FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
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2 Chapter 4: Water
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4 Coordinating Lead Authors: Martina Angela Caretta (Sweden), Aditi Mukherji (India)
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6 Lead Authors: Md Arfanuzzaman (Bangladesh), Richard A. Betts (United Kingdom), Alexander Gelfan
7 (Russian Federation), Yukiko Hirabayashi (Japan), Tabea Katharina Lissner (Germany), Elena Lopez Gunn
8 (Spain), Junguo Liu (China), Ruth Morgan (Australia), Sixbert Mwanga (Tanzania), Seree Supratid
9 (Thailand)
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11 Contributing Authors: Malcolm Araos (Canada/USA), Soumya Balasubramanya (Sri Lanka/India),
12 Angelica Katharina Casparina Brackel (The Netherlands), John Caesar (United Kingdom), Holly B.
13 Caggiano (USA), Benjamin Cook (USA), Constantino Dockendorff (Germany/Chile), Calynn Dowler
14 (USA), Robert Dunn (UK/Germany), Lina Elisabeth Erika Eklund (Sweden), Zhang Fan (China), Valeria
15 Fanghella (Italy), Colin M. Finlayson (Australia), Sabine Fuss (Germany), Animesh Kumar Gain
16 (Italy/Bangladesh), Freya Garry (United Kingdom), Laila Gohar (United Kingdom), Valentin Golosov
17 (Russian Federation), Sharlene Liane Gomes (The Netherlands/Canada), Benjamin Jerome Gray (USA),
18 Lukas Gudmundsson (Switzerland/Germany/Iceland), Tania Guillen Bolaneos (Germany/Nicaragua), Kate
19 Halladay (United Kingdom), Ed Hawkins (United Kingdom), Greeshma Hegde (India), Masoud Irannezhad
20 (China/Iran), Bj鴕n Kl鴙e (Finland/Norway), Aristeidis G. Koutroulis (Greece), Manish Kumar (India),
21 Jonathan Lautze (South Africa/USA), Deborah Ley (Mexico/Guatemala), Ashwina Mahanti (India),
22 Ganquan Mao (China), Deborah McGregor (Canada), Mamta Mehar (India), Megan Mills-Novoa (USA),
23 Tessa M鰈ler (Germany/Luxemburg), Sanchari Mukhopadhyay (India), Tero Mustonen (Finland),
24 Lakshmikantha N R (India), Gustavo Naumann (Italy/Argentina/Germany), Prajjwal Kumar Panday
25 (USA/Nepal), Vishnu Prasad Pandey (Nepal), Jagadish Parajuli (USA/Nepal), Assela Pathirana
26 (Netherlands/Sri Lanka), Ritu Priya (India), B. Uday Bhaskar Reddy (India), Ekaterina Rets (Russian
27 Federation), Rodrigo Fernandez Reynosa (USA/Guatemala), Pamela Rittelmeyer (USA), Conrado M.
28 Rudorff (Brazil), Orie Sasaki (Japan), Corinne Schuster Wallace (Canada/Wales), Christopher A. Scott
29 (USA), Cydney Kate Seigerman (USA), Sonali Senaratna Sellamuttu (Myanmar/Sri Lanka), Rinan Shah
30 (India), Mohammad Shamsudduha (United Kingdom/Bangladesh), Gitta Shrestha (Nepal), Afreen Siddiqui
31 (USA/Pakistan), Balsher Singh Sidhu (Canada/India), Aprajita Singh (USA/India), Anna Sinisalo
32 (Norway/Finland), Francesca Spagnuolo (Italy), Jaishri Srinivasan (USA/India), Makere Stewart-Harawira
33 (Canada/New Zealand), Debra Tan (Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region, China/Malaysia), Masahiro
34 Tanoue (Japan), Brock Ternes (USA), William Rigoberto Delgado Thompson (USA/United
35 Kingdom/Mexico), Peter Uhe (United Kingdom/Australia), Astrid Ulloa (Colombia), Nicole van Maanen
36 (Germany/The Netherlands), Shuchi Vora (India), Yashoda Yashoda (India)
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39 Review Editors: Blanca Elena Jimenez Cisneros (France/Mexico), Zbigniew Kundzewicz (Poland)
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41 Chapter Scientists: Vishnu Prasad Pandey (Nepal), Rodrigo Fernandez Reynosa (USA/Guatemala)
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43 Date of Draft: 1 October 2021
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45 Notes: TSU Compiled Version
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47
48 Table of Contents
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50 Executive Summary..........................................................................................................................................4
51 4.1 Centrality of Water Security in Climate Change and Climate Resilient Development.....................8
52 Box 4.1: Implications of Climate Change for Water Scarcity and Water Insecurity ..............................10
53 4.1.1 Points of Departure and Advancements since AR5 ......................................................................14
54 4.1.2 Climatic and Non-Climatic Drivers of Changes in the Water Cycle............................................15
55 4.2 Observed Changes in Hydrological Cycle due to Climate Change....................................................16
56 4.2.1 Observed Changes in Precipitation, Evapotranspiration and Soil Moisture ..............................17
57 4.2.2 Observed Changes in Cryosphere (Snow, Glaciers, and Permafrost) .........................................22
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1 4.2.3 Observed Changes in Streamflow.................................................................................................25
2 4.2.4 Observed Changes in Floods ........................................................................................................27
3 4.2.5 Observed Changes in Droughts ....................................................................................................32
4 4.2.6 Observed Changes in Groundwater..............................................................................................37
5 4.2.7 Observed Changes in Water Quality ............................................................................................39
6 4.2.8 Observed Changes in Soil Erosion and Sediment Load ...............................................................40
7 4.3 Observed Sectoral Impacts of Current Hydrological Changes..........................................................41
8 4.3.1 Observed Impacts on Agriculture .................................................................................................41
9 4.3.2 Observed Impacts on Energy and Industrial Water Use ..............................................................43
10 4.3.3 Observed Impacts on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) ....................................................44
11 4.3.4 Observed Impacts on Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors..................................................................45
12 Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER: Disasters as the Public Face of Climate Change..................................46
13 4.3.5 Observed Impacts on Freshwater Ecosystems..............................................................................51
14 4.3.6 Observed Impacts on Water-related Conflicts..............................................................................53
15 4.3.7 Observed Impacts on Human Mobility and Migration .................................................................54
16 4.3.8 Observed Impacts on the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
17 Traditional Peoples...............................................................................................................54
18 4.4 Projected Changes in Hydrological Cycle due to Climate Change....................................................58
19 4.4.1 Projected Changes in Precipitation, Evapotranspiration, and Soil Moisture..............................58
20 4.4.2 Projected Changes in Cryosphere (Snow, Glaciers, and Permafrost) .........................................65
21 4.4.3 Projected Changes in Streamflow.................................................................................................66
22 4.4.4 Projected Changes in Floods........................................................................................................69
23 4.4.5 Projected Changes in Droughts....................................................................................................72
24 4.4.6 Projected Changes in Groundwater .............................................................................................74
25 4.4.7 Projected Changes in Water Quality ............................................................................................76
26 4.4.8 Projected Changes in Soil Erosion and Sediment Load ...............................................................77
27 4.5 Projected Sectoral Water-related Risks ...............................................................................................77
28 4.5.1 Projected Risks to Agriculture ......................................................................................................78
29 4.5.2 Projected Risks to Energy and Industrial Water Use ...................................................................80
30 4.5.3 Projected Risks to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) .........................................................82
31 4.5.4 Projected Risks to Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors.......................................................................83
32 4.5.5 Projected Risks to Freshwater Ecosystems...................................................................................84
33 4.5.6 Projected Risks to Water-related Conflicts...................................................................................85
34 4.5.7 Projected Risks to Human Mobility and Migration......................................................................86
35 4.5.8 Projected Risks to the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
36 Traditional Peoples...............................................................................................................86
37 4.6 Key Risks and Adaptation Responses in Various Water Use Sectors ...............................................90
38 4.6.1 Key Risks Related to Water...........................................................................................................90
39 Box 4.2: Observed Risks, Projected Impacts and Adaptation Responses to Water Security in Small
40 Island States ............................................................................................................................................92
41 4.6.2 Adaptation in the Agricultural Sector...........................................................................................93
42 Box 4.3: Irrigation as an Adaptation Response ...........................................................................................95
43 4.6.3 Adaptation in Energy and Industrial Sectors................................................................................97
44 4.6.4 Adaptation in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) Sector .....................................................97
45 Box 4.4: COVID-19 Amplifies Challenges for WaSH Adaptation.............................................................99
46 4.6.5 Adaptation in Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors..............................................................................99
47 Box 4.5: Reduce, Remove, Re-use and Recycle (4Rs): Wastewater Re-use and Desalination as an
48 Adaptation Response............................................................................................................................101
49 4.6.6 Adaptation for Communities Dependant on Freshwater Ecosystems.........................................102
50 Box 4.6: Nature Based Solutions for Water-related Adaptation..............................................................103
51 4.6.7 Adaptation Responses for Water-related Conflicts.....................................................................104
52 4.6.8 Adaptations Through Human Mobility and Migration...............................................................104
53 4.6.9 Adaptation of the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
54 Traditional Peoples.............................................................................................................105
55 Box 4.7: Flood-related Adaptation Responses ...........................................................................................106
56 4.7 Benefits and Effectiveness of Water-Related Adaptations, Their Limits and Trade-offs .............107
57 4.7.1 Current Water-related Adaptation Responses, Benefits, Co-benefits and Maladaptation.........108
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1 4.7.2 Projections of Future Effectiveness of Adaptation Responses....................................................119
2 4.7.3 Comparing Current and Future Water-related Adaptation Responses ......................................123
3 4.7.4 Limits to Adaptation and Loss and Damage...............................................................................125
4 4.7.5 Costs of Adaptation and Losses due to Non-Adaptation ............................................................129
5 4.7.6 Trade-offs and Synergies between Water-related Adaptation and Mitigation ...........................130
6 Box 4.8: Water-Energy-Food (WEF) Nexus Approaches for Managing Synergies and Trade-offs.....132
7 4.8 Enabling Principles for Achieving Water Security, Sustainable and Climate Resilient
8 Development Through Systems Transformations.............................................................................133
9 4.8.1 Appropriate Technologies...........................................................................................................133
10 4.8.2 Adequate and Appropriate Financing ........................................................................................134
11 4.8.3 Gender, Equity and Social Justice ..............................................................................................135
12 4.8.4 Inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge........................................................136
13 4.8.5 Participative, Cooperative and Bottom-up Engagement ............................................................137
14 4.8.6 Polycentric Water Governance...................................................................................................138
15 4.8.7 Strong Political Support .............................................................................................................139
16 FAQ4.1: What is water security, and how will climate change affect it?................................................139
17 FAQ4.2: Which places are becoming wetter and which are becoming drier, and what risks do these
18 bring to people? ....................................................................................................................................140
19 FAQ4.3: How will climate change impact the severity of water-related disasters, such as droughts and
20 floods? .................................................................................................................................................... 142
21 FAQ4.4: Globally, agriculture is the largest user of water. How will climate change impact this sector,
22 and how can farmers adapt to these changes?...................................................................................144
23 FAQ4.5: Which principles can communities implement to sustainably adapt to the ways that climate
24 change is impacting their water security?..........................................................................................146
25 References......................................................................................................................................................148
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 Executive Summary
2
3 This chapter assesses observed and projected climate-induced changes in the water cycle, their current
4 impacts and future risks on human and natural systems and the benefits and effectiveness of water-related
5 adaptation efforts now and in the future.
6
7 Currently, ~4 billion out of 7.8 billion people are estimated to experience severe water scarcity for at least
8 one month per year due to climatic and non-climatic factors (medium confidence1). Since the 1970s, 44% of
9 all disaster events have been flood-related. Not surprisingly, a large share of adaptation interventions (~60%)
10 is forged in response to water-related hazards (high confidence). {4.1, Box 4.1, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.2, 4.2.4,
11 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.3.8, 4.6, 4.7}
12
13 Intensification of the hydrological cycle due to human-induced climate change is affecting physical
14 aspects of water security (high confidence), thereby exacerbating existing water-related vulnerabilities
15 caused by other socioeconomic factors. {4.2, 4.2.1.1, 4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3, 4.2.2, 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 4.2.6, 4.3}
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17 Nearly half a billion people live in unfamiliarly wet areas, where the long-term average precipitation is as
18 high as previously seen in only about one in six years (medium confidence). Approximately 163 million
19 people live in unfamiliarly dry areas now (medium confidence). {4.2.1.1}
20
21 The intensity of heavy precipitation has increased in many regions since the 1950s (high confidence).
22 Substantially more people (~709 million) live in regions where annual maximum one-day precipitation has
23 increased than regions where it has decreased (~86 million) (medium confidence). At the same time, more
24 people (~700 million) are also experiencing longer dry spells than shorter dry spells since the 1950s (medium
25 confidence). {4.2.1.1}
26
27 During the last two decades, the global glacier mass loss rate exceeded 0.5 meters water equivalent year-1
28 (high confidence), impacting humans and ecosystems, including cultural uses of water among vulnerable
29 high mountain and polar communities (high confidence). {4.2.2, 4.3.8}
30
31 There is a clear trend of increases in streamflow in the northern higher latitudes (high confidence), with
32 climatic factors being more important than direct human influence in a larger share of major global basins
33 (medium confidence). At the same time, groundwater in aquifers across the tropics has experienced enhanced
34 episodic recharge from intense precipitation and flooding events (medium confidence), with implications for
35 sectoral water use. {4.2.3, 4.2.6, 4.3.1, 4.3.4}
36
37 Extreme weather events causing highly impactful floods and droughts have become more likely and
38 (or) more severe due to anthropogenic climate change (high confidence). {4.2.4, 4.2.5, Cross-Chapter
39 Box DISASTER in Chapter 4}
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41 Anthropogenic climate change has contributed to the increased likelihood and severity of the impact of
42 droughts (especially agricultural and hydrological droughts) in many regions (high confidence). Between
43 1970 to 2019, 7% of all disaster events worldwide were drought-related. Yet, they contributed to 34% of
44 disaster-related deaths, mostly in Africa. {4.2.5, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER in Chapter 4}
45
46 Several recent heavy rainfall events, such as in western Europe, China, Japan, the United States, Peru, Brazil
47 and Australia that led to substantial flooding, were made more likely by anthropogenic climate change (high
48 confidence). There is high confidence that the warming in the last 40-60 years has led to ~10 days earlier
49 spring floods per decade. Between 1970 to 2019, 31% of all economic losses were flood-related. {4.2.4,
50 Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER in Chapter 4}
51
1 In this Report, the following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, medium, or robust;
and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very
low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and
agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increasing levels of evidence and degrees of
agreement are correlated with increasing confidence.
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1 There is increasing evidence of observed changes in hydrological cycle on people and ecosystems. A
2 significant share of those impacts is negative and felt disproportionately by already vulnerable
3 communities (high confidence). {4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5,4.3.6, 4.3.8}
4
5 Agriculture and energy production have been impacted by changes in the hydrological cycle (high
6 confidence). Between 1983 and 2009, approximately three-quarters of the global harvested areas (~454
7 million hectares) experienced yield losses induced by meteorological drought, with the cumulative
8 production losses corresponding to the US $166 billion. There is medium confidence that current global
9 thermoelectric and hydropower production has been negatively affected due to droughts with ~4 to 5%
10 reduction in plant utilization rates during drought years compared to long-term average values since the
11 1980s. {4.3.1, 4.3.2}
12
13 Climate change and changes in land use and water pollution are key drivers of loss and degradation of
14 freshwater ecosystems (high confidence), with impacts observed on culturally significant terrestrial and
15 freshwater species and ecosystems in the Arctic, high mountain areas (high confidence). In addition,
16 precipitation and extreme weather events are linked to increased incidence and outbreaks of water-related
17 diseases (high confidence). {4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.5, 4.3.8}
18
19 Changes in water-related hazards disproportionately impact vulnerable populations such as the poor, women,
20 children, Indigenous Peoples, and the elderly in all locations, especially in the Global South, due to systemic
21 inequities stemming from historical, socioeconomic and political marginalization (medium confidence).
22 {4.3.1, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.3.8}
23
24 Water-related risks are projected to increase with every degree of global warming (high confidence),
25 and more vulnerable and exposed regions and peoples are projected to face greater risks (medium
26 confidence). {Box 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.1.1, 4.4.4, 4.5.4, 4.5.5, 4.5.6, Box 4.2}
27
28 Climate change impacts via water availability changes are projected to increase with every degree of global
29 warming (high confidence), but there are high regional uncertainties. Between 3 to 4 billion people are
30 projected to be exposed to physical water scarcity at 2癈 and 4癈 global warming levels (GWL),
31 respectively (medium confidence). {Box.4.1; 4.4.1, 4.4.3, 4.4.5, 4.6.1}
32
33 By 2100, 1/3rd of the 56 large-scale glacierized catchments are projected to experience a mean annual run-off
34 decline by over 10%, with the most significant reductions in Central Asia and Andes (medium confidence).
35 Expected impacts may be felt by roughly 1.5 billion people who are projected to critically depend on run-off
36 from the mountains by the mid-21st century (RCP6.0 scenario). {4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.5.8}
37
38 By 2050, environmentally critical streamflow is projected to be affected in 42% to 79% of the world's
39 watersheds, causing negative impacts on freshwater ecosystems (medium confidence). Modified streamflow
40 is also projected to affect inflows to urban storage reservoirs and increase the vulnerability of urban water
41 services to hydro-meteorological extremes, particularly in less developed countries (high confidence). {4.4.6,
42 4.5.4, 4.4.5}
43
44 Future water-related impacts of climate change on various sectors of the economy are projected to lower
45 global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (ranging from 0.49% of GDP by mid-century (SSP3) to less than
46 0.1% (RCP8.5, SSP5), with higher projected losses expected in low-and middle-income countries (medium
47 confidence). {4.7.5}
48
49 Drought and flood risks and societal damages are projected to increase with every degree of global
50 warming (medium confidence). {4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.4.7, 4.5.1, 4.5.2}
51
52 Drought risks are projected to increase over the 21st century in many regions (very high confidence),
53 increasing economy-wide risks (high confidence). With RCP6.0 and SSP2, the global population exposed to
54 extreme-to-exceptional total water storage drought is projected to increase from 3% to 8% over the 21st
55 century (medium confidence). {4.4.5}
56
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1 The projected increase in precipitation intensity (high confidence) will increase rain-generated local flooding
2 (medium confidence). Direct flood damages are projected to increase by 4 to 5 times at 4癈 compared to
3 1.5癈 (medium confidence). {Box 4.1, 4.4.1, 4.4.1.1, 4.4.4, 4.5.4, 4.5.5}
4
5 At 4癈 global warming by the end of the century, approximately 10% of the global land area is projected to
6 face simultaneously increasing high extreme streamflow and decreasing low extreme streamflow, affecting
7 roughly over 2.1 billion people (medium confidence). {4.4.3}. The increase in extreme events is projected to
8 compromise the efficacy of WaSH services and slow progress towards reductions in WaSH-related disease
9 burdens (medium confidence). {4.5.3}
10
11 Limiting global warming to 1.5癈 would reduce water-related risks across regions and sectors (high
12 confidence). {4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4, 4.5.6, 4.5.7, 4.6.1, 4.7.2}
13
14 Projected increases in hydrological extremes pose increasing risks, with a potential doubling of flood risk
15 between 1.5癈 and 3癈 of warming and an estimated 120% to 400% increase in population at risk of river
16 flooding at 2癈 and 4癈, respectively. Projected losses include a 1.2 to 1.8-fold increase in GDP loss due to
17 flooding between 1.5癈 and 2癈 warming (medium confidence). {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.5.6, 4.6.1, 4.7.2}
18
19 Over large areas of northern South America, the Mediterranean, western China and high latitudes in North
20 America and Eurasia, extreme agricultural drought are projected to be at least twice as likely at 1.5癈 global
21 warming, 150 to 200% more likely at 2癈 warming, and over 200% at 4癈 (medium confidence). Due to the
22 combined effects of water and temperature changes, risks to agricultural yields could be three times higher at
23 3癈 compared to 2癈 (medium confidence). {4.5.1, 4.6.1}
24
25 In Mediterranean parts of Europe, hydropower potential reductions of up to 40% are projected under 3癈
26 warming, while declines below 10% and 5% are projected under 2癈 and 1.5癈 warming levels,
27 respectively.
28
29 Climate-induced hydrological changes are projected to increase migration in the last half of the century, with
30 an almost 7-fold increase in asylum seekers to the EU for RP4.5 compared to RCP2.6. The number of
31 internally displaced people in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America increased almost 5 times
32 for RCP 8.5 compared to RCP2.6 (low confidence). {4.5.7}
33
34 Observed water adaptation responses have multiple benefits (high confidence), yet evidence of
35 effectiveness of adaptation in reducing climate risks is not clear due to methodological challenges
36 (medium confidence). {4.6, 4.7.1, 4.7.3}
37
38 A large share of adaptation interventions (~60%) are shaped in response to water-related hazards (high
39 confidence) and involve water interventions (irrigation, rainwater harvesting, soil moisture conservation).
40 Adaptation responses in developing countries tend to be autonomous, incremental and focused on managing
41 water-related risks in agriculture. In contrast, responses are more policy-oriented and urban-focused in
42 developed countries (high confidence). {4.6.2, box 4.3, 4.6.5, 4.7.1, 4.7.2}
43
44 Irrigation helps stabilise and increase crop yields and is often a preferred strategy for farmers and
45 policymakers for risk reduction, but irrigation is also associated with a range of adverse outcomes, including
46 groundwater over-extraction (medium confidence). In addition, large-scale irrigation also affects local to
47 regional climates, both in terms of temperature and precipitation change (high confidence) {4.2.6, 4.6.2, Box.
48 4.2}.
49
50 Water adaptation measures tend to have positive economic and environmental outcomes in developing and
51 developed countries, respectively (high confidence). Roughly 1/3rd and 1/4th of case studies on water
52 adaptation also documents maladaptation and co-benefits, respectively (high confidence). A significant
53 knowledge gap remains in knowing if observed adaptation benefits also translate to climate risk reduction, if
54 so, by how much and under what conditions (medium confidence). {4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.7.4}
55
56
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1 Future projected adaptations are effective in reducing risks to a varying extent (medium confidence),
2 but effectiveness falls sharply beyond 2癈, underscoring the need for limiting warming to 1.5癈 (high
3 confidence). {4.6, 4.7.2, 4.7.3}
4
5 Adaptations that are beneficial now (e.g., crop and water-related ones) are also projected to effectively
6 reduce specific future risks to a moderate to a large extent (medium confidence). However, residual impacts
7 remain for some options and regions at all levels of warming, and the overall effectiveness decreases at
8 higher warming levels (high confidence), further underscoring the need for limiting warming to 1.5癈. {Box
9 4.2, 4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.7.3, 4.7.4}
10
11 At warming levels beyond 1.5癈, the potential to reach biophysical limits to adaptation due to limited water
12 resources are reported for Small Islands (medium confidence) and regions dependent on glaciers and
13 snowmelt (medium confidence). {4.7.4}
14
15 Water security is critical for meeting Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and systems transitions
16 needed for climate-resilient development, yet many mitigation measures have high water footprint
17 which can compromise SDGs and adaptation outcomes (high confidence). {4.1, Box 4.4, 4.6, 4.6.2,
18 4.6.3, 4.7, 4.7.1, 4.7.4, 4.7.5.7}
19
20 Water features prominently in Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans
21 of most countries. SDGs cannot be met without adequate and safe water (high confidence), and water is
22 fundamental to all systems transition (high confidence). {4.1, 4.7, 4.7.1, 4.8, 4.8.7}
23
24 Water garners a significant share of public and private adaptation funds (high confidence). However, barriers
25 remain for low-income countries to access funds (medium confidence), and there is insufficient evidence on
26 benefits for marginalized groups (medium confidence). {4.8.2}
27
28 Many mitigation measures, such as carbon capture and storage, bio-energy, and afforestation and
29 reforestation, can have a high-water footprint (high confidence). The water intensity of mitigation must be
30 managed in socially and politically acceptable ways to increase synergies with SDGs, improve water
31 security, and reduce trade-offs with adaptation (medium confidence). {4.7.6}
32
33 A common set of enabling principles underpinned by strong political support can help meet the triple
34 goals of water security, sustainable and climate-resilient development (high confidence) {4.8, 4.8.3,
35 4.8.4. 4.8.5, 4.8.6, 4.8.7
36
37 Many countries and social groups most threatened by climate change have contributed the least to the
38 problem and do not have the adequate resources to adapt (high confidence). Water adaptation policies
39 enabled through ethical co-production between holders of Indigenous Knowledge, local knowledge and
40 technical knowledge (medium confidence); through cooperation and coordinated actions among multiple
41 actors, including women and all marginalized groups, at various levels of governance (medium confidence) is
42 needed for effective transitions towards Climate Resilient Development. {4.8, 4.8.3,4.8.4, 4.8.5, 4.8.6}
43
44
45
46
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1 4.1 Centrality of Water Security in Climate Change and Climate Resilient Development
2
3 Water security is defined as "the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate
4 quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-being, and socio-economic
5 development, for ensuring protection against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for
6 preserving ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability" (Grey and Sadoff (2007)). Risks
7 emanating from various aspects of water insecurity have emerged as a significant global challenge. The
8 Global Risks Report by the World Economic Forum lists water crisis as one of the top five risks in all its
9 reports since 2015 (WEF, 2015; WEF, 2016; WEF, 2017; WEF, 2018; WEF, 2019; WEF, 2020). Water also
10 features prominently in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (4.8) and plays a central role in various
11 systems transitions needed for climate-resilient development. Most SDGs cannot be met without access to
12 adequate and safe water (Ait-Kadi, 2016; Mugagga, 2016}. In addition, without adequate adaptation, future
13 water-related impacts of climate change on various sectors of the economy are projected to lower global
14 gross domestic product (GDP) by mid-century, with higher projected losses expected in low-and middle-
15 income countries (World Bank, 2017; GCA, 2019).
