 transitions and broader development pathways to identify effective interventions and barriers to their 12 implementation (very high confidence). However, the monitoring and evaluation of individual system 13 transitions, much less CRD, remains highly challenging for multiple reasons (Persson, 2019). The highly 14 contextual nature of resilience, adaptation and sustainable development means that, unlike climate 15 mitigation, it is difficult to define universal metrics or targets for adaptation and resilience (Pringle and 16 Leiter, 2018), (Brooks et al., 2014). This is demonstrated by the Paris Agreement's global goal for 17 adaptation, The mismatch between timescales associated with resilience and adaptation interventions and 18 those over which the results of such interventions are expected to become apparent tends to result in a focus 19 on the measurement of spending, outputs, and short-term outcomes, rather than longer-term impacts (Brooks 20 et al., 2014; Pringle and Leiter, 2018). The need to assess resilience and adaptation against a background of 21 evolving climate hazards, and to link resilience and adaptation with development outcomes, present further 22 methodological challenges (very high confidence) (Brooks et al., 2014). 23 24 Currently, the ability to monitor different components of CRD are in various stages of maturity (very high 25 confidence). Monitoring of the sustainable development goals, for example, is a routine established practice 26 at global and regional levels, and UNDP publishes annual updates on progress toward the SDGs (United 27 Nations, 2021). For resilience, Brooks et al. (2014) identify three broad approaches to its measurement, each 28 of which could offer potential mechanisms for monitoring progress toward CRD. One is a `hazards' 29 approach, in which resilience is described in terms of the magnitude of a particular hazard that can be 30 accommodated by a system, useful in contexts where thresholds in climate and related parameters can be 31 identified and linked with adverse impacts on human populations, infrastructure and other systems (Naylor et 32 al., 2020). An `impacts' approach is one in which resilience is measured in terms of actual or avoided 33 impacts and is suited for tracking adaptation success in delivering CRD over longer timescales, for example 34 at the national level (Brooks et al., 2014). Finally, a `systems' approach is one where resilience is described 35 in terms of the characteristics of a system using quantitative or qualitative indicators which are often 36 associated with different `dimensions' of resilience (Serfilippi and Ramnath, 2018; Saja et al., 2019). This 37 allows measurement of key indicators that are proxies for resilience at regular intervals, even in the absence 38 of significant climate hazards and associated disruptions (very high confidence) (Brooks et al., 2014) (see 39 also Cross-Chapter Box ADAPT in Chapter 1). Similar criteria could be applied to evaluating adaptation 40 options and their implementation as well as various interventions in pursuit of SDGs. 41 42 18.4.3 Arenas of Engagement 43 44 Much of the enabling conditions for system transitions discussed in 18.4.2 are inherently linked to actors and 45 their agency in pursuing system change. Yet, a significant literature has developed since the AR5 exploring 46 note only the role of different actors in pursuing adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development options, 47 but also how those actors interact with one another to drive outcomes. CRD pathways are determined by the 48 interactions between societal actors and networks, including government, civil society and the private sector, 49 as well as science and the media. The resultant social choices and cumulative private and public actions (and 50 inactions) are institutionalized through both formal and informal institutions that evolve over time and seek 51 to provide societal stability in the face of change. The degree to which the emergent pathways foster just and 52 climate resilient development depends on how contending societal interests, values and worldviews are 53 reconciled through these interactions. These interactions occur in many different arenas of engagement, i.e., 54 the settings, places and spaces in which societal actors interact to influence the nature and course of 55 development, including political, economic, socio-cultural, ecological, knowledge-technology and 56 community arenas (Figures 18.1, 18.2). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-72 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 For example, political arenas range from formalized election and voting procedures to more informal and 2 less transparent practices, like special interest lobbying. Town squares and streets can become sites of 3 political struggle and dissent, including protests against climate inaction. As a more specific case-in-point, 4 the formal space for national, sub-national and international adaptation governance emerged at COP 16 5 (UNFCCC, 2010) when adaptation was recognized as having a similar level of priority as mitigation. The 6 Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) built on this and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (United 7 Nations, 2015) to link adaptation to development and climate justice, widening the scope of adaptation 8 governance beyond formal government institutions. It also highlighted the importance of multi-level 9 adaptation governance, including non-state voices from civil society and the private sector. This implied the 10 need for wider arenas and modes of engagement around adaptation (Chung Tiam Fook, 2017; Lesnikowski 11 et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a) that facilitate coordination and convergence among these diverse actors including 12 individual citizens to collectively solve problems and unlock the synergies between adaptation and 13 mitigation and sustainable development (IPCC, 2018a; Romero-Lankao et al., 2018). 14 15 There are many other visible and less visible arenas of engagement in the other interconnected spheres of 16 societal interaction spanning scales from the local to international level. The metaphor of arenas derives 17 from diverse social and political theory, with applications in studies of, among other things, governance 18 transformation and transitions (Healey, 2006; J鴕gensen, 2012; J鴕gensen et al., 2017). It underscores that 19 these arenas can be enduring or temporary in nature, are historically situated and often spatially bounded, 20 and signifies the many different mechanisms by which societal actors interact in dynamic and emergent 21 ways. Power and politics impact access and influence in these arenas of engagement � with varying levels of 22 inclusion and exclusion shaping the nature and trajectory of development. In practice, some arenas of 23 engagement are `struggle arenas' as different societal actors strive to influence the trajectory of development, 24 with inevitable winners and losers. 25 26 Institutional arrangements to foster CRD are at an early stage of development in most regions (medium 27 agreement, limited evidence). They need to be further clarified and strengthened to enable a sharing of 28 resources and responsibilities that facilitate climate actions embracing climate resilience, equity, justice, 29 poverty alleviation and sustainable development (Wood et al., 2017; IPCC, 2018a; Reckien et al., 2018). 30 These endeavours are strongly influenced by how contested and complementary worldviews about climate 31 change and development are mobilised by societal actors to justify, direct, accelerate and deepen 32 transformational climate action or entrench maladaptive business as usual practices (18.4.3.1). 33 34 18.4.3.1 Worldviews 35 36 Worldviews are overarching systems of meaning and meaning-making that inform how people interpret, 37 enact, and co-create reality (De Witt et al., 2016). Worldviews shape the vision, beliefs, attitudes, values, 38 emotions, actions, and even political and institutional arrangements. As such, they can promote holistic, 39 egalitarian approaches to enable, accelerate and deepen climate action and environmental care (Ramkissoon 40 and Smith, 2014; De Witt et al., 2016; Lacroix and Gifford, 2017; Sanganyado et al., 2018; Brink and 41 Wamsler, 2019). Alternatively, they can also serve as significant barriers to system transitions and 42 transformation, based on anthropocentric, mechanistic and materialistic, worldviews and the utilitarian, 43 individualist or skeptical values and attitudes they often promote (very high confidence) (Beddoe et al., 2009; 44 van Egmond and de Vries, 2011; Stevenson et al., 2014; Zummo et al., 2020). 45 46 Traditional, modern and postmodern worldviews have different, and in many ways, complementary 47 potentials for integrative diverse approaches to climate action and sustainable development. They can also 48 destabilize climate-sensitive societal values (van Egmond and de Vries, 2011; Van Opstal and Hug�, 2013; 49 De Witt et al., 2016; Shaw, 2016) which are predictors of concern (Shi et al., 2015). Among the challenges 50 of strongly different climate-related worldviews, is that they rarely co-exist. Some worldviews become 51 incompatible or hostile to other worldviews, openly seeking to dominate, eliminate or segregate competing 52 perspectives (medium agreement, medium evidence) (de Witt, 2015; Jackson, 2016; Nightingale, 2016; Xue 53 et al., 2016; Goldman et al., 2018). 54 55 To address these difficult contests, climate- and global environmental change-related worldviews are often 56 scientized. This can exclude other worldviews which ultimately narrows understanding of climate change 57 and the solution space. Hence, the post-AR5 literature on worldviews focuses on the numerous meanings, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-73 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 associations, narratives and frames of climate change and how these shape perceptions, attitudes and values 2 (Morton, 2013; Boulton, 2016; Hulme, 2018; Nightingale B鰄ler, 2019). The recognition of the diversity of 3 interpretations and meanings has led to multidisciplinary and transdisciplinary research that incorporates the 4 humanities and the arts (Murphy, 2011; Elliott and Cullis, 2017; Steelman et al., 2019; Tauginien et al., 5 2020), feminist studies (MacGregor, 2003; Demeritt et al., 2011; Bell, 2013; Brink and Wamsler, 2019; 6 Plesa, 2019) and religious studies (Sachdeva, 2016; McPhetres and Zuckerman, 2018) to examine diverse 7 understandings of reality and knowledge possibilities around climate change. In addition, literature on 8 cultural cognition, epistemological plurality and relational ontologies draws on non-Western worldviews and 9 forms of knowledge (Goldman et al., 2018) (Jackson, 2016; Nightingale, 2016; Xue et al., 2016). 10 11 On the other hand, the tendence for certain worldviews to dominate the policy discourse has the potential to 12 exacerbate social, economic and political inequities (very high confidence). ontological, epistemic and 13 procedural injustices. Research aimed at exploring the existing political ontology and knowledge politics of 14 exclusion that marginalize certain communities and actors originated in academic, or scientific perspectives. 15 This includes institutions such as the IPCC and is subsequently replicated in social representations, including 16 the media, public policy and the development agenda, narrowing possibilities for social transformation 17 (Jackson, 2014; Luton, 2015; Escobar, 2016; Burman, 2017; Newman et al., 2018; Sanganyado et al., 2018; 18 Wilson and Inkster, 2018). 19 20 21 [START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX INDIG HERE] 22 23 Cross-Chapter Box INDIG: The Role of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge in 24 Understanding and Adapting to Climate Change 25 26 Authors: Tero Mustonen (Finland), Sherilee Harper (Canada), Gretta Pecl (Australia), Vanesa Cast醤 Broto 27 (Spain), Nina Lansbury (Australia), Andrew Okem (Nigeria/South Africa), Ayansina Ayanlade (Nigeria), 28 Jackie Dawson (Canada), Pauline Harris (Aotearoa-New Zealand), Pauliina Feodoroff (Finland), Deborah 29 McGregor (Canada) 30 31 Indigenous knowledge refers to the understandings, skills and philosophies developed by societies with long 32 histories of interaction with their natural surroundings (UNESCO, 2018; IPCC, 2019a). Local knowledge 33 refers to the understandings and skills developed by individuals and populations, specific to the places where 34 they live (UNESCO, 2018; IPCC, 2019a). Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are inherently 35 valuable but have only recently begun to be appreciated and in western scientific assessment processes in 36 their own right (Ford et al., 2016). In the past these often endangered ways of knowing have been suppressed 37 or attacked (Mustonen, 2014). Yet these knowledge systems represent a range of cultural practices, wisdom, 38 traditions, and ways of knowing the world that provide accurate and useful climate change information, 39 observations, and solutions (very high confidence) (Table Cross-Chapter Box INDIG.1). Rooted in their own 40 contextual and relative embedded locations, some of these knowledges represent unbroken engagement with 41 the earth, nature and weather for many tens of thousands of years, with an understanding of the ecosystem 42 and climatic changes over longer-term timescales that is held both as knowledge by Indigenous Peoples and 43 Local Peoples as well as in the archaeological record (Barnhardt and Angayuqaq, 2005; UNESCO, 2018). 44 45 Indigenous Peoples around the world often hold unique worldviews that link today's generations with past 46 generations. In particular, many Indigenous Peoples consider concepts of responsibility through 47 intergenerational equity, thereby honouring both past and future generations (Matsui, 2015; McGregor et al., 48 2020). This can often be in sharp contrast to environmental valuing and decision-making that occurs in 49 Western societies (Barnhardt and Angayuqaq, 2005). Therefore, consideration of Indigenous knowledge and 50 local knowledge needs to be a priority in the assessment of adaptation futures (Nakashima et al., 2012)(Ford 51 et al., 2016) (Chapter 1), although adequate Indigenous cultural and intellectual property rights require legal 52 and non-legal measures for recognition and protection (Janke, 2018). 53 54 Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge are crucial to address environmental impacts, such as climate 55 change, where the uncertainty of outcome is high and a range of responses are required (Mackey and 56 Claudie, 2015). However, working with this knowledge in an appropriate and ethically acceptable way can 57 be challenging. For instance, questions of data `validity' and the requirement to communicate such Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-74 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 knowledge in the dominant language can lead to inaccurate portrayals of Indigenous knowledge as inferior to 2 science. This may overlook the uniqueness of Indigenous knowledge and then lead to the overall devaluation 3 of Indigenous political economies, cultural ecologies, languages, educational systems, and spiritual practices 4 (Smith, 2013; Sillitoe, 2016; Naude, 2019; Barker and Pickerill, 2020). Furthermore, Indigenous knowledge 5 is too often only sought superficially � focusing only on the `what', rather than the `how' of climate change 6 adaptation and/or seen through the lenses of `romantic glorification' leaving little room for the knowledge to 7 be expressed as authored by the communities and knowledge holders themselves (Yunkaporta, 2019). 8 9 Multiple knowledge systems and frameworks 10 11 Indigenous knowledge systems include not only the specific narratives and practices to make sense of the 12 world, but also profound sources of ethics and wisdom. They are networks of actors and institutions that 13 organise the production, transfer and use of knowledge (L鰂marck and Lidskog, 2017). There is a pluralism 14 of forms of knowledge that emerge from oral traditions, local engagement with multiple spaces, and 15 Indigenous cultures (Peterson et al., 2018). Recognising such multiplicity of forms of knowledge has long 16 been an important concern within sustainability science (Folke et al., 2016). Less dominant forms of 17 knowledge should not be put aside because they are not comparable or complementary with scientific 18 knowledge (Brattland and Mustonen, 2018; Mustonen, 2018; Ford et al., 2020; Ogar et al., 2020). Instead, 19 Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge can shape how climate change risk is understood and 20 experienced, the possibility of developing climate change solutions grounded in place-based experiences, 21 and the development of governance systems that match the expectations of different Indigenous knowledge 22 and local knowledge holders (very high confidence). 23 24 Different frameworks that enable the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge have emerged from efforts to utilise 25 more than one knowledge system (high evidence, high agreement). For example, the Intergovernmental 26 Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has developed a `nature's 27 contribution to peoples' framework that provides a common conceptual vocabulary and structural analysis 28 (D韆z et al., 2015; Teng� et al., 2017; D韆z et al., 2018; Peterson et al., 2018). The IPBES approach 29 complements other efforts to study areas of intersection between scientific and Indigenous worldviews 30 (Barnhardt and Angayuqaq, 2005; Huaman and Sriraman, 2015) or `boundaries' that illustrate `blind spots' 31 in scientific knowledge (Cash et al., 2003; Clark et al., 2016; Brattland and Mustonen, 2018). These 32 frameworks highlight areas of collaboration but provide less guidance in areas where sources of evidence 33 conflict across different knowledge systems (L鰂marck and Lidskog, 2017). These experiences suggest that 34 the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in international assessments may transform the 35 process of assessment of scientific, technical, and socio-economic evidence (medium evidence, high 36 agreement). These knowledge systems also point to novel discoveries that may be still unknown to the 37 scientific world but have been known by communities for millennia (Mustonen and Feodoroff, 2020). 