16
17 There are at least four reasons for the centrality of water security in adapting to, and mitigating climate
18 change.
19
20 First, approximately half the world's population (~4 billion out of 7.8 billion people) are assessed as being
21 currently subject to severe water scarcity for at least one month per year (medium confidence) due to climatic
22 and non-climate factors (Box 4.1). Water insecurity arises from many factors, both environmental and
23 societal. Environmental factors include too little freshwater due to drought or pollution, and too much water,
24 due to extreme precipitation and flooding, and are being affected by climate change. Societal factors include
25 economic and governance-related barriers to water access or protection from water-related damages.
26 Currently, many people are experiencing climate change on a day to day basis through water-related impacts
27 such as the increased frequency and intensity of heavy precipitation (high confidence) (4.2.1.1, WGI 11.4.2);
28 accelerated melting of glaciers (high confidence) (4.2.2, WGI 8.3.1); changes in frequency, magnitude and
29 timing of floods (high confidence) (4.2.4, WGI 11.5.2); more frequent and severe droughts in some places
30 (high confidence) (4.2.5, WGI 11.6.2); decline in groundwater storage and reduction in recharge (medium
31 confidence) (4.2.6, WGI 8.3.1) and water quality deterioration due to extreme events (medium confidence)
32 (4.2.7). For example, since the 1970s, 44% of all disaster events have been flood-related (WMO, 2020).
33 With the added stressor of climate change, globally, a larger fraction of land and population are projected to
34 face increased water scarcity due to climate change. For example, at approximately 2癈 global warming
35 level (GWL), between 0.9 and 3.9 billion people are projected to be at increased exposure to water stress,
36 depending on regional patterns of climate change and the socio-economic scenarios considered (Koutroulis
37 et al., 2019).
38
39 Second, while climate change directly affects freshwater availability across space and time, it also affects
40 water requirements for different uses, such as irrigation, potentially adding to existing societal challenges
41 (Bijl et al., 2018). Vulnerability to water-related impacts of climate change and extreme weather are already
42 felt in all major sectors and are projected to intensify in the future, e.g., in agriculture (high confidence)
43 (4.3.1, 4.5.1); energy and industry (high confidence for observed drought impacts and projected impacts)
44 (4.3.2, 4.5.2); water for health and sanitation (high confidence about links to precipitation extremes and
45 disease outbreaks) (4.3.3, 4.5.3); water for urban, peri-urban and municipal sectors (medium confidence)
46 (4.3.4, 4.5.4) and freshwater ecosystems (high confidence in climate change as a driver in degradation of
47 freshwater ecosystems) (4.3.5, 4.5.5). Agriculture and irrigation account for the most significant proportion
48 of consumptive water use and accounts for 60-70% of total water withdrawals (Hanasaki et al., 2018; Burke
49 et al., 2020; M黮ler Schmied et al., 2021). Globally, 10% of the most water-stressed basins account for 35%
50 of global irrigated calorie production (Qin et al., 2019), and food production is at risk in those basins, and
51 worldwide due to changes in hydrological components of climate change. Lack of access to clean water and
52 sanitation has been one of the leading causes of water-borne diseases. In 2017, approximately 2.2 billion
53 people lacked access to safe drinking water, and roughly 4.2 billion people could not access safe sanitation
54 (WHO and UNICEF, 2019). Inequities in access to safe water are being amplified during the current
55 COVID-19 pandemic (Box 4. 5 and Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7). The same 10% of most water-
56 stressed basins also account for 19% of global thermal electricity generation (Qin et al., 2019), and globally,
57 both production of hydropower and thermal power has been negatively affected by droughts and other
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1 extreme events. Globally, between 16% and 39% of cities experienced surface-water deficits between 1971-
2 2000. If environmental flow requirements (EFRs) are accounted for, these numbers increase to 36% and
3 63%, respectively. Even under a scenario where urban water gets the highest priority, more than 440.5
4 million people in cities globally are projected to face a water deficit by 2050 (Fl鰎ke et al., 2018). The
5 situation is particularly precarious in the Global South, where most of the population lacks access to piped
6 water (WRI, 2019).
7
8 Third, a large majority (~60%) of all adaptation responses documented since 2014 are about adapting to
9 water-related hazards like droughts, floods and rainfall variability (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021b) (high
10 confidence). Water-related adaptation action features prominently in nationally determined contributions
11 (NDC) pledges by a large majority of countries in both Global North and Global South (GWP, 2018). These
12 adaptation responses and their current benefits and effectiveness in reducing water-related risks in the future
13 are systematically assessed in this chapter (4.6, 4.7.1, 4.7.2 and 4.7.3). These adaptation measures aim to
14 reduce impacts of water-related hazards through responses such as irrigation, water and soil moisture
15 conservation, rainwater harvesting, changes in crops and cultivars, improved agronomic practices, among
16 others (4.6.2; 4.7.1). Only ~20% of all documented case studies on observed water-related adaptations
17 measure outcomes (positive or negative), but the link between positive outcomes and climate risk reduction
18 is unclear and remains challenging to assess (4.7.1) (medium confidence). On the other hand, most of the
19 future projected water-related adaptations are effective at lower global warming levels (GWLs) (1.5癈) than
20 at higher GWLs showing the importance of mitigation for future adaptations to remain effective (high
21 confidence).
22
23 Finally, while limiting global warming to 1.5癈 would minimize the increase in risks in the various water
24 use sectors and keep adaptation effective, many mitigation measures can potentially impact future water
25 security. For example, bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) and afforestation and
26 reforestation can have a considerable water footprint if done at inappropriate locations (4.7.6, see also
27 Canadell et al. (2021)). Therefore, minimizing the risks to water security from climate change will require a
28 full-systems view that considers the direct impacts of mitigation measures on water resources and their
29 indirect effect via limiting climate change (high confidence).
30
31 This chapter draws on previous IPCC reports and new methodologies (4.1.1 and SM4.1, SM4.2) and assesses
32 the impacts of climate change on natural and human dimensions of the water cycle with a particular focus on
33 water-related vulnerabilities and adaptation responses (Figure 4.1). Section 4.2 assesses observed changes in
34 the hydrological cycle, and Section 4.3 focuses on their societal impacts and detects which parts of these
35 changes are directly attributable to climate change. Section 4.4 assesses projected risks of changes in the
36 hydrological cycle on various components of the hydrological cycle, and Section 4.5 assesses the same for
37 sectoral risks. Projections and risks assessments for future impacts are framed in terms of GWLs and time
38 horizons, as these are useful for informing mitigation policy under the Paris Agreement and informing
39 adaptation planning. Sections 4.6 and 4.7 assesses current and future water-related adaptation responses in
40 reducing climate and associated impacts and risks and looks at limits to adaptations, especially in a future
41 warmer world. Finally, Section 4.8 outlines the enabling principles for meeting water security, sustainable
42 development goals and climate-resilient development.
43
44
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1
2 Figure 4.1: Chapter structure.
3
4
5 [START BOX 4.1 HERE]
6
7 Box 4.1: Implications of Climate Change for Water Scarcity and Water Insecurity
8
9 Water scarcity and water insecurity are related concepts but not identical, and each has a range of
10 interpretations leading to some overlap. Water scarcity can be broadly described as a mismatch between the
11 demand for fresh water and its availability, quantified in physical terms. Water security/insecurity is a
12 broader concept with definitions beyond physical water scarcity, encompassing access to water services,
13 safety from poor water quality and flooding, and appropriate water governance that ensures access to safe
14 water (Sadoff et al., 2020). Metrics of water security include both physical and socio-economic components
15 and are a tool for comparison between different locations and countries regarding relative levels of water
16 security in the context of water-related risks. Some definitions of water scarcity also incorporate these
17 broader issues. For example, `economic water scarcity' has been defined as a situation where "human,
18 institutional, and financial capital limit access to water, even though water in nature is available locally to
19 meet human demands" (Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, 2007). Economic
20 water scarcity can also occur where infrastructure exists, but water distribution is inequitable (Jaeger et al.,
21 2017). Much of the literature exploring the impacts of climate change on water security, however, focuses on
22 quantifying physical water scarcity. Discussions in this box consider physical water scarcity as a quantifiable
23 measure of water availability compared to its demand and consider the societal elements of economic water
24 scarcity to be part of the more comprehensive concept of water insecurity.
25
26 Physical water scarcity
27
28 Definitions of water scarcity have evolved to take account of a broader set of factors. For example, physical
29 water scarcity indicates that an insufficient quantity of water is available to meet requirements. A commonly-
30 used measure of physical water scarcity is the Falkenmark index which measures the amount of renewable
31 freshwater available per capita (Falkenmark et al., 1989; White et al., 2014). However, the Falkenmark index
32 is now regarded as an incomplete measure, as it does not account for water needed for non-human needs (as
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1 quantified with Environmental Flow Requirements, EFRs). Therefore, EFRs have begun to be incorporated
2 in recent water scarcity assessments (Liu et al., 2016; Liu et al., 2017b). Quality-induced water scarcity is an
3 additional factor beginning to be considered (Liu J. and D., 2020).
4
5 Using a Water Scarcity Index (WSI) defined as the ratio of demand and availability, accounting for EFRs, it
6 is estimated that 4 billion people live under conditions of severe water scarcity for at least one month per
7 year (Figure Box 4.1.1(a): (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016)). Nearly half of these people live in India and
8 China. Although regions with high water scarcity are already naturally dry (virtually certain2), human
9 influence on climate is leading to reduced water availability in many regions. It is very likely that global
10 patterns of soil moisture change are being driven by human influence on climate, and an overall global
11 decline in soil moisture is attributable to greenhouse forcing [4.2.1.3]. Climate-change patterns of
12 streamflow change include declines in western North America, north-east South America, the Mediterranean
13 and South Asia (medium confidence) [4.2.3]. However, quantification of the contribution of anthropogenic
14 climate change to current levels of water scarcity is not yet available.
15
16
17
18 Figure Box 4.1.1: Geographical distributions of current water scarcity and levels of challenge for policies addressing
19 future change. (a) The number of months per year with severe water scarcity (ratio of water demand to availability >
20 1.0). Reproduced from (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016). (b) Local levels of policy challenges for addressing water
21 scarcity by 2050, considering both the central estimate (median) and the change uncertainty in projections of a Water
22 Scarcity Index (WSI) from the present day to 2050 (Greve et al., 2018). Projections used five CMIP5 climate models,
23 three global hydrological models from ISIMIP, and three Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs). Levels of policy
24 challenges refer to the scale and nature of policies to address water scarcity and range from monitoring and reviewing
25 risks (`low') through transitional changes in water systems (`medium') to transformational changes (`high'). Low policy
26 challenges arise when the projected water scarcity in 2050 is lower (< 0.4), and the level of uncertainty remains
27 relatively stable in future projections. Medium policy challenge arises when either the central estimate of water scarcity
28 remains low, but uncertainty increases or the uncertainty is stable, but the central estimate of water scarcity for 2050 is
29 higher (>0.4). High policy challenges arise when the central estimate of water scarcity is higher and the uncertainty
30 increases. Grey areas show gridpoints defined as non-water scarce (75th quantile of the WSI < 0.1 at all times) or very
31 low average water demand. Hatched areas show countries with no data for at least one component. Reproduced from
32 (Greve et al., 2018).
33
2 In this Report, the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result:
Virtually certain 99�100% probability, Very likely 90�100%, Likely 66�100%, About as likely as not 33�66%,
Unlikely 0�33%, Very unlikely 0�10%, and Exceptionally unlikely 0�1%. Additional terms (Extremely likely: 95�
100%, More likely than not >50�100%, and Extremely unlikely 0�5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed
likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely). This Report also uses the term `likely range' to indicate that the assessed
likelihood of an outcome lies within the 17-83% probability range.
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1
2 Water demand is projected to change as a direct result of socio-economic changes. For example, the global
3 water demand for domestic, industrial and agricultural uses, presently about 4,600 km� per year, is projected
4 to increase by 20% to 30% by 2050 (Greve et al., 2018), depending on the socio-economic scenario.
5 Changes in water availability and demand have been projected in several studies using climate models and
6 socio-economic scenarios (e.g., (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014; Gosling and Arnell, 2016; Greve et al.,
7 2018; Koutroulis et al., 2019)). In such studies, the projected changes in water availability arise from
8 differences in precipitation (P) and evapotranspiration (ET). However, both P and ET are also subject to very
9 high uncertainty in key processes such as regional climate change patterns (Uhe et al., 2021) and the
10 influence of vegetation responses to elevated CO2 on transpiration (Betts et al., 2015).
11
12 Human factors are projected to be the dominant driver of future water scarcity on a global scale (Graham et
13 al., 2020a). However, at regional scales, high uncertainty in climate changes means that reduced water
14 availability is more likely than not in many major river basins and remains a risk in most basins even where
15 the central estimate is for increased water availability due to climate change (Figure 4.12). Such substantial
16 uncertainties in projected water scarcity are crucial factors causing water management policies and planning
17 challenges in the future. Therefore, locations projected to see significant increases in water scarcity with
18 large uncertainty can be considered to be subject to the highest challenges for water management policy
19 (Figure Box 4.1.1(b): (Greve et al., 2018)).
20
21 Water security and insecurity
22
23 Unlike physical water scarcity, water security or insecurity cannot be quantified in absolute terms. However,
24 relative levels of water security in different places can be compared using metrics representing critical
25 aspects of security (Gain et al., 2016; Young et al., 2019), ideally with thresholds for secure/insecure
26 compared with local experience to assess validity (Young et al., 2019).
27
28 (Gain et al., 2016) define a Global Water Security Index (GWSI) metric on a scale of 0 to 1 combining
29 indicators of relative levels of availability of freshwater, accessibility to water services, water management,
30 and water quality and safety (including flood risk, which can affect water quality as well as being a direct
31 physical hazard). Global application of this index indicates large worldwide differences in water security
32 arising from different combinations of reasons (Figure Box 4.1.2(a)). In North Africa, the Middle East, large
33 parts of the Indian Subcontinent and north China, low water security arises predominantly from low water
34 availability. However, many areas with relatively high-water availability have relatively low levels of water
35 security due to other factors. In 2015, 29% of the world's population did not have access to safe drinking
36 water (Ritchie and Roser, 2019). In large parts of South and South-East Asia, significant contributions to
37 water insecurity came from increased flood risk and deteriorated water quality (Burgess et al., 2010; Ward et
38 al., 2017; Farinosi et al., 2018). Water availability is relatively high across most of Africa, but water security
39 is relatively low due to low accessibility, management, and safety/quality standards. Most people in Africa
40 do not have access to safe drinking water and improved sanitation (Marson and Savin, 2015; Naik, 2017;
41 Armah et al., 2018).
42
43 In contrast, some high physical water scarcity areas, such as some parts of the USA, Australia, and Southern
44 Europe, show relatively high-water security levels due to good governance, safety and quality, and
45 accessibility. Nevertheless, marginalized groups such as Indigenous Peoples experience reduced access to
46 water even within regions in the Global North. For example, in both Canada and the US, many Indigenous
47 Peoples living on reserves lack access to piped water (Collins et al., 2017; Hanrahan, 2017; Marshall et al.,
48 2018) and (or) are on boil water advisories (Patrick et al., 2019). In Australia, 25-40% of Aboriginal people
49 live in remote rural areas with poor access to clean water (Bowles, 2015; NCCARF, 2018).
50
51
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1
2 Figure Box 4.1.2: Global Water Security Index (GWSI) and its components for the present day, and factors affecting
3 future change in water security. Low values (red) indicate the lowest levels of water security (a) Centre: a global map of
4 local values of GWSI, constructed from the following components with their subjectively-weighted contribution to the
5 combined metric indicated in brackets. Top left: relative availability of fresh water (45%), comprising a Water Scarcity
6 Index, Drought Index and the groundwater depletion rate. Top right: relative accessibility to water services (20%),
7 including drinking water and sanitation. Bottom left: relative water quality and safety (20%), including a water quality
8 index and flood frequency index. Bottom right: relative effectiveness of water management (15%), comprising a World
9 Governance index at country scale (itself representing six components: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and
10 Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of
11 Corruption) and indicators of transboundary legal frameworks and political tensions at a river basin scale. Data for the
12 components do not apply to the same set of dates but are generally applicable to recent decades up to 2010. For further
13 details, see (Gain et al., 2016). (b) Factors through which climate change or action on mitigation or adaptation could
14 influence water security.
15
16
17 The discrepancy between physical water scarcity and overall water insecurity is a function of socio-
18 economic vulnerabilities and governance gaps. Therefore, improving societal aspects of water management
19 will be key in adapting to climate change-driven increases in water scarcity in the future (high confidence).
20
21 Future water security will depend on the magnitude, rate and regional details of future climate change and
22 non-climatic factors, including agricultural practices, water demand, governance. In many cases, climate
23 change may not be the dominant factor affecting water security. Nevertheless, climate change poses clear
24 risks to water security in many regions through potential impacts on water availability, quality, and flooding.
25 The range of possible outcomes is extremely large, and assessing the likelihood of particular outcomes
26 depends on consideration of uncertain regional climate changes and uncertain socio-economic futures.
27 Uncertainty in future water scarcity projections makes climate change risks to water security and planning
28 for adaptation challenging. Limiting climate change to lower levels of global warming would reduce the
29 risks to water security arising from climate change, partly because uncertainties in regional climate change is
30 smaller at lower levels of warming.
31
32 In summary, approximately 4 billion people are assessed as currently subject to severe water scarcity for at
33 least one month per year due to climatic and non-climatic factors, and this is projected to exacerbate at
34 higher levels of warming (medium confidence). General water insecurity issues are seen worldwide,
35 particularly in South Asia, North China, Africa and the Middle East, due to high population densities often
36 coupled with low water availability, accessibility, quality, and governance (high confidence). Areas with
37 high water availability can also be water-insecure due to increased flood risk, deteriorated water quality, and
38 poor governance (high confidence). Future water security will depend on the evolution of all these socio-
39 economic and governance factors and future regional climate change (high confidence). The main climate
40 change contribution to water insecurity is the potential for reduced water availability, with a secondary
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1 contribution from increased flooding risk (medium confidence). Future socio-economic conditions are a
2 crucial driver of water insecurity, implying the need for further adaptation to some level of future climate
3 change (medium confidence). However, policy challenges are high in many regions, with uncertainty in the
4 regional climate outcomes being a key factor (high confidence).
5
6 [END BOX 4.1 HERE]
7
8
9 4.1.1 Points of Departure and Advancements since AR5
10
11 The Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) concluded that for each degree of global warming, approximately 7% of
12 the global population, under a scenario of moderate population growth, was projected to be exposed to a
13 decrease of renewable water resources of at least 20%. In addition, AR5 reported negative impacts on
14 streamflow volumes, its seasonality (specifically in cryospheric zones), a decline in raw water quality
15 (medium evidence, high agreement), and projected reduction in renewable surface water and groundwater in
16 most dry tropical regions. AR5 projected an increase in meteorological, agricultural and hydrological
17 droughts in dry regions (medium confidence) (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014).
18
19 The Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5癈 (SR1.5) assessed that limiting global warming to 1.5癈 is
20 expected to substantially reduce the probability of extreme droughts, precipitation deficits and risks
21 associated with water availability in some regions (medium confidence). On the other hand, higher risks to
22 natural and human systems in a 2.0癈 world would mean increased vulnerability for the poor, showing that
23 socio-economic drivers are expected to have a more significant influence on water-related risks and
24 vulnerabilities than changes in climate alone (medium confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).
25
26 The Special Report on Oceans and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (SROCC) confirmed findings from
27 AR5, with robust evidence of declines in snow cover and negative mass balance in most glaciers globally.
28 Glacier melting seriously threatens water supply to mountain communities and millions living downstream
29 through water shortages, jeopardizing hydropower generation, irrigation, and urban water uses (Hock et al.,
30 2019b). Additionally, Arctic hydrology and vegetation will be affected by permafrost changes, negatively
31 impacting Arctic communities' health and cultural identity (Meredith et al., 2019).
32
33 The Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL) stated that groundwater over-extraction for
34 irrigation is causing depletion of groundwater storage (high confidence). The report also noted that
35 precipitation changes, coupled with human drivers, will have a role in causing desertification, and water-
36 driven soil erosion is projected to increase due to climate change (medium confidence). The population
37 vulnerable to impacts related to water is projected to increase progressively at 1.5癈, 2癈 and 3癈 of global
38 warming, with half of those impacted residing in South Asia, followed by Central Asia, West Africa and East
39 Asia. SRCCL stated that improved irrigation techniques (e.g., drip irrigation) and moisture conservation
40 (e.g., rainwater harvesting using Indigenous and local practices) could increase farmers' adaptive capacity
41 (high confidence) (Mirzabaev et al., 2019).
42
43 The Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) Working Group I (WGI) (Douville et al., 2021) concluded that
44 anthropogenic climate change has increased atmospheric moisture and precipitation intensity (very likely by
45 2-3% per 1癈) (high confidence), increased terrestrial ET (medium confidence) and contributed to drying in
46 dry summer climates including in the Mediterranean, southwestern Australia, southwestern South America,
47 South Africa and western North America (medium to high confidence), and has caused earlier onset of
48 snowmelt and increased melting of glaciers (high confidence) since the mid-20th century. The report also
49 stated with high confidence that the water cycle variability and extremes are projected to intensify, regardless
50 of the mitigation policy. The share of the global population affected by water-related hazards and water
51 availability issues is projected to increase with the intensification of water cycle variability and extremes.
52 They concluded with high confidence that strong and rapid mitigation initiatives are needed to avert the
53 manifestation of climate change in all components of the global water cycle.
54
55 Building on these previous reports, this chapter advances understanding climate change-induced
56 hydrological changes and their societal impacts and risk in several key ways.
57
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1 First, since AR5, the methodology of climate change impact studies has advanced and these methodological
2 advances are described in SM4.1. AR6 uses new projections (CMIP6) based on the SSPs and other scenarios
3 and we assess those results in this chapter alongside those using other projections and scenarios.
4
5 Second, this chapter follows the developments set in motion by SR 1.5, SRCCL and SROCC to incorporate
6 Indigenous Knowledge (IK), traditional knowledge (TK) and local knowledge (LK). SR 1.5 stated that
7 disadvantaged and vulnerable populations, including Indigenous Peoples and certain local communities, are
8 at disproportionately higher risk of suffering adverse consequences due to global warming of 1.5癈 or more
9 (Roy et al., 2018). SRCCL highlighted the enhanced efficacy of decision-making and governance with the
10 involvement of local stakeholders, particularly those most vulnerable to climate change, such as Indigenous
11 Peoples (Arneth et al., 2019). SROCC found adaptation efforts have benefited from the inclusion of IK and
12 LK (Abram et al., 2019). In this chapter, we engage directly with Indigenous contributing authors and use
13 multiple evidence-based approaches, as undertaken by the IPBES (Teng� et al., 2014; Teng� et al., 2017).
14 This approach is guided by the understanding that the co-production of knowledge (between scholars and
15 local communities) about water and climate change vulnerability, impacts and adaptation has the potential to
16 lead to new water knowledge and context-specific governance strategies (Arsenault et al., 2019; Chakraborty
17 and Sherpa, 2021). Additionally, shifting beyond the exclusive use of technical knowledge and Western
18 viewpoints redresses the shortcomings of resource- and security-oriented understandings to water and
19 acknowledges the more holistic and relational approaches common to IK and LK (4.8.4) (Stefanelli et al.,
20 2017; Wilson, 2019; Chakraborty and Sherpa, 2021).
21
22 Finally, grounded in the AR6 goal to expand the solution space, this chapter advances the understanding of
23 adaptation in the water sector since AR5 by deploying a meta-analysis of adaptation measures. The meta-
24 analysis focuses on both current adaptation responses (4.7.1) and future projected adaptation responses,
25 which have been modelled (4.7.2). The meta-review assesses the outcomes of current adaptation responses
26 and effectiveness of future projected adaptations in reducing climate and associated risks. Studies derived
27 from Global Adaptation Mapping Initiative (GAMI) database (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a) (see Chapter 16),
28 were coded systematically following a meta-review protocol developed specifically for this assessment
29 ((Mukherji et al., 2021), SM4.2). A similar meta-review protocol was also developed to assess effectiveness
30 of adaptations to reduce projected climate risks (4.7.2; SM4.2).
31
32 4.1.2 Climatic and Non-Climatic Drivers of Changes in the Water Cycle
33
34 The water cycle is affected by both climatic and non-climatic factors (Douville et al., 2021). Radiative
35 forcing by changes in greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations, aerosols, and surface albedo drives global and
36 regional changes in evaporation and precipitation (Douville et al., 2021). A warmer atmosphere holds more
37 moisture, increasing global and regional mean precipitation; and more extreme precipitation (Allan et al.,
38 2014; Giorgi et al., 2019; Allan et al., 2020). Regional precipitation responses vary according to changes in
39 atmospheric circulation. Geographical variation in aerosols drives changes in atmospheric circulation,
40 affecting precipitation patterns such as the Asian monsoon (Ganguly et al., 2012; Singh et al., 2019).
41 (Section 4.2.1)
42
43 Warming increases glacier melt and is expected to decrease snowfall globally and lead to shorter snow
44 seasons with earlier but less rapid snowmelt. It can also lead to local increases in snowfall intensity (Allan et
45 al., 2020). These changes affect the seasonality of river flows in glacier-fed or snow-dominated basins.
46 (4.2.2)
47
48 Rising atmospheric CO2 generally decreases plant transpiration, affecting soil moisture, runoff, stream flows,
49 the return of moisture to the atmosphere and surface temperature (Skinner et al., 2017). However, in some
50 regions, these can be offset by increased leaf area ("global greening") driven by elevated CO2, land-use
51 change, nitrogen deposition and effects of climate change itself (Zhu Z et al., 2016; Zeng Z et al., 2018).
52 Increased ozone can impact plant functioning, reducing transpiration (Arnold et al., 2018). (4.2.1)
53
54 Direct human interventions include abstraction of surface water and groundwater for drinking, irrigation, and
55 other freshwater uses, as well as streamflow impoundment behind dams and large-scale inter-basin transfers
56 (Zhao et al., 2015; Donchyts et al., 2016; McMillan et al., 2016; Shumilova et al., 2018). The consequences
57 of these interventions are substantial and are discussed below briefly. In addition, these direct human
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1 interventions can change due to various societal and economic factors, including changes in land use and
2 urbanization (4.3 and 4.5).
3
4 Irrigation can reduce river flows and groundwater levels via abstraction and increase local precipitation
5 (Alter et al., 2015; Cook et al., 2015), alter precipitation remotely through moisture advection (de Vrese et
6 al., 2016), and change the timing of monsoons through land-sea temperature contrasts (Guimberteau et al.,
7 2012). The land cover change affects ET and precipitation (Li et al., 2015; Douville et al., 2021),
8 interception of precipitation by vegetation canopies (de Jong and Jetten, 2007), infiltration (Sun et al.,
9 2018a), and runoff (Bosmans et al., 2017) (4.5.1, 4.6.2, Box 4.3). Land cover impacts on the hydrological
10 cycle are of similar magnitude as human water use (Bosmans et al., 2017).
11
12 Urbanization decreases land surface permeability (Choi et al., 2016), which can increase fast runoff and
13 flooding risks and reduce local rainfall by decreasing moisture return to the atmosphere (Wang et al., 2018).
14 But urbanization can also increase the sensible heat flux driving greater or more extreme precipitation
15 (Kusaka et al., 2014; Niyogi et al., 2017). (4.3.4, 4.5.4)
16
17 In summary, radiative forcing by GHG and aerosols drives changes in evapotranspiration and precipitation at
18 global and regional scales, and the associated warming shifts the balance between frozen and liquid water
19 (high confidence). Rising CO2 concentrations also affect the water cycle via plant physiological responses
20 affecting transpiration, including via reduced stomatal opening and increased leaf area (high confidence
21 regarding the individual processes; medium confidence regarding their net impact). Land cover changes and
22 urbanization affect both the climate and land hydrology by altering the exchanges of energy and moisture
23 between the atmosphere and surface (high confidence) and changing the permeability of the land surface.
24 Direct human interventions in river systems and groundwater systems are non-climatic drivers with
25 substantial impacts on the water cycle (high confidence) and have the potential to change as part of societal
26 responses to climate change (Figure 4.2).
27
28
29
30 Figure 4.2: The water cycle, including direct human interventions. Water fluxes on land precipitation, land evaporation,
31 river discharge, groundwater recharge, and groundwater discharge to the ocean from (Douville et al., 2021). Human
32 water withdrawals for various sectors are shown from (Hanasaki et al., 2018; Sutanudjaja et al., 2018; Burek et al.,
33 2020; Droppers et al., 2020; M黮ler Schmied et al., 2021). Green water use (Abbott et al., 2019) refers to the use of soil
34 moisture for agriculture and forestry. Irrigation water use (called blue water) is not included in green water use).
35
36
37
38 4.2 Observed Changes in Hydrological Cycle due to Climate Change
39
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1 All components of the global water cycle have been modified due to climate change in recent decades (high
2 confidence) (Douville et al., 2021), with hundreds of millions of people now regularly experiencing
3 hydrological conditions that were previously unfamiliar (4.2.1.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.5). Extensive records from
4 weather stations, satellites and radar clearly show that precipitation patterns have shifted worldwide. Three
5 major shifts documented are (a) some regions receiving more annual or seasonal precipitation and others
6 less, (b) many regions have seen increased heavy precipitation, and many have seen either increases or
7 decreases in dry spells, (c) some regions have seen shifts towards heavier precipitation events separated by
8 more prolonged dry spells (4.2.1.1). Observationally-based calculations suggest that evapotranspiration (ET)
9 has changed in response to changes in precipitation and increasing temperatures, resulting in changing
10 patterns of soil moisture worldwide which are now detectable by satellite remote sensing (4.2.1.2, 4.2.1.3).
11 Rising temperatures have caused profound and extensive changes in the global cryosphere, with mountain
12 glaciers, land ice and snow cover shrinking, causing substantial, permanent impacts on the ways of life of
13 people in these regions, particularly Indigenous Peoples with strong cultural links to long-term or seasonally-
14 frozen environments (4.2.2, 4.3.8). Groundwater recharge in spring may have been reduced due to shorter
15 snowmelt seasons, although the dominant impact on groundwater has been non-climatic and through
16 intensification of irrigation (4.2.6). The global-scale pattern of streamflow changes is now attributable to
17 observed historical climate change, with human land and water use insufficient by themselves to explain the
18 observed streamflow changes at global scales (4.2.3). Numerous examples of extreme hydrometeorological
19 events, including heavy precipitation, flooding, drought and wildfire events causing deaths, high levels of
20 economic damage and extensive ecological impacts, have been shown to have been made more likely by
21 human influence on climate through increased GHG concentrations in the atmosphere (4.2.1.1, 4.2.4, 4.2.5).
22 Overall, there is a clear picture of human alteration of the global water cycle, which is now affecting
23 societies and ecosystems across the world. This section describes changes in the hydrological cycle through a
24 lens of societal impacts.
25
26 4.2.1 Observed Changes in Precipitation, Evapotranspiration and Soil Moisture
27
28 4.2.1.1 Observed Changes in Precipitation and Heavy Precipitation
29
30 AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) concluded that GHG forcing has driven increased contrasts in precipitation
31 amounts between wet and dry seasons and weather regimes over tropical land areas (medium confidence),
32 with a detectable precipitation increase in the northern high latitudes (high confidence). GHG forcing has
33 also contributed to drying in dry summer climates, including the Mediterranean, south-western Australia,
34 south-western South America, South Africa, and western North America (medium to high confidence)
35 (Figure 4.3). AR6 WG1 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) also concluded that the frequency and intensity of heavy
36 precipitation events have likely increased at the global scale over most land regions with good observational
37 coverage. Heavy precipitation has likely increased on the continental scale over North America, Europe, and
38 Asia. Regional increases in heavy precipitation frequency and (or) intensity have been observed with at least
39 medium confidence for nearly half of the AR6 WG1 climatic regions (Figure 4.3). Human influence, in
40 particular GHG emissions, is likely the main driver of the observed global-scale intensification of heavy
41 precipitation in land regions
42
43 Large numbers of people live in regions where the annual mean precipitation is now "unfamiliar" compared
44 to the mean and variability between 1891 and 2016 (Figure 4.3, g). "Unfamiliar" is defined as the long-term
45 change being greater than one standard deviation in the annual data (Figure 4.3 (b)). In 2020, approximately
46 498 million people lived in unfamiliarly wet areas, where the long-term average precipitation is as high as
47 previously seen in only about one in six years (medium confidence) (Figure 4.3, c). These areas are primarily
48 in mid and high latitudes (Hawkins et al., 2020). On the other hand, approximately 163 million people lived
49 in unfamiliarly dry areas, mostly in low latitudes (medium confidence). Due to high variability over time, the
50 signal of long-term change in annual mean precipitation is not distinguishable from the noise of variability in
51 many areas (Hawkins et al., 2020), implying that the local annual precipitation cannot yet be defined
52 "unfamiliar" by the above definition.
53
54 Notably, many regions have seen increased precipitation for part of the year and decreased precipitation at
55 other times (high confidence) (Figure 4.3, d, e), leading to small changes in the annual mean precipitation.
56 Therefore, the numbers of people seeing unfamiliar seasonal precipitation levels are expected to be higher
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1 than those quoted above for unfamiliar annual precipitation changes (medium confidence). Still, quantified
2 analysis of this is not yet available.
3
4 The intensity of heavy precipitation has increased in many regions (high confidence), including much of
5 North America, most of Europe, most of the Indian sub-continent, parts of northern and south-eastern Asia,
6 much of southern South America, parts of southern Africa and parts of central, northern and western
7 Australia (Figure 4.3, f) (Dunn et al., 2020; Sun et al., 2020). Conversely, heavy precipitation has decreased
8 in some regions, including eastern Australia, north-eastern South America and western Africa. The length of
9 dry spells has also changed, with increases in annual mean consecutive dry days (CDD) in large areas of
10 western, eastern and southern Africa, eastern and south-western South America, and South-East Asia and
11 decreases across much of North America. Precipitation extremes have changed in some places where annual
12 precipitation shows no trend. Some regions such as southern Africa and parts of southern South America are
13 seeing increased heavy precipitation and longer dry spells. Many regions with changing extremes are highly
14 populated, such as the Indian sub-continent, South-East Asia, Europe, and parts of North America, South
15 America and Southern Africa (Figure 4.3, h). Substantially more people (~709 million) live in regions where
16 annual maximum one-day precipitation has increased than regions where it has decreased (~86 million)
17 (medium confidence). However, more people are experiencing longer dry spells than shorter dry spells:
18 approximately 701 million people live in places where annual mean CDD is longer than in the 1950s, and
19 ~404 million in places with shorter CDD (medium confidence) (Figure 4.3)).
20
21
22
23
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1
2
3
4 Figure 4.3: Observed mean and extreme precipitation changes, and people experiencing the emergence of historically
5 unfamiliar precipitation and changes in extreme precipitation. (a) Changes in annual mean precipitation over land
6 (1891�2019) in the Global Precipitation Climatology (GPCC) v2020 dataset (Schneider et al., 2017; Schneider et al.,
7 2020). Green shows increasing precipitation, orange/red show decreases. (b) Emergence of wetter and drier climates,
8 defined as the ratio of the signal S of change to the noise N of variability, where the latter is defined as one standard
9 deviation in annual data with the trend removed, i.e., occurs approximately one in six years: "unfamiliar": S/N>1.0;
10 "unusual": S/N>2.0; "unknown": S/N>3.0. Grey regions are either unobserved (oceans) or deserts (<250 mm/year).
11 Stippling indicates where the signal of change is not significant. See (Hawkins et al., 2020) for further details. (c)
12 Precipitation trends from the CRU dataset in December, January, and February (mm day-1 decade-1). [to be replaced
13 with GPCC for consistency with panel; (b) (d) As (c) for June-July-August. (e) Changes in annual mean maximum 1-
14 day precipitation (Rx1day) in the HadEX3 dataset (Dunn et al., 2020). (f) Trend in annual mean consecutive dry days
15 (CDD), 1950 � 2018, in HadEX3. (g) Population densities in grid boxes with emerging precipitation changes, at 1�
16 resolutions. (h) Population densities per grid box where the trend in Rx1day is significantly different from zero. (i)
17 Population densities per grid box where the trend in CDD is significantly different from zero. Stipples in (h) and (i)
18 show where HadEX3 data is available. Population data in (g), (h) and (i) are for 2020 from (CIESIN, 2018a; CIESIN,
19 2018b).
20
21
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1 In summary, annual mean precipitation is increasing in many regions worldwide and decreasing over a
2 smaller area, particularly in the tropics. Nearly half a billion people live in areas with historically unfamiliar
3 wet conditions, and over 160 million in areas with historically unfamiliar dry conditions (medium
4 confidence). Over 600 million people experience heavy precipitation significantly more intense than in the
5 1950s, but less than 80 million experience decreased heavy precipitation. Compared to the 1950s, 601
6 million people now experience longer dry spells and 364 million experience shorter dry spells.
7
8 4.2.1.2 Observed and Reconstructed Changes in Evapotranspiration
9
10 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) conclude with high confidence that global terrestrial annual ET has increased
11 since the early 1980s, driven by both increasing atmospheric water demand and vegetation greening (medium
12 confidence), and can be partly attributed to anthropogenic forcing (high confidence).
13
14 Regional changes in ET depend on changes in both the climate and the properties of the land surface and
15 ecosystems. The latter also responds to changes in climate and atmospheric composition. For example, a
16 warming climate increases evaporative demand (Huang M et al., 2015; Berg et al., 2016), although seasonal
17 rainfall totals (Hovenden et al., 2014) affect the amount of soil moisture available for evaporation. Since
18 transpiration accounts for much of the land-atmosphere water flux (Good et al., 2015), vegetation changes
19 also play a significant role in overall changes in ET.
20
21 With higher CO2, the increase in evaporative demand can, to some extent, be counteracted by reduced
22 stomatal conductance (`physiological effect'), which reduces transpiration and increases leaf-level water use
23 efficiency (WUE), but is highly species-specific. There is evidence for recent increases in leaf-scale WUE
24 from tree rings (14 �10 %, broadleaf to 22 �6 %, evergreen over the 20th century: (Frank et al., 2015)),
25 carbon isotopes (30 to 35 % increase in 150 years: (van der Sleen et al., 2014)), and satellite-based
26 measurements (1982�2008) combined with data-driven models (Huang M et al., 2015). WUE is also affected
27 by aerodynamic conductance (Knauer et al., 2017), nutrient limitation (Medlyn et al., 2015; Donohue et al.,
28 2017), soil moisture availability (Bernacchi and VanLoocke, 2015; Medlyn et al., 2015), and ozone pollution
29 (King et al., 2013; Frank et al., 2015).
30
31 Higher CO2 also increases photosynthesis rates, though this may not be maintained in the longer term
32 (Warren et al., 2015; Adams et al., 2020), particularly where temperatures exceed the thermal maxima for
33 photosynthesis (Duffy Katharyn et al., 2021). Higher photosynthesis increases leaf area index (LAI)
34 (`structural effect') and therefore transpiration; 55�25% of observed increases in ET (1980�2011) have been
35 attributed to LAI change (Zeng Z et al., 2018). Increases in ET driven by increased LAI (from satellite
36 observations 1982�2012) are estimated at 0.32 � 0.07 mm month-1 per decade, generating a climate forcing
37 of -0.31 Wm-2 per decade (Zeng et al., 2017).
38
39 Overall regional transpiration change depends on the balance between the physiological and structural
40 effects (e.g. (Tor-ngern et al., 2015; Ukkola et al., 2015)). In dry regions, ET may increase due to increasing
41 LAI (Huang M et al., 2015), but in some densely vegetated regions, the stomatal effect dominates (Mao et
42 al., 2015). Reductions in transpiration due to rising CO2 concentrations may also be offset by a longer
43 growing season (Frank et al., 2015; Mankin et al., 2019). Other factors modulate the transpiration effect both
44 temporally and spatially, for example, additional vegetation structural changes (Kim et al., 2015; Domec et
45 al., 2017), vegetation disturbance and age (Donohue et al., 2017) and species (Bernacchi and VanLoocke,
46 2015).
47
48 Recent studies report global ET increases from the early 1980s to 2009 and 2013 (Table 4.1). Calculations
49 informed by observations suggest that ET has increased in most regions, with statistically significant
50 (p<0.05) trends of up to 10mm yr-2 observed in large parts of North America and northern Eurasia. Larger
51 increases in ET are also observed in several regions, including northeast Brazil, western central Africa,
52 southern Africa, southern India, southern China, and northern Australia. Decreases of around 10mm yr-2 are
53 reported for western Amazonia and central Africa (Miralles et al., 2014), although not across all datasets
54 (Zeng et al., 2018). In estimates of past changes in long-term drying or wetting of the land surface driven by
55 climate, uncertainties in ET observations or reconstructions make a more substantial contribution to the
56 overall uncertainty than observed changes in precipitation (Greve et al., 2014). Other changes in ET are also
57 driven strongly by land cover changes and irrigation (Bosmans et al., 2017).
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1
2
3 Table 4.1: Trends in global evapotranspiration for different periods between 1981-1982 and 2009-2013.
Trend (mm yr-2) Period Data source Author(s)
+0.54 1981 to 2012 Observations (Zhang Y et al., 2016)
+1.18 1982 to 2010 Observations (Mao et al., 2015)
+0.93�0.31 1982 to 2010 LSMs (Mao et al., 2015)
+0.88 1982 to 2013 Remote-sensing data (Zhang K et al., 2015)
+1.5 1982 to 2009 Remote-sensing and (Zeng et al., 2014)
surface observations
4
5
6 The contribution of changes in WUE to observed changes in ET is a key knowledge gap. WG1 assigned low
7 confidence to this contribution. Estimating large-scale transpiration response to increased CO2 based on leaf-
8 level responses of WUE is not straightforward (Bernacchi and VanLoocke, 2015; Medlyn et al., 2015; Tor-
9 ngern et al., 2015; Walker et al., 2015; Kala et al., 2016) and new methodological approaches are needed.
10
11 In summary, there is high confidence that ET increased by between approximately 0.5 and 1.5mm yr-2
12 between the 1980s and early 2010s due to warming-induced increased atmospheric demand worldwide and
13 greening of vegetation in many regions. Increases in many areas are 10mm yr-2 or more, but in some tropical
14 land areas, ET has decreased by 10mm yr-2. Plant stomatal responses to rising CO2 concentrations may play a
15 role, but there is low confidence in quantifying this. Changes in land cover and irrigation have also changed
16 regional ET (medium confidence).
17
18 4.2.1.3 Observed and Estimated Past Changes in Soil Moisture and Aridity
19
20 AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) find that a global trend in soil moisture is detectable in a reanalysis and is
21 attributable to GHG forcing, and conclude that it is very likely that anthropogenic climate change affected
22 global patterns of soil moisture over the 20th century.
23
24 Changes in soil moisture and land surface aridity are due to changes in the relative balance of precipitation
25 and ET. Regional trends derived from satellite remote sensing products show increases and decreases in
26 annual surface soil moisture of up to 20% or more between the late 1970s and mid-2010s (Figure 4.4). For
27 example, using the ESA CCI SM v03.2 COMBINED products (van der Schalie et al., 2021), approximately
28 0.9 billion people live in regions with decreasing surface soil moisture, and 2.1 billion people live in regions
29 with increasing surface soil moisture (Figure 4.4, b). However, there are disagreements between datasets on
30 the direction of change in some regions (Seneviratne et al., 2010; Feng and Zhang, 2015; Feng, 2016), so
31 quantification is subject to low confidence.
32
33
34
35
36 Figure 4.4: Global patterns of changes in soil moisture and people in regions with significant changes. (a) Percentage
37 changes in surface soil moisture (0�5cm) for 1978�2015 from satellite remote sensing: the "COMBINED" product of
38 European Space Agency Climate Change Initiative Soil Moisture (ESA CCI SM v03.2), which blends data products
39 from two microwave instruments, a scatterometer measuring radar backscattering and a radiometer measuring
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1 brightness temperature (van der Schalie et al., 2021). (b) The population density in 0.25癵rid boxes with trends of
2 significantly increasing and decreasing soil moisture from (a).
3
4
5 Analysis of changes in precipitation-evapotranspiration estimates for 1948-2005 (Greve et al., 2014)
6 suggests that geographical variations in soil moisture trends are more complex than the "wet get wetter, dry
7 get drier" (WGWDGD) paradigm. This is also supported by remote sensing data, with ESA CCI data for
8 1979-2013 showing only 15% of land following the WGWDGD paradigm for soil moisture (Feng and
9 Zhang, 2015). Defining arid, humid and transitional areas according to precipitation and temperature
10 regimes, all three classes of regions see more widespread trends of declining soil moisture than increasing
11 soil moisture (Feng and Zhang, 2015). In the ESA CCI product, increasing soil moisture trends are mainly
12 seen in humid or transitional areas and are rare in arid regions (Table 4.2)
13
14 Table 4.2: Proportions of arid, transitional and humid areas with drying and wetting trends in surface soil moisture
15 from remote sensing, 1979-2013 (Feng and Zhang, 2015).
Areas % of the area with a drying trend % of the area with a wetting trend
Arid 38.4 2.9
Transitional 13.0 10.5
Humid 16.3 8.1
16
17 Reconstructions of historical soil moisture trends with data-driven models and process-based land surface
18 models indicate drier dry seasons predominantly in extratropical latitudes, including Europe, western North
19 America, northern Asia, southern South America, Australia and eastern Africa, consistent with climate
20 model simulations of changes due to human-induced climate change (Padr髇 et al., 2020). Furthermore,
21 reduced water availability in the dry season is generally a consequence of increasing ET rather than
22 decreasing precipitation (Padr髇 et al., 2020).