38 39 The importance of free and prior-informed consent 40 41 Obtaining free and prior-informed consent is a necessary but not sufficient condition to engage in knowledge 42 production with Indigenous Peoples (Sillitoe, 2016). Self-determination in climate change assessment, 43 response, and governance is critical (Chakraborty and Sherpa, 2021), and Indigenous Peoples are actively 44 contributing to respond to climate change (Etchart, 2017). Climate change assessment and adaptation should 45 be self-determined and led by Indigenous Peoples, acknowledge the importance of developing genuine 46 partnerships, respect Indigenous knowledge and ways of knowing, and acknowledge Indigenous Peoples as 47 stewards of their environment (Country et al., 2016; Country et al., 2018; ITK, 2019; Barker and Pickerill, 48 2020; Chakraborty and Sherpa, 2021). Supporting Indigenous Peoples' leadership and rights in climate 49 adaptation options at the local, regional, national and international levels is an effective way to ensure that 50 such options are adapted to their living conditions and do not pose additional detrimental impacts to their 51 lives (very high confidence). Chapter 18 shows that the transformations required to deliver climate resilient 52 futures will create societal disruptions, with impacts that are most often unevenly experienced by groups 53 with high exposure and sensitivity to climate change, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities 54 (Schipper et al., 2020a). Climate-resilient futures depend on finding strategies to address the causes and 55 drivers of deep inequities (Chapter 18). For example, climate resilient futures will depend on recognising the 56 socio-economic, political and health inequities that often affect Indigenous Peoples (Mapfumo et al., 2016; 57 Ludwig and Poliseli, 2018) (very high confidence). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-75 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 International conventions to support and utilize Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge 3 4 Several tools within international conventions may support instruments to develop equitable processes that 5 facilitate the inclusion Indigenous knowledge and leadership in climate change adaptation initiatives. The 6 International Labour Convention 69 recognised Indigenous People's right to self-determination in 1989 7 (ILO, 1989). The United Nations' Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (United Nations, 2007) 8 includes articles on the right to development (Article 23), the right to maintain and strengthen their 9 distinctive spiritual relationship and to uphold responsibilities to future generations (Article 25), and the right 10 to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive capacity of their territories (Article 11 29). Article 26 upholds the right to the lands, territories and resources, the right to own, use, develop and 12 control the lands, and legal recognition and protection of these lands, territories, and resources. Indigenous 13 Peoples are also recognized within the Sustainable Development Goals as a priority group (Carino and 14 Tamayo, 2019). International events such as the `Resilience in a time of uncertainty: Indigenous Peoples and 15 Climate Change' Conference brought together Indigenous Peoples' representatives and government leaders 16 from around the world to discuss the role of Indigenous Peoples in climate adaptation (UNESCO, 2015). 17 18 The value of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in climate adaptation planning 19 20 There have been increasing efforts to enable Indigenous knowledge holders to participate directly in IPCC 21 assessment reports (Ford et al., 2012; Nakashima et al., 2012; Ford et al., 2016). Adaptation efforts have 22 benefited from the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (IPCC, 2019e) (very high 23 confidence). Moreover, it has been recognized that including Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge in 24 IPCC reports can contribute to overcoming the combined challenges of climate change, food security, 25 biodiversity conservation, and combating desertification and land degradation (IPCC, 2019c) (high 26 confidence). Limiting warming to 1.5癈 necessitates building the capability of formal assessment processes 27 to respect, include and utilize Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge (IPCC, 2018a) (medium evidence, 28 high agreement). 29 30 However, these efforts have been accompanied by a recognition that `integration' of Indigenous knowledge 31 and local knowledge cannot mean that those knowledge systems are subsumed or required to be validated 32 through typical scientific means (Gratani et al., 2011; Matsui, 2015). Such a critique of `validity' can be 33 inappropriate, unnecessary, can disrespect Indigenous Peoples' own identities and histories, limits the 34 advancement and sharing of these perspectives in the formal literature, and overlooks the structural drivers 35 of oppression and endangerment that are associated with Western civilization (Ford et al., 2016). Moreover, 36 by underutilizing Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge systems, opportunities that could otherwise 37 facilitate effective and feasible adaptation action can be overlooked. We should also reserve space for the 38 understanding that each cultural knowledge system, building on linguistic-cultural endemicity, is unique and 39 inherently valuable. 40 41 Indigenous Peoples have often constructed their ways of knowing using oral histories as one of the vehicles 42 of mind and memory, observance, governance, and maintenance of customary law (Table Cross-Chapter 43 Box INDIG.2). These ways of knowing can also incorporate the relationships between multiple factors 44 simultaneously which adds particular value towards understanding complex systems that is in contrast to the 45 dominant reductionist, Western approach- noting that non-reductionist approaches also exist (Ludwig et al., 46 2014; Hoagland, 2017). 47 48 For climate research, the role of oral histories as a part of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge is 49 extremely relevant. For example, ocean adaptation initiatives can be guided by oral historians and keepers of 50 knowledge who can convey new knowledge and baselines of ecosystem change over long-time frames 51 (Nunn and Reid, 2016). Oral histories can also convey cultural indicators and linguistic devices of species 52 identification as a part of a local dialect matrix and changes in ecosystems and species using interlinkages 53 not available to science (Mustonen, 2013; Frainer et al., 2020). Oral histories attached to maritime place 54 names, especially underwater areas (Brattland and Nilsen, 2011), can position observations relevant for 55 understanding climate change over long ecological timeframes (Nunn and Reid, 2016). Species abundances, 56 well-being and locations are some of the examples present in the ever-evolving oral histories as living ways 57 of knowing. Indigenous knowledge and oral histories may also have the potential to convey governance, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-76 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 moral, and ethical frameworks of sustainable livelihoods and cultures (Mustonen and Shadrin, 2020) rooted 2 in the particular Indigenous or local contexts that are not otherwise available in written or published forms. 3 4 Climate change research involving Indigenous Peoples and local communities has shown that the generation, 5 innovation, transmission, and preservation of Indigenous knowledge is threatened by climate change 6 (Kermoal and Altamirano-Jim閚ez, 2016; Simonee et al., 2021). This is because Indigenous knowledge is 7 taught, local knowledge is gained through experience, and relationships with the land are sustained through 8 social engagement within and among families, communities, and other societies (Tobias J.K, 2014; Kermoal 9 and Altamirano-Jim閚ez, 2016). The knowledge that has traditionally been passed on in support of identity, 10 language and purpose has been disrupted at an intergenerational level (Lemke and Delormier, 2017). Many 11 of these dynamics have affected local knowledge transfers equally (Mustonen, 2013). This scenario 12 represents a tension for Indigenous Peoples, where Indigenous knowledge in the form of land-based life 13 ways, languages, food security, intergenerational transmission and application are threatened by climate 14 change, yet in parallel, these same practices can enable adaptation and resilience (McGregor et al., 2020). 15 16 17 Table Cross-Chapter Box INDIG.1: Examples of Indigenous knowledge and local knowledge about climate change 18 used in this Assessment Report Issue Examples of Indigenous Peoples' and local Context, peoples, and Source location communities' action Climate Phenological cues to forecast and respond to climate Smallholder farmers, forecasting/ear change Delta State, Nigeria ly warning Forecasting of weather and climate variation Afar pastoralists, through observation of the natural environment (e.g. north-eastern Ethiopia Ch9 changes in insects, and wildlife). Fire hazards Observation of wind patterns to plan response to Inupiat, Alaska, US Ch14 coastal erosion/flooding Ch12 Sky and moon observation to determine the onset of Maya, Guatemala Ch12 rainy season Ch14 Indigenous nations in Prescribed burning Venezuela, Brazil, Ch12 Guyana, Canada, and Crop yield / Water management, native seeds conservation and US food security exchange, crop rotation, polyculture, and Mapuche, Chile agroforestry Livelihood Crop association (milpa) agroforestry, land Ch12 and well-being preparation and tillage practices, native seed Ecosystem selection and exchange, adjusting planting Maya, Guatemala degradation calendars, Harvesting rain-water and the use of maize Yucat醤 Peninsula, Ch14 landraces by Indigenous farmers to adapt to climate Mexico impacts and promote food security in Mexico Cultural values ingrained in knowledge system: Quechua, Cusco, Peru Ch12 reciprocity, collectiveness, equilibrium, and solidarity S醡i, Nenets, and Ch13 Ecosystem restoration including rewilding Komi, Scandinavia and Ch14 Siberia Collaboration with researchers, foresters, and Indigenous Nations in landowners to manage native black ash deciduous Canada and US trees against emerald ash borer Selection and planting of native plants that reduce erosion Fisheries Whole-of-island approaches that embed IK and LK Small islands states (as Ch15 in environmental governance defined by Chapter 15) Traditional climate-resilient fishing approaches Indigenous nations Ch14 across North America CCP6 and the Arctic Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-77 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Management Restoration of traditional network of water tanks Traditional Ch6 of urban communities and resources activists in South Indian cities such as Bengaluru 1 2 3 Table Cross-Chapter Box INDIG.2: Case Study Summary Region Summary Africa Many rural smallholder farmers in Africa use their ingrained Indigenous knowledge systems to navigate climatic changes as many do not have access to Western systems of weather forecasting. Instead, these farmers have been reported to use observations of clouds and thunderstorms, and migration of local birds to determine the start of the wet season, as well as create temporary walls by rivers to store water during droughts. Indigenous knowledge systems should be incorporated into strategic plans for climate change adaptation policies to help smallholder farmers cope with climate change (Mapfumo et al., 2016). Arctic For local Inuit hunters and others who travel across Arctic land, ice and sea, there is evidence that the most accurate approach to reduce risk and enable informed decision-making for safe travel, is to combine Indigenous knowledge and local observations of weather with official online weather and marine services information that is available nationally (Simonee et al., 2021). Combining Inuit and local knowledge of weather, water, ice, and climate information with official forecasts has provided local hunters with more accurate, locally relevant information, and has on several occasions helped to avoid major weather-related accidents. Latin In Venezuela, Brazil, and Guyana, Indigenous knowledge systems have led to a lower incidence of America wildfires, reducing the risk of rising temperatures and droughts (Mistry et al., 2016). The Mapuche Indigenous Peoples in Chile use various traditional and sustainable agricultural practices, including: native seed conservation and exchange (trafkintu), crop rotation, polyculture, and tree- crop association. They also give thanks to Mother Earth through rituals to nurture socioecological sustainability (Parraguez-Vergara et al., 2018). In rural Cusco Region of Peru, "cultures values known in Quechua as ayni (reciprocity), ayllu (collectiveness), yanantin (equilibrium) and chanincha (solidarity)" have led to successful adaptation to climate change (Walshe and Mori Argumedo, 2016). (Aotearoa The traditional calendar system (maramataka) used by the Mori in Aotearoa-New Zealand New incorporates ecological, environmental and celestial Indigenous knowledge. Mori practitioners are Zealand) collaborating with scientists through the Effect of Climate Change on Traditional Mori Calendars project (Harris et al., 2017) to examine if climatic changes are impacting the use of the maramataka, which can be used as a framework to identify and explain environmental changes. Observations are being documented across Aotearoa, New Zealand to improve understandings of environmental changes and explore the use of Indigenous Mori knowledge in climate change Skolt S醡i assessment and adaptation. (Finland) In 2011, the Skolt S醡i in Finland began the first co-governance initiative where collaborative management and Indigenous knowledge were utilized to effectively manage a river and Atlantic Salmon (Salmo salar). This species is culturally and spiritually significant to the Skolt S醡i and has been adversely impacted by rising water temperatures and habitat loss (Brattland and Mustonen, 2018; Feodoroff, 2020; Ogar et al., 2020) (see also CCP Polar). Using Indigenous knowledge, they mapped changes in catchment areas and used cultural indicators to determine the severity of changes. Through collaborative management efforts that utilized both Indigenous knowledge and science, spawning and juvenile habitat areas for trout and grayling were restored, demonstrating the autonomous community capacity (Huntington et al., 2017) of the Indigenous Skolt S醡i and the capacity of Indigenous knowledge to address climate change impacts and detection of very first microplastics pollution together with science (Pecl et al., 2017; Brattland and Mustonen, 2018; Mustonen and Feodoroff, 2020). 4 5 [END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX INDIG HERE] 6 7 8 18.4.3.2 Political and government arenas 9 10 Climate resilient development is embedded in social systems, in the political economy and its 11 underlying ideologies, interests and institutions (see 18.4.1). The pursuit of CRD, and shifting Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-78 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 development pathways away from prevailing trends, unfolds in an array of political arenas, from the 2 offices of bureaucrats to parliament buildings, sidewalks and streets, to discursive arenas in which 3 governance actors interact � from the village level to global forums (J鴕gensen et al., 2017; Montoute et 4 al., 2019; S鴕ensen and Torfing, 2019; Pasquini, 2020). Paradoxically, the post-AR5 literature suggests that 5 political arenas are often used to shut down efforts to explore the solution space for climate change and 6 sustainable development (medium agreement, robust evidence) (e.g., Kenis and Mathijs, 2012; Kenis and 7 Mathijs, 2014; Beveridge and Koch, 2016; Kenis and Lievens, 2016; Driver et al., 2018; Meriluoto, 2018; 8 Swyngedouw, 2018; Mocca and Osborne, 2019). Power relationships among different actors create 9 opportunities for people to be included or excluded in collective action (Sim閍nt-Germanos, 2019) (18.3.1.6, 10 18.4.3.5). Therefore, as evidenced by examples from the UK (MacGregor, 2019) and China (Huang and Sun, 11 2020) small-scale collective environmental action has transformative potential in part due to its ability to 12 increase levels of cooperation among different actors (medium agreement, limited evidence) (Green et al., 13 2020; Bl黨dorn and Deflorian, 2021). 14 15 In addition to the `arm's length' acts of voting, social mobilisation, protest, and dissent can be critical 16 catalysts for transformative change (Porta, 2020). These are competitions for recognition, power, and 17 authority (Nightingale, 2017) that take place in settings. This is evidenced by experiences from the energy 18 sector in Bangladesh which became a contested national policy domain and where social movements 19 eventually transformed the nation's energy politics (Faruque, 2017). Similarly, in Germany, the nation's 20 energy transition led to marked changes in agency, legal frameworks, and energy markets drove the 21 proliferation of so-called municipalizations of energy systems � a reversal of years of system privatization 22 (Becker et al., 2016). Meanwhile, experience in Bolivia demonstrate that the transformative potential of 23 political conflict depends on transcending narrow issues to form broad coalitions with a collective identity 24 that challenge prevailing development objectives and trajectories (Andreucci, 2019). Such examples 25 illustrate the power of the communities as a vanguard against environmentally destructive practices 26 (Villamayor-Tomas and Garc韆-L髉ez, 2018). Social movements have been successful at countering fossil 27 fuel extraction (Piggot, 2018) and open up political opportunities in the face of increasing efforts to capture 28 natural resources (Tramel, 2018) and are bolstered by resistance from within some corporations and/or their 29 shareholders (Foug鑢e and Bond, 2016; Swaffield, 2017). 30 31 Coincident with these social movements targeting climate change and sustainability has been a rise of 32 political conservatism and populism as well as growth in misinformation (high agreement, medium evidence) 33 (Mahony and Hulme, 2016; Swyngedouw, 2019). This reflects efforts to maintain the status quo by actors in 34 positions of power in the face of rising social inertia for climate action (Brulle and Norgaard, 2019). Political 35 arenas of the future may even require a new body politic that includes non-humans and a new geo-spatial 36 politics (Latour et al., 2018). 37 38 As introduced in the discussion of governance as an enabling condition (18.4.2.1), a wide range of actors are 39 involved in successful adaptation, mitigation, and sustainability policy and practice including national, 40 regional and local governments, communities, and international agencies (Lwasa, 2015). As of 2018, 197 41 countries had between them over 1,500 laws and policies addressing climate change as compared to 60 42 countries with such legislation in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was agreed upon (Nachmany et al., 2017; 43 Nachmany and Setzer, 2018). In judicial branches, climate change litigation is increasingly becoming an 44 important influence on policy and corporate behavior among investors, activists, and local and state 45 governments (Setzer and Byrnes, 2019). There is enhanced action on climate change at both national and 46 subnational levels, even in cases where national policies are inimical as in USA (Carmin et al., 2012; Hansen 47 et al., 2013). 