23
24 While observationally-based data for soil moisture are now more widely available, regional trends remain
25 uncertain due to disagreements between datasets, so confident assessments of soil moisture changes remain a
26 knowledge gap.
27
28 In summary, global mean soil moisture has slightly decreased, but regional changes vary, with both increases
29 and decreases of 20% or more in some regions (medium confidence). Drying soil moisture trends are more
30 widespread than wetting trends, not only in arid areas but also in humid and transitional areas (medium
31 confidence). Reduced dry-season water availability is driven mainly by increasing transpiration (medium
32 confidence)
33
34 4.2.2 Observed Changes in Cryosphere (Snow, Glaciers, and Permafrost)
35
36 AR5 reported a decrease in snow cover over most of the Northern Hemisphere, decreases in the extent of
37 permafrost and increases in its average temperature, and glacier mass loss in most parts of the world
38 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). SROCC (IPCC, 2019c) stated with very high or high confidence (a)
39 reduction in seasonal snow cover (snow cover extent decreased by 13.4% per decade for 1967-2018); (b)
40 glacier mass budget of all mountain regions (excluding the Canadian and Russian Arctic, Svalbard,
41 Antarctica, Greenland) was 490�100 kg m-2 yr-1 in 2006-2015; (c) warming of permafrost (e.g. permafrost
42 temperatures increased by 0.39癈 in the Arctic for 2007-2017). Tourism and recreation activities have been
43 negatively impacted by declining snow cover, glaciers and permafrost in high mountains (medium
44 confidence).
45
46 Recent studies confirmed with high confidence that snow cover extent continues to decrease across the
47 northern hemisphere in all months of the year (see (Douville et al., 2021; Eyring et al., 2021; Fox-Kemper et
48 al., 2021) for more details). From 1922 to 2018, snow cover extent in the northern hemisphere peaked in the
49 1950s-1970s (Mudryk et al., 2020) and consistently reduced since the end of the 20th century (Hern醤dez-
50 Henr韖uez et al., 2015; Thackeray et al., 2016; Mudryk et al., 2017; Beniston et al., 2018; Hammond et al.,
51 2018; Thackeray et al., 2019; Mudryk et al., 2020). The consistently negative snow-mass trend of
52 approximately 5 Gt yr-1 in 1981-2018 for all winter-spring months (Mudryk et al., 2020), including 4.6 Gt
53 yr-1 decrease of snow mass across North America and a negligible trend across Eurasia, has been observed
54 (Pulliainen et al., 2020). Negative trends in snow-dominated period duration of 2.0 to 6.5 weeks decade-1
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1 was detected from surface and satellite observations during 1971�2014 (Allchin and D閞y, 2017), mainly
2 owing to earlier seasonal snowmelt (Fox-Kemper et al., 2021). The observed decrease of snow cover metrics
3 (extent, mass, duration) led to changes in runoff seasonality and has impacted water supply infrastructure
4 (Bl鰏chl et al., 2017; Huss et al., 2017), particularly in south-western Russia, western US and Central Asia.
5 In these regions, snowmelt runoff accounts for more than 30% of irrigated water supplies (Qin et al., 2020).
6 Negative impacts on hydropower production due to changes in the seasonality of snowmelt have also been
7 documented (Kopytkovskiy et al., 2015).
8
9 During the last two decades, the global glacier mass loss rate exceeded 0.5-meter water equivalent (m w.e.)
10 year-1 compared to an average of 0.33 m w.e. y-1 in 1950�2000. This volume of mass loss is the highest since
11 the start of the entire observation period (very high confidence) (Zemp et al., 2015; Zemp et al., 2019;
12 Hugonnet et al., 2021) (also see (Douville et al., 2021; Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; Gulev et al., 2021) for more
13 details). Regional estimates of glacier mass balance are also mostly negative (Dussaillant et al., 2019;
14 Menounos et al., 2019; Zemp et al., 2019; Douville et al., 2021; Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; Hugonnet et al.,
15 2021), except for West Kunlun, Eastern Pamir and the northern Karakoram (Brun et al., 2017; Lin et al.,
16 2017; Berthier and Brun, 2019). Changes in glacier metrics estimated in post-SROCC publications are
17 summarized in Figure 4.5.
18
19
20
21 Figure 4.5: Global and regional estimates of changes in glacier characteristics (elevation, m yr-1; mass Gt yr-1, mass
22 balance, m.w.e. yr-1) and 95% confidence intervals of the estimates. Results are taken from the post-SROCC
23 publications, which are labelled in the chart titles as 1 - (Hugonnet et al., 2021); 2 - (Yang et al., 2020); 3 - (Dussaillant
24 et al., 2019); 4 - (Davaze et al., 2020); 5 - (Sommer et al., 2020); 6 - (Schuler et al., 2020).
25
26
27 Regional and global decreasing trends in glacier mass loss are about linear until 1990, after which they
28 accelerated, especially in Western Canada, the USA, and Southern Andes (WGMS, 2017). There is a
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1 worldwide growth in the number, total area and total volume of glacial lakes by around 50% between 1990
2 to 2018 due to the global increase in glacier melt rate (Shugar et al., 2020). An increase in area, number and
3 volume of glacial lakes can potentially increase risks of GLOFs with significant negative societal impacts
4 (Ikeda et al., 2016). A drop in glacier runoff has happened in the regions where the glaciers have already
5 passed their peak water stage, example, as in Canadian Rocky Mountains, European Alps, tropical Andes,
6 North Caucasus (Bard et al., 2015; Hock et al., 2019b; Rets et al., 2020). There is medium confidence that the
7 accelerated melting of glaciers has negatively impacted glacier-supported irrigation systems worldwide
8 (Buytaert et al., 2017; N黶ser and Schmidt, 2017; Xenarios et al., 2019). Varying impacts on hydropower
9 production (Schaefli et al., 2019) and tourism industry in some places due to cryosphere changes have also
10 been documented (Hoy et al., 2016; Steiger et al., 2019).
11
12 Permafrost changes mainly refer to changes in temperature and active layer thickness (ALT) (Hock et al.,
13 2019b; Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; Gulev et al., 2021). Permafrost temperature near the depth of zero annual
14 temperature amplitude increased globally by 0.29�0.12癈 during 2007�2016: by 0.39�0.15癈 in the
15 continuous permafrost and by 0.20�0.10� in the discontinuous permafrost (Biskaborn et al., 2019). Thus,
16 permafrost is warming during the last 3-4 decades (Romanovsky et al., 2017) with a rate of 0.4-1.4 癈
17 decade-1 throughout the Russian Arctic, 0.1-0.8 癈 decade-1 in Alaska and Arctic Canada during 2007-2016
18 (Biskaborn et al., 2019) and 0.1-0.24 癈 decade-1 in Tibetan plateau (Wu et al., 2015). The ALT is also
19 increasing in the European and Russian Arctic and high mountain areas of Eurasia since the mid-1990s
20 (Hock et al., 2019b; Fox-Kemper et al., 2021; Gulev et al., 2021). Unfortunately, unlike glaciers and snow,
21 the lack of in-situ observations on permafrost still cannot be compensated by remote sensing. Still, some
22 methodological progress on this front has been happening recently (Nitze et al., 2018).
23
24 There is high confidence that degradation of the cryosphere components is negatively affecting terrestrial
25 ecosystems, infrastructure and settlements in the high-latitude and high-altitude areas (Fritz et al., 2017;
26 Oliva and Fritz, 2018; Streletskiy et al., 2019). Similarly, communities in the North polar regions and the
27 ecosystems on which they depend for their livelihoods are at risk (Mustonen, 2015; Pecl et al., 2017;
28 Mustonen and Lehtinen, 2020) (Figure 4.6).
29
30
31
32 Figure 4.6: Map of selected observed impacts on cultural water uses of Indigenous Peoples of the cryosphere. Map
33 location is approximate; text boxes provide names of the Indigenous Peoples whose cultural water uses have been
34 impacted by climate change; changed climate variable; impact on water; and specific climate impact on cultural water
35 use (4.3.7).
36
37
38 In summary, the cryosphere is one of the most sensitive indicators of climate change. There is high
39 confidence that cryosphere components (glaciers, snow, permafrost) are melting or thawing since the end of
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1 the 20th and beginning of the 21st century. Widespread cryosphere changes are affecting humans and
2 ecosystems in mid-to-high latitudes and the high mountains regions (high confidence). These changes are
3 already impacting irrigation, hydropower, water supply, cultural and other services provided by the
4 cryosphere, and populations depending on ice, snow and permafrost.
5
6 4.2.3 Observed Changes in Streamflow
7
8 AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) concluded with medium evidence and high agreement that trends in
9 annual streamflow have generally followed observed changes in regional precipitation and temperature since
10 the 1950s. AR6 WGI (Eyring et al., 2021; Gulev et al., 2021) (12.4.5) conclude with medium confidence that
11 anthropogenic climate change has altered local and regional streamflow in various parts of the world, but
12 with no clear signal in the global mean.
13
14 Between the 1950s and 2010s, stream flows showed decreasing trends in parts of western and central Africa,
15 eastern Asia, southern Europe, western North America and eastern Australia, and increasing trends in
16 northern Asia, northern Europe, and northern and eastern North America (Dai, 2016; Gudmundsson et al.,
17 2017; Gudmundsson et al., 2019; Li et al., 2020b; Masseroni et al., 2020). Significant spatial heterogeneity is
18 also found in streamflow changes at the regional scale. For instance, in Canada, annual streamflow trends
19 were mixed. Significant declines occurred at 11% of stations and significant increases at 4% of stations, with
20 most decreases occurring in southern Canada (Bonsal et al., 2019). An increasing trend (1950-2010) is found
21 in the northern region, mainly due to climate warming. Mixed trends are found in other regions.
22
23 The spatial differences in annual mean streamflow trends around the world are influenced by climatic
24 factors, particularly changes in precipitation and evaporation (Zang and Liu, 2013; Greve et al., 2014;
25 Hannaford, 2015; Ficklin et al., 2018), as well as by anthropogenic forcing (Gudmundsson et al., 2016;
26 Gudmundsson et al., 2017; Gudmundsson et al., 2021). Other factors (e.g. land-use change and CO2 effects
27 on vegetation) dominate in some areas, especially dryland regions (Berghuijs et al., 2017b). Human activities
28 can reduce run-off through water withdrawal and land-use changes (Zaherpour et al., 2018; Sun et al., 2019a;
29 Vicente-Serrano et al., 2019), and human regulation of streamflows via impounding reservoirs can also play
30 a major role (Hodgkins et al., 2019).
31
32 Streamflow trends are attributed to varying combinations of climate change and direct human influence
33 through water and land use in different basins worldwide, with conclusions on the relative contribution of
34 climatic and anthropogenic factors sometimes depending on the methodology (Dey and Mishra, 2017).
35 Precipitation explains over 80% of the changes in discharge of large rivers from 1950 to 2010 in northern
36 Asia and northern Europe, where the impact of human activities is relatively limited (Li et al., 2020b). In
37 northwest Europe, precipitation and evaporation changes explain many observed trends in streamflow
38 (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2019). In several polar areas in Northern Europe (e.g. Finland), North America (e.g.
39 British Columbia in Canada), and Siberia, many studies reported increased wintertime streamflow primarily
40 due to climate warming, for instance, more rainfall instead of snowfall and more glacier run-off in the winter
41 period (e.g. (Bonsal et al., 2020)) (4.2.2). A similar phenomenon of the earlier snowmelt run-off is also
42 found in North America during 1960-2014 (Dudley et al., 2017). Thus, climate drivers largely explain
43 changes in the average and maximum run-off of predominantly snow-fed rivers (Yang et al., 2015a; Bring et
44 al., 2016; Tananaev et al., 2016; Frolova et al., 2017b; Ficklin et al., 2018; Magritsky et al., 2018; Rets et al.,
45 2018).
46
47 In contrast, in southwestern Europe, land cover changes and increased water demands by irrigation are the
48 main drivers of streamflow reduction (Vicente-Serrano et al., 2019) (4.3.1). In addition, the human
49 intervention also contributed to the increase of the wintertime streamflow due to the release of water in the
50 winter season for hydropower generation in large rivers in the northern regions (Rawlins et al., 2021). In
51 some regions, the impact of human activities on run-off and streamflow outplays the climate factors, e.g. in
52 typical basins in China after 2000 (Zhai and Tao, 2017).
53
54 (Shi et al., 2019) find that in 40 major basins worldwide, both climatic and direct human impact contribute to
55 observed flow changes to varying degrees. Climate change or variability is the main contributor to changes
56 in basin-scale trends for 75% of rivers, while direct human effects on streamflow dominate for 25%.
57 However, this does not consider attribution of the climate drivers to anthropogenic forcing. Using time series
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 of low, mean, and high river flows from 7250 observatories around the world (1971 to 2010) and global
2 hydrological models (GHMs) driven by Earth System Model simulations with and without anthropogenic
3 forcing of climate change, (Gudmundsson et al., 2021) also found direct human influence to have a relatively
4 small impact on global patterns of streamflow trends. (Gudmundsson et al., 2021) further identified
5 anthropogenic climate change as a causal driver of the global pattern of recent trends in mean and extreme
6 river flow (Figure 4.7). Overall, the sign of observed trends and simulations accounting for human influence
7 on the climate system was found to be consistent for decreased mean flows in western and eastern North
8 America, southern Europe, north-east South America and the Indian subcontinent, and increased flows in
9 northern Europe. Similar conclusions were drawn for low and high flows, except for the Indian subcontinent.
10 However, in some regions, the observed trend was opposite to that simulated with anthropogenic climate
11 forcing. Thus, human water and land use alone did not explain the observed pattern of trends.
12
13
14 a)
15
16 b)
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1
2 Figure 4.7: Observed changes in river flows and attribution to externally forced climate change. (a) Percentage changes
3 in flow in individual rivers 1971 to 2010. Black box outlines show climatic regions with at least 80 gauging stations
4 with almost complete daily observations over 1971-2010, using the SREX (Seneviratne et al., 2012) regions. (b) Left
5 column: observed regional median trends from 1971 to 2010 in SREX regions with at least 80 gauging stations with
6 almost complete daily observations over that period. Middle column: trends simulated by eight Global Hydrological
7 Models driven by four CMIP5 Earth System Models, with human water and land use from 1971 to 2020 and the pre-
8 industrial control climate state. Right column: same as the middle column but with ESM-simulated climates from 1971
9 to 2010 with both anthropogenic forcings (greenhouse gases, aerosols and land use) and natural external forcings (solar
10 variability and volcanic eruptions). Top row: low flows (annual 10th percentile); Middle row: mean flows; Bottom row:
11 high flows (annual 90th percentile). Reproduced from (Gudmundsson et al., 2021).
12
13
14 Although there are different observational and simulated run-off and streamflow datasets (e.g., Global
15 Runoff Data Center, GRDC), it is still challenging to obtain and update long-term river discharge records in
16 several regions, particularly Africa, South and East Asia (Dai, 2016). When observed data are scarce,
17 hydrological models are used to detect trends in run-off and streamflow. However, simulations of streamflow
18 can differ between models depending on their structures and parameterizations, contributing to uncertainties
19 for trend detection, especially when considering human intervention (e.g. (Caillouet et al., 2017; Hattermann
20 et al., 2017; Smith et al., 2019b; Telteu et al., 2021)).
21
22 In summary, both climate change and human activities influence the magnitude and direction of change in
23 run-off and streamflow. There are no clear trends of changing streamflow on the global level. However,
24 trends emerge on a regional level (a general increasing trend in the northern higher latitude region and mixed
25 trend in the rest of the word) (high confidence). Climatic factors contribute to these trends in most basins
26 (high confidence). They are more important than direct human influence in a larger share of major global
27 basins (medium confidence), although direct human influence dominates in some (medium confidence).
28 Overall anthropogenic climate change is attributed as a driver to the global pattern of change in streamflow
29 (medium confidence).
30
31 4.2.4 Observed Changes in Floods
32
33 AR6 WGI Chapter 11 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) assessed with high confidence the increase in the extreme
34 precipitation and associated increase in the frequency and magnitude of river floods. However, there is low
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1 confidence in changes in the river flooding regionally, which is strongly dependent upon complex catchment
2 characteristics and land use patterns. SROCC (Hock et al., 2019b) summarized with high confidence that
3 changes in the cryosphere have led to changes in frequency, magnitude and location of rain-on-snow floods,
4 snowmelt floods and glacier-related floods.
5
6 There is high confidence that the frequency and magnitude of river floods have changed in the past several
7 decades in some regions mentioned below (and in WGI 11.5.2; SM4.1) with impacts across human and
8 natural systems (4.3). A global flood database based on in situ measurement and satellite remote-sensing
9 during 1985�2015 show that floods have increased 4-fold and 2.5璮old in the tropics and northern mid-
10 latitudes, respectively (Najibi and Devineni, 2018). Estimates of flood exposure using satellite-derived
11 inundation area and high-resolution population data showed a 20-24% increase during 2000�2018 (Tellman
12 et al., 2021). Analyses of in situ streamflow measurement showed both increases and decreases in the
13 frequency of river floods for 1960�2010 in Europe (Berghuijs et al., 2017a; Bl鰏chl et al., 2019a) and the
14 United States (Berghuijs et al., 2017a), an overall increase in China, Brazil and Australia (Berghuijs et al.,
15 2017a) but decrease in some areas in the Mediterranean (Tramblay et al., 2019) and southern Australia
16 (Ishak et al., 2013; Do et al., 2017). Warming in the last 40-60 years has led to 1 to10 day earlier per decade
17 spring flood occurrence depending on the location (the most frequent being 2 to 4 days/decade) (high
18 confidence) (Yang L. et al., 2015; Bl鰏chl et al., 2017; Dudley et al., 2017; Solander et al., 2017; Rokaya et
19 al., 2018; Kireeva et al., 2020).
20
21 Between 1970 to 2019, 44% of all disasters, and 31% of all economic losses were flood related (WMO,
22 2021). Observed flood risks changes in recent decades are often caused by human factors such as increased
23 urbanization and population growth rather than climate change alone (Tramblay et al., 2019). There is
24 medium confidence that flood vulnerability varies among various regions and countries (Jongman et al.,
25 2012; Scussolini et al., 2016; Tanoue et al., 2016) (Figure 4.8), reflecting differences in GDP, severity and
26 characteristics of hazard and political and social conditions (Rufat et al., 2015). Flood vulnerability has
27 decreased with economic development in many regions, while increased exposure has elevated risk in some
28 places (Mechler, 2016; Tanoue et al., 2016). Global annual mean exposed population considering the current
29 flood protection standard is estimated to be US$ 54 million under the climate of 1976-2005 and unevenly
30 distributed (Alfieri et al., 2017). Similar estimation using different models shows an increase of flood
31 exposure in the past (US$31 million for 1971-1990 and US$ 45 million for 1991-2010 without population
32 change as fixed in 2010) (Tanoue et al., 2016) (4.7.5).
33
34
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1
2 Figure 4.8: (a) Local flood protection standard (return period) at sub-country scale (Scussolini et al., 2016) based on
3 published reports and documents, websites and personal communications with experts. Note that the vulnerability of
4 this map reflects local flood protection such as complex infrastructure and does not fully reflect the other source of
5 vulnerabilities, including exposure. (b) Modelled mean global fluvial flood water depth (Tanoue et al., 2016; Tanoue et
6 al., 2021) based on a land surface model and a river and inundation model driven by reanalysis climate forcing of 5
7 CMIP5 GCMs (metres). The annual maximum daily river water was allocated along elevations, and inundation depth
8 was calculated for each year and averaged for the target period. (c) Population distribution per 30 arc second grid cell
9 (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2010; Klein Goldewijk et al., 2011). (d) Population exposed to flood (number of people where
10 inundation occurs) per 30 arc-second grid cell. Population under inundation depth > 0 m (a) was counted when the
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1 return period of annual maximum daily river water exceeds the flood protection standard (c) calculated by the authors.
2 All values are averages for the period 1958-2010 for the past and 2050-2070 for the future.
3
4
5 The link between rainfall and flooding is complex. While observed increases in extreme precipitation have
6 increased the frequency and magnitude of pluvial floods and river floods in some regions, floods could
7 decrease in some regions due to other factors. These factors could include soil wetness condition, cryosphere
8 change, land cover change and river system management, adaptation measures or water usage within the
9 river basin (WGI FAQ8.2). For example, in the USA and Europe, a study indicated that major (e.g., 25�100-
10 year return period) floods did not show significant long-term trends (Hodgkins et al., 2019). Nevertheless,
11 anthropogenic climate change increased the likelihood of a number of major heavy precipitation events and
12 floods that resulted in disastrous impacts in southern and eastern Asia, Europe, North America and South
13 America (Table 4.3) (high confidence). (Davenport et al., 2021) demonstrated that anthropogenic changes in
14 precipitation extremes had contributed one-third of the cost of flood damages (from1988 to 2017) in the
15 USA. Anthropogenic climate change has altered 64% (8 out of 22 events increased, 8 decreased) of floods
16 events with significant loss and damage during 2010-2013 (Hirabayashi et al., 2021a). (Gudmundsson et al.,
17 2021) attributed observed change in extreme river flow trends to anthropogenic climate change (4.2.3).
18 Although there is growing evidence on the effects of anthropogenic climate change on each event, given the
19 relatively poor regional coverage and high model uncertainty, there is low confidence in the attribution of
20 human-induced climate change to flood change on the global scale.
21
22
23 Table 4.3: Selected major heavy precipitation events from 2014-2021 that led to flooding and their impacts. Studies
24 were selected for presentation based on the availability of impacts information. This is not a systematic assessment of
25 event attributions studies and their physical science conclusions. "Sign of influence" indicates whether anthropogenic
26 climate change was found to have made the event more or less likely, and "mechanism/magnitude of influence"
27 quantifies the change in likelihood and the processes or quantities involved.
Year Country / Impact Anthropogenic climate change influence Reference
Region the likelihood of an event
Sign of Mechanism / magnitude
influence of influence
2021 Germany, At least 222 fatalities, Increase 1-day rainfall intensity (Kreienkamp et
Belgium, substantial damage to increased by 3 - 19%, the al., 2021)
Luxembourg and infrastructure, economic likelihood of event
neighbouring costs of 4.5 to 5.5 increased by a factor
countries billion in Germany and between 1.2 and 9
over 0.35 billion in
Belgium.
2019 Canada (Ottawa) Thousands of people Increase Spring maximum 30-day (Kirchmeier-
evacuated, extended rainfall accumulation in Young et al.,
states of emergency, 2019 was 3 times as 2021)
and about $200 million likely with
in insured losses anthropogenic forcing
Southern China Over 6 million people Decrease Anthropogenic forcings (Li et al., 2021b)
across several southern have reduced the
China provinces were likelihood of heavy
affected by heavy rains, precipitation in southern
floods, and landslides. China like the 2019
These extremes caused March璊uly event by
at least 91 deaths, about 60%
collapsed over 19,000
houses, damaged
around 83,000 houses,
and affected 419,400 ha
of crops (China
Ministry of Emergency
Management 2020).
The direct economic
loss was estimated to be
more than 20 billion
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2018 USA (Mid- RMB (equivalent to 3 Increase 1.1 to 2.3 times more (Winter et al.,
2017 Atlantic) billion USD) Decrease likely 2020)
2016 Central Western 1 fatality, $12 million Decrease ~47% reduction in the (Zhang et al.,
China damages Increase probability 2020b)
Persistent heavy rain led Unknown
North-western to floods, landslides and Increase 34% reduction in the (Ji et al., 2020)
China house collapse affecting Increase probability
2.9 million people. The Increase
Japan direct economic loss of 7% increase in total (Kawase et al.,
Australia over US$ 1.3 billion Increase precipitation 2020)
(Tasmania) Extreme flooding in the
Peru Upper Yellow River Increase Unknown (Tozer et al.,
basin affected about 1.4 Increase 2020)
Uruguay and million people and led At least 1.5 times more (Christidis et al.,
Brazil to 30 deaths and likely 2019)
North-East disappearances.