48 49 The strong role of governments in climate action has implications for the nature of democracy, the 50 relationship between the local and the national state, and between citizens and the state (Dodman and Mitlin, 51 2015). More integration of government policy and interventions across scales, accompanied by capacity 52 building to accelerate adaptation is needed (very high confidence). Key needs include enhanced funding, 53 clear roles and responsibilities, increased institutional capability, strategic approaches, community 54 engagement, judicial integrity (Lawrence et al., 2015). More resources, and more active involvement of the 55 private sector and civil society can help maintain adaptation on the policy agenda. Multilevel adaptation 56 approaches are also relevant in low-income countries where local governments have limited financial Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-79 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 resources and human capabilities often leading to dependency on national governments and donor 2 organizations (Donner et al., 2016; Adenle et al., 2017). 3 4 Unlike mitigation, adaptation has traditionally been viewed as a local process, involving local authorities, 5 communities, and stakeholders (Preston et al., 2015). The literature on the governance of adaptation 6 continues to emphasize that local governments have demonstrated leadership in implementation by 7 collaborating with the private sector and academia. Local governments can also play a key role (Melica et 8 al., 2018; Romero-Lankao et al., 2018) in converging mitigation and adaptation strategies, coordinating and 9 develop effective local responses, enabling community engagement and more effective policies around 10 exposure and vulnerability reduction (Fudge et al., 2016). Local authorities are well-positioned to involve the 11 wider community in designing and implementing climate policies and adaptation implementation (Slee, 12 2015; Fudge et al., 2016). Local governments also help deliver basic services, and protect their integrity 13 from climate impacts (Austin et al., 2015; Cloutier et al., 2015; Nalau et al., 2015; Araos et al., 2017). 14 However, the resource limitations of local governments as well as their small geographic sphere of influence 15 suggests the need for more funding for this from higher levels of government, particularly national 16 governments, to address adaptation gaps (very high confidence) (Dekker, 2020). Local adaptation 17 implementation gaps can be linked to limited political commitment at higher levels of government and weak 18 cooperation between key stakeholders (Runhaar, 2018). Incongruities and conflicts can exist between 19 adaptation agendas pursued by national governments and the spontaneous adaptation practices of 20 communities. There may be grounds for re-evaluating current consultative processes integral to policy 21 development, if narrow technical approaches emerge as the norm for adaptation (Smucker et al., 2015). 22 23 Therefore, the traditional view of adaptation as a local process has now widened to recognize it as a multi- 24 actor process that transcends scales from the local and sub-national to national and even international (very 25 high confidence (Mimura et al., 2014). Many of the impacts of climate change are both local and 26 transboundary, so that local, bilateral and multilateral cooperation are needed (Nalau et al., 2015; Donner et 27 al., 2016; Magnan and Ribera, 2016; Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Lesnikowski et al., 2017). National policies 28 and transnational governance should be seen as complementary, especially where they favor transnational 29 engagement with sub- and non-state actors (Andonova et al., 2017). National governments typically act as a 30 pivot for adaptation coordination, planning, determining policy priorities, and distributing financial, 31 institutional and sometimes knowledge resources. National governments are also accountable to the 32 international community through international agreements. National governments have helped enhance 33 adaptive capacity through building awareness of climate impacts, encouraging economic growth, providing 34 incentives, establishing legislative frameworks conducive to adaptation, and communicating climate change 35 information (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; Massey et al., 2014; Austin et al., 2015; Huitema et al., 2016). 36 37 18.4.3.3 Economic and financial arenas 38 39 The performance of local, national, and the global economies is a priority consideration shaping perceptions 40 of climate risk and the costs and benefits of different policy responses to climate change. The most 41 commonly used indicator of performance is gross domestic product (GDP) (Hoekstra et al., 2017). 42 Traditionally, national development efforts have sought to maximize the growth of GDP under the 43 assumption that GDP growth equates not only to economic prosperity (including poverty reduction) but also 44 to increased efficiency and reduced environmental externalities (Ota, 2017). Such assumptions often employ 45 models such as the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) that postulates that economic development initially 46 increases environmental impacts, but these trends eventually reverse with continued economic growth. 47 Wealthy nations of the global North, including for example the United States, Great Britain, Iceland, Japan, 48 have had success over the past decade in reducing their greenhouse gas emissions while growing their 49 economies (very high confidence). However, attempts to empirically test EKC in different national contexts 50 has yielded mixed results. Case studies in Myanmar, China, and Singapore, for example, suggest that the 51 impacts of GDP on environmental quality are contingent on the development context and the environmental 52 impact under consideration (Aung et al., 2017; Lee and Thiel, 2017; Xu, 2018; Chen and Taylor, 2020). In 53 addition, an extensive literature now argues that current patterns of development, and the economic systems 54 underpinning that development, are unsustainable (Washington and Twomey, 2016), and thus economic 55 growth may not necessarily continue indefinitely in the absence of more concerted effort to pursue 56 sustainable development, including reducing the impacts of climate change. 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-80 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Given such criticisms of the link between development and economic growth, a growing number of 2 researchers argue for the need for alternatives to GDP to guide development and evaluate the costs and 3 benefits of different policy interventions (Hilmi et al., 2015). For example, while GDP growth can drive 4 growth in income, it can also drive growth in inequality which can undermine poverty reduction efforts (very 5 high confidence) (Fosu, 2017). Hence, recent years have seen significant interest in the concept of well-being 6 as a more robust measure for linking policy and the economy with sustainable development for a healthy 7 Anthropocene era (Fioramonti et al., 2019). 8 9 Another mechanism for evaluating environmental performance is to include environmental data in the 10 System of National Accounts (SNA) through the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA) 11 introduced by the UN. As the international statistical standard for environmental-economic accounting 12 (Pirmana et al., 2019), SEEA includes natural capital resources in national accounting. A number of recent 13 studies conclude that failure to account for natural capital in macroeconomic impact assessments results in 14 overly optimistic outcomes (Pirmana et al., 2019; Jendrzejewski, 2020; Naspolini et al., 2020), (Banerjee et 15 al., 2019; Kabir and Salim, 2019; Keith et al., 2019). For example, Jendrzejewski (2020) inserted natural 16 capital into a computable general equilibrium model of the 2017 European windstorm on state-owned forests 17 in Poland. This resulted in more negative assessment of impacts, suggesting excluding natural capital could 18 lead to erroneous investments, strategies. or policies. Similarly, other studies rely on Quality of life (QOL) 19 measurements as alternatives for GDP. Estoque et al. (2018) suggested a "QOL-Climate" assessment 20 framework, designed to capture the social-ecological impacts of climate change and variability. 21 22 Another alternative to GDP is Green GDP which seeks to incorporate the environmental consequences of 23 economic growth (Boyd, 2007; Stjepanovi et al., 2017; Stjepanovi et al., 2019). Green GDP is difficult to 24 measure, because it is difficult to evaluate the environmental depletion and ecological damages of growth 25 (Stjepanovi et al., 2019). Although there is no consensus in measuring Green GDP, attempts have been 26 made for select countries including the United States (Garcia and You, 2017), Europe (Stjepanovi et al., 27 2019), China (Chi and Rauch, 2010; Yu et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2020), Ukraine and Thailand 28 (Harnphatananusorn et al., 2019), and Malaysia (Vaghefi et al., 2015). Le (2016) illustrated the potential 29 negative impacts of climate change vulnerability on green growth. Some studies have suggested that 30 focusing on green growth as the only strategy to address climate change would be risky. Hickel and Kallis 31 (2020) argue that green growth is likely to be a misguided goal due to the difficulties of separating economic 32 growth from resource use and, therefore, carbon emissions (see also (Antal and van den Bergh, 2014). 33 Therefore, alternative strategies are required (Hickel and Kallis, 2020). In addition, green growth should also 34 be able to justly respond to social movements involving contestation, internal debates and tensions (Mathai 35 et al., 2018). 36 37 The emphasis on Green GDP is mirrored by another concept, Blue Growth, that focuses on the pursuing 38 sustainable development through the ecosystem services derived from ocean conservation (Mustafa et al., 39 2019). Synthesis studies suggest that more intensive use of ocean resources, such as scaling up seaweed 40 aquaculture, can be used to enhance CO2eq sequestration, thereby contributing to greenhouse gas mitigation, 41 while also achieving other economic goals (Lilleb� et al., 2017; Froehlich et al., 2019). Similarly, Sarker et 42 al. (2018) present a framework for linking Blue Growth and climate resilient development in Bangladesh, 43 with Blue Growth representing an opportunity for adapting to climate change. Bethel et al. (2021) also links 44 Blue Growth to resilience, noting that a Blue economy can help facilitate recovery from the COVID-19 45 pandemic. Nevertheless, consistent with earlier assessment of enabling conditions for system transitions 46 (18.4.2.1), implementation of Blue Growth initiatives is contingent upon the successful achievement of 47 social innovation as well as creating an inclusive and cooperative governance structure (very high 48 confidence) (Larik et al., 2017; Soma et al., 2018). 49 50 A potential critique of the various alternative metrics and models for economic development is that they are 51 all framed in the context of growth. Over the past decade, ecological economists and political scientists have 52 proposed Degrowth (e.g., Kallis, 2011; Demaria et al., 2013) and managing without growth (e.g., Jackson, 53 2009) as a solution for achieving environmental sustainability and socio-economic progress. Such concepts 54 are a deliberate response to concerns about ecological limits to growth and the compatibility between 55 growth-oriented development and sustainability (Kallis et al., 2009). Sustainable degrowth is not the same as 56 negative GDP growth which is typically referred to as a recession (Kallis, 2011). Degrowth goes beyond 57 criticizing economic growth; it explores the intersection among environmental sustainability, social justice, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-81 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 and well-being (Demaria et al., 2013). Under current economic and fiscal policies (see Box 18.8), degrowth 2 has been argued as an unstable development paradigm because declining consumer demand leads to rising 3 unemployment, declining competitiveness, and a spiral of recession (Jackson, 2009: 46). More 4 comprehensive modelling of socio-economic performance understands the segments of sufficient social 5 transformation to guarantee maintenance and rise in wellbeing coupled with reduced 'footprints' (Raworth, 6 2017; Hickel, 2019; D'Alessandro et al., 2020). 7 8 9 START BOX 18.8 HERE 10 11 Box 18.8: Macroeconomic policies in support of Climate-Resilient Development 12 13 Climate change risk may differ from other economic and financial risks in a number of ways: climate change 14 is global; involves long-term impact; and involves a great deal of uncertainty; and with the possibility of 15 irreversible change (Hansen, 2021). The macroeconomic implications will differ across countries with less 16 developed countries are likely to suffer more relative to more advanced ones (Batten, 2018). Hence, 17 policymakers need to understand the impact of climate change on macroeconomic issues such as potential 18 output growth, capital formation, productivity, and long run level of interest rates, in order to better design 19 policy interventions, be it monetary or fiscal (Economides and Xepapadeas, 2018; Bank of England, 2019; 20 Rudebusch, 2019). As discussed, below a range of fiscal tools can be leveraged to mitigate the effects of 21 climate change (Krogstrup and Oman, 2019). 22 23 Monetary Policy 24 25 Changes in climate and subsequent policy responses could increase volatility of food and energy prices, 26 resulting in higher headline inflation rates. Thus, Central Banks (CBs) have to pay careful attention to 27 underlying inflationary factors in order to maintain their inflationary targets. In response, CBs can take a 28 number of actions. For example, they could require that collateral comprises assets that support the move to 29 low-carbon economy, or their refinancing operations and crisis facilities could incentivize borrowers' move to 30 low-carbon activities, particularly in countries where CBs' mandate has been expanded to account for climate 31 impact (Papoutsi et al., 2021). Other actions that CBs could take include adoption of sustainable and 32 responsible investment principles (Rudebusch, 2019), require financial firms to disclose their climate related 33 risks (ECB, 2020; Lee, 2020). Despite these opportunities, there is ongoing debate regarding whether CBs 34 should actively use monetary policy to address climate change and its risks (Honohan, 2019). 35 36 Fiscal policy 37 38 The application of green fiscal policies to address climate change could lead to environmental benefits 39 including environmental revenues that may be used for broader fiscal reforms (OECD, 2021). As the US aims 40 at becoming carbon neutral by 2050, fiscal policies at the national, sectoral, and international level can help to 41 achieve this goal, along with investment, regulatory, and technology policies (Parry, 2021). The effectiveness 42 of green fiscal policies are through their fiscal potential, opportunities for efficiency gains, distributional and 43 macroeconomic impacts, and their political economy implications (Metcalf, 2016). The International 44 Monetary Fund argues public support for green policies may rise in response to the COVID-19 crisis (IMF, 45 2017). For example, Leibenluft (2020) argues that investments to combat climate change should be an 46 important component of the efforts to rebuild the economy in the wake of COVID-19. Such action is justified 47 not only on ecological and social welfare grounds, but from a long-term fiscal perspective. For example, 48 climate change impacts and/or efforts to adapt to those impacts drive increased spending in areas such as public 49 health and disaster mitigation or response. Preventive and corrective actions would strengthen resilience to 50 shocks and alleviate the financial constraints they create, particularly for small countries (Catalano et al., 51 2020). For example, Mallucci (2020) found that natural disasters exacerbate fiscal vulnerabilities and trigger 52 sovereign defaults in seven Caribbean countries. Ryota (2019) illustrates how to include natural disaster and 53 climate change in a fiscal policy framework to developing countries. 54 55 Carbon pricing 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-82 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Pricing of greenhouse gases, including carbon, is a crucial tool in any cost-effective climate change mitigation 2 strategy, as it provides a mechanism for linking climate action to economic development (IMF/OECD, 2021). 3 By 2019, 57 nations around the world had implemented or scheduled implementation of carbon pricing. These 4 initiatives cover 11 gigatons of carbon dioxide or about 20% of greenhouse gases emissions. Carbon prices in 5 existing initiatives range between $1 and $127 per ton of carbon dioxide, while 51% of the emissions that are 6 covered are priced more than $10 per ton of carbon dioxide. Moreover, in 2018, Governments raised about 7 $44 billion in carbon pricing revenues (World Bank, 2019). However, the carbon prices are lower than the 8 levels required for attaining the ambitious goal of climate change mitigation, and therefore, prices would need 9 to increase if pricing alone is going to be used to drive compliance with the Paris Agreement. Higher carbon 10 prices would also be warranted if prices are based on the social cost of carbon, which represents the present 11 value of the marginal damage to economic output caused by carbon emissions (Cai and Lontzek, 2018). This 12 cost needs to be considered with the social benefits of reducing carbon emissions through cost-benefit analyses 13 in order to make the intended regulation acceptable. 14 15 Taxes 16 17 Carbon taxes represent another financial mechanism for addressing climate (Metcalf, 2019), 2019b). For 18 example, the implementation of a carbon tax and a value-added tax on transport fuel in Sweden resulted in a 19 reduction of CO2 emissions from transport of about 11% in which the carbon tax had the largest share 20 (Andersson, 2019). In the United States, for example, a carbon tax could increase fiscal flexibility by collecting 21 new revenues that can be redeployed to finance reforms and help stimulate economic growth. However, U.S. 22 tax-inclusive energy prices would have to be 273% higher than laissez faire levels in 2055 in order to meet 23 international agreements (Casey, 2019). Similarly, limiting global warming to 2 degrees or less would likely 24 require a carbon tax rate in the Asia/Pacific region to be significantly higher than $25 per ton (IMF, 2021). 25 Therefore, using tax revenues to issue payments back to taxpayers that are disproportionately impacted or to 26 redistribute capital among regions may be one of the most important features of carbon tax policies. Although 27 the average effect of carbon tax on welfare would be positive, some regions (56%) will gain and some regions 28 (44%) lose (Scobie, 2013). Therefore, large transfer payments are needed to compensate those losing from 29 carbon tax (Krusell and Smith, 2018). IMF (2019) argues that, of the various mitigation strategies to reduce 30 fossil fuel CO2 emissions, carbon taxes are the most powerful and efficient, because they allow firms and 31 households to find the lowest-cost ways of reducing energy use and shifting toward cleaner alternatives. 32 33 Subsidies 34 35 The World Bank has been encouraging both developed and developing states, especially those with petroleum 36 reserves, to use the removal of subsidies as a mechanism for promoting energy transitions away from fossil 37 fuels. The transition has led to social unrest in some cases, especially where there is a culture of entitlement to 38 low-cost energy because it is an indigenous resource. Such reforms have been more effective when 39 governments have been able to clearly show how savings are applied to social and health programs that benefit 40 human well-being. Nevertheless, policy makers should not underestimate the complexity of issues involved in 41 the removal of subsidies that will increase the cost of carbon and hasten the transition to cleaner fuels (Scobie, 42 2017; Scobie et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020a). A crucial issue to take into account is the harmful effects some 43 subsidies have on biodiversity. Although governments agreed in 2010 to make progress on reducing subsidies 44 in 2010, by 2020 few governments had identified specific incentives to remove or taken action toward their 45 removal. Further investigation of the positive and negative effects of subsidy redirection or elimination on 46 people and the environment (Dempsey et al., 2020). 47 48 END BOX 18.8 HERE 49 50 51 18.4.3.4 Knowledge-technology and ecological arenas 52 53 Knowledge-technology arenas comprise the interaction in knowledge spaces connected to technology 54 transitions. The institutional and political architecture through which knowledge and technology interact is 55 described in sustainability transitions literature (Fazey et al., 2018b; Sengers et al., 2019l Kanger, 2020 56 #3709). A common theme explored in that literature is the ability of actors to access and apply various forms 57 of knowledge as a means of effecting change. Different forms of innovation are recognized as a core Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-83 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 enabling condition for achieving system transitions for CRD (18.3.3; Cross-Chapter Box INDIG). However, 2 while scientific and technology knowledge may be useful, in some cases, they remain subordinate to political 3 agendas, or are controlled by actors in positions of power and thus not equitably distributed (very high 4 confidence) (Mormina, 2019). Participatory decision-making, for example, assumes that multiple actors, 5 with differing motivations, agency and influence, engage with climate decision making and co-produce 6 actions. Yet, some actors may not participate in the process if the proposed actions do not align with their 7 motivations or if they do not have adequate agency (Roelich and Giesekam, 2019). Hence, effectively using 8 knowledge to inform policy is challenging for both scientists, policymakers, and civil society alike. 9 10 Science, technology, and innovation (STI) policies are expected to shape expectations of the potential for a 11 better world based on clean technologies, higher labor productivity, economic growth and a healthier 12 environment (Schot and Steinmueller, 2018; Mormina, 2019). STI policies are considered as `social goods 13 for development'. Hence, STI policies are often proposed or implemented as means of addressing 14 environmental challenges such as climate change along with sustainable development goals such as the 15 reduction of inequality, poverty, and environmental pollution (Mormina, 2019). Realizing the benefits of 16 STI, however, may be contingent on building broader STI capacity and bolstering nations' systems of 17 innovation (very high confidence) (Mormina, 2019). This could include building global research partnerships 18 to address priority STI needs as well as long-standing gaps between the global North and South. Such an 19 approach shifts the framing of STI as one focused on individual investigators to one comprised of building 20 knowledge networks. It also creates opportunities for integration of disparate forms of knowledge and 21 innovation, including local and indigenous knowledge, into global knowledge systems (Cross-Chapter Box 22 INDIG). 23 24 Furthermore, an extensive literature increasingly incorporates natural and ecological systems as knowledge 25 domains relevant to understanding opportunities for sustainability and CRD. For example, the literature on 26 socioecological systems (SES) (Sterk et al., 2017; Holzer et al., 2018; Avriel-Avni and Dick, 2019; 27 Mart韓ez-Fern醤dez et al., 2021) as well as social, ecological, and technological systems (SETS) 28 (McPhearson and Wijsman, 2017; Webb et al., 2018; Ahlborg et al., 2019), explicitly integrate ecological 29 knowledge into sustainability including concepts such as planetary boundaries (18.1.1), adaptation and 30 nature-based solutions, natural resources management, rights and access to nature, and understanding of how 31 humans govern society-nature interactions in the face of climate change (Benjaminsen and Kaarhus, 2018; 32 Mikulewicz, 2019; Nightingale et al., 2020). Some of these interactions are explained in Cross-Chapter Box 33 INDIG including conflict over which knowledges are recognized as valuable in understanding and 34 responding to climate change and therefore shape the nature of climate actions. Actor engagement in 35 stewardship, solidarity, inclusion of multiple knowledges and nature-society connectedness can highlight the 36 intertwined nature of ecological change and knowledge relations thereby support shifts to sustainability 37 (Pelling, 2010; Hulme, 2018; Ives et al., 2019; Nightingale et al., 2020) (see also Box 18.6). 38 39 The expanding definition of what constitutes credible, relevant, and legitimate knowledge is leading to the 40 democratization of knowledge and efforts to address historical inequities in access to knowledge (Ott and 41 Kiteme, 2016; Rowell and Feldman, 2019). This is reflected in the communication of science, which is 42 increasingly focused on reducing the distance between internal scientific and public communication and 43 more engagement in public science governance and knowledge production (Waldherr, 2012; Peters, 2013). 44 One innovative approach in co-production of knowledge is mobilizing communities through citizen science 45 (Heigl et al., 2019). This also presents additional opportunities to incorporate local knowledge with scientific 46 research, and better match scientific capability to societal needs. 47 48 18.4.3.5 Community arenas 49 50 Societal choices and development trajectories emerge from decisions made in different arenas which 51 intersect and interact across levels and scales, in diverse institutional settings - some formal with their 52 associated instruments and interventions, while others are informal. Since AR5, both formal and informal 53 setting are increasingly arenas of debate and contestation regarding development choices and pathways (very 54 high confidence) (see 18.4.4, Chapters 1, 6, 8, 10 and 17). Community arenas exist from the local to the 55 global scale and constitute the many interactions between governance actors, often transcending any one 56 scale to reflect the emergent outcomes of interactions in political, economic, socio-cultural, knowledge- 57 technology and ecological arenas of engagement. Actions within and between these five arenas hence come Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-84 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 together in the community arena of engagement. While community engagement is often described at the 2 level of villages and cities (Ziervogel et al., 2021) (Chapter 8), communities in terms of people interacting 3 with each other sharing worldviews, values and behaviors, also exist at the regional and global levels. For 4 example, civil society engagement in climate action reached a peak in 2019, notably through the global 5 youth movement which led to large global mobilisation and street demonstrations on all continents and in 6 many large cities (Bandura and Cherry, 2020; Han and Ahn, 2020; Martiskainen et al., 2020). Calling for 7 enhanced climate action by governments and other societal actors, the youth movement was supported by 8 many other societal groups and networks, including arenas of community interaction. 9 10 While the SR1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018) for the first time comprehensively assessed behavioral dimensions 11 of climate change adaptation, most literature still has a greater focus on what triggers mitigation behavior 12 (Lorenzoni and Whitmarsh, 2014; Clayton et al., 2015). Meanwhile, with CRD still a relatively young 13 concept, there is little literature focused on what motivates action in pursuit of CRD rather than its 14 subcomponents of climate action and sustainable development. Nevertheless, a common motivation that is 15 emerging in the literature is clinically significant levels of climate distress among individuals (Bodnar, 16 2008), which is experienced as a continuing distress over a changed landscape which no longer offers solace, 17 also known as solastalgia (high agreement, medium evidence) (Albrecht et al., 2007). This is accompanied 18 by a shift from blaming natural forces for disasters to attributing it to human negligence which is known to 19 lead to more acute perceptions of risk as well as more prolonged PTSD than trauma arising from non-human 20 causes. Improving social connections, acknowledging anxiety, reconnecting to nature, and finding creative 21 ways to re-engage are identified as ways of managing this growing anxiety (Lertzman, 2010; Clayton et al., 22 2017). Climate action in communities at various scales could fulfil many of these needs. 23 24 18.4.4 Frontiers of Climate Action 25 26 After decades of limited government action and social inertia to reduce the risk of climate change, there is 27 also increasing social dissent toward the current political, economic and environmental policies to address 28 climate (Brulle and Norgaard, 2019; Carpenter et al., 2019). Social movements are demanding radical action 29 as the only option to achieve the mobilization necessary for deep societal transformation (very high 30 confidence) (Hallam, 2019; Berglund and Schmidt, 2020). 31 32 Prompted by SR1.5, new youth movements seek to use science-based policy to break with incremental 33 reforms and demand radical climate action beyond emissions reductions (Hallam, 2019; Klein, 2020; 34 Thackeray et al., 2020; Thew et al., 2020). Recent social movements and climate protests embrace new 35 modalities of action related to political responsibility for climate injustice through disruptive collective 36 political action (Young, 2003; Langlois, 2014). This is complemented by a regenerative culture and ethics of 37 care (Westwell and Bunting, 2020). These new social movements are based on nonviolent methods of 38 resistance, including actions classified as dutiful, disruptive and dangerous dissent (O'Brien, 2018). 39 40 The new climate movement mixes messages of fear and hope to propel urgency and the need to respond to a 41 climate emergency (Gills and Morgan, 2020). While some consider the mix between fear and hope as 42 beneficial to success depending on psychological factors (Salamon, 2019) or political geography (Kleres and 43 Wettergren, 2017) others warn of the risks of a rhetoric of emergency and its political outcomes (Hulme and 44 Apollo-University Of Cambridge Repository, 2019; Slaven and Heydon, 2020). 45 46 Research shows that new climate movements have increased public awareness, and also stimulated 47 unprecedented public engagement with climate change (very high confidence) (Lee et al., 2020; Thackeray et 48 al., 2020) and has helped rethink the role of science with society (Isgren et al., 2019). Such movements may 49 represent new approaches to accelerate social transformation and have resulted in notable political successes, 50 such as declarations of climate emergency at the national and local level, as well as in universities. Their 51 methods have also proven effective to end fossil fuel sponsorship (Piggot, 2018). Social demands for radical 52 action are likely to continue to grow, as there is growing discontent with political inertia and a rejection of 53 reformist positions. 54 55 56 [START BOX 18.9 HERE] 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-85 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Box 18.9: The Role of the Private Sector in Climate Resilient Development via Climate Finance, 2 Investments and Innovation. 3 4 Climate finance broadly refers to resources that catalyze low-carbon and climate-resilient development. It 5 covers the costs and risks of climate action, supports an enabling environment and capacity for adaptation 6 and mitigation, and encourages R&D and deployment of new technologies. Climate finance can be 7 mobilized through a range of instruments from a variety of sources, international and domestic, public and 8 private (see Sections 18.4.2.2). 9 10 The private sector has particular competencies which can make significant contributions to adaptation, 11 through innovative technology, design of resilient infrastructure, development and implementation of 12 improved information systems and the management of major projects. The private sector can be seen as a 13 "supplier of innovative goods and services" to meet the adaptation priorities of developing countries with 14 expertise in technology and service delivery (Biagini and Miller, 2013). 15 16 Future investment opportunities in CRD are in water resources, agriculture and environmental services. 17 Provision of clean water is another opportunity, requiring investment in water purification and treatment 18 technologies such as desalination, and wastewater treatment. Weather and climate services are a possible 19 area for private investment. (Hov et al., 2017; Hewitt et al., 2020). 20 21 [END BOX 18.9 HERE] 22 23 24 18.5 Sectoral and Regional Synthesis of Climate Resilient Development 25 26 Prior sections of this chapter assessed the literature relevant to CRD inclusive of climate risk management, 27 systems transitions and transformation, and actors and the arenas in which they engage one another to enable 28 or constrain CRD. Here, this knowledge is explored in different climatological and development contexts 29 through a synthesis of CRD-relevant assessments within the WGII sectoral and regional chapters. 30 31 18.5.1 Regional Synthesis of Climate-Resilient Development 32 33 In synthesizing regional knowledge relevant to the pursuit of CRD, this section first considers geographic 34 heterogeneity in regional responses of common climate variables to increases in globally averaged 35 temperatures. Such heterogeneity is a key driver of climate risk in different global regions, as well as human 36 and natural systems within those regions. This is followed by synthesis of various national development 37 indicators, aggregated to the regional level, as well as various challenges, opportunities, and options 38 supporting CRD reported within WGII regional chapters. 39 40 18.5.1.1 Climate Change Risk for Different Global Regions 41 Two important elements of understanding the opportunities and challenges associated with the pursuit of 42 CRD in different regional contexts are a) the geographic variability in climate conditions that shape 43 livelihoods, behaviors, and responses of human and natural systems; and b) how those conditions could shift 44 in the future in response to climate change, which determines the additional burden that climate change 45 could create for adaptation and sustainable development. 46 47 The climate analyses of WGI provide information on regional differences in temperature, rainfall, and sea- 48 surface temperatures for different global regions and how they are projected to change in response to 49 different levels of aggregate global warming (Table 18.4). Such data reveal that even when aggregated to 50 broad geographic regions, significant variations exist for all of these parameters, which is a function of the 51 baseline climatology of each region. For example, temperatures in Africa and Australia are, on average, 52 warmer than in Europe or North America. Significant variations are also observed for rainfall variables. Such 53 regional variation in climate conditions is part of the regional context that shapes current patterns of 54 development of the past present and future. They influence biodiversity and natural resource availability as 55 well as exposure to climatic extremes (tropical storms, heat waves, and drought) that contribute to disasters. 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-86 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 The WGI data also indicate that increases in globally averaged temperatures will have different 2 consequences for regional climate change (Table 18.4), including variation in the magnitude and, for 3 precipitation, even the direction of change (very high confidence). For example, although average 4 temperatures, daily minimum temperature, and the number of days over a given thresholds are projected to 5 increase in all regions except Antarctica, the magnitude of the change varies. Moreover, little change is 6 projected for daily maximum temperatures across different regions. Nevertheless, the number of days over 7 different temperature thresholds such as 35癈 increases markedly in most regions, reflecting the 8 disproportionate impact that global warming has on the tails of temperature distributions. Given outcomes in 9 many systems including public health, agriculture, ecosystems and biodiversity, and infrastructure are often 10 associated with biophysical thresholds (e.g., physiological or design thresholds), those regions where such 11 thresholds are increasingly exceeded due to climate change may experience disproportionately higher 12 impacts (very high confidence). Given such temperatures occur more frequently in regions such as Africa 13 and Central and South America, this disproportionate exposure is exacerbated by disproportionate 14 vulnerability, adaptation gaps, and development needs (very high confidence; 18.2.4; Table 18.4). 15 16 The regional response of precipitation to globally averaged temperatures increases is less clear than 17 temperature, in part due to high intra-region variability. Average daily precipitation remains fairly stable in 18 all global regions in response to higher magnitudes of global warming (Table 18.4). However, 5-day 19 precipitation totals provide a clearer signal of increasing hydrologic activity in response to higher globally 20 averaged temperatures (Table 18.4). Such data no not necessarily reflect changes in rainfall extremes that 21 could occur with downstream consequences for hazards such as drought or flooding. Similarly, while SSTs 22 are more uniform across global ocean basins, all basins are anticipated to warm in response to higher 23 globally averaged temperatures (Table 18.5). Unlike temperature, however, SST increases are anticipated to 24 be only a fraction of the globally averaged increase in temperature, due in large part to the heat capacity of 25 the oceans. Nevertheless, such higher SSTs have implications not only for ocean ecosystems and the 26 distribution of marine species, but also for weather patterns, such as formation and intensity of tropical 27 cyclones (very high confidence). 