Bangladesh 237 fatalities, more than At least double, with a (de Abreu et al.,
6,000 buildings most likely increase of 2019)
China destroyed by floods and about fivefold
landslides
South China $100 million in Doubled the likelihood (Rimi et al.,
China (Wuhan) insurance claims of the 2017 pre-monsoon 2019)
Widespread flooding extreme 6-day rainfall
and landslides affected event
1.7 million people, 177
fatalities, estimated total Doubled the probability (Sun et al.,
damage of $3.1 billion
Direct economic loss in from 0.6% to 1.2% 2019b)
Brazil of US$102
million, displacement of 1.5-fold (0.6 to 4.7) (Sun and Miao,
more than 3,500 people increase in the 2018)
in Uruguay probability
Flash flood-affected (Zhou et al.,
~850,000 households, Approximately 60% of 2018a)
~220,000 ha of nearly the risk
harvestable Boro rice
damaged. Crop failure
contributed to a record
30% rice price hike
compared to the
previous year
7.8 million people
affected 34 fatalities,
about 0.8 million people
displaced, 605,000
hectares of crops
affected, 116,000
hectares without
harvest. 32,000 houses
collapsed, 41,000 were
severely damaged.
Direct economic loss
24.12 billion Chinese
Yuan (~ US$3.6 billion)
Widespread severe
flooding, waterlogging,
and landslides in the
Yangtze璈uai region.
237 fatalities, 93 people
missing, at least US$22
billion in damage
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China (Yangtze The direct economic Increase Increased probability by (Yuan et al.,
River) loss of about US$10 38% (� 21%) 2018)
billion
Australia Flooding and wild None Minimal (Hope et al.,
weather impacted some 2018)
agriculture and power
generation.
2015 India (Chennai) City declared a disaster None None (van Oldenborgh
area. Damages et al., 2017a)
estimated as $3 billion
2014 Indonesia 26 reported deaths Unclear 2-day rain event (Siswanto et al.,
(Jakarta) Thousands of buildings approximately 2.4 times 2015)
flooded, much more likely compared to
infrastructure damaged. 1900, but cause not
Losses up to US $384 established
million
1
2
3 In snow-dominated regions, 1~10 days earlier spring floods per decades due to warmer temperature are
4 reported for the last decades (high confidence), such as in Europe (Mor醤-Tejeda et al., 2014; Kormann et
5 al., 2015; Matti et al., 2016; Vormoor et al., 2016; Bl鰏chl et al., 2017), the European part of Russia (Frolova
6 et al., 2017a; Frolova et al., 2017b; Kireeva et al., 2020), Canada (Yang L. et al., 2015; Burn et al., 2016;
7 Rokaya et al., 2018), and the United States (Mallakpour and Villarini, 2015; Solander et al., 2017).
8
9 There is a knowledge gap in how ice-related floods, including glacier-related and ice-jam floods, respond to
10 ongoing climate change. Despite the increase in the number of glacial lake studies (Wang and Zhou, 2017;
11 Harrison et al., 2018; Begam and Sen, 2019; Bolch et al., 2019), changes in the frequency of occurrence of
12 glacier-related floods associated with climate change remain unclear (medium confidence). Studies show that
13 the compound occurrence of high surges and high river discharge has increased in some regions (WGI
14 Chapter 11), but few studies quantify changes and impacts. Increases in precipitation from tropical cyclones
15 (WGI Chapter 11) and associated high tide are expected to exacerbate coastal flooding. However, more
16 studies are required to quantify their impacts. In addition, limitations in the duration of data hinder the
17 assessment of trends in low-likelihood high-impact flooding (WGI BOX 11.2).
18
19 In summary, the frequency and magnitude of river floods have changed in the past several decades with high
20 regional variations (high confidence). Anthropogenic climate change has increased the likelihood of extreme
21 precipitation events and the associated increase in the frequency and magnitude of river floods (high
22 confidence). There is high confidence that the warming in the last 40-60 years has led to ~10 days earlier
23 spring floods per decade, shifts in timing and magnitude of ice-jam floods and changes in frequency and
24 magnitude of snowmelt floods.
25
26 4.2.5 Observed Changes in Droughts
27
28 There are different types of droughts, and they are interconnected in terms of processes (Douville et al.,
29 2021). Meteorological droughts (periods of persistent low precipitation) propagate over time into deficits in
30 soil moisture, streamflow, and water storage, leading to a reduction in water supply (hydrological drought).
31 Increased atmospheric evaporative demand increases plant water stress, leading to agricultural and
32 ecological drought.
33
34 Hydrological drought can result in shortages of drinking water and cause substantial economic damages.
35 Agricultural drought threatens food production through crop damage and yield decreases (e.g. (Tigkas et al.,
36 2019), 4.3.1) (high confidence) and consequent economic impacts (Table 4.4). For example, drought in India
37 in 2014 was reported to have led to an estimated US $30 billion in losses (Ward and Makhija, 2018).
38 Ecological drought increases the risks of wildfire (Table 4.4). Cascading effects of droughts can include
39 health issues triggered by a lack of sanitation (4.3.3); can cause human displacements, loss of social ties,
40 sense of place and cultural identity; and migration to unsafe settlements (medium confidence) (Serdeczny et
41 al., 2017) (4.3.7). Between 1970 and 2019, only 7% of all disaster events were drought-related, yet they
42 contributed disproportionately to 34% of disaster-related death, mostly in Africa (WMO, 2021).
43 Nevertheless, Indigenous knowledge, traditional knowledge and local knowledge have increased drought
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1 resilience among crop and livestock farmers, for example, in South Africa (Muyambo et al., 2017), Uganda
2 (Barasa et al., 2020) and India (Patel et al., 2020) (4.8.4).
3
4 When hazard, vulnerability, and exposure are considered together, drought risk is lower for sparsely
5 populated regions, such as tundra and tropical forests, and higher for populated areas and intensive crop and
6 livestock farming regions, such as South and Central Asia, the Southeast of South America, Central Europe,
7 and the Southeast of the USA (Figure 4.9). Dynamics in exposure and vulnerability are rarely addressed
8 (Jurgilevich et al., 2017; Hagenlocher et al., 2019). Quantifying economic vulnerability to drought in terms
9 of damages as a percentage of exposed Gross Domestic Product, (Formetta and Feyen, 2019) show a
10 disproportionate burden of drought impact on low-income countries, but with a clear decrease in global
11 economic drought vulnerability between 1980�1989 and 2007�2016 including a convergence between
12 lower-income and higher-income countries due to stronger vulnerability reduction in less-developed
13 countries. Nevertheless, in 2007-2016 economic vulnerability to drought was twice as high in lower income
14 countries compared to higher-income countries (Formetta and Feyen, 2019).
15
16
17
18 Figure 4.9: Current global drought risk and its components. (a) Drought hazard computed for the events between 1901�
19 2010 by the probability of exceedance the median of global severe precipitation deficits, using precipitation data from
20 the Global Precipitation Climatology Center (GPCC) for 1901�2010. (b) Drought vulnerability is derived from an
21 arithmetic composite model combining social, economic, and infrastructural factors proposed by (UNISDR, 2004). (c)
22 Drought exposure computed at the sub-national level with the non-compensatory DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis)
23 model (Cook et al., 2014). (d) Drought risk based on the above components of hazard, vulnerability and exposure,
24 scored on a scale of 0 (lowest risk) to 1(highest risk) with the lowest and highest hazard, exposure, and vulnerability
25 (Carr鉶 et al., 2016).
26
27
28 AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021) found that increasing agricultural and ecological
29 droughts trends are more evident than increasing trends in meteorological drought in several regions due to
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1 increased evaporative demand. Therefore, WG1 concluded with high confidence that the increased frequency
2 and the severity of agricultural/ecological droughts over the last decades in the Mediterranean and western
3 North America can be attributed to anthropogenic warming.
4
5 In addition, there is high confidence in anthropogenic influence on increased meteorological drought in
6 south-western Australia and medium confidence that recent drying and severe droughts in southern Africa
7 and south-western South America can be attributed to human influence. Increased agricultural/ecological and
8 (or) meteorological and (or) hydrological drought is also seen with either medium confidence or high
9 confidence in the trend but with low confidence on attribution to anthropogenic climate change in western,
10 north-eastern and central Africa; central, eastern and southern Asia; eastern Australia; southern and north-
11 eastern South America and the South American monsoon region; and western and central Europe. Finally,
12 decreased drought in one or more categories is seen with medium confidence in western and eastern Siberia;
13 northern and central Australia; south-eastern South America; central North America and northern Europe,
14 but with low confidence in attribution to anthropogenic influence except in northern Europe where
15 anthropogenic influence on decreased meteorological drought is assessed with medium confidence.
16
17 Major drought events worldwide have had substantial societal and ecological impacts, including reduced
18 crop yields, shortages of drinking water, wildfires causing deaths of people, very large numbers of animals
19 and impacting the habitats of threatened species, and widespread economic losses (Table 4.4, Cross-Chapter
20 Box DISASTER in Chapter 4). In addition, anthropogenic climate change was found to have increased the
21 likelihood or severity of most such events examined in event attribution studies.
22
23
24 Table 4.4: Selected major drought events from 2013-2020 and their societal impact. Studies were selected for
25 presentation based on the availability of impacts information, including an example of events which was not found to
26 have a component attributable to climate change. This is not a systematic assessment of event attributions studies and
27 their physical science conclusions. "Sign of influence" indicates whether anthropogenic climate change was found to
28 have made the event more or less likely, and "mechanism/magnitude of influence" quantifies the change in likelihood
29 and the processes or quantities involved.
Year Country / Impact Influence of anthropogenic climate on the Reference
region likelihood of an event
Sign of Mechanism/magnitude of
influence influence
2019 / Australia Wildfires burning ~97,000 Increase Extreme high temperatures (van
2020
km2 across southern and causing drying of fuel. The Oldenborgh
eastern Australia. 34 likelihood of extreme heat at et al., 2020;
human fatalities; 5900 least doubled due to the Ward et al.,
buildings destroyed; long-term warming trend, 2020; Haque
millions of people affected and the likelihood of Fire et al., 2021)
by hazardous air quality; Weather Index as severe or
between 0.5 and 1.5 billion worse as observed
wild animals and tens of in 2019/20 by at least 30%,
thousands of livestock despite no attributable
killed; at least 30% of increase in meteorological
habitat affected for seventy (precipitation) drought.
taxa, including 21 already
listed as threatened with
extinction, over US$110
billion financial loss.
2019 Western Cape, Water supply was reduced Increase Anthropogenic greenhouse (Kam et al.,
South Africa to 20% of capacity in forcing at least doubled the 2021)
January 2018. Agricultural likelihood of drought levels
yields in 2019 declined by seen in 2015-2019,
25% offsetting anthropogenic
aerosol forcing.
Yunnan, Water scarcity affected Increase Anthropogenic influence (Wang et al.,
south-western nearly 7 million residents increased the risk of 2019 2021b)
China and resulted in crop failure March璊une hot and dry
over at least 1.35 � 104 extremes over Yunnan
km2 cropland (Fig. 1). province in south-western
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More than 94% of the total China by 123%�157% and
area in the province was 13%�23%, respectively.
drought-stricken, and
Southwestern around 2 million people Increase Anthropogenic forcing has (Lu et al.,
China faced drinking water Increase likely increased the like- 2021)
shortages, with a direct lihood of the May璊une
South China economic loss of about 2019 severe low precipita-
6.56 billion RMB tion event in south-western
Over 640,100 hectares of China by approximately 1.4
crops with rice, corn, and to 6 times.
potatoes were extensively
damaged. Over 100 rivers Anthropogenic global Du et al.
and 180 reservoirs dried warming increased the (2021)
out. Over 824,000 people weather-related risk of
and 566,000 head of extreme wildfire by 7.2 Hu et al.
livestock having a severe times. In addition, the El (2021)
lack of drinking water, Ni駉 event increased risk by
with a direct economic loss 3.6 times. Zhang et al.
of 2.81 billion Chinese Anthropogenic forcing (2020)
Yuan ($400 million) reduced the probability of
A lightning-caused forest rainfall amount in the (Du et al.,
fire in Muli County killed extended rainy winter of 2021)
31 firefighters and burned 2018/19 by ~19% but
about 30 ha of forest exerted no influence on the (Hoell et al.,
excessive rainy days 2019)
Middle and Reduced agriculture Decrease Likelihood increased by 17
lower reaches productivity and increased times in the HadGEM3-A
of the Yangtze load on power system model. However, the event
River, China supplies and did not occur without human
transportations, and on influence in the CAM5
human health. model.
The likelihood of the record
2018 South China Shrinking reservoirs, water Increase 145 CDD was increased by
2017 shortages. Area and yield Increase between 1.29 and 2.09 times
China for early rice reduced by by anthropogenic climate
(Beijing) 350 thousand hectares and change and between 1.43
1.28 million tons relative and 4.59 times by combining
to 2017 the La Ni馻 event and weak
A record 145 Consecutive Arctic polar vortex.
Dry Days (|CDD), severe 1.5 times more likely due to
drought, increased risk of increased evapotranspiration
wildfires. (minimal anthropogenic
impact on precipitation)
USA "billion-dollar disaster"; Increase
(Northern widespread wildfires (one Increase Likelihood doubled (Funk et al.,
Great Plains) of Montana's worst 2019)
wildfire seasons on record)
East Africa compromised water
resources, destruction of
property, livestock sell-
offs, reduced agricultural
production, agricultural
losses of $2.5 billion
Extensive drought across
Tanzania, Ethiopia, Kenya,
and Somalia contributed to
extreme food insecurity
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2016 Southern approaching near-famine Increase Anthropogenic climate (Funk et al.,
Africa conditions Not found change likely increased the 2018)
Millions of people were intensity of the 2015/16 El
2016 Brazil affected by famine, Increase Ni駉, and a drought of this (Martins et
disease, and water severity would have been al., 2018)
2016 Thailand shortages. In addition, a 9- Increase very unlikely (probability
million ton cereal deficit No ~9%) in the pre-industrial (Christidis et
2015 Washington resulted in 26 million impact climate. al., 2018)
state, USA people in need of Not found
humanitarian assistance. Increase (Fosu et al.,
2014 S鉶 Paulo, Tr阺 Marias, Sobradinho, The record temperature of 2016)
Brazil and Itaparica reservoirs April 2016 in Thailand (Otto et al.,
reached 5% of volume would not have occurred 2015)
2014 Southern capacity. (Cear�), without the influence of both
Levant, Syria registered 39 (of 153) anthropogenic forcings and (Bergaoui et
reservoirs empty in Cear�. El Ni駉. Anthropogenic al., 2015)
Another 42 reached forcing has contributed to
inactive volume. 96 (of drier Aprils, but El Ni駉 was
184) Cear� municipalities the dominant cause of low
experienced water supply rainfall.
interruption. Snowpack drought resulted
Severe drought affected 41 from exceedingly high
Thai provinces, had temperatures despite normal
devastating effects on precipitation
major crops, such as rice Anthropogenic climate
and sugar cane, and change
incurred a total loss in the is not found to be a major
agricultural production of influence on the hazard,
about half a billion US whereas increasing
dollars population and water
consumption increased
The US $335 million loss vulnerability.
for the agricultural
industry The persistent drought in the
2014 rainy season
In January 2015, the was unprecedented for the
largest water supply critical January璅ebruary
system used for Sao Paulo, period in the observational
Cantareira, sank to a water record, and was made ~45%
volume of just 5% of more likely by
capacity, and the number anthropogenic climate
of people supplied fell change.
from 8.8 million people to
5.3 million people, with
other systems taking over
supplies for the remainder.
While the extent to which
the 2007/08 drought in the
Levant region destabilized
the Syrian government was
not clear, "there is no
questioning the enormous
toll this extreme event took
on the region's population.
The movement of refugees
from both the drought and
war-affected regions into
Jordan and Lebanon
ensured that the
anomalously low
precipitation in the winter
of 2013/14 amplified
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impacts on already
complex water and food
provisions."
2013- Mediterranean The Eastern (main) basin Unclear High western Pacific sea (Barlow and
2014 coastal Middle of the Aral Sea dried up surface temperatures (SSTs) Hoell, 2015)
East, for the first time in modern linked to drought in the
northward history Middle East and central-
through southwest Asia, and the
Turkey and SSTs in that region showed a
eastward strong warming trend.
through
Kazakhstan,
Uzbekistan
and
Kyrgyzstan
2014 East Africa Some isolated food Increase Anthropogenic warming (Funk et al.,
security crises contributed to the 2014 East 2018)
African drought by
increasing East African and
west
Pacific temperatures, and
increasing the gradient
between standardized
western and central Pacific
SST
causing reduced rainfall,
evapotranspiration, and soil
moisture.
1
2
3 Although long-term drought trends are clearer for agricultural or ecological drought compared to
4 meteorological droughts (Douville et al., 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021), most attribution studies for
5 individual extreme events focus on meteorological (precipitation) drought and sometimes also considers
6 temperature anomalies. A complete examination of drought relevant to societal impacts often requires
7 consideration of hydrological and agricultural drought, so extreme event attribution conclusions relating to
8 precipitation alone may not fully capture the processes leading to societal effects. There is, therefore, a
9 critical knowledge gap in the attribution of changes in drought indicators more closely related to societal
10 impacts such as soil moisture and the availability of fresh water supplies.
11
12 In summary, droughts can have substantial societal impacts (virtually certain), and agricultural and
13 ecological drought conditions in particular have become more frequent and severe in many parts of the world
14 but less frequent and severe in some others (high confidence). Drought-induced economic losses relative to
15 GDP are approximately twice as high in lower-income countries compared to higher-income countries,
16 although the gap has narrowed since the 1980s and at the global scale there is a decreasing trend of economic
17 vulnerability to drought (medium confidence). Nevertheless, anthropogenic climate change has contributed to
18 the increased likelihood or severity of drought events in many parts of the world, causing reduced
19 agricultural yields, drinking water shortages for millions of people, increased wildfire risk, loss of lives of
20 humans and other species and loss of billions of dollars of economic damages (medium confidence).
21
22 4.2.6 Observed Changes in Groundwater
23
24 AR5 concluded that the extent to which groundwater abstractions are affected by climate change is not well
25 known due to the lack of long-term observational data (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). AR 6 (Douville et al.,
26 2021) confirmed that, despite considerable progress since AR5, limitations in the spatio-temporal coverage
27 of groundwater monitoring networks, abstraction data, and numerical representations of groundwater
28 recharge processes continue to constrain understanding of climate change impacts on groundwater.
29
30 Globally groundwater use has societal and economic benefits providing a critical buffer against precipitation
31 variability. Groundwater irrigation has ensured food security, livelihood support, and poverty alleviation, for
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1 example, in India (Sekhri, 2014), Bangladesh (Salem et al., 2018), and sub-Saharan Africa (Taylor et al.,
2 2013a; Cuthbert et al., 2019b). Groundwater is a safe drinking water source during natural hazard-induced
3 disasters (Richts and Vrba, 2016). However, groundwater over-exploitation leads to the attenuation of
4 societal benefits, including reduced agricultural production (Asoka and Mishra, 2020; Jain et al., 2021),
5 decrease in adaptive capacity of communities (Blakeslee et al., 2020), and water quality deterioration (Mas-
6 Pla and Menci�, 2019). Loss of traditional water systems based on groundwater, such as foggara in Tunisia
7 (Mokadem et al., 2018), qanat in Pakistan (Mustafa and Usman Qazi, 2008), aflaj in Oman (Remmington,
8 2018), and spring boxes in the Himalayas (Kumar and Sen, 2018) also leads to loss of cultural values for
9 local communities.
10
11 Even though global groundwater abstraction (789 � 30 km3 yr-1) is just about 6 percent of the annual
12 recharge (~13,466 km3) (Hanasaki et al., 2018), few hotspots of groundwater depletion have emerged at local
13 to regional scales since the end of 20th century to beginning of 21st century due to intensive groundwater use
14 for irrigation. The variability in groundwater storage is a function of human abstraction and natural recharge,
15 which is in turn controlled by local geology (Green, 2016). In humid regions, precipitation influences
16 recharge, and linear associations between precipitation and recharge are often observed (Kotchoni et al.,
17 2019); for example, over humid locations in sub-Saharan Africa (Cuthbert et al., 2019b).
18
19 A global review (Bierkens and Wada, 2019) of groundwater storage changes highlight that estimates of
20 depletion rates at the global scale are variable. These estimates range from approximately 113 to 510 km3
21 year-1 and variation in estimates is due to methods and spatio-temporal scales considered (high confidence).
22 Global hydrological models (Herbert and D鰈l, 2019) show that human-induced groundwater depletion at
23 rates exceeding 20 mm year-1 (2001�2010) is occurring in the major aquifers systems such as the High Plains
24 and California Central Valley aquifers (USA), Arabian aquifer (Middle East), North-Western Sahara aquifer
25 (North Africa), Indo-Gangetic Basin (India) and North China Plain (China) (high confidence). Groundwater
26 depletion at lower rates (<10 mm year-1) is taking place in the Amazon Basin (Brazil) and Mekong River
27 Basin (South East Asia), primarily due to climate variability and change (high confidence). A global-scale
28 analysis (Shamsudduha and Taylor, 2020) of GRACE satellite measurements (2002�2016) for the 37 world's
29 large aquifer systems reveals that trends in groundwater storage are mostly nonlinear and declines are not
30 secular (high confidence). There are strong statistical associations between changes in groundwater storage
31 and extreme annual precipitation from 1901 to 2016 in the Great Artesian Basin (Australia) and the
32 California Central Valley aquifer (USA). Groundwater recharge of high magnitudes can be generated from
33 intensive precipitation events. On the other hand, recharge can become more episodic, mostly in arid to
34 semi-arid locations (robust evidence, medium agreement). For example, in central Tanzania, seven rainfall
35 events between 1955 and 2010 generated 60% of total recharge (Taylor et al., 2013b). Similarly, in southern
36 India (Asoka et al., 2018) and southwestern USA (Thomas et al., 2016), focused recharge via losses from
37 ephemeral river channels, overland flows, and floodwaters is documented (Cuthbert et al., 2019b).
38
39 In cold regions, where snowmelt dominates the local hydrological processes (Irannezhad et al., 2016) and
40 (Vincent et al., 2019) show high recharge to aquifers from glacial meltwater; while (Nygren et al., 2020)
41 report a decrease in groundwater recharge due to a shift in main recharge period from spring (snowmelt) to
42 winter (rainfall). In Finland, a sustained reduction (almost 100 mm in 100 years) of long-term snow
43 accumulation combined with early snowmelt has reduced spring-time recharge (Irannezhad et al., 2016)
44 (medium confidence).
45
46 Data from ground-based long-term records in the Indo-Gangetic Basin reveals that sustainable groundwater
47 supplies are constrained more by extensive contamination (e.g., arsenic, salinity) than depletion (MacDonald
48 et al., 2016). Many low-lying coastal aquifers are contaminated with increased salinity due to land-use
49 change, rising sea levels, reduced stream flows, and increased storm surge inundation (Lall et al., 2020).
50 Nearly 26 million people are currently exposed to very high (>1500 S cm-1) salinity in shallow groundwater
51 in coastal Bangladesh (Shamsudduha and Taylor, 2020).
52
53 Groundwater Dependent Ecosystems (GDEs), such as terrestrial wetlands, stream ecosystems, estuarine and
54 marine ecosystems (Kl鴙e et al., 2014), support wetlands, biodiversity, provide water supply, baseflows to
55 rivers, offers recreational services, and help control floods (Rohde et al., 2017). Globally, 10% to 23% of the
56 watersheds have reached the environmental flow limits due to groundwater pumping (de Graaf et al., 2019).
57 A recent study of 4.2 million wells across the USA shows that induced groundwater recharge in nearly two-
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1 thirds of these wells could reduce stream discharges, thereby threatening GDEs (Jasechko et al., 2021).
2 (Work, 2020) found reduced spring flow due to increased groundwater abstraction in 26 out of 56 springs
3 studied in Florida (USA). GDEs in semi-arid and arid regions tend to have much longer groundwater
4 response times and may be more resilient to climate change than those in humid areas where groundwater
5 occurrence is mostly at shallow levels (Cuthbert et al., 2019a; Opie et al., 2020). However, groundwater
6 depletion impacts on the full range of ecosystem services remain understudied (Bierkens and Wada, 2019).
7
8 A better understanding of and incorporating subsurface storage dynamics into earth system models will
9 improve climate-groundwater interactions under global warming (Condon et al., 2020). Long-term
10 groundwater-level monitoring data are of critical importance (Famiglietti, 2014) for understanding the
11 sensitivity of recharge processes to climate variability and, more critically, calibration and validation of
12 hydrological models (Goderniaux et al., 2015). GRACE satellite-derived groundwater storage estimates
13 provide important insights at a regional scale (Rodell et al., 2018) but overlook more localized depletion or
14 short-term storage gains. Low and middle-income countries, e.g., in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa,
15 lack such monitoring networks, which is a significant knowledge gap.
16
17 In summary, groundwater storage has declined in many parts of the world, most notably since the beginning
18 of the 21st century, due to the intensification of groundwater-fed irrigation (high confidence). Groundwater in
19 aquifers across the tropics appears to be more resilient to climate change as enhanced recharge is observed to
20 occur mostly episodically from intense precipitation and flooding events (robust evidence, medium
21 agreement). In higher altitudes, warmer climates have altered groundwater regimes and may have led to
22 reduced spring-time recharge due to reduced duration and snowmelt discharges (medium confidence).
23
24 4.2.7 Observed Changes in Water Quality
25
26 AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) concluded with medium evidence and high agreement that climate
27 change affected water quality, posing additional risks to drinking water quality and human health (Field et
28 al., 2014b), particularly due to increased eutrophication at higher temperatures or release of contaminants
29 due to extreme floods (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). In addition, SROCC (Hock et al., 2019b; Meredith et
30 al., 2019) assessed that glacier decline and permafrost degradation impacts water quality through increases in
31 legacy contaminants (medium evidence, high agreement).
32
33 Warming temperatures and extreme weather events are can potentially impact water quality (Khan et al.,
34 2015). Water quality can be compromised through algal blooms that affect the taste and odour of recreational
35 and drinking water and can harbour toxins and pathogens (Khan et al., 2015). Warming directly affects
36 thermal water regimes, promoting harmful algal blooms (Li et al., 2018; Noori et al., 2018) (4.3.5).
37 Additionally, permafrost degradation leads to an increased flux of contaminants (MacMillan et al., 2015;
38 Roberts et al., 2017; Mu et al., 2019). The increased meltwater from glaciers (Zhang et al., 2019) releases
39 deposited contaminants and reduces water quality downstream (Zhang et al., 2017; Hock et al., 2019b).
40
41 Floods intensify the mixing of floodwater with wastewater and the redistribution of pollutants (Andrade et
42 al., 2018). In addition, contaminated floodwaters pose an immediate health risk through waterborne diseases
43 (Huang et al., 2016b; Paterson et al., 2018; Setty et al., 2018). Wildfires, along with heavy rainfalls and
44 floods, can also affect turbidity, which increases drinking water treatment challenges and has been linked to
45 increases in gastrointestinal illness (de Roos et al., 2017. Droughts reduce river dilution capacities and
46 groundwater levels {Wen, 2017 #2093), increasing the risk of groundwater contamination (Kl鴙e et al.,
47 2014). More generally, contaminated water diminishes its aesthetic value, compromising recreational
48 activities, reducing tourism and property values, and creating challenges for management and drinking water
49 treatment (Eves and Wilkinson, 2014; Khan et al., 2015; Walters et al., 2015).
50
51 Between 2000-2010, ~10% of the global population faced adverse water quality issues (van Vliet et al.,
52 2021). Adverse drinking water quality has been associated with extreme weather events in countries located
53 in Asia, Africa, and South and North America (Jagai et al., 2015; Levy et al., 2016; Huynh and Stringer,
54 2018; Leal Filho et al., 2018; Abedin et al., 2019) (medium evidence, high agreement). Dilution factors in
55 635 of 1049 US streams fell extremely low during drought conditions. Additionally, the safety threshold for
56 endocrine-disrupting compound concentration exceeded in roughly a third of streams studied (Rice and
57 Westerhoff, 2017). Natural acid rock drainage, which can potentially release toxic substances, has
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1 experienced an intensification in an alpine catchment of Central Pyrenees due to climate change and severe
2 droughts in the last decade. River length affected by natural acid drainage increased from 5 km in 1945 to 35
3 km in 2018 (Zarroca et al., 2021). Three-fold increases in contaminants and five-fold increases in nutrients
4 have been observed in water sources after wildfires (Khan et al., 2015). Due to permafrost thawing, the
5 concentration of major ions, especially SO42- in two high Arctic lakes, has rapidly increased up to 500% and
6 340% during 2006�2016 and 2008�2016, respectively (Roberts et al., 2017). The exports of Dissolved
7 Organic Carbon, Particulate Organic Carbon and Mercury in six Arctic rivers were reported to increase with
8 significant deepening active layers caused by climate warming during 1999-2015 (Mu et al., 2019).
9 Sustained warming in Lake Tanganyika in Zambia during the last 150 years reduced lake mixing, which
10 has depressed algal production, shrunk the oxygenated benthic habitat by 38%, and further reduced fish yield
11 and mollusc (Cohen et al., 2016). From 1994 to 2010, coastal benthos at King George Island in Antarctica
12 has observed a remarkable shift primarily linked to ongoing climate warming and the increased sediment
13 runoff triggered by glacier retreats (Sahade et al., 2015). The recovery time of macroinvertebrates from
14 floods was found longer in cases of pre-existing pollution problems (Smith et al., 2019a).
15
16 In summary, although climate-induced water quality degradation due to increases in water and surface
17 temperatures or melting of the cryosphere has been observed (medium confidence), evidence of global-scale
18 changes in water quality is limited because many studies are isolated and have limited regional coverage.
19
20 4.2.8 Observed Changes in Soil Erosion and Sediment Load
21
22 AR5 established potential impacts of climate change on soil erosion and sediment loads in mountain regions
23 with glacier melt (low to medium evidence) (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). SRCCL (Olsson et al., 2020)
24 reported with high confidence that rainfall changes attributed to human-induced climate change have already
25 intensified drivers of land degradation. Nonetheless, attributing land degradation to climate change alone is
26 challenging because of the role of land management practices (medium evidence, high agreement).
27
28 Climate change impacts soil erosion and sedimentation rates both directly from increasing rainfall or
29 snowmelt intensity (Vanmaercke et al., 2014; Polyakov et al., 2017; Diodato et al., 2018; Golosov et al.,
30 2018; Li et al., 2020a; Li et al., 2020b) and indirectly from increasing wildfires (Gould et al., 2016;
31 Langhans et al., 2016; DeLong et al., 2018), permafrost thawing (Schiefer et al., 2018; Lafreni鑢e and
32 Lamoureux, 2019; Ward Jones et al., 2019), vegetation cover changes (Micheletti et al., 2015; Potemkina
33 and Potemkin, 2015; Carrivick and Heckmann, 2017; Beel et al., 2018). In addition, accelerated soil erosion
34 and sedimentation have severe societal impacts through land degradation, reduced soil productivity and
35 water quality (4.2.7), increased eutrophication and disturbance to aquatic ecosystems (4.3.5), sedimentation
36 of waterways and damage to infrastructure (Graves et al., 2015; Issaka and Ashraf, 2017; Schellenberg et al.,
37 2017; Hewett et al., 2018; Panagos et al., 2018; Sartori et al., 2019) (medium confidence).
38
39 In the largest river basin of the Colombian Andes, regional climate change and land use activities
40 (ploughing, grazing, deforestation) caused a 34% erosion rate increase over 10 years, with the anthropogenic
41 soil erosion rate exceeding the climate-driven erosion rate (Restrepo and Escobar, 2018). Sedimentation
42 increases due to soil erosion in mountainous regions burned by wildfires, as a result of warming and altered
43 precipitation, is documented with high confidence in the USA (Gould et al., 2016; DeLong et al., 2018),
44 Australia (Nyman et al., 2015; Langhans et al., 2016), China (Cui et al., 2014), Greece (Karamesouti et al.,
45 2016), and can potentially damage downstream aquatic ecosystems (4.3.5) and water quality (4.2.7) (Cui et
46 al., 2014; Murphy et al., 2015; Langhans et al., 2016) (medium confidence). In Australia, for instance,
47 sediment yields from post-fire debris flows (113�294 t ha-1) are 2�3 orders of magnitude higher than annual
48 background erosion rates from undisturbed forests (Nyman et al., 2015). The positive trend in sediment yield
49 in small ponds in the semi-arid southwestern USA over the last 90 years was not entirely related to the
50 rainfall or runoff trends, but was a result of complex interaction between long-term changes in vegetation,
51 soil, and channel networks (Polyakov et al., 2017).
52
53 Regional climate changes (precipitation decrease) and human activities (landscape engineering, terracing,
54 large-scale vegetation restoration, soil conservation) over the Loess Plateau (China) caused a distinct
55 stepwise reduction in sediment loads from the upper-middle reach of the Yellow River, with 30% of the
56 change related to climate change (Tian et al., 2019). Substantial increases in sediment flux were identified on
57 the Tibetan Plateau (Li et al., 2020a; Li et al., 2021a), e.g. the sediment load from the Tuotuohe headwater
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1 increased by 135% from 1985-1997 to 1998-2016, mainly due to climate change (Li et al., 2020a). In 1986-
2 2015, the sedimentation rate in dry valley bottoms of the Southern Russian Plain was 2 to 5 times lower than
3 in 1963�1986 due to the warming-induced surface runoff reduction during spring snowmelt (Golosov et al.,
4 2018). Declining erosion trends are primarily associated with soil conservation management in northern
5 Germany (Steinhoff-Knopp and Burkhard, 2018) and reforestation in southwestern China (Zhou et al.,
6 2020).
7
8 The climate change impact on erosion and sediment load varies significantly over the world (Li et al., 2020b)
9 (high confidence). There was a statistically significant correlation between sediment yield and air
10 temperature for the non-Mediterranean region of Western and Central Europe (Vanmaercke et al., 2014) and
11 Northern Africa (Achite and Ouillon, 2016). Still, such correlation is yet to be found for the other European
12 rivers (Vanmaercke et al., 2015). Increased sediment and particulate organic carbon fluxes in the Arctic
13 regions are caused by permafrost warming (Schiefer et al., 2018; Lafreni鑢e and Lamoureux, 2019; Ward
14 Jones et al., 2019). (Potemkina and Potemkin, 2015) demonstrate that regional warming and permafrost
15 degradation have contributed to an increased forested area over the last 40�70 years, reducing soil erosion in
16 Eastern Siberia. The sediment dynamics of small rivers in the eastern Italian Alps, depending on extreme
17 floods, is sensitive to climate change (Rainato et al., 2017). In the north-eastern Italian Alps, precipitation
18 change in 1986-2010 affected soil wetness conditions, influencing sediment load (Diodato et al., 2018).
19 Regional warming in northern Africa (Algeria) dramatically changed river streamflow and increased
20 sediment load over 4 decades (84% more every decade compared to the previous) (Achite and Ouillon,
21 2016).
22
23 A long-term global soil erosion monitoring network based on the unified methodological approach is needed
24 to correctly evaluate erosion rate, detect its changes and attribute them to climate or other drivers.
25
26 In summary, in the areas with high human activity, the latter impact soil erosion and sediment flux more
27 significantly than the climatic factors (high confidence). On the other hand, in natural conditions, e.g. in high
28 latitudes and high mountains, the influence of climate change on the acceleration of the erosion rate is
29 observed (limited evidence, medium agreement).
30
31
32 4.3 Observed Sectoral Impacts of Current Hydrological Changes
33
34 The intensification of the hydrological cycle due to anthropogenic climate change has multifaceted and
35 severe impacts for cultural, economic, social and political pathways. In this section, we assess burgeoning
36 evidence since AR5 which shows that environmental quality, economic development, and social well-being
37 have been affected by climate induced hydrological changes since many aspects of the economy,
38 environment, and society are dependent upon water resources. We advance previous IPCC reports by
39 assessing evidence on the impacts of climate change-induced water insecurity for energy production (4.3.2),
40 urbanization (4.3.4), conflicts (4.3.6), human mobility (4.3.7) and cultural usage of water (4.3.8).
41
42 Integrating qualitative and quantitative data, we show that it is evident that societies heightened exposure to
43 water-induced disasters � as floods and droughts � and other hydrological changes have increased
44 vulnerability across most sectors and regions, with few exceptions. Through the assessment of literature
45 relying on Indigenous knowledge, we are also able to present evidence on how observed changes impact
46 particularly Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and marginalized groups, as women, people without
47 social protections and minorities.
48
49 Importantly, we note, that climate change induced hydrological changes are, for most sectors, one of the
50 several factors, often coupled with urbanization, population growth and heightened economic disparities, that
51 have increased societal vulnerability and required communities across the globe to alter their productive and
52 cultural practices.
53
54 4.3.1 Observed Impacts on Agriculture
55
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1 AR5 concluded with high confidence that agricultural production was negatively affected by climate change,
2 with droughts singled out as a major driver of food insecurity. In contrast, evidence of floods on food
3 production was limited (Porter et al., 2014).
4
5 Globally 23% of croplands are irrigated, providing 34% of global calories production. Of these lands, 68%
6 experience blue water scarcity at the least one month-yr and 37% up to 5 months-yr. Such agricultural water
7 scarcity is experienced in mostly drought-prone areas in low-income countries (Rosa et al., 2020a).
8 Approximately three-quarters of the global harvested areas (~454 million hectares) experienced drought-
9 induced yield losses between 1983 and 2009, and the cumulative production losses corresponded to US$166
10 billion (Kim et al., 2019). Globally, droughts affected both harvested areas and yields, with a reported cereal
11 production loss of 9-10% due to weather extremes between 1964 and 2007. Yield losses were greater by
12 about 7% during recent droughts (1985-2007) due to greater damage � reducing harvested area - compared to
13 losses from earlier droughts (1964-1984), with 8-11% greater losses in high-income countries than in low-
14 income ones (Lesk et al., 2016). Globally, between 1961 and 2006, it has been estimated that 25% yield loss
15 occurred, with yield loss probability increasing by 22% for maize, 9% for rice, and 22% for soybean under
16 drought conditions (Leng and Hall, 2019). Mean climate, and climate extremes are responsible for 20-49%
17 of yield anomalies variance, with 18-45% of this variance attributable to droughts and heatwaves (Vogel et
18 al., 2019). Drought has been singled out as a major driver of yield reductions globally (high confidence)
19 (Lesk et al., 2016; Meng et al., 2016; Zipper et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2019; Leng and Hall, 2019).
20
21 Yields of major crops in semi-arid regions, including the Mediterranean, sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and
22 Australia, are negatively affected by precipitation declines in the absence of irrigation (Iizumi et al., 2018;
23 Ray et al., 2019), but this trend is less evident in wetter regions (Iizumi et al., 2018). Precipitation and
24 temperature changes reduced global mean yields of maize, wheat and soybeans by 4.1%, 1.8% and 4.5%,
25 respectively (Iizumi et al., 2018). Of the global rice yield variability of ~32%, precipitation variability
26 accounted for a larger share in drier South Asia than in wetter East and Southeast Asia (Ray et al., 2015).
27 Between 1910-2014 agro-climatic conditions became more conducive to maize and soybean yield growth in
28 the American Midwest due to increases in summer precipitation and cooling due to irrigation (Iizumi and
29 Ramankutty, 2016; Mueller et al., 2016) (Box 4.3). In Australia, between 1990 and 2015, the negative effects
30 of reduced precipitation and rising temperature led to yield losses, but yield losses were partly avoided
31 because of elevated CO2 atmospheric concentration and technological advancements (Hochman et al.,
32 2017a). Overall, temperature-only effects are stronger in wetter regions like Europe and East and Southeast
33 Asia, and precipitation-only effects are stronger in drier regions (Iizumi et al., 2018; Ray et al., 2019)
34 (medium evidence, high agreement). In Asia, the gap between rainfed and irrigated maize yield widened
35 from 5% in the 1980s to 10% in the 2000s (Meng et al., 2016). In North America, yields of maize and
36 soybeans have increased (1958-2007), yet meteorological drought has been associated with 13% of overall
37 yield variability. However, yield variability was not a concern where irrigation is prevalent (Zipper et al.,
38 2016). However, when water scarcity has reduced irrigation, yields have been negatively impacted (Elias et
39 al., 2016). In Europe, yields have been affected negatively by droughts (Beillouin et al., 2020), with losses
40 tripling between 1964 and 2015 (Br醩 et al., 2021). In West Africa between 2000 and 2009, drought, among
41 other altered climate conditions, led to millet and sorghum yield reductions between 10-20% and 5-15%,
42 respectively (Sultan et al., 2019). Between 2006 to 2016, droughts contributed to food insecurity and
43 malnutrition in northern, eastern, and southern Africa, Asia and the Pacific. In 36% of these nations � mainly
44 in Africa � where severe droughts occurred, undernourishment rose (Phalkey et al., 2015; Cooper et al.,
45 2019). An attribution study showed that anthropogenic emissions increased the chances of October-
46 December droughts over the region by 1.4 to 4.3 times and resulted in below-average harvests in Zambia and
47 South Africa (Nangombe et al., 2020). Root crops, a staple in many tropics and sub-tropical countries, and
48 vegetables are particularly prone to drought, leading to smaller fruits or crop failure (Daryanto et al., 2017;
49 Bisbis et al., 2018). Livestock production has also been affected by changing seasonality, increasing
50 frequency of drought, rising temperatures and vector-borne diseases and parasites through changes in the
51 overall availability, as well as reduced nutritional value, of forage and feed crops (Varadan and Kumar,
52 2014; Naqvi et al., 2015; Zougmor� et al., 2016; Henry et al., 2018; Godde et al., 2019) (medium
53 confidence).
54
55 Floods have led to harvest failure, crop and fungal contamination (Liu et al., 2013; Uyttendaele et al., 2015).
56 Globally, between 1980 and 2018, excess soil moisture has reduced rice, maize, soybean and wheat yields
57 between 7 and 12% (Borgomeo et al., 2020). Changes in groundwater storage and availability, which are
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1 affected by the intensity of irrigated agriculture, also negatively impacted crop yields and cropping patterns
2 (4.2.6, Box 4.3, 4.7.2). Moreover, extreme precipitation can lead to increased surface flooding, waterlogging,
3 soil erosion and susceptibility to salinization (high confidence). For example, in Bangladesh, in March and
4 April 2017, floods affected 220,000 ha of nearly ready to be harvested summer paddy crop and resulted in
5 almost a 30% year on year increase in paddy prices. An attribution study of those pre-monsoon extreme
6 rainfall events in Bangladesh concluded that anthropogenic climate change doubled the likelihood of the
7 extreme rainfall event (Rimi et al., 2019). Moreover, floods, extreme weather events and cyclones have led
8 to animal escapes and infrastructure damage in aquaculture (Beveridge et al., 2018; Islam and Hoq, 2018;
9 Naskar et al., 2018; Lebel et al., 2020) (see 5.9.1).
10
11 Worldwide, the magnitudes of climate-induced water-related hazards and their impact on agriculture are
12 differentiated across populations and genders (4.3.6; 4.8.3). Evidence shows that hydroclimatic factors pose
13 high food insecurity risks to subsistence farmers, whose first and only source of livelihood is agriculture, and
14 who are situated at low latitudes where the climate is hotter and drier (Shrestha and Nepal, 2016; Sujakhu et
15 al., 2016). Historically, they have been the most vulnerable to observed climate-induced hydrological
16 changes (Savo et al., 2016). Indigenous and local communities, often heavily reliant on agriculture, have a
17 wealth of knowledge about observed changes. These are important because they shape farmers' perceptions,
18 which in turn shape the adaptation measures farmers will undertake (Caretta and B鰎jeson, 2015; Savo et al.,
19 2016; Sujakhu et al., 2016; Su et al., 2017) (4.8.4) (high confidence).
20
21 In summary, ongoing climate change in temperate climates has some positive impacts on agricultural
22 production. In subtropical/tropical climates, climate-induced hazards such as floods and droughts negatively
23 impact agricultural production (high confidence). People living in deprivation and Indigenous people have
24 been disproportionally affected. They often rely on rain-fed agriculture in marginal areas with high exposure
25 and high vulnerability to water-related stress and low adaptive capacity (high confidence).
26
27 4.3.2 Observed Impacts on Energy and Industrial Water Use
28
29 AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) concluded with medium evidence and high agreement that hydropower
30 negatively impacts freshwater ecosystems. SROCC (IPCC, 2019a) concluded with medium confidence that
31 climate change has led to both increases and decreases in annual/seasonal water inputs to hydropower plants.
32
33 Water is a crucial input for hydroelectric and thermoelectric energy production, which together account for
34 94.7% of the world's current electricity generation (Petroleum, 2020). Climate change impacts hydropower
35 production through changes in precipitation, evaporation, volume, and timing of run-off; and impacts cooling
36 of thermoelectric power plants through reduced streamflow and increased water temperatures (Yalew et al.,
37 2020). In addition, extreme weather events, like tropical cyclones, landslides, and floods, damage energy
38 infrastructure (MCTI, 2020; Yalew et al., 2020), while high temperature and humidity increase the energy
39 requirement for cooling (Maia-Silva et al., 2020).
40
41 With 1,308 GW installed capacity in 2019, hydropower became the world's largest single source of
42 renewable energy (IHA, 2020) (also see Figure 6.12, WGIII). While hydropower reduces emissions relative
43 to fossil fuel-based energy production, hydropower reservoirs are being increasingly associated with GHG
44 emissions caused by submergence and later re-emergence of vegetation under reservoirs due to water level
45 fluctuations (R鋝鋘en et al., 2018; Song et al., 2018; Maavara et al., 2020). A recent global study concluded
46 that reservoirs might emit more carbon than they bury, especially in the tropics (Keller et al., 2021) (medium
47 confidence).
48
49 In Ghana, between 1970 and 1990, rainfall variability accounted for 21% of inter-annual variations in
50 hydropower generation (Boadi and Owusu, 2019). In Brazil's S鉶 Francisco River, following drought events
51 in 2016 and 2017, hydropower plants operated with an average capacity factor of only 23% and 17%,
52 respectively (de Jong et al., 2018). In Switzerland, increased glacier melt contributed to 3% to 4% of
53 hydropower production since 1980 (Schaefli et al., 2019) (4.2.2). In the USA, hydropower generation
54 dropped by nearly 27% for every standard deviation increase in water scarcity. Equivalent social costs of
55 loss in hydropower generation between 2001-2012 were approximately US$330,000 (at 2015 value) per
56 month for every power plant that experienced water scarcity (Eyer and Wichman, 2018). Globally, for the
57 period 1981-2010, the utilization rate of hydropower was reduced by 5.2% during drought years compared to
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1 long-term average values (van Vliet et al., 2016a). Thus, there is a growing body of evidence of negative
2 impacts of extreme events on hydropower production (high confidence).
3
4 Impacts of water scarcity on thermoelectric plants are more unequivocal than hydropower plants. For
5 example, a simulation study showed that 32% of the world's coal-fired power plants are currently
6 experiencing water scarcity for at least five months or more in a year. The majority of these plants are in
7 China (52%), followed by India (15%) and the USA (11%) (Rosa et al., 2020c). In the United Kingdom,
8 almost 50% of freshwater thermal capacity is lost on extreme high-temperature days, causing losses in the
9 range of average GBP 29-66 million/year. In the case of ~20% of particularly vulnerable power plants, these
10 losses could increase to GBP 66-95 million/year annualized over 30 years (Byers et al., 2020). Globally, for
11 the period 1981-2010, the utilization rate of thermoelectric power was reduced by 3.8% during drought years
12 compared to long-term average values (van Vliet et al., 2016a); and none of the studies reported increases in
13 thermoelectric power production as a consequence of climate change (high confidence).