28 29 The other aspect of the regional climate responses to global temperature increases that is important for CRD 30 is the marked differences observed between changes in response to 1.5癈 versus 4癈 of warming. Higher 31 levels of global warming are associated with higher regional changes, including changes in extremes of 32 temperature. This in turn increases climate risk to exposed and vulnerable human and natural systems, 33 thereby increasing demand for adaptation. If that demand is not met, then the adaptation gap will be larger 34 with greater risk of loss and damage (very high confidence) (Schaeffer et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2016; United 35 Nations Environment Programme, 2021). This is true not only for regions, but also at the sectoral level 36 (18.5.2). Therefore, CRD pathways must balance the demands for emissions reductions to reduce exposure, 37 adaptation to manage residual climate change risks, and sustainable development to address vulnerability 38 and enhance capacity for sustainable development. 39 40 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-87 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 18.4: Projected continental level result ranges for select temperature and precipitation climate change variables by global warming level. Ranges are 5th and 95th percentiles 2 from SSP5-8.5 WGI CMIP6 ensemble results. There is little variation in the 5th and 95th percentile values by GWL across the SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5 3 projections. Source: WGI AR6 Interactive Atlas (https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/). Climate variable Global All Regions North Europe Asia Centra-South Africa Australia Antarctica warming America America level 4癈 12 to 15 8 to 11 5 to 9 12 to 14 24 to 27 26 to 29 24 to 27 -33 to -27 Mean temperature 3癈 11 to 14 6 to 11 4 to 7 10 to 14 23 to 26 25 to 28 23 to 26 -35 to -26 10 to 13 5 to 9 3 to 6 8 to 12 22 to 25 24 to 27 22 to 25 -36 to -27 (degrees C) 2癈 1.5癈 9 to 12 4 to 8 2 to 5 8 to 12 22 to 24 24 to 26 22 to 24 -36 to -27 Minimum of daily 4癈 -12 to -5 -25 to -15 -22 to -14 -18 to -9 11 to 15 10 to 14 5 to 10 -64 to -48 minimum 3癈 -13 to -6 -27 to -15 -24 to -15 -20 to -11 10 to 15 8 to 14 4 to 10 -64 to -50 temperatures 2癈 -15 to -8 -30 to -18 -27 to -17 -22 to -13 9 to 14 7 to 13 3 to 9 -65 to -51 (degrees C) 1.5癈 -16 to -9 -32 to -20 -28 to -19 -23 to -14 8 to 14 6 to 12 3 to 9 -66 to -51 Maximum of daily 4癈 32 to 37 32 to 38 28 to 33 35 to 40 36 to 43 40 to 47 41 to 49 -12 to -5 maximum 3癈 31 to 39 31 to 38 28 to 34 35 to 41 35 to 44 39 to 51 41 to 54 -12 to -3 2癈 30 to 37 30 to 36 26 to 33 33 to 39 34 to 43 38 to 50 39 to 53 -13 to -4 temperatures 1.5癈 29 to 36 29 to 35 25 to 31 32 to 39 33 to 42 38 to 49 39 to 52 -14 to -5 (degrees C) Number of days 4癈 81 to 106 36 to 50 11 to 22 57 to 77 138 to 194 153 to 210 140 to 168 0 to 0 with maximum 3癈 66 to 87 27 to 40 6 to 15 44 to 59 100 to 153 131 to 183 124 to 147 0 to 0 temperature above 2癈 52 to 68 19 to 29 4 to 8 33 to 45 61 to 106 116 to 151 102 to 124 0 to 0 1.5癈 45 to 58 16 to 24 2 to 5 30 to 39 43 to 85 107 to 133 94 to 115 0 to 0 35癈 � bias adjusted Near-surface total 4癈 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 2 2 to 3 4 to 5 2 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 precipitation 3癈 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 5 2 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 (mm/day) 2癈 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 5 2 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 1.5癈 2 to 3 2 to 3 2 to 2 2 to 3 3 to 5 2 to 3 1 to 2 1 to 1 Maximum 5-day 4癈 79 to 99 75 to 93 53 to 71 81 to 105 118 to 168 68 to 113 81 to 124 20 to 29 precipitation 3癈 66 to 99 68 to 87 48 to 68 70 to 101 97 to 165 60 to 118 76 to 129 19 to 27 amount (mm) 2癈 64 to 93 65 to 84 47 to 65 66 to 95 93 to 162 55 to 107 73 to 122 18 to 26 1.5癈 63 to 91 63 to 83 46 to 64 64 to 93 92 to 160 52 to 105 74 to 119 18 to 25 4 5 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-88 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 18.5: Projected sea surface temperature change ranges by global warming level and ocean biome (degrees Celsius). Ranges are 5th and 95th percentiles from SSP5-8.5 WGI 2 CMIP6 ensemble results. There is little variation in the 5th and 95th percentile values by GWL across the SSP1-2.6, SSP2-4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5 projections. Source: WGI 3 AR6 Interactive Atlas (https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/). Global All ocean Northern Northern Equatorial Southern Southern Gulf of Eastern Amazon Arabian Indonesian warmin biomes Hemispher Hemispher Hemispher Hemispher Mexico g level Boundaries River Sea Flowthrough e - High e - e - e - High Latitudes Subtropics Subtropics Latitudes 4癈 1. t 2. 2. t 3. 2. t 2. 2. t 3. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 2. t 2. 2. t 2. 1. t 2. 2. t 2. 1. t 2.7 9 o 4 0 o 3 2 o 8 1 o 0 8 o 4 3 o 0 1 o 8 1 o 7 7 o 5 3 o 9 9 o 3癈 1. t 1. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 1. t 1. 0. t 1. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 1. t 2. 1. t 1.9 3 o 7 2 o 2 4 o 4 4 o 2 2 o 7 7 o 4 5 o 3 4 o 1 2 o 0 6 o 2 3 o 2癈 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1 0. t 0. 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1. 0. t 1.2 6 o 0 5 o 4 7 o 4 7 o 3 5 o 3 o 8 6 o 4 6 o 3 6 o 3 6 o 3 5 o 1.5癈 0. t 0. 0. t 0. 0. t 1. 0. t 0. 0. t 0. 0. t 0. 0. t 1. 0. t 0. 0. t 0. 0. t 0. 0. t 0.8 2o7 1o9 2o0 2 o 8 2 o 6 1o5 2o0 2o9 2 o 9 2 o 9 1 o 4 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-89 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.5.1.2 Regional Perspectives on Climate-Resilient Development 2 3 The various regional chapters within the AR6 WGII report each provide insights into progress toward CRD 4 as well as the opportunities and challenges associated with future pursuit of different CRD pathways. 5 Common indicators of development reflect the significant diversity that exists across different global regions 6 with respect to their development context (very high confidence). For example, the Human Development 7 Index, recently adjusted to reflect the effect of planetary pressures (PPAHDI), illustrates the overall higher 8 levels of development of North America and European countries of the global North as well as Australasia 9 compared with Asia, Africa, Central and South America and small islands of the global South. Generally, 10 this reflects the higher levels of vulnerability and greater need for both sustainable development to reduce 11 poverty and support sustainable economies as well as climate action to address climate risk (Table 18.6). 12 13 However, even within a given region, there is significant variation in PPAHDI among nations. Such 14 differences reflect fundamental differences in historical patterns of development, as well as current 15 development needs and challenges, and they imply differences in what future development pathways would 16 be consistent with CRD. In addition, nations and regions with lower PPAHDI values suggests greater 17 capacity challenges for both greenhouse gas mitigation and climate adaptation. However, nations and regions 18 with high PPAHDI values also tend to have higher per capita CO2e emissions production, indicating that 19 economic development based on fossil fuel use undermines both efforts on climate action as well as the 20 SDGs (very high confidence) (Figure 18.6). Such challenges are also reflected by differential Gini 21 coefficients and metrics of state fragility among regions, which reflect inequities in income distribution and 22 broader vulnerability of nations and regions to shocks and stressors (Figure 18.6). In addition, high variation 23 is observed in CO2 emissions production, even among comparatively wealthy nations, suggesting CO2e 24 emissions of some nations are tightly coupled to development, while others have pursued more carbon 25 neutral development trajectories. Even within regions such as Africa, Asia, Central and South America, and 26 Europe, large within-region variations are observed in inequality and state fragility, suggesting high 27 variability among nations. Given the emphasis in the sustainable development and CRD literature on equity 28 and vulnerability, addressing such determinants of vulnerability is a core design principle for CRD 29 pathways. 30 31 In addition to development indicators, the literature assessed in the WGII regional chapters indicates that 32 different regions experience a range of development challenges and opportunities that affect the pursuit of 33 CRD (very high confidence). These represent dimensions of governance, institutions, economic 34 development, capacity, and social and cultural factors that shape decision-making, investment, and 35 development trajectories. For example, significant challenges exist within regions with respect to managing 36 debt and the ability to fund or finance climate action and sustainable development interventions (very high 37 confidence). On the other hand, a broad range of opportunities exist to pursue CRD including challenges 38 with debt and financing of adaptation competing policy objectives, social protection programs, economic 39 diversification, investing in education and human capital development, and expanding disaster risk reduction 40 efforts (very high confidence). 41 42 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-90 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 18.6: Relationship among development indicators relevant to climate-resilient development. National Gini 3 coefficients (most recent year available; n=141; (World Bank, 2021)), the Fragile States Index (2021; n=163; (Fund for 4 Peace, 2021)), and per capita CO2 emissions (2018; n=169; (Human Development Report Office, 2020)) are plotted 5 against the Planetary Pressures-Adjusted Human Development Index (2020, n=163; (Human Development Report 6 Office, 2020) 7 8 9 There are a wide variety of more focused options for climate action and sustainable development (very high 10 confidence). Such options have potential for synergies and trade-offs including implications for greenhouse 11 gas mitigation, land use change and conservation, food and water, or social equity. Despite variation in 12 development context, regional assessments suggest CRD efforts will be associated with some common 13 features. For example, in all regions, existing vulnerability and inequality exacerbate climate risk and 14 therefore pose challenges to CRD (very high confidence). Furthermore, low prioritization of sustainability 15 and climate action in government decision making, low perceptions of climate risk, and path dependence in 16 governance systems and decision-making processes all pose barriers to system transitions, transformation, 17 and CRD (very high confidence). 18 19 18.5.2 Sectoral Synthesis of Climate-Resilient Development 20 The sectoral chapters of the WGII report provide insights regarding how development processes interact 21 with sectors to shape the potential for climate-resilient development. Similar to global regions, each sector is 22 associated with various challenges, opportunities, and options that enable or constrain CRD (Table 18.7). A 23 number of challenges are common across sectors and mirror those associated with different regions. For 24 example, issues associated with natural resource dependency, access to information for decision-making, 25 access to human and financial capital, and path dependence of institutions represent barriers that must be 26 overcome if sectors are to support transitions that enable CRD. These challenges are more acute within 27 vulnerable communities or nations where capacity to innovate and invest are constrained and social 28 inequities reinforce the status quo (very high confidence). At the same time, a number of sector-specific 29 opportunities for mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development can be used to integrate sectors into 30 CRD pathways. This could include policies and planning initiatives to enhance sector sustainability and 31 resilience as well as capacity building and greater inclusion of different actors and groups in decision making 32 including capitalizing on local and indigenous knowledge as a mechanism for more representative and 33 equitable action. 34 In addition, the sectoral assessments identify a broad range of specific adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable 35 development options that could play a role in facilitating CRD. Many of these options appear initially to be 36 specific to a given sector. For example, options for the water sector (Chapter 4) are assessed independently Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-91 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 from those for health and well-being (Chapter 7). In practice, however, evidence suggests the importance of 2 thinking about sectoral options as cross-cutting, mutually supportive, and synergistic packages rather than 3 singular options. First, each of the sectoral chapters has links to multiple SDGs (Table 18.7), implying each 4 sector is important for achieving a range of sustainability goals that extend beyond sectoral boundaries. 5 Moreover, progress across multiple sectors simultaneously creates opportunities for synergies for achieving 6 the SDGs, but also enhances the risk of potential trade-offs (very high confidence). Second, a number of 7 options are common to multiple sectors. For example, options associated with ecosystem-based adaptation 8 and nature-based approaches to environmental management appear in multiple sectors (Table 18.7). 9 Similarly, climate-smart agriculture and agroecological approaches to food systems create opportunities for 10 food security, but those same options also benefit land-based ecosystems, water, poverty and livelihoods, 11 and human well-being. Joint implementation 12 13 18.5.3 Feasibility and Efficacy of Options for Climate-Resilient Development 14 15 While both the sectoral and regional assessments indicate a rich toolkit of management options is available 16 to decision-makers to facilitate CRD, two key uncertainties undermine efforts to implement those options. 17 The first is the feasibility of implementation. Options that seem promising could nevertheless encounter 18 implementation barriers due to cost, absence of necessary capacity, lack of public acceptance, or competition 19 with alternative options. Progress in the literature since the AR5 and SR1.5 reports enables improved 20 consideration for options feasibility for both mitigation (SR1.5 ref) and adaptation (Cross-Chapter Box 21 FEASIB). This assessment allows the range of available options to be considered in a more critical light, 22 particular when on is considering opportunities for implementation over the near-term. Meanwhile, the other 23 challenge is that of option efficacy. Significant uncertainties remain regarding how well a given option will 24 perform in a specific context and whether it is capable of adequately addressing risk (18.6.1). Such 25 uncertainties can undermine the pursuit of CRD or at least efforts to accelerate system transitions that 26 support CRD (medium evidence, medium agreement) (18.3). Accordingly, closer examination of option 27 implementation in the real world, including within different sectoral and regional contexts, would enhance 28 the knowledge available to decision-makers regarding which options will best fit the needs of a given CRD 29 pathway. 30 31 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-92 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 18.6: Regional synthesis of dimensions of climate-resilient development. For each region, quantitative information is provided on common development indicators including 2 the planetary pressures-adjusted human development index (PPHDI, 2020, n=169; (Human Development Report Office, 2020)), Gini coefficients (GINI, most recent year available; 3 n=156; (World Bank, 2021)), Fragile States Index (FRAGILITY; 2021; n=173; (Fund for Peace, 2021)), and per capita CO2 emissions production (CO2/PC, 2018; n=169; (Human 4 Development Report Office, 2020)). Each indicator is associated with a mean value among nations within a specific region as well as the range (minimum to maximum) value. In 5 addition, the table contains evidence of sustainable development challenges and opportunities as well as adaptation/sustainable development options and potential synergies and 6 trade-offs associated with their implementation. Synergies and trade-offs are categorized as follows: (T) Trade-off among policies and practices; (S+) Synergy among policies and 7 practices that enhances sustainability; (S-) Synergy among policies and practices that undermines sustainability. Region Development Indicators Challenges Opportunities Options Synergies and Trade-Offs mean (range) � climate change literacy can � institutional and financial � strengthening climate services � (T) competing uses for water PPAHDI 0.53 challenges in programming enable the mainstreaming of (9.4.2) such as hydropower (0.39- and implementing activities climate change into national � ecosystem based adaptation generation, irrigation, and 0.72) to support concrete and sub-national (9.11.4.2) ecosystem requirements 42.8 adaptation measures developmental agendas � economic diversification create trade-offs among GINI (27.6- (9.14.5) (9.4.2) (9.12.3) different management FRAGILITY 63.4) � high debt levels exacerbate � Adaptive responses can be � intensive irrigation9.15.2 objectives (9.7.3) 87.3 � agricultural and livelihood � (T) migration in response to (57.0- fiscal challenges and used as an opportunity for unfavorable environmental 110.9) diversification (9.12.3) conditions provides undermine economic comprehensive, � drought resistant crop varieties opportunities for farmers but Africa puts pressure on the provision resilience (9.14) transformative change (9.15.2) of social services and reduces � insufficient development (9.6.2) � soil and water conservation farm labor (9.15.2) � Investments in human � (T) intensive Irrigation and adaptation finance and (9.15.2 contributes to the capital, can facilitate accessibility of finance socioeconomic development (9.14.5) � complexity of estimating and poverty reduction (9.9.1) � Strengthening the the costs and benefits for adaptation measures in participation of women in development of agriculture CO2/PC 1.1 specific contexts (9.14.2) decision-making as well as but has come at a cost to advance traditional and local ecosystem integrity and (0.0-8.1) � exclusions of migrants and other vulnerable knowledge can support human well-being (9.15.2) populations from social climate action and programs (9.9.4) sustainable livelihoods � mismatch between the (9.9.3) supply of, and demand for, climate services (9.5) 0.65 � migration and displacement � Investing in climate-resilient � risk insurance 10.5.5 � (S+) nature-based adaptation HPAHDI (0.47- (Box 10.6) and sustainable � climate-smart agriculture solutions, wetland protection, 0.78) � uneven economic infrastructure can be a 10.4.5.5, (Table 10.6) and climate-smart agriculture Asia 34.9 development (10.4.6) source of green jobs as well � wetland protection and enhance carbon sequestration GINI (26.6- � rapid land use change as a means of reducing restoration (Table 10.6) (Table 10.6) 43.9) (10.4.6) climate vulnerability FRAGILITY 73.6 (10.6.2) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-93 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report CO2/PC (32.3- � increasing inequality � sustainable development � aquifer storage and recovery � (S+) disaster risk reduction 111.7) (10.4.6) pathways that connect and capacity building has PPAHDI climate change adaptation (Table 10.6) synergistic interactions with GINI 6.3 � large, socially and disaster risk reduction � integrated smart water grids climate adaptation when the (0.3-38.0) differentiated vulnerable efforts can reduce climate two are effectively integrated FRAGILITY populations (10.4.6) vulnerability and increase (Table 10.6) (10.6.2) 0.75 resilience (10.6.2) � disaster risk management CO2/PC (0.70- � Underinvestment in � (S+) environmental PPAHDI 0.81) adaptation, particularly in � social protection programs (Table 10.6) sustainability has benefits for 34.4 public health systems, can develop risk � early warning systems (Table relieving poverty and (34.4- given current and projected management strategies to promoting social equity 34.4) risks (11.3.6.3) address loss and damage 10.6) (10.6.4) 20.1 from climate change (10.5.6) � resettlement and migration (18.4- � Underlying social and � (T) intensive irrigation and 21.8) economic vulnerabilities (Table 10.6) other forms of water exacerbate disadvantage � nature-based solutions in consumption can have a 12.1 among particular social negative effect on water (7.3-16.9) groups (11.8.2) urban areas quality and aquatic � coastal green infrastructure ecosystems (10.6.3) 0.71 � Competing policy and planning objectives within (Table 10.6) � (T) adapting to fire risk in governments (11.7.2) peri-urban zones introduces � implementation of national � climate adaptation services, potential trade-offs among � Limits to adaptation across policies and guidance on ecological values and fuel the region and among climate adaptation and planning and tools from reduction in treed landscapes neighbors (11.7.2) resilience (Box 11.5) (11.3.5) government and private sector � Fear of litigation and � cooperation among demands for compensation individual farmers for providers (11.7.1) create disincentives for adaptation and regional � enhancing governance climate adaptation (11.7.2) innovation (11.7.1) frameworks (Table 11.17) � different climate change � enhancing understanding of � building capacity for risk perceptions among Indigenous knowledge and different groups (11.7.2) practices (Table 11.11) adaptation (Table 11.17) � community partnership and Australasia collaborative engagement(Table 11.17) � flexible decision-making (Table 11.17) � reducing systemic vulnerabilities (Table 11.17) � providing adaptation funding and compensation mechanisms (Table 11.17) � addressing social attitudes and engagement in adaptation and climate action (Table 11.17) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-94 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Central GINI (0.62- � vulnerability of informal � Address existing � upgrading of informal and � (S+) conservation and and South FRAGILITY 0.78) development deficits, restoration of natural America 47.2 settlements with chronic particularly the needs of vulnerable settlements ecosystems have synergies CO2/PC (38.6- informal settlements and � capacity building in national with mitigation, adaptation Europe 57.9) exposure to everyday, non- economies and sustainable development 65.9 and city level government (12.7.1) (35.9- climate risks � Adopt collaborative 92.6) � limited political influence approaches to decision- institutions � (T) wind farms support making that integrate civic � enhancing social protection greenhouse gas mitigation but 2.2 of poor and most groups and communities as have ecosystem implications (0.9-4.8) well as the private sector programs and impacts (13.4.2) vulnerable groups � integrated land use planning � poor market access of rural � Enhance adoption of � (T) adapting and mitigating sustainable tourism and and risk-sensitive zoning climate change through households livelihood diversification � infrastructure greening afforestation and forest � little consideration of the � disaster risk mitigation and management may be hampered by biophysical and implications of NDCs for management land use trade-offs (13.3.2) � emergency medical and public poverty and livelihoods � corruption, particularly in health preparedness � improving insurance the construction and mechanisms and climate infrastructure sector � gender inequities in labor financing � ecosystem conservation, markets � limits to adaptation protection, and restoration � appropriate use of climate PPAHDI 0.76 � mitigation and adaptation � engagement in climate GINI (0.52- remain siloed around change knowledge, policy, information and development 0.83) sectoral approaches (Box and practice networks (Box FRAGILITY 31.9 13.3) 13.3) of climate services (24.6- � ecological restoration of CO2/PC 41.3) � institutional, policy, and � national policies can lead to 41.1 behavioral lock-ins more ambitious and habitats agroforestry and (16.2- constrain the rate of system integrated climate planning 72.9) transitions (13.11.4) and action with associated reforestation (13.8.2) co-benefits (Box 13.3) � "smart farming" and 6.8 � legislative and decision- (1.3-21.3) making process constraints � system transformations knowledge training (13.5.2.1) on climate action (13.11.4) towards more adaptive and � soil management practices climate resilient systems � high adaptation costs and (13.11.4, Box 13.3) (13.5.2.1) concerns about � changing sowing dates and effectiveness and feasibility (13.3.2, Table 13.A.5) changes in cultivars (13.5.2.1) � stricter enforcement of existing � competition for land use among adaptation and other health regulations (13.7.2) uses (13.3.2) � integrated coastal zone management and marine spatial planning (13.4.2) � nature-based solutions (13.4.2) � climate services 13.6.2.3 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-95 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report North PPAHDI 0.72 � perceptions of climate � increased focus on building � tailored insurance products for � (S+) Post-fire ecosystem America GINI (0.72- change as irrelevant or not adaptive capacity in small recovery measures, 0.73) urgent (13.3.2) towns and rural areas specific physical climate restoration of habitat Small FRAGILITY 40.0 (14.6.3) connectivity, and managing Islands (33.3- � public budget and human risks13.6.2.5 for carbon storage enhance CO2/PC 45.4) capital limitations (13.3.2) � greater use of SDGs as a � protection of world heritage adaptation potential and 45.4 framework for equitable offers co-benefits with carbon PPAHDI (21.7- � lack of representation of all adaptation measures (14.6.3) sites (13.8.2) mitigation (Box 14.1) GINI 69.9) groups and communities in � indigenous knowledge-based politics and decision- � broader and deeper � (T) REDD+ represents a FRAGILITY 11.9 making (14.6.3) recognition of the role of land and resource management trade-off between carbon (3.8-16.6) Indigenous knowledge and mitigation and the ability of � economic and financial local knowledge systems in (Section 14.4.4) communities to improve their 0.68 constraints on adaptation adaptation (14.6.3) � adaptive co-management of food security (14.4.7) (0.51- within communities 14.6.2 0.76) � greater emphasis on agriculture and freshwater � (T) New coastal and alpine 40.2 � persistent social participatory governance and developments generate (28.7- vulnerability and inequities co-production of knowledge resources (Section 14.4.3) economic activity but 56.3) 14.6.3, 14.4.7.3 in adaptation decision- � ecosystem based management enhance local social 64.6 making (14.6.2.2) inequalities (15.4.10) (38.1- � adaptation actions that are and nature based solutions 97.5) maladaptive and exacerbate � enhanced use of risk-based � (S+) development decisions existing inequities decision analysis (Box 14.3) Section 14.4.2, and outcomes are (14.6.2.1) frameworks and flexible strengthened by consideration adaptation pathways 14.4.3, 14.4.4) (Table 14.9). of climate and disaster risk � constraints on capacity for (14.6.2.2) � increase efficiency and equity (15.7) data collection (Table 14.8) � coordination of policies to of water management and � (S-) impacts of invasive alien � limited organizational support transformational species on islands are willingness implement new adaptation (14.6.2.2) allocation (14.4.3.3) projected to increase with and untested solutions � energy conservation measures (Table 14.8) � increasing women's access to climate change funding (14.6.1.3) � high dependence of and support from � guidelines, codes, standards, economic activity on organizations tourism (15.3.4.5) (15.6.5)promoting and specifications for agroecology, food � Lack of coordination sovereignty, and infrastructure (14.6.1.6) among government regenerative economies � modifying zoning and buying departments (15.6.1) (15.7) properties in floodplains � limited regional cooperation (15.6.1) (14.6.1.3) � web-based tools for visualizing and exploring climate information scenario planning and risk analyses (s14.6.1.6) � raising dwellings and other infrastructure (15.5.2) � land reclamation (15.5.2) � migration and planned resettlement (15.5.2) � ecosystem-based adaptation including Indigenous and local knowledge (15.5.2) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-96 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report � absence of planning � expanding sustainable � protected areas (15.5.2) time due to synergies between tourism economies (15.7) � ecosystem restoration and climate change and other frameworks (15.6.1) drivers (15.3.3) � corruption and corrupt � integrating climate change improved agroforestry � (S-) synergies between and disaster management changing climate and other people in political and with broader development practices (15.5.2 15.5.4) natural and anthropogenic planning and � community-based adaptation stressors could lead to public life (15.6.1) implementation (15.7) disproportionate impacts on � insufficient human capital (15.5.5) biodiversity (15.3.3) � using climate risk insurance � livelihood diversification and CO2/PC 3.7 (15.6.1) as a way to support (0.3-31.3) � competing development development and adaptation use of improved technologies processes (15.7) priorities (15.5.5) and equipment (15.5.6) � lack of education and � improving cross sectoral and � diversifying cropping cross agency coordination awareness around climate (15.7) patterns, expanding or change (15.6.4) � enhanced integration prioritizing other cash crops � failure of externally driven between development assistance, public financial (15.5.6) adaptation (15.6.5) management, and climate � small-scale livestock � constraints on economic, finance (15.5.7) husbandry (15.5.6) legislative, and technical � irrigation technologies capacity of local (15.5.6) � diversification away from governments (15.7) coastal tourism � disaster risk management (DRM) (15.5.7) � early warning systems and climate services (15.5.7) 1 2 3 Table 18.7: Sectoral synthesis of dimensions of climate-resilient development. For each sectoral chapter of the WGII report, this table identifies those SDGs that are discussed in the 4 relevant chapter as being particularly relevant to the sector. In addition, the table contains evidence of sustainable development challenges and opportunities as well as 5 adaptation/sustainable development options and potential synergies and trade-offs associated with their implementation. Synergies and trade-offs are categorized as follows: (T) 6 Trade-off among policies and practices; (S+) Synergy among policies and practices that enhances sustainability; (S-) Synergy among policies and practices that undermines 7 sustainability. Relevant Challenges Opportunities Options Trade-offs Sector SDGs � nature based solutions offer the � habitat restoration, � (S+) ecosystem-based adaptation SDG 1, � low capacity for dispersal limits Terrestrial SDG 2, range shifts to match climate opportunity to address climate connectivity, and creation of measures, such as restoration of and SDG 3, (2.6.1) change and biodiversity protected areas (Table 2.5) forests and wetlands for flood and freshwater SDG 6, � constraints on the evolution of problems in an integrated way � integrated landscape erosion control help maintain ecosystems SDG 7, greater stress tolerance among (2.6) management (Table Cross- freshwater supply and quality and their � adaptation can be integrated services SDG 9, species (2.4.2, 2.6.1) Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in (2.2.2) SDG 10, � altered peatland drainage and with the protection of Chapter 2) � (S-) over-grazing/stocking of SDG 11, repeated disturbances pose biodiversity and land-based pastures and grasslands can result Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-97 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report SDG 12, barriers to restoration of tropical climate change mitigation � community-based natural in soil erosion and the loss of SDG 13, peatlands (2.4.3) initiatives (2.6.2) biodiversity (Table Cross-Chapter SDG 15, � demonstrating the efficacy of resource management BoxNATURAL1 in Chapter 2) SDG 17 natural flood management efforts � development assistance can help � (T) planting non-native poses challenges to its address resource constraints (2.6.5.7) monocultures for mitigation can deployment (2.6.5) associated with marine � maintain or restore natural reduce biodiversity and resilience � uncertainties in climate and ecosystem management (3.6.3) � (T) inappropriate hydrological socioeconomic projections species and structural restoration can result in increased constrain adaptation planning and � improving coordination among methane emissions (Table Cross- implementation (2.7) actors and projects will diversity (Table Cross- Chapter Box NATURAL1 in contribute to achieving SDGs Chapter 2) Ocean and SDG1, � shifts in the distribution of fish (3.6.3) Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in � (T) afforestation/reforestation and coastal SDG2, species across exclusive bioenergy initiatives can conflict ecosystems SDG3, economic zones present � private finance can support Chapter 2) with other land uses such as food and their SDG5, governance, ecological, and restoration of blue-carbon � restoration of hydrological and timber production (Table services SDG7, conservation challenges (3.4.3) systems (3.6.3) Cross-Chapter Box BECCS, 2.2.2, SDG8, flows and catchment Box 2.2) SDG9, � resource constraints impede the � joint implementation of coastal SDG10, implementation of ecosystem- and marine management vegetation (Table Cross- � (S+) adaptation in ocean and SDG11, based and community-based initiatives can address coastal systems can be designed in SDG12, adaptation for low- to middle- governance challenges across Chapter Box NATURAL.1 in ways that substantially contribute SDG13, income nations (3.6.2) scales and sectors (3.6.3) to the SDGs and not only support SDG14 Chapter 2) but allow the attainment of social, � governance in marine social- � ocean-based renewable energy � control of feral herbivores environmental and economic ecological systems is highly options can reduce reliance on targets (3.6.4) complex with poorly-defined imported fuel (3.6.3) with (Table Cross-Chapter legal frameworks (3.6.2) � (S+) blue/green economies can Box NATURAL.1 in Chapter reduce emissions and finance � "Coastal squeeze" challenges adaptation pathways (3.6.3) adaptation, creating tensions 2) between coastal development and � reduce non-climatic stressors � (T) built infrastructure conflicts coastal habitat management with mitigation goals and can (3.6.3) to land-based ecosystems create potential ecological, social and cultural impacts that (Table 2.6) undermines ecosystem health � maritime spatial planning and (3.6.2) integrated coastal management (3.6.2; Figure 3.2.6) � adaptive and sustainable fisheries management (3.6.2) � habitat restoration (3.6.2) � fishery mobility (Figure 3.6.2) � assisted evolution (Figure 3.2.6) � increase participation in management and governance (Figure 3.2.6) � nature-based solutions (3.6.2) � hard and soft infrastructure (Figure 3.2.6) � livelihood diversification (Figure 3.6.2) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-98 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Water SDG 1, � uncertainty in future water � a resilient circular economy � disaster mitigation and � (S+) increasing the proportion of SDG 2, availability (Box 4.1, Box 4.4) delivers access to water, sewerage, treated wastewater, Food, fiber, SDG 3, sanitation, wastewater, and response (Figure 3.2.6) recycling and safe reuse would and other SDG 6, � lack of sufficient data, ecological flows (Box 4.7) � finance and market help reach climate and water ecosystem SDG 7, information and knowledge in targets (Box 4.7) products SDG 10, understanding the water energy � adaptive sanitation systems and mechanisms (Figure 3.2.6) SDG 11, food nexus (Box 4.6) sustainable urban drainage � changes in crop cultivars and � (S+) solar irrigation pumps provide SDG 13 contribute to a `one health for income diversification for � increasing urbanization is approach' which can prevent agronomic practices (4.5) small and marginal farmers while SDG1, creating new and difficult water and sanitation � changes in irrigation and also generating renewable energy SDG2, demands for urban water contamination risks during (Box 4.7) SDG3, management. (4.3.4) floods and droughts. (Box 4.7) water management practices SDG4, � (T) desalination of seawater or SDG5, � barriers to adapting water- � climate-proof infrastructure (4.5) brackish inland water is energy- SDG6, dependent livelihoods in rural would reduce infection risks in � water and soil conservation intensive, high salinity brine, and communities (4.3.1) flood-prone areas (Box 4.7) other contaminants (4.5.5) (4.5) � mainstreaming water � governance can derive � migration and off-farm � (T) negative-emission management across sectors and legitimacy from inclusion of technologies, such as direct air enhancing finance for adaptation multiple stakeholders, including livelihood diversification capture can result in a net increase (4.3.5) women, indigenous communities in water consumption (4.5.5) and young people (4.6.6) (4.5) � path-dependency of institutions, � collective action, policies and � (S+) agricultural production and the speed at which these � Indigenous and local knowledge systems that integrate crops, allow for changes in the decision- can help ensure solutions align institutions (4.5) livestock, forestry, fisheries and making process (4.5.3) with the interests of communities � economic and financial aquaculture can increase food (FAQ 4.5) production per unit of land, reduce � increased cost and management incentives (4.5) challenges of providing safe food � integrated approaches to food, � training and capacity building (5.2.2) water, health, biodiversity and energy that involve vulnerable (4.5) � warming-induced shifts of species