14
15 In energy sector, a large number of studies document the impact of extreme climate events (e.g., droughts, or
16 extreme temperature days) on production of hydropower and thermo-electric power, yet, there are limited
17 studies that measure trends in energy production due to long term climate change. This remains a knowledge
18 gap.
19
20 Mining in regions already vulnerable to climate change-induced water scarcity is under threat, leading some
21 countries like El Salvador to ban metal mining completely (Odell et al., 2018). Likewise, food and agro-
22 processing companies are aware of water-related threats to their operations, with 77% of 35 publicly traded
23 companies evaluated in 2019 explicitly citing water as a risk factor in their annual reports, up from 59% in
24 2017 (CDP, 2018; CERES, 2019). Changes in water availability affect the mining, electrical, metal, and
25 agro-processing sector (UNIDO, 2017; Odell et al., 2018; Frost and Hua, 2019), but these impacts are less
26 understood due to the lack of studies.
27
28 In summary, there is high confidence that climate change has had negative impacts on hydro and thermal
29 power production globally due to droughts, changes in the seasonality of river flows, and increasing ambient
30 water temperatures.
31
32 4.3.3 Observed Impacts on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH)
33
34 AR5 showed that local changes in temperature and rainfall had altered the distribution of some water-related
35 diseases (medium confidence), and extreme weather events disrupt water supplies, impacting morbidity,
36 mortality, and mental health (very high confidence) (Field et al., 2014b). In addition, melting and thawing of
37 snow, ice, and permafrost (4.2.2) have also adversely impacted water quality, security, and health (high
38 confidence) (IPCC, 2019a) (4.2.7).
39
40 Literature since AR5 confirms that temperature, precipitation, and extreme weather events are linked to
41 increased incidence and outbreaks of water-related and neglected tropical diseases (Col髇-Gonz醠ez et al.,
42 2016; Levy et al., 2016; Azage et al., 2017; Harp et al., 2021) (high confidence). For example, the rainy
43 season in Senegal has been associated with an 84% increase in relative risk of childhood diarrhoea, and an
44 additional wet day per week was associated with up to 2% increases in diarrheal disease in Mozambique
45 (Thiam et al., 2017; Horn et al., 2018). In Ecuador, increases of 1.5 cases of diarrhoea per 1000 were
46 associated with heavy rainfall after dry periods, while a decrease of 1 case per 1000 was associated with
47 heavy rain after wet periods (Carlton et al., 2014). Floods have been associated with 22% increases in
48 relative risk of diarrhoea in China (Liu et al., 2018c). In addition, higher levels of faecal contamination of
49 drinking water and hands (i.e., lack of WaSH) has been statistically significantly associated with increased
50 child diarrhoea (Goddard et al., 2020).
51
52 In 2020, 2 billion people lacked access to uncontaminated water, while 771 million lacked basic sanitation
53 services, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and rural areas (WHO and UNICEF, 2021). Even in high-income
54 countries, poor quality drinking water can be a health issue (Murphy et al., 2014). For example, in a sampled
55 population in Canada, reported exposure to exposure routes for waterborne illness included 7% from private
56 wells and 71.8% from municipal water (David et al., 2014). Drinking water treatment can be compromised
57 by degraded source water quality and extreme weather events, including droughts, storms, ice storms and
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1 wildfires that overwhelm or cause infrastructure damage (Sherpa et al., 2014; Khan et al., 2015; Howard et
2 al., 2016; White et al., 2017) (high confidence). Adverse health effects are exacerbated due to the absence of
3 adequate WaSH, particularly in poorer households (Khan et al., 2015; Kostyla et al., 2015; Ciss� et al.,
4 2016), WaSH infrastructure failure (Khan et al., 2015; Wanda et al., 2017), or inadequate WaSH facilities in
5 emergency shelters (Alam and Rahman, 2014). For example, WaSH coverage decreased from 65% to 51%
6 due to damage from floods and earthquakes in Malawi (Wanda et al., 2017). Loss of electricity also impacts
7 WaSH service delivery (Cashman, 2014), and infrastructure damage caused by climate hazards may reverse
8 progress on universal access to WaSH (Kohlitz et al., 2017) (limited evidence, high agreement). In addition,
9 wastewater outflows have been associated with a 13% increased relative risk of gastrointestinal illness
10 through contaminated drinking water sources (Jagai et al., 2015) (limited evidence, high agreement).
11 Harmful algal blooms represent an emerging health risk, but lack of monitoring and reporting prevent risk
12 exposure assessments (Carmichael and Boyer, 2016; Nichols et al., 2018) (limited evidence, high
13 agreement). Chemical contaminants (e.g., nitrates, arsenic) have been linked to non-communicable diseases,
14 including neurological disorders, liver and kidney damage, and cancers (Jones Rena et al., 2016), and to
15 some water-related diseases (e.g., schistosomiasis) (low evidence, medium agreement).
16
17 Water insecurity and inadequate WaSH have been associated with increased disease risk (high confidence),
18 stress and adverse mental health (limited evidence, medium agreement), food insecurity and adverse
19 nutritional outcomes, and poor cognitive and birth outcomes (limited evidence, medium agreement)
20 (Workman and Ureksoy, 2017; Sclar et al., 2018; Boateng et al., 2020; Rosinger and Young, 2020; Wutich et
21 al., 2020). Climate-induced water scarcity and supply disruptions disproportionately impact women and
22 girls. The necessity of water collection takes away time from income-generating activities, child care, and
23 education (Yadav and Lal, 2018; Schuster et al., 2020) (medium evidence, medium agreement). Consumption
24 of larger volumes of water is essential for healthy women during pregnancy, lactation, and caregiving, which
25 increases the amount of water that has to be fetched. Fetching of water is associated with increased risk of
26 sexual abuse, demand for sexual favours at controlled water collection points, physical injuries (e.g.,
27 musculoskeletal or from animal attacks), domestic violence for not completing daily water-related domestic
28 tasks (limited evidence, high agreement), and poorer maternal and child health (Mercer and Hanrahan, 2017;
29 Pommells et al., 2018; Anwar et al., 2019; Collins et al., 2019a; Geere and Hunter, 2020; Venkataramanan et
30 al., 2020) (medium evidence, high agreement). Menstrual hygiene management is a public health issue but
31 poorly linked to climate change, despite relationships between lack of adequate WaSH, poor menstrual
32 hygiene, and urinary tract infections (Ellis et al., 2016; Pouramin et al., 2020). Water insecurity also affects
33 emotional, spiritual, and cultural relationships that are often critical to Indigenous health (Wilson et al.,
34 2019) (limited evidence, high agreement).
35
36 There are gaps in data on climate-driven water-related disease burden for both infectious and non-
37 communicable diseases. Increased demands for water and WaSH services for infectious diseases, such as
38 HIV/AIDs and COVID-19 (Box4.4) exacerbate existing vulnerabilities and inequities (Stanley et al., 2017;
39 Armitage and Nellums, 2020a; Rodriguez-Lonebear et al., 2020). Additionally, limited research has been
40 undertaken to quantify the effects of climate-compromised WaSH on health and wellbeing.
41
42 In summary, WaSH-related household water insecurity and disease incidence are products of geography,
43 politics, social and environmental determinants, vulnerability, and climate change (Bardosh et al., 2017;
44 Stoler et al., 2021).
45
46 4.3.4 Observed Impacts on Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors
47
48 All previous IPCC reports have focused on future water-related risks to urban areas due to climate change
49 rather than documented observed impacts.
50
51 Climate extremes have profound implications for urban and peri-urban water management, particularly in an
52 increasingly urbanized world (high confidence). Over half (54%) of the global population currently lives in
53 cities (WWAP, 2019), and global urbanization rates continue to increase across all SSPs (Jiang and O'Neill,
54 2017). Using observed station data for 217 urban areas worldwide, (Mishra et al., 2015) noted that 17% of
55 cities experienced statistically significant increases (p-value <0.05) in the frequency of daily precipitation
56 extremes from 1973 to 2012. (Mishra et al., 2015) hypothesized that such observed climate changes in urban
57 areas were largely due to large scale changes rather than local land cover changes.
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1
2 Since AR5, factors such as rapid population growth, urbanization, ageing infrastructure, and changes in
3 water use have also magnified climate risks, such as drought and flooding, and contributed to urban and peri-
4 urban water insecurity (medium agreement, medium evidence) (4.1.2). For example, despite an increase in
5 flooding events from 1.1 flood events per year (1986-2005) to 5 flood events per year (2006-2016) in
6 Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), analyses of rainfall indices showed few have significant trends at 5% level
7 over the period 1961-2015 and that the generalized extreme value distribution fit the time-series of annual
8 maximum daily rainfall (Tazen et al., 2019). On the other hand, long-term annual variations of maximum
9 hourly precipitation in Shanghai (China) increased significantly during 1916-2014, especially from 1981.
10
11 Advances in the attribution of extreme weather events have made it possible to determine the causal
12 relationship between droughts, floods, and climate change for some cities, particularly those with long
13 hydro-meteorological records (Bader et al., 2018; Otto et al., 2020). Attribution analysis shows that
14 urbanization contributed to the increase in both frequencies of local and abrupt heavy rainfall events in the
15 city, at a rate of 1.5 and 1.8 (10yr)-1, respectively (Liang and Ding, 2017). A multi-method attribution
16 showed that the likelihood of prolonged rainfall deficit in Cape Town (South Africa) during 2015-17 was
17 made more likely by a factor of 3.3 (1.4-6.4) due to anthropogenic climate change (Otto et al., 2018). These
18 results show that climate change has impacted the return time of extreme droughts in the Western Cape,
19 exceeding the capacity of the existing water supply system to cope (Otto et al., 2018) (Box 9.4; 9.8.2). In
20 Baton Rouge (USA), a rapid attribution study showed that the probability of an event such as the intense
21 precipitation and flash flooding of August 2016 has increased by at least a factor of 1.4 due to radiative
22 forcing (USA) (van der Wiel et al., 2017). In Houston (USA), a study found that the combination of
23 urbanization and climate change nearly doubled peak discharge (84%) during Hurricane Harvey (August
24 2017), suggesting that land-use change magnified the effects of climate change on catchment response to
25 extreme precipitation events (Sebastian et al., 2019) (14.4.3.1; Box 14.5 The Economic Consequences of
26 Climate Change in North America, Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER in Chapter 4). According to a multi-
27 method approach, the 2014/15 drought event in Sao Paulo (Brazil) was more likely to have been driven by
28 water use changes and population growth than climate change (Otto et al., 2015) (Cross-Chapter Box
29 DISASTER in Chapter 4).
30
31 The science of weather event attribution requires high-quality observational data and climate models that are
32 currently available only in highly developed countries (Otto et al., 2020). In addition, further research is
33 necessary to determine the impacts of climate change on water-related extremes in the urban areas of
34 developing countries (Bai et al., 2018). For example, a combination of observational analysis and global
35 coupled climate models showed that the 2015 flooding event in Chennai (India) could not be attributed to
36 anthropogenic climate change, with the effects of that being relatively small in the region due to the impact
37 of greenhouse gas increases being largely counteracted by those of aerosols (van Oldenborgh et al., 2017a)
38 (4.2.5). Further research is also required to determine the impacts of climate change on water-related
39 extremes in informal settlements where vulnerability to water insecurity is high due to poverty,
40 overcrowding, poor-quality housing, and lack of basic infrastructure (Scovronick et al., 2015; Grasham et al.,
41 2019; Williams et al., 2019; Satterthwaite et al., 2020).
42
43 In summary, water-related hazards such as drought and flooding have been exacerbated by climate change in
44 some cities (high confidence). Further research is necessary to determine the extent and nature of water-
45 related climate change impacts in the urban areas of developing countries (high confidence).
46
47
48 [START CROSS-CHAPTER BOX DISASTER HERE]
49
50 Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER: Disasters as the Public Face of Climate Change
51
52 Authors: Aditi Mukherji (India, Chapter 4), Gu閘adio Ciss� (Mauritania/Switzerland/France, Chapter 7),
53 Caroline Zickgraf (Contributing Author), Paulina Aldunce (Chile, Chapter 7), Liliana Raquel Miranda Sara
54 (Peru, Chapter 12), William Solecki, (USA, Chapter 17), Friederike Otto (United Kingdom, WGI), Fran鏾is
55 Gemenne (France, WGI), Martina Angela Caretta (Sweden, Chapter 4);, Richard Jones (United Kingdom,
56 WGI); Richard Betts (United Kingdom, Chapter 4), Maarten van Aalst (Netherlands, Chapter 16), Jakob
57 Zscheischler (Switzerland), Kris Murray (UK), Mauro E. Gonz醠ez (Chile).
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1
2 Introduction
3
4 Some extreme weather events are increasing in frequency and (or) severity as a result of climate change
5 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) (high confidence). These include extreme rainfall events (Roxy et al., 2017; Myhre
6 et al., 2019; Tabari, 2020); extreme and prolonged heat leading to catastrophic fires (Bowman et al., 2017;
7 Krikken et al., 2019; van Oldenborgh et al., 2020); and more frequent and stronger cyclones/hurricanes and
8 resulting extreme rainfall (Griego et al., 2020). These extreme events, coupled with high vulnerability and
9 exposure in many parts of the world, turn into disasters and affect millions of people every year. New
10 advances enable the detection and attribution of these extreme events to climate change (Otto et al., 2016;
11 Seneviratne et al., 2021), with the most recent study saying that heavy rains leading to devasting floods in
12 the Western Europe that captured the world's attention in July 2021 was made more likely due to climate
13 change (Kreienkamp et al., 2021). Most WGII chapters (this volume) report various extreme event-induced
14 disasters and their societal impacts. This cross-chapter box brings together authors from WGI and WGII to
15 underscore that disasters following extreme events have become the most visible and public face of climate
16 change (Solecki and Rosenzweig, 2014). These disasters reflect immediate societal and political implications
17 of rising risks (high confidence) but also provide windows of opportunity to raise awareness about climate
18 change and to implement disaster reduction policies and strategies (high confidence) (Albright, 2020; Boudet
19 et al., 2020).
20
21 Here, we document eight catastrophic climate-related disasters that took place between 2017-2021. These
22 disasters resulted in the loss of lives, livelihoods, had adverse impacts on biodiversity, health, infrastructure,
23 and the economy. It provided important rallying points for discussions around climate change, equity, and
24 vulnerability in some cases. These disasters also offer valuable lessons about the role of effective climate
25 change adaptation in managing disaster risks and the importance of loss and damage mechanisms in global
26 negotiation processes (Jongman et al., 2014; Mechler et al., 2014; Cutter and Gall, 2015).
27
28 Case 1. Compounded Events and Impacts on Human Systems: Cyclones Idai and Kenneth in
29 Mozambique in 2019
30
31 While individual events alone can lead to major disasters, when several events occur in close spatial and
32 temporal proximity, impacts get compounded with catastrophic results (Zscheischler et al., 2018;
33 Zscheischler et al., 2020). In March 2019, Cyclone Idai (Category 2) was the deadliest storm on record to
34 strike the African continent, with the coastal city of Beira in Mozambique being particularly hard hit with at
35 least 602 deaths (CRED, 2019; Zehra et al., 2019; Phiri et al., 2020). Nationally, Idai caused massive
36 housing, water supply, drainage and sanitation destruction, but its impact extended to South Africa through
37 disruption of the regional electricity grid (Yalew et al., 2020). In April 2019, amidst heightened
38 vulnerabilities in the aftermath of cyclone Idai, cyclone Kenneth (Category 4) hit the country, affecting
39 254,750 people and destroying more than 45,000 homes (Kahn et al., 2019). These circumstances caused the
40 rapid spread of cholera, which triggered a massive vaccination program to control the epidemic (Kahn et al.,
41 2019; Lequechane et al., 2020). While there were no specific detection and attribution studies for Idai and
42 Kenneth, overall, there is high confidence that the rainfall associated with tropical cyclones is more intense
43 because of global warming. However, there remain significant uncertainties about the impact of climate
44 change on the numbers and strength of tropical cyclones per se (Walsh et al., 2019; Zhang G. et al., 2020).
45
46 Case 2. COVID-19 as the compounding risk factor: Cyclone Amphan in India and Bangladesh, 2020
47
48 Cyclone Amphan hit coastal West Bengal and Bangladesh on 20th May 2020. It was the first super cyclone
49 to form in the Bay of Bengal since 1999 and one of the fiercest to hit West Bengal, India, in the last 100
50 years. The cyclone intensified from a cyclonic storm (Category 1) to a super cyclone (Category 5) in less
51 than 36 hours (Balasubramanian and Chalamalla, 2020). Several hours before and on 20th May, extreme rain
52 events resulted in heavy cumulative rainfall, flash flooding, and landslides in several adjoining districts
53 (Mishra and Vanganuru, 2020). As per the initial estimates, about 1,600 km2 area in the mangrove forests of
54 Sundarbans were damaged, and over 100 lives were lost. Earlier cyclones in the region have shown that
55 impacts of these events are gendered (Roy, 2019). The cyclone damage was somewhat lessened due to the
56 delta's mangroves (Sen, 2020). The estimated damage was US$13.5 billion. Cyclone Amphan was the
57 largest source of displacement in 2020, with 2.4 million displacements in India alone, of which 800,000 were
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1 pre-emptive evacuations by authorities (IDMC., 2020). Because it happened amidst the COVID19 crisis,
2 evacuation plans were constrained due to social distancing norms (Baidya et al., 2020). Social media played
3 an important role in disseminating pre-cyclone warnings, and information on post-cyclone relief work
4 (Crayton et al., 2020; Poddar et al., 2020).
5
6 Case 3. Further exacerbating inequities in Human Systems: Hurricane Harvey, US, 2017
7
8 Hurricane Harvey, a Category 4 hurricane, made landfall on Texas and Louisiana in August 2017, causing
9 catastrophic flooding and 80 deaths and inflicting $125 billion (2017 USD) in damage, of which $67 billion
10 (2017 USD) was attributable to climate change (Frame et al., 2020). Several studies estimated the return
11 period of the rainfall associated with this event and assessed that human-induced climate change increased
12 the likelihood by a factor of approximately 3 using a combination of observations and climate models (Risser
13 and Wehner, 2017; van Oldenborgh et al., 2017b). The impacts of Hurricane Harvey were exacerbated by
14 extensive residential development in flood-prone locations. A study showed that urbanization increased the
15 probability of such extreme flood events several folds (Zhang W. et al., 2018) through the alteration of
16 ground cover and disruption and redirection of water flow. Water quality in cities also deteriorated (Horney
17 et al., 2018; Landsman et al., 2019) and 85% of flooded land subsided at a rate of 5mm/yr following the
18 event (Miller and Shirzaei, 2019). Notably, the impacts of Harvey were unequally distributed along racial
19 and social categories in the greater Houston area. Neighbourhoods with larger Black, Hispanic and disabled
20 populations were the worst affected by the flooding following the storm and rainfall (Chakraborty et al.,
21 2018; Chakraborty et al., 2019; Collins et al., 2019b). In addition, racial and ethnic disparities were shown to
22 impact post-disaster needs, ranging from household damage to mental health and recovery (Collins et al.,
23 2019b; Flores et al., 2020; Griego et al., 2020).
24
25 Case 4. Impacts worsened due to socio-cultural and political conditions: The "Coastal Ni駉" in Peru,
26 2017
27
28 The Coastal Ni駉 event of 2017 led to extreme rainfall in Peru, which was made more likely by at least 1.5
29 times as compared to pre-industrial times due to anthropogenic climate change and Coastal Ni駉 (Christidis
30 et al., 2019) and comparable to the El Ni駉 events of 1982�83 and 1997�98 (Poveda et al., 2020). This event
31 showed evidence of larger anomalies in flood exposure (Muis et al., 2018; Christidis et al., 2019; Rodr韌uez-
32 Morata et al., 2019) and sediment transport (Morera et al., 2017). In Peru, this Ni駉 event led to 6 to 9 billion
33 US dollars of monetary losses, more than a million inhabitants were affected, 6,614 km of roads were
34 damaged, 326 bridges were destroyed, 41,632 homes were damaged or became uninhabitable, and 2,150
35 schools and 726 health posts were damaged (French and Mechler, 2017; French et al., 2020), leaving half of
36 the country in a state of emergency (Christidis et al., 2019). Furthermore, institutional and systemic socio-
37 cultural and political conditions at multiple levels significantly worsened disaster risk management which
38 hampered response and recovery (French et al., 2020). Citizens and zero-orders responders proved to be
39 more effective and quicker than national disaster risk management response (Briones et al., 2019).
40
41 Case 5. Triggering institutional response for future preparedness: Mega Fires of Chile, 2017
42
43 The megafire that occurred in Chile in January 2017 had the highest severity recorded on the planet
44 (CONAF, 2017), burning in three weeks an area close to 350,000 hectares in south-central Chile. These
45 events have been associated with the prolonged ongoing drought that has persisted for more than one decade
46 and with the increase in heat waves (Gonz醠ez et al., 2018; Miranda et al., 2020). This extreme drought and
47 the total burned area of the last decades have been attributed to anthropogenic climate change in at least 25%
48 and 20% of their severity, respectively (Boisier et al., 2016). The megafire of summer 2017 resulted in 11
49 deaths, more than 1,500 houses burned and the destruction of the small town of Santa Olga. The smoke from
50 these fires exposed 9.5 million people to air pollution, causing an estimated 76 premature deaths (Bowman et
51 al., 2017; Gonz醠ez et al., 2020). The direct costs incurred by the State exceeded USD 360 million (Gonz醠ez
52 et al., 2020). The 2017 megafires led to a series of institutional responses such as management plans that
53 include preventive forestry techniques, regulatory plans containing rural-urban interface areas, an emergency
54 forest fire plan, and promotion of native species (Gonz醠ez et al., 2020).
55
56 Case 6. Loss of human lives and biodiversity: Bushfires in Australia, 2019/20
57
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1 In the summer of 2019/20, bushfires in Australia killed 417 people due to smoke, between 0.5 and 1.5 billion
2 wild animals and tens of thousands of livestock (van Oldenborgh et al., 2020). These fires also destroyed
3 approximately 5,900 buildings and burnt 97,000 km2 of vegetation, which provided habitat for 832 species of
4 native vertebrate fauna. Seventy taxa had more than 30% of their habitat impacted, including 21 already
5 identified as threatened with extinction (Ward et al., 2020). In addition, millions of people experienced levels
6 of smoke 20 times higher than the government-identified safe level. The year 2019 had been Australia's
7 warmest and driest year on record. In 2019/20 summer, the seasonal mean and mean maximum temperatures
8 were the hottest by almost 1癈 above the previous record. Eight of the ten hottest days on record for national
9 mean temperatures occurred in December 2019. While the prevailing weather conditions were strongly
10 influenced by the Indian Ocean Dipole pressure pattern, with a contribution from weakly positive ENSO
11 conditions in the Pacific, the fact that Australia is approximately 1癈 warmer than the early 20th century
12 demonstrates links to anthropogenic climate change. Eight climate models using event attribution
13 methodologies (comparison of simulations with present-day and pre-industrial forcings) indicates that
14 anthropogenic climate change made the heat conditions of December 2019 more than twice as likely (van
15 Oldenborgh et al., 2020).
16
17 Case 7. Improved preparedness reduced mortality: Heatwave in Europe, 2019
18
19 In 2019, Europe experienced several record-breaking heatwaves. In June, the first one featured record heat
20 for that time in early summer, with temperatures of 6-10癈 above normal over most of France and Germany,
21 northern Spain, northern Italy, Switzerland, Austria, and the Czech Republic (Climate., 2019). The second
22 heatwave also resulted in all-time records for Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the
23 United Kingdom in July. Attribution studies (Vautard et al., 2020) demonstrated that these would have had
24 extremely small odds in the absence of human-induced climate change or would have been 1.5-3癈 colder
25 without human-induced climate change. This study concluded that state-of-the-art climate models
26 underestimate the trends in local heat extremes compared to the observed trend. Since the 2003 heatwave,
27 which resulted in tens of thousands of deaths across Europe, many European countries have adopted
28 heatwave plans, including early warning systems. Therefore, mortality in 2019 was substantially lower than
29 it might have been. Unfortunately, mortality is not registered systematically across Europe, and therefore
30 comprehensive analyses are missing. But even based on the countries that provide the numbers, more
31 specifically France, Belgium and the Netherlands, the European heatwave of 2019 resulted in over 2500
32 deaths (CRED, 2019). Despite their deadliness and the fact that climate change increases the frequency,
33 intensity and duration of heatwaves globally (Perkins-Kirkpatrick and Lewis, 2020) , heatwaves are not
34 consistently reported in many countries (Harrington and Otto, 2020), rendering it currently impossible to
35 estimate climate change impacts on lives and livelihoods comprehensively.