groups can help to address � flood risk reduction measures create resource allocation current and future food security challenges, reduce vulnerability (4.5) � urban water management (4.5) � water, sanitation, and hygiene adaptations (4.5) � agro-forestry and forestry responses (4.5) � livestock and fishery responses (4.5) � indigenous and local knowledge (4.5) � energy related adaptations (4.5) � livelihood diversification (5.4.4) � social protection policies and programs (5.4.4) � changes in crop management including irrigation, Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-99 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report SDG7, challenges among different of Indigenous people, small- fertilizers, planting schedules, climatic risk, and reduce emissions SDG9, fishing fleets (5.2.1) scale landholders and (Chapter 5 ES) SDG9, � challenges related to REDD+ pastoralists, and promote and crop varieties (5.4.4.1) � (S+) integrated approaches to food, SDG10, implementation and forest use resilient ecosystems. (5.12.3, � adjusting water management water, health, biodiversity and SDG11, (5.6.3) 5.13.2; 5.14) energy can help address current SDG12, � differences in perceptions about � agroforestry delivers benefits for for forage production (5.5.4) and future food security SDG13, the validity of different forms of climate change mitigation, � rotational grazing of livestock challenges, reduce vulnerability of SDG14, knowledge (5.8.4) adaptation, desertification, land Indigenous people, small-scale SDG15, � inequality in access to climate degradation, and food security (5.5.4) landholders and pastoralists, and SDG16 services (5.14.1) and is considered to have broad � fire management to control promote resilient ecosystems. � lack of support, policies, and adaptation and moderate (5.12.3, 5.13.2; 5.14) SDG11, incentives for the adoption of mitigation potential (5.10.4) woody thickening of grass � (T) growing biomass demand for SDG13, agroecological approaches � partnerships between key producing sustainable bioproducts SDG17 (BIOECO.1) stakeholders such as researchers, (5.5.4) competes with food production � financial barriers limit forest managers, and local actors � using more suitable livestock with potential effects on food implementation of adaptation can lead to a shared prices and knock-on effects related options in agriculture, fisheries, understanding of climate-related breeds or species (5.5.4) to civil unrest (BIOECO.1) aquaculture and forestry (5.14.3) challenges and more effective � migratory pastoralist decisions. (5.6.3) � poor municipal funding, data � urban ecological infrastructure activities (5.5.4) collection, and collaboration including green, blue, turquoise � monitor and manage the hinders sustainable development and others can be a source of initiatives, capacity building, nature-based solutions that can spread of pests, weeds, and and climate action (6.1.5, 6.4.5, improve both adaptation and 6.4.9) mitigation in urban areas (6.1.2) diseases (5.5.4) � transition architecture � nature- or ecosystem-based � high urbanization rates pose movements can drive urban challenges to areas that already adaptation (6.4.1) strategies (5.12.5.2) have high levels of poverty, � transformative capacities Cities, unemployment, informality, and support adaptation efforts and � green infrastructure, � (S+) sustainable urban energy settlements housing and service backlogs systemic change processes planning that includes and key (6.2.1) (6.4.4) sustainable land use and opportunities to avoid and reduce infrastructure � incorporating Indigenous and the UHI effect can provide � Limited capacity for early- local knowledge help generate planning, and sustainable synergies for both climate warning systems in low-income more people-oriented and place- mitigation and adaptation in urban countries (6.3.2) specific adaptation policies water management (6.1.2) areas (Cross-Chapter Box URBAN (6.4.7) � nature-based solutions (6.3.3) in Chapter 6) � lack of administrative capacities, � climate finance offers the � insurance (6.3.2) coordination across sectors and opportunity to overcome � switching to air cooling for � (S+) natural ventilation and efforts, transparency and structural impediments to passive energy strategies can accountability slows climate action (Box 6.5) thermal power plants (6.3.4) capture synergies between climate sustainability transitions and � increasing the efficiency of mitigation and adaptation (Cross- disaster risk reduction (Case Chapter Box URBAN in Chapter Study 6.4) hydro and thermoelectric 6) power plants (6.3.4) � (S+) community-based adaptation � changing reservoir operation has potential to be better integrated to enhance well-being and create rules (6.3.4) synergies with the Sustainable � upgrading infrastructure and Development Goals strengthening, or relocating � (T) urban mitigation efforts can create trade-offs with adaptation (critical) assets (6.3.4) such as intensifying the Urban � including green, blue, turquoise and nature-based solutions (Cross-Chapter Box URBAN in Chapter 6) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-100 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Health, SDG3, � a lack of capacity for adaptation � urban ecological infrastructure � cooling networks (Cross- Heat Island (UHI) effect (Cross- wellbeing and SDG5, has resulted in only moderate or can be a source of nature-based Chapter Box URBAN in Chapter the changing SDG8, low levels of adaptation solutions that can improve both Chapter Box URBAN in 6) structure of SDG10, implementation across different adaptation and mitigation in � (T) efforts aimed at increasing communities SDG13 countries (7.4.2) urban areas (Cross-Chapter Box Chapter 6) adaptation may undermine URBAN in Chapter 6) � early warning systems (Table mitigation objectives by increasing � transitioning to renewable energy investment in hard infrastructure sources presents opportunities for � high density environments 6.4) that increases emissions (Cross- realizing health co-benefits coupled with other design � resource demand and supply Chapter Box URBAN in Chapter (7.4.4) measures can provide mitigation 6) and adaptation benefits (Cross- side management strategies � (T) lack of open and green spaces � shifting to healthier plant-rich Chapter Box URBAN in (Table 6.4) may induce long-distance leisure diets can reduce GHG emissions Chapter 6) � enhanced monitoring of air trips thereby increasing emissions and reduce land-use (Cross- and (Cross-Chapter Box URBAN Chapter Box HEALTH in � COVID-19 recovery investments quality in rapidly developing in Chapter 6) Chapter 7) offer an opportunity to contribute to climate resilient cities (Table 6.4) � (T) energy strategies for energy � future flows of migration within development through a green, � investment in air pollution efficiency and GHG emissions and between countries are likely resilient, healthy and inclusive reductions can generate health co- to respond strongly to particular recovery (Cross-Chapter Box controls (Table 6.4) benefits through improved air combinations of climatic hazards COVID in Chapter 7) � core and shell preservation, quality but may slow poverty and may present challenges for reduction efforts (7.4.2, 7.4.5) future adaptation policies and � investing in basic infrastructure elevation and relocation for programs for all can transform � (S+) investing in adaptation for development opportunities, heritage buildings (6.3.2) health and community wellbeing � climate change disruptions to increase adaptive capacity and � improved building and urban has the potential to generate natural environments can be reduce climate risk (Cross- considerable co-benefits in terms expected to disrupt livelihood Chapter Box HEALTH in design including use of of reducing impacts of non-climate practices, stimulate higher rates Chapter 7) health challenges passive cooling systems � Integrated agroecological (Table 7.2) � (S+) investments in mitigating systems offer opportunities to � better access to public health greenhouse gas emissions will not increase dietary diversity while only reduce risks associated with building local resilience to systems for the most dangerous climate change, but will climate-related food insecurity increase population health and (7.4.2) vulnerable (Table 7.2) wellbeing through a number of � deployment of renewable pathways. (7.4) � Incorporating climate change and health considerations into energy sources (Table 7.2) disaster reduction and � improved water, sanitation management strategies could and hygiene conditions (Table 7.2) � early-warning system of vector-borne diseases, insecticide treated bed nets, and indoor spraying of insecticide (Table 7.2) � targeted efforts to develop vaccines for infectious diseases exacerbated by climate change (Table 7.2) � improved personal drinking and eating habits (Table 7.2) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-101 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Poverty, SDG1, of outmigration to urban centers, potentially improve funding � improved food storage, food � (S+) agriculture technologies livelihoods SDG2, and in some instances necessitate opportunities (7.4.2) facilitate mitigation to climate and SDG3, planned or organized relocations � adaptive urban design that processing, and food change and adaptation such as sustainable SDG5, of exposed settlements (Cross- provides access to healthy saving water while maintaining development SDG10, Chapter Box MIGRATE in natural spaces can promote preservation (Table 7.2) grain yield (8.6.1) SDG14 Chapter 7) social cohesion and mitigate � emergency shelters for people mental health challenges (7.4.2) � (S+) sustainable pastoralism � use of political frameworks for to escape heat (Table 7.2) increases carbon sequestration but decision-making that are � polycentric governance, adaptive � improved funding and access can also contribute to adaptation unfavorable towards adaptation governance, multi-level by changing grazing management, and system transitions (Table 8.4) governance, collaborative to mental health care (Table livestock breeds, pest management, governance, or network and production structures (8.6.1) � attitudes toward risk and other governance are increasingly used 7.2) cultural values limit responses to understand transitions towards � improved education for girls � (S+) REDD+ may provide (Table 8.4) climate-compatible development adaptation benefits by enhancing (8.6.2) and women (Table 7.2) households' economic resilience � psychological distress causes � improved maternal and child through positive livelihood impacts insecurity and behaviors that � well-coordinated and integrated (8.6.1) increase vulnerability (Table 8.4) nexus approaches to adaptation health services (Table 7.2) offer opportunities to build � expanded private sector � (S+) solar energy contributes to � limited financial resources to resilient systems while reducing GHG emissions and support adaptation projects (8.2.2, harmonizing interventions, activity and public-private improving air quality (8.6.1) Table 8.4) mitigating trade-offs and improving sustainability (8.6.2) partnerships (8.6.1) � (S+) hydropower contributes to � small-holder farmers have poor � credit and insurance (8.6.1) mitigation and adaptation through access to markets and land tenure � income from new livelihood � use of climate-smart water resource availability for (8.6.1) activities can support recovery irrigation and drinking water following disasters linked to agricultural practices and (8.6.1) � unsuitable infrastructure may climate variability and change increase exposure (Table 8.4) (8.4.5) technologies (8.6.1) � (S+) green roofed buildings � crop insurance (8.6.1) contribute to cooler temperatures, � lack of access to technologies that � improving industrial processes � conservation agriculture thereby reducing energy use for can support adaptation (Table can contribute to the optimized air-conditioning (8.6.1) 8.4) use of energy, reuse of waste, (8.6.1) reducing GHG emissions, use of � changing farmers' perception � gender-based inequalities biomass and more efficient constrain women's access to equipment (Table 8.3) and enhancing farmers' resources for adaptation (Table 8.7) � industrialization and adaptive capacity (8.6.1) technological innovation in rural � REDD+ (8.6.1) � poverty constrains livelihood areas may assist vulnerable � improving industrial diversification, resilience or adaptive capacity (Table 8.7) processes (Table 8.3) � renewable energy and energy efficiency (Table 8.3) � smart electricity grids (8.6.1) � green buildings (8.6.1) � efficient fuels (8.6.1) � pollution control investments (8.6.1) � public transit and non- motorized transport with increased use of biofuels (8.6.1) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-102 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 � indigenous peoples and other communities through provision � integrated natural resource � (T) mitigation measures such as populations with strong of resources, enhanced forecast bioenergy may result in trade-offs attachments to place face barriers information, or reuse of biowaste management (Table 8.2) with efforts to achieve sustainable to adaptation (Table 8.7) (Table 8.3) � disaster risk management development, eradicate poverty � responses to climate change can and reduce inequalities (8.6.1) � local institutions face ongoing create significant development (Table 8.2) challenges in gaining support opportunities including job � relocation of vulnerable � (T) migration to urban centers can from higher governance levels, creation and livelihood be a form of adaptation, but can particularly in developing diversification (8.4.3) communities (Table 8.2) increase the vulnerability of countries. (8.5.2) � Education and communities of origin or at destinations (8.2.2) communication (Table 8.2) � land use planning (Table 8.3) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-103 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 18.6 Conclusions and Research Needs 2 3 18.6.1 Knowledge Gaps 4 5 Research to improve the understanding of CRD currently exists in a nascent state, because, as noted in the 6 AR5, "integrating climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation, and sustainable development is a 7 relatively new challenge" (Denton et al., 2014). While a large volume of literature has emerged since the 8 AR5 that spans the nexus of sustainable development, CRD, and climate action, the identified research gaps 9 in AR5 (Denton et al., 2014) continue to be priorities for informing CRD. These include enhancing 10 understanding of mainstreaming of climate change into institutional decision-making, managing risk under 11 conditions of uncertainty, catalyzing system transitions and transformation, and processes for enhancing 12 participation, equity, and accountability in sustainable development (very high confidence). 13 14 The more recent literature adds significant context to the concept of CRD, but also introduces broader 15 perspectives regarding its significance in the arena of climate action. Hence, concepts that are both 16 complementary to, and competitive with, CRD, such as climate safe', `climate compatible' and `climate 17 smart' development (Huxham et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2017b; Ficklin et al., 2018; Mcleod et al., 2019) 18 (18.1.1). These different framings of the intersection between sustainable development and climate action 19 are used in different communities of research and practice, which complicates efforts to provide clear 20 guidance to decision-makers regarding the goals of CRD and how best to achieve it. This is attributable in 21 part to persistent conceptual confusion and disciplinary divides over more fundamental concepts such as 22 resilience and sustainability (Rogers et al., 2020; Zaman, 2021), not to mention contested perspectives 23 regarding development (Lo et al., 2020; Song et al., 2020a; Morton, 2021) (medium agreement; medium 24 evidence). 25 26 Reconciling different perspectives on CRD is not simply a matter of academic debate. Climate action, 27 resilience, and sustainable development are all active areas of policy and practice with significant economic, 28 social, environmental, and political implications (18.1.3). Hence, enhancing the role of CRD as a practical 29 framework for development and a guide for action may necessitate improving the science-policy discourse 30 regarding CRD (Winterfeldt, 2013; Jones et al., 2014; Ryan and Bustos, 2019). This includes consideration 31 for risk and science communication; decision analysis and decision support systems; and mechanisms for 32 knowledge co-production between scientists and public policy actors (very high confidence). 33 34 In addition, the AR6 WGII report highlights a number of elements of CRD that are associated with 35 significant knowledge gaps and uncertainties. As a result, enhancing the value of CRD as a unifying concept 36 in development would benefit from further conceptualization and socialization of the concept as well as 37 efforts to address the following knowledge gaps: 38 � The challenges posed by different levels of global warming to achieving CRD and the magnitude 39 and nature of the adaptation gap (and associated finance needs) that must be addressed to enable 40 climate resilience. 41 � The efficacy of different adaptation, mitigation, and sustainable development interventions in 42 reducing climate risk and/or enhancing opportunities for CRD in the short, medium and long term. 43 � How different CRD pathways can be designed such that they illustrate opportunities for the practical 44 pursuit of CRD in a manner consistent with principles of inclusion, equity, and justice. 45 � How deliberative, participatory learning can be integrated into approaches to CRD in order to 46 enhance the representation of diverse actors, forms of knowledge, governance regimes, economic 47 systems, and models for decision-making in CRD. 48 � The synergies and trade-offs associated with the implementation of different policy packages and the 49 design principles and development contexts that enhance the ability to successfully manage potential 50 trade-offs. 51 � The limits of incremental system transitions to achieving CRD on a timeline that reflects the urgency 52 associated with the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. 53 � The capacity of governments, social institutions, and individuals to drive large-scale social 54 transformations that open up the solutions space for CRD. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-104 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 � Best practices for avoiding maladaptation and ensuring that adaptation interventions are designed so 2 they do not exacerbate vulnerability to climate change to support CRD. 3 18.6.2 Conclusions 4 5 The concept of CRD presents an ambitious agenda for actors at multiple scales � global to local, particularly 6 in the manner in which it reframes climate action to integrate a broader set of objectives than simply 7 reducing greenhouse gas emissions or adapting to the impacts of climate change. Specifically, recent 8 literature extends policy goals for climate action beyond avoiding dangerous interference with the climate 9 system to adopt normative goals of meeting basic human needs, eliminating poverty and enabling sustainable 10 development in ways that are just and equitable. This creates a policy landscape for climate action that is not 11 only richer, but also more complex in that it situates responses to climate change squarely within the 12 development arena. Current policy goals associated with the Paris Agreement, Sendai Framework, and the 13 SDGs imply aggressive timetables. Yet, as noted in the AR5 and supported by more recent literature 14 (Section 18.2.1), the world is neither on track to achieve all of the SDGs nor fulfil the Paris Agreement's 15 objective of limiting warming to well-below 2癈 (Denton et al., 2014; IPCC, 2018a). This places aspirations 16 for CRD in a precarious position. Transitions will be necessary across multiple systems (Section 18.1.3). 17 While some may be already underway, the pace of those transitions must accelerate, and societal 18 transformations may be necessary, to enable CRD (18.3, 18.4, Box 18.1) 19 20 Given the pace of climate change and the inherent challenge of sustainable development, particularly in the 21 face of inevitable disruptions and setbacks such as the COVID-19 pandemic (Cross-Chapter Box COVID in 22 Chapter 7), the feasibility of achieving CRD is an open question. Rapid changes will be required to shift 23 public and private investments, strengthen institutions and orient them toward more sustainable policies and 24 practices, expand the inclusiveness of governance and the equity of decision-making, and shift societal and 25 consumer preferences to more climate-resilient lifestyles. Nevertheless, the collective body of recent 26 literature on CRD, system transitions, and societal transformation, combined with the assessments within 27 recent IPCC Special Reports (IPCC, 2018a; IPCC, 2019b; IPCC, 2019d) indicate that there are a broad range 28 of opportunities for designing and implementing adaptation and mitigation options that enable the climate 29 goals in the Paris Agreement to be achieved while enhancing resilience and meeting sustainable 30 development objectives. However, options should be considered alongside the mechanisms by which 31 societies can engage in order to create the conditions that can support the implementation of those options 32 (Section 18.4). This includes formal policy mechanisms pursued by governments, the catalyzation of 33 innovation by private firms and entrepreneurship, as well as informal, grassroots interventions by civil 34 society. While there is no "one-size-fits-all" solution for CRD that will work for all actors at all scales, 35 exploring different pathways by which actors can achieve their development and climate goals can make 36 valuable contributions to developing effective strategies for CRD. 37 38 A fundamental challenge for achieving CRD globally is reconciling different perspectives on CRD. As noted 39 in the AR5, "as policy makers explore what pathways to pursue, they will increasingly face questions about 40 managing discourses about what societal objectives to pursue" (Denton et al., 2014: 1124). Since the AR5, 41 such discourses have become prominent in policy debates over climate action and sustainable development 42 due to different nations, communities, and subpopulations having different understandings of what 43 constitutes CRD. Aggressive efforts to rapidly reduce greenhouse gas emissions or enhance resilience to 44 climate change, for example, could have negative externalities for the development objectives of some 45 actors. This potential for trade-offs complicates efforts to build consensus regarding what constitutes 46 appropriate climate and development policies and practices and by whom. The CRD pathways preferred by 47 one actor are likely to be contested by others. This means operationalizing concepts such as CRD in practice 48 is likely to necessitate ongoing negotiation. 49 50 Ultimately, one of the critical developments within the literature is the emergence of procedural and 51 distributive justice as key criteria for evaluating climate action and CRD more specifically. This trend not 52 only recognizes the need to prevent vulnerable human and ecological systems from experiencing 53 disproportionate harm from the changing climate, but also the need to prevent those same systems from 54 being harmed by mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development policies and practices. Failure to 55 adequately engage with equity and justice when designing sustainability transitions could lead to 56 maladaptation, aggravated poverty, reinforcement of existing inequalities, and entrenched gender bias and Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-105 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 exclusion of Indigenous and marginalized communities (Jenkins et al., 2018; Fisher et al., 2019; Schipper et 2 al., 2020b). These consequences could ultimately slow, rather than accelerate, CRD. Hence, developing 3 programs and practices for prioritizing equity in effective transition risk management is an important 4 dimension of enabling CRD. 5 6 As indicated by the literature assessed within this chapter, keeping windows of opportunity open for CRD 7 will necessitate urgent action, even under diverse assumptions regarding how future mitigation and 8 adaptation interventions evolve. If nations are to collectively limit warming to well-below 2癈, for example, 9 unprecedented emissions reductions will be necessary over the next decade (IPCC, 2018a). These reductions 10 would necessitate rapid progression of system transitions (18.3). If, despite the Paris Agreement, future 11 emissions trajectories take the world beyond 2癈, a greater demand will be placed on adaptation as a means 12 of enhancing the resilience of development. Given the long-lived nature of human systems, and the built 13 environment in particular, significant adaptation investments would be needed over the near-term to meet 14 this demand. Yet, it is important to note that even in the absence of consideration for climate change, 15 substantial development needs exist for communities around the world at present. Hence, a robust strategy 16 for the pursuit of CRDPs is a near-term focus on portfolios of policies and practices that promote of human 17 and ecological well-being. 18 19 [START FAQ18.1 HERE] 20 21 FAQ18.1: What is a climate resilient development pathway? 22 23 Climate resilient development pathways (CRDPs) are continuous processes that strengthen sustainable 24 development, efforts to eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities while promoting fair and cross-scalar 25 capacities for adaptation to global warming and reduction of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. 26 27 A pathway is defined in IPCC reports as a temporal evolution of natural and/or human systems towards a 28 future state. These can range from sets of scenarios, narratives of potential futures to solution-oriented 29 decision-making processes to achieve desirable societal goals. 30 31 When used in the context of climate resilient development (CRD), pathways refer to continuous processes 32 that strengthen sustainable development, efforts to eradicate poverty, and reduce inequalities while 33 promoting fair and cross-scalar adaptation and mitigation. As they imply deep societal changes and/or 34 transformation, CRDPs raise questions of ethics, equity, and feasibility of options to drastically reduce 35 emission of greenhouse gasses (mitigation) that limit global warming (e.g., to well below 2癈) and achieve 36 desirable and livable futures and wellbeing for all. 37 38 There in no one true, correct pathway to pursue but multiple ways, modalities, depending on numerous 39 factors, such as political, cultural and economic contexts. Pathways are not one single decision or action, nor 40 is there an absolute, universal, fixed, final goal to be pursued, yet there are undesirable and non-CRDPs. 41 Hence, a CRDP is a continuum of coherent, consistent decisions, actions and interventions within each 42 country, and as a global community. While dependent on past development and its socio-ethical, political, 43 economic, ecological and knowledge-technology outcomes at any point in time, transformation, ecological 44 tipping points and shocks can create sudden shifts and unexpected non-linear development pathways. 45 Actions taken today also foreclose some future potential pathways. The differentiated impacts of hurricanes 46 and COVID-19 illustrate how the character of societal development such as equity and inclusion have 47 enabled some societies to be more resilient than others. 48 49 [END FAQ18.1 HERE] 50 51 52 [START FAQ18.2 HERE] 53 54 FAQ18.2: What is climate resilient development and how can climate change adaptation (measures) 55 contribute to achieving this? 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-106 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 The key purpose of CRD is to pursue sustainable development, engaging climate actions in ways that 2 support human and planetary health and well-being, equity and justice. Climate resilient development 3 combines adaptation and mitigation with underlying development choices and everyday actions, carried out 4 by multiple actors within political, economic, ecological, socio-ethical and knowledge-technology arenas. 5 The character of processes within these development arenas are intrinsic to how social choices are made, 6 directing actions in a CRD or non-CRD direction. For example, inclusion, agency and social justice are 7 qualities within the political arena that underpin actions that enable CRD. 8 9 CRD addresses the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions, levels of warming and related climate 10 risks. However, CRD involves more than just achieving temperature targets. It considers the possible 11 transitions that enable those targets to be achieved as well as the evaluation of different adaptation strategies 12 and how the implementation of these strategies interact with broader sustainable development efforts and 13 objectives. This interdependence between patterns of development, climate risk, and the demand for 14 mitigation and adaptation action is fundamental to the concept of CRD. Therefore, climate change and 15 sustainable development cannot be assessed or planned in isolation of one another. 16 17 Hence, CRD is defined as the development that deliberately adopts mitigation and adaptation measures to 18 secure a safe climate on earth, meet basic needs for each human being, eliminate poverty and enable 19 equitable, just and sustainable development. It halts practices causing dangerous levels of global 20 warming. CRD may involve deep societal transformation to ensure well-being for all. CRD is now emerging 21 as one of the guiding principles for climate policy, both at the international level, reflected in the Paris 22 Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) and within specific countries. 23 24 25 26 Figure FAQ18.2.1: Multiple intertwined climate resilient development pathways. Climate change adaptation is one 27 of several climatic and non-climatic measures carried out through decision-making by multiple actors that may drive a 28 pathway in a CRD or non-CRD direction. Adaptation, mitigation and sustainable development actions can push a 29 society in a CRD direction, but only if these measures are just and equitable. There are multiple simultaneous pathways 30 in the past, present and future. Societies (illustrated as boats) move on different pathways, towards CRD and non-CRD, 31 with some pathways more dominant than others. The direction of pathways is emergent, taking place through 32 contestations and social choices, through social transformation as well as through surprises and shocks (illustrated as 33 rocks). Path dependency means it is possible but often turbulent to shift from a non-CRD to a CRD pathway. Such a 34 shift becomes more difficult in as risks/shocks increase (more rocks) and non-CRD processes and outcomes progress, 35 limiting future options. Low CRD processes and outcomes at the bottom are characterized by inequity, exclusion, 36 polarization, environmental and social exploitation, entrenchment of business as usual, with increasing risks/shocks. 37 High CRD processes and outcomes (at the top of the figure) are characterized by equity, solidarity, justice, human well- 38 being, planetary health, stewardship/care and system transitions. 39 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-107 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Climate change adaptation is one of several climatic and non-climatic measures carried out through decision- 2 making by multiple actors that may drive a pathway in a CRD or non-CRD direction. Adaptation, mitigation 3 and sustainable development actions can push a society in a CRD direction, but only if these measures are 4 just and equitable. There are multiple simultaneous pathways in the past, present and future. Societies 5 (illustrated as boats) move on different pathways, towards CRD and non-CRD, with some pathways more 6 dominant than others. The direction of pathways is emergent, taking place through contestations and social 7 choices, through social transformation as well as through surprises and shocks (illustrated as rocks). Path 8 dependency means it is possible but often turbulent to shift from a non-CRD to a CRD pathway. Such a shift 9 becomes more difficult in as risks/shocks increase (more rocks) and non-CRD processes and outcomes 10 progress, limiting future options. Low CRD processes and outcomes at the bottom are characterized by 11 inequity, exclusion, polarization, environmental and social exploitation, entrenchment of business as usual, 12 with increasing risks/shocks. High CRD processes and outcomes (at the top of the figure) are characterized 13 by equity, solidarity, justice, human well-being, planetary health, stewardship/care and system transitions. 14 15 [END FAQ18.2 HERE] 16 17 18 [START FAQ18.3 HERE] 19 20 FAQ18.3: How can different actors across society and levels of government be empowered to pursue 21 climate resilient development? 22 23 CRD entails trade-offs between different policy objectives. Governments, political and economic elites may 24 play a key role in defining the direction of development at a national and sub-national scale; but in practice, 25 these pathways can be influenced and even resisted by local people, NGOs and civil society. 26 27 Contestation and debate are inherent in its construct and implementation. An active civil society and 28 citizenship create the enabling conditions for deliberation, protest, dissent and pressure which are 29 fundamental for an inclusive participatory process. These enable a multiplicity of actors to engage across 30 multiple arenas, from decision-making and everyday actions Hence, decisions and actions may be influenced 31 by uneven interactions between actors, including socio-political relations of domination, marginalization, 32 contestation, compliance and resistance with diverse and often unpredictable outcomes. 33 34 In this way, recent social movements and climate protests show new modalities of action related to political 35 responsibility for inaction based on contestation. The new climate movement led mostly by youngsters, 36 markedly seek science-based policy and more importantly, demand to break with a reformist stance and 37 social inertia through radical climate action. This is mostly done through collective disruptive action, and 38 non-violent resistance to promote awareness, a regenerative culture and ethics of care. These movements 39 have resulted in notable political successes, such as declarations of climate emergency at the national and 40 local level, as well as in universities. Also, their methods have proven effective to end fossil fuel 41 sponsorship. 42 43 The success and importance of recent climate movements also provide elements to rethink the role of science 44 in society. In one hand, the new climate movements demanding political action were prompted by the 45 findings of scientific reports, mainly the IPCC (2018a) and IPBES (2019) reports. On the other hand, these 46 movements have increased public awareness, and also stimulated public engagement with climate change at 47 unprecedented levels. 48 49 [END FAQ18.3 HERE] 50 51 52 [START FAQ18.4 HERE] 53 54 FAQ18.4: What role do transitions and transformations in energy, urban and infrastructure, 55 industrial, land and ocean ecosystems, and in society, play in climate resilient development? 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-108 Total pages: 197 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 18 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 The IPCC 1.5 report identified transitions and transformations in key systems, such as energy, land, and 2 ocean ecosystems, and urban and infrastructure, that are needed for a climate resilient development. A 3 system transitions focus helps visualize the interdependence between each system as well as how sustainable 4 development, mitigation, and adaptation interact. A societal transformation, in terms of values and 5 worldviews that shape aspirations, lifestyles and consumption patterns, is a constraining/enabling condition 6 for such transformations. This report however identifies societal transformation as one of the five major 7 transformations currently underway. It delves into the implications of this on how we assess options, value 8 different outcomes from the perspectives of ethics, equity, justice and inclusion. 9 10 [END FAQ18.4 HERE] 11 12 13 [START FAQ18.5 HERE] 14 15 FAQ18.5: What are success criteria in climate resilient development and how can actors satisfy those 16 criteria? 17 18 Climate resilient development is not a predefined goal to be achieved at a certain point or stage in the future. 19 It is a constant process of evaluating, valuing, acting and adjusting various options for mitigation, adaptation 20 and sustainable development, shaped by societal values as well as contestations of these. Any achievement 21 or success is always a work in progress, with continuous, directed, intentional actions. These actions will 22 vary according to the priorities and needs of each population or system; therefore, specific indicators will 23 vary according to each specific context, ensuring we prioritize people, planet, prosperity, peace, and 24 partnership, per the broad goals of the Agenda 2030 on sustainable development. 25 26 If Climate Resilient Development is defined as the development that deliberately adopts mitigation and 27 adaptation measures to secure a safe climate, meet basic needs, eliminate poverty and enable equitable, just 28 and sustainable development, then, the 17 United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) provide 29 a good (although limited) measure of progress. They aim at ending poverty and hunger globally and protect 30 life on land and under water until the year 2030. Although there are proven synergies between the SDGs and 31 mitigation, there remains to explore clear synergies between the SDGs and adaptation in terms of how 32 adaptation relates to the fulfilment of the SDGs. 33 34 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 18-109 Total pages: 197