36
37 Case 8. Loss of human lives and property: Floods in Europe in 2021
38
39 From 12th to 15th July 2021, extreme rainfall in Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and neighbouring
40 countries led to severe flooding. The severe flooding was caused by very heavy rainfall over a period of 1-2
41 days, wet conditions prior to the event and local hydrological factors. The observed rainfall amounts in the
42 Ahr/Erft region and the Belgian part of the Meuse catchment substantially exceeded previous records for
43 observed rainfall. An attribution study (Kreienkamp et al., 2021) focused on the heavy rainfall rather than
44 river discharge and water levels, because sufficient hydrological data was not available, partly because
45 hydrological monitoring systems were destroyed by the event. Considering a larger region of Western
46 Europe between the northern side of the Alps and the Netherlands, in any given location one such event can
47 be expected every 400 years on average in the current climate. The floods resulted in least 222 fatalities and
48 substantial damage to houses, roads, communication infrastructure, motorways, railway lines and bridges.
49
50
51 Table Cross-Chapter Box DISASTER.1: Summarizing impacts, loss and damage, displacement, and climate change
52 detection and attribution of these seven disasters case studies
Name of the disaster event Impacts, loss and damage; and Climate change detection and attribution
displacement
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Cyclones Idai and 254,750 affected people, and more than There are no D&A studies on Idai and
Kenneth, March and April 45,000 houses were destroyed. Sparked Kenneth, but it is known that rainfall
2019, Mozambique, Africa cholera outbreaks that resulted in 6,600 associated with tropical cyclones are now
cases and over 200 deaths. More than more intense because of global warming,
500,000 people were displaced in 2019. As but there remain significant uncertainties
of 31st December 2019, more than 132,000 concerning changes in the number and
people were internally displaced in strength of the cyclones themselves
Mozambique (IDMC., 2020). (Walsh et al., 2019; Zhang G. et al.,
2020).
Cyclone Amphan, May About 1,600 km2 area in the mangrove The combined decline of both aerosols
2020, West Bengal, India forests of Sundarbans was damaged. The (due to COVID-19 related lockdowns)
and Bangladesh city of Kolkata lost a substantial portion of and clouds may have contributed to the
its green cover due to Amphan. The increased sea surface temperature,
estimated damage was US$13.5 billion. further compounding the climate change-
Cyclone Amphan was the largest source of related warming of the oceans (Vinoj and
displacement in 2020, with 2.4 million Swain, 2020). However, there are no
displacements in India and a similar attribution studies on tropical cyclones in
number in Bangladesh. Out of these 2.4 the Indian Ocean.
million, roughly 800,000 were pre-emptive
evacuations or organized by the authorities
(IDMC., 2020).
Hurricane Harvey, 2017, Catastrophic flooding and many deaths Several attribution studies found that the
USA inflicted $125 billion (2017 USD). In rainfall associated with Harvey has
addition, economic costs due to the rainfall increased by a factor of 3, while intensity
are estimated at $90 billion, of which in rainfall and wind speed also increased
$67bn are attributed to climate change due to human-induced climate change
(Frame et al., 2020). (Emanuel, 2017; Risser and Wehner,
2017; Patricola and Wehner, 2018; van
Oldenborgh et al., 2020)
Coastal Ni駉 2017, Peru US$ 6 to 9 billion monetary losses with 114 Clear anthropogenic climate change
deaths, 414 injuries and 1.08 million fingerprint detected. For example, while
inhabitants affected. In addition, 6,614 km the anomalously warm ocean favoured
of improved roads were damaged, 326 extreme rainfall of March 2017 in Peru,
bridges destroyed, 41,632 homes destroyed the human influence was estimated to
or uninhabitable, and 242,433 homes, 2,150 make such events at least 1.5 times more
schools and 726 health centres damaged. likely (Christidis et al., 2019).
Mega fires in Chile, The megafire that occurred in Chile in There is no attribution study on the fires
January 2017 in Chile (yet). Still, there is an increasing
January 2017 burned in three weeks an area number of attribution studies on wildfires
close to 3500 km2 in south-central Chile. worldwide, finding that because climate
change has increased the likelihood of
As a result, thousands of people were extreme heat, which is part of the fire
displaced. weather, the likelihood of wildfire
weather conditions has increased too
(Krikken et al., 2019; van Oldenborgh et
al., 2020).
Australian bushfires of Killed 417 people due to smoke, between Anthropogenic climate change made the
2019/2020 0.5 and 1.5 billion wild animals and tens of extreme heat condition of December
thousands of livestock. Destroyed ~ 5,900 2019 more than twice as likely (van
buildings and burnt 97,000 km2 of Oldenborgh et al., 2020).
vegetation that provided habitat for 832
species of native vertebrate fauna.
Heatwaves of Europe, Record heat in several European countries, There have been many attribution studies
2019 and deadliest global disaster of 2019, with on heatwaves in Europe, finding that
over 2500 deaths (CRED, 2019). human-induced climate change is
increasing the frequency and intensity of
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heatwaves. In the case of 2019, the
observed heat would have been
extremely unlikely without climate
change. The studies also find that climate
models underestimate the increase in
heat waves in Europe compared to
observed trends (Vautard et al., 2020).
Floods in Western Europe Severe flooding resulting in at least 222 Climate change was found to have
(Germany, Belgium), July fatalities and substantial damage to houses, increased the intensity of the maximum
2021 roads, communication infrastructure, 1-day rainfall event in the summer
motorways, railway lines and bridges. season in this large region by about 3 -
Some communities were cut off for days 19% compared to a global climate 1.2 癈
due to road closures, inhibiting emergency cooler than at the present day. The
responses including evacuation. The cost of increase was similar for the 2-day event.
the event was estimated at 4.5 to 5.5 The likelihood of such an event today
billion in Germany and over 0.35 billion was found to have increased by a factor
in Belgium. between 1.2 and 9 for both the 1-day and
2-day events in the large region
(Kreienkamp et al., 2021).
1
2
3 Disaster risk reduction needs to be a central component of adaptation and mitigation for meeting SDGs
4 and for climate-resilient future
5
6 Disasters resulting from extreme events are increasingly experienced by a large section of human population
7 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). Disasters expose inequalities in natural and managed systems and human
8 systems as they disproportionately affect poor and marginalized communities like ethnic minorities, people
9 of colour, Indigenous Peoples, women and children. Therefore, disaster risk reduction is fundamental for
10 climate justice and climate-resilient development (UNISDR., 2015). Far from being disconnected policy
11 objectives, disaster risk reduction and climate change mitigation/adaptation are two sides of the same coin as
12 recognized explicitly by the Paris Agreement and Sendai Framework of 2015. There can be no sustainable
13 development without disaster risk reduction, as explicitly recognized by the Sustainable Development Goals
14 of 2015. Furthermore, disaster events can increase awareness among citizens and provide a platform for all
15 important stakeholders, including climate activists, to come together, and give a clarion call for the urgency
16 of climate action.
17
18 In summary, disasters are a stark illustration of the potential for extreme weather events to impact people and
19 other species. With the frequency, severity and (or) likelihood of several types of extreme weather
20 increasing, disasters can increasingly be regarded as "the public face of climate change" (high confidence).
21 Detection and attribution studies make the climate change fingerprint of several types of disasters
22 increasingly clear (high confidence). Moreover, existing vulnerabilities and exposures play an important role
23 in turning extreme events into disasters, further exacerbating existing racial, gender and social inequalities
24 (high confidence). Therefore, disaster risk reduction needs to be central to adaptation and mitigation efforts
25 to meet the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement for a climate-resilient future.
26
27 [END CROSS-CHAPTER BOX DISASTER HERE]
28
29
30 4.3.5 Observed Impacts on Freshwater Ecosystems
31
32 The loss and degradation of freshwater ecosystems have been widely documented, and SRCCL assessed
33 with medium confidence the loss of wetlands since the 1970s (Olsson et al., 2020).
34
35 The links between air and water temperatures and ecological processes in freshwater ecosystems are well
36 recognized. Increasing temperatures affect wetlands by influencing biophysical processes, affecting feeding
37 and breeding habits and species' distribution ranges, including their ability to compete with others. Increased
38 temperatures can also cause deoxygenation in the lower depths of the water columns and throughout the
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1 entire water column if heating destabilizes the water column. Under extreme heat, often associated with
2 minimal rainfall or water flows, the drying of shallower areas and the migration or death of individual
3 organisms can occur (Dell et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2014; Scheffers et al., 2016; Szekeres et al., 2016;
4 Myers et al., 2017; FAO, 2018a) (high confidence). A global systematic review of studies since 2005 shows
5 that climate change is a critical direct driver of freshwater ecosystems impacts through increasing
6 temperatures or declining rainfall, for example, by causing physiological stress or death (thermal stress,
7 dehydration or desiccation), limiting food supplies, or resulting in migration of animals to other feeding or
8 breeding areas, and possibly increased competition with animals already present in those migrating locations
9 (Bustamante et al., 2018; Diaz et al., 2019). Other drivers include land-use changes, water pollution,
10 extraction of water, drainage and conversion, and invasive species, which to varying extents interact
11 synergistically with climate change or are exacerbated due to climate change (Finlayson et al., 2017; Ramsar
12 Convention, 2018).
13
14 The Global Wetland Outlook (Ramsar Convention, 2018) reported that between 1970 and 2015, the area of
15 freshwater wetlands declined by approximately 35% (Davidson and Finlayson, 2018), with high levels of the
16 overall percentage of threatened species recorded in Madagascar and Indian Ocean Islands (43%); in Europe
17 (36%); in the tropical Andes (35%); and New Zealand (41%) (Ramsar Convention, 2018). Where long term
18 data are available, only 13% of the wetlands recorded in and around the year 1700 remained by 2000.
19 However, these data may overestimate the rate of loss (Davidson, 2014) (limited evidence, medium
20 agreement). Many wetland-dependent species have seen a long-term decline, with the Living Planet Index
21 showing that 81% of populations of freshwater species are in decline and others being threatened by
22 extinction (Davidson and Finlayson, 2018; Darrah et al., 2019; Diaz et al., 2019) (high confidence).
23
24 Temperature changes lead to changes in the distribution patterns of freshwater species. Poleward and up-
25 elevation range shifts due to warming temperatures tend to ultimately lead to reduced range sizes. Freshwater
26 species in the tropics are particularly vulnerable (Jezkova and Wiens, 2016; Sheldon, 2019). Systematic
27 shifts towards higher elevation and upstream were found for 32 stream fish species in France (Comte and
28 Grenouillet, 2013). In North America, for the bull trout (Salvelinus confluentus) a reduction in the number of
29 occupied sites was documented in a watershed in Montana (Eby et al., 2014). Other impacts include
30 disruption of seasonal movements of migratory waterbirds that regularly visit freshwater ecosystems, with
31 adverse impacts on their feeding and breeding (Finlayson et al., 2006; Bussi鑢e et al., 2015). Keystone
32 species, such as the beaver (Caster Canadensis) in North America, have been moving into new areas as the
33 vegetation structure has changed in response to higher temperatures enabling shrubs to establish in the Arctic
34 and alpine tundra ecosystems (Jung et al., 2016). Increased occurrence and intensity of algal blooms have
35 occurred due to the interactive effects of thermal extremes and low dissolved oxygen concentrations in water
36 (Griffith and Gobler, 2020) (4.2.7). A global review found that almost 90% of all studies reviewed
37 documented a decline in salmonid populations in North Amercia and Europe, and identified knowledge gaps
38 elsewhere (Myers et al., 2017). Another review (Pecl et al., 2017) found declines in Atlantic salmon in
39 Finland, and poleward shift in coastal fish species, while another review (Scheffers et al., 2016) noted
40 hybridization between freshwater species like invasive rainbow trout (Oncorhynchus mykiss) and native
41 cutthroat trout (O. clarkia).
42
43 Lakes have been warming, as shown by an increasing trend of summer surface water temperatures between
44 1985 and 2009 of 0.34癈 per decade (O'Reilly et al., 2015). However, responses of individual lakes to
45 warming were very dependent on local characteristics (O'Reilly et al., 2015), with warming enhancing the
46 impacts of eutrophication in some instances (Sepulveda-Jauregui et al., 2018). For example, temperature
47 increases led to lower oxygen concentrations in eutrophied coastal wetlands due to phytoplankton and
48 microbial respiration (Jenny et al., 2016) and stimulated algal blooms (Michalak, 2016) and affected the
49 community structure of fish and other biotas (Mantyka-Pringle et al., 2014; Poesch et al., 2016).
50
51 Rising temperatures have a strong impact in the arctic zone, where the southern limit of permafrost is
52 moving north and leading to changes in the landscape (Arp et al., 2016; Minayeva et al., 2018). Thawing of
53 the permafrost leads to increased erosion and runoff and changes in the geomorphology and vegetation of
54 arctic peatlands (Nilsson et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2018b). Permafrost thawing has led to the expansion of
55 lakes in the Tibetan Plateau (Li et al., 2014). As northern high latitude peatlands store a large amount of
56 carbon, permafrost thawing can increase methane and carbon dioxide emissions (Schuur et al., 2015;
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1 Moomaw et al., 2018). This represents a major gap in our understanding of the rates of change and their
2 consequences for freshwater ecosystems.
3
4 The extent of past degradation due to multiple drivers is important as climate change is expected to interact
5 synergistically and cumulatively with these (Finlayson et al., 2006), exacerbate existing problems for
6 wetland managers, and potentially increase emissions from carbon-rich wetland soils (Finlayson et al., 2017;
7 Moomaw et al., 2018). Freshwater ecosystems are also under extreme pressure from changes in land use and
8 water pollution, with climate change exacerbating these, such as the further decline of snow cover (DeBeer
9 et al., 2016) and increased consumptive use of fresh water, and leading to the decline, and possibly
10 extinction, of many freshwater-dependent populations (high confidence). Thus, differentiating between the
11 impacts of multiple drivers is needed, especially given the synergistic and cumulative nature of such impacts,
12 which remains a knowledge gap.
13
14 In summary, climate change is one of the key drivers of the loss and degradation of freshwater ecosystems
15 and the unprecedented decline and extinction of many freshwater dependent populations. The predominant
16 key drivers are changes in land use and water pollution (high confidence).
17
18 4.3.6 Observed Impacts on Water-related Conflicts
19
20 According to AR5, violent conflict increases vulnerability to climate change (Field et al., 2014a) (medium
21 evidence, high agreement). Furthermore, the IPCC SRCCL (Hurlbert et al., 2019) concluded with medium
22 confidence that climatic stressors can exacerbate the negative impacts of conflict.
23
24 Since AR5, only a few studies focused specifically on the association between observed changes in the
25 hydrological cycle linked to climate change and conflicts (Zografos et al., 2014; Dinar et al., 2015). Some
26 studies associate conflicts with local abundance of water (Salehyan and Hendrix, 2014; Selby and Hoffmann,
27 2014; de Juan, 2015), mainly because of political mobilization around abundant waters and the need for
28 developing new rules of allocation among competing users. Others provide evidence that the increase in
29 water availability in some areas versus a decrease in other surrounding areas can affect the risk of a conflict
30 in a region (de Juan, 2015) (low to medium confidence). However, the large majority acknowledges
31 reduction of water availability due to climate change as having the potential to exacerbate tensions (de
32 Stefano et al., 2017; Waha et al., 2017), especially in regions and within groups dependent on agriculture for
33 food production (von Uexkull et al., 2016; Koubi, 2019) (high confidence). Particularly representative is the
34 case of Syria, where drought aggravated existing water and agricultural insecurity (Kelley et al., 2015).
35 However, whether drought caused civil unrest in Syria remains highly debated (Gleick, 2014; Kelley et al.,
36 2017; Selby et al., 2017; Ash and Obradovich, 2019). Additionally, there is no consensus on the causal
37 association between observed climate changes and conflict (Hsiang Solomon et al., 2013; Burke et al., 2015;
38 Selby, 2019). However, evidence suggests that changes in rainfall patterns amplify existing tensions (Abel et
39 al., 2019); examples include Syria, Iraq (Abbas et al., 2016; von Lossow, 2016) and Yemen (Mohamed et al.,
40 2017) (medium confidence). There is also medium evidence that in some regions of Africa (e.g., Kenya,
41 Democratic Republic of Congo), there are links between observed water stress and individual attitude for
42 participating in violence, particularly for the least resilient individuals (von Uexkull et al., 2020) (medium
43 confidence). A reverse association from conflict to climate impacts has also been observed (Buhaug, 2016).
44 For example, conflict-affected societies cannot address climate-change impacts due to other associated
45 vulnerabilities such as poverty, food insecurity, and political instability.
46
47 For transboundary waters, the probability of inter-state conflict can both increase and decrease (Dinar et al.,
48 2019) depending on climatic variables (e.g. less precipitation) and other socio-economic and political factors,
49 such as low levels of economic development and political marginalization (Koubi, 2019). Climate change
50 concerns also play a role in stimulating cooperative efforts, as in the case of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
51 Meghna River Basin (Mirumachi, 2015; Link et al., 2016) (medium confidence). More generally, there is
52 some evidence that when hydrological conditions change in transboundary river basins, formal agreements
53 (e.g., water treaties or river basin organizations) can enhance cooperation (de Stefano et al., 2017; Dinar et
54 al., 2019) (medium evidence, high agreement). Still, more cooperation does not necessarily reduce the risk of
55 conflict, especially when water variability increases beyond a certain threshold (low evidence, medium
56 agreement) (Dinar et al., 2015; Dinar et al., 2019).
57
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1 In summary, there is no consensus on the causal association between observed climate change and conflicts.
2 Still, evidence exists that those tensions can be amplified depending on climatic variables and other
3 concomitant socio-economic and political factors.
4
5 4.3.7 Observed Impacts on Human Mobility and Migration
6
7 AR5 (Adger and Pulhin, 2014), found links between climate change and migration in general (medium
8 evidence, high agreement), but provided no assessment of climate-induced hydrological changes and
9 migration specifically. Likewise, SRCCL (Mirzabaev et al., 2019; Olsson et al., 2020) and SROCC (Hock et
10 al., 2019b) noted that migration is complex and that migration decisions and outcomes are influenced by a
11 combination of social, demographic, economic, environmental and political factors and contexts (see Cross-
12 Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7). This chapter confirms this evidence, focusing on climate-induced
13 hydrological changes.
14
15 Climate-induced hydrological changes can, through slow-onset (e.g. drought) or rapid onset (e.g., flood)
16 events, influence human mobility and migration through effects on the economy and livelihoods (Adger et
17 al., 2018). There is medium confidence that climate-induced hydrological changes have affected bilateral
18 migration (Backhaus et al., 2015; Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Falco et al., 2019). However, there is medium
19 evidence and low agreement on the effects on the movements of refugees globally (Missirian and Schlenker,
20 2017; Owain and Maslin, 2018; Abel et al., 2019; Schutte et al., 2021).
21
22 There is robust evidence that floods and droughts have, mainly through adverse impacts on agriculture
23 (Mastrorillo et al., 2016; Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava, 2017; Bergmann et al., 2021; Zouabi, 2021) (4.6.2),
24 both increased and decreased the risk of temporary or permanent migration (Obokata et al., 2014; Afifi et al.,
25 2016; Thiede et al., 2016; Murray-Tortarolo and Salgado, 2021; Wesselbaum, 2021). However, migration
26 effects depend on the nature of the hydrological change, for example, whether it is a slow-onset or rapid
27 onset event (Kaczan and Orgill-Meyer, 2020), the perception of change (Koubi et al., 2016; de Longueville
28 et al., 2020), as well as the socio-economic situation of the affected communities (Ocello et al., 2015; Afifi et
29 al., 2016; Thiede et al., 2016) (robust evidence; medium agreement).
30
31 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that an average of 12 million new
32 displacements happen each year due to droughts and floods alone. By the end of 2020, there were 7 million
33 people displaced due to natural disasters, including drought and floods (IDMC., 2020). Furthermore,
34 household water insecurity has also been singled out as a driver of migration, given its physical and mental
35 health and socio-economic effects (Stoler et al., 2021) (medium confidence).
36
37 More research is needed to understand better the contexts in which climate-induced hydrological changes
38 affect the likelihood of migration or alters existing patterns (Obokata et al., 2014; Gray and Wise, 2016;
39 Cattaneo et al., 2019).
40
41 In summary, climate-induced hydrological changes can increase and decrease the likelihood of migration
42 (robust evidence, medium agreement). The outcome is determined mainly by the socio-economic, political,
43 and environmental context (medium confidence).
44
45 4.3.8 Observed Impacts on the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
46 Traditional Peoples
47
48 AR5 concluded with high confidence that the livelihoods and cultural practices of the diverse Indigenous
49 Peoples of the Arctic have been impacted by climate change (Larsen et al., 2014). SROCC found with high
50 confidence that cryospheric and associated hydrological changes have affected culturally significant
51 terrestrial and freshwater species and ecosystems in high mountain and polar regions, thus impacting
52 residents' livelihoods and cultural identity, including Indigenous Peoples (Hock et al., 2019b; IPCC, 2019a;
53 Meredith et al., 2019). SROCC also concluded that Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and Local Knowledge (LK)
54 are vital in determining community responses to environmental risk. The report further noted that IK and LK
55 helps increase adaptive capacity and reduces long-term vulnerability, but did not assess climate-related
56 impacts on cultural water uses on low-lying islands (Oppenheimer et al., 2019).
57
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1 Freshwater (including ice and snow) has diverse meanings and symbolic representations, as well as
2 associated practices, management and reciprocal responsibilities for many Indigenous Peoples, local
3 communities and traditional peoples (Cave and McKay, 2016; Craft, 2018; Hansen and Antsanen, 2018;
4 Ngata, 2018; Chiblow 2019; Wilson et al., 2019; Moggridge and Thompson, 2021). Climate-driven
5 hydrological changes are affecting culturally significant terrestrial and freshwater species and ecosystems,
6 particularly for Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples in the Arctic, high-mountain
7 areas, and small islands (high confidence). These climate impacts on cultural water uses are influencing
8 travel, hunting, herding, fishing, and gathering practices, which have negative implications for livelihoods,
9 cultural traditions, economies, and self-determination (Table 4.5).
10
11 Some of these losses may be classified as non-economic loss and damage, such as loss of culture and
12 traditions (Thomas and Benjamin, 2018b; McNamara et al., 2021). The vulnerability of these cultural uses to
13 climate change is exacerbated by historical and ongoing processes of colonialism and capitalism, which
14 dispossessed Indigenous Peoples and disrupted culturally significant multi-species relationships (Whyte,
15 2017; Whyte, 2018; Wilson et al., 2019; Whyte, 2020; Rice et al., 2021) (14.4.7.3; 9.13.2.4). Despite these
16 significant structural barriers, there is medium confidence that some Indigenous Peoples, local communities
17 and traditional peoples are adapting to the risks of climate-driven hydrological changes to cultural water uses
18 and practices (4.6.9).
19
20 There is high confidence that the prospect of loss (anticipatory grief) due to climate-related hydrological
21 change, such as inundation, or relocation, affects Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional
22 peoples. These communities are especially susceptible to detrimental mental health impacts because of the
23 implications of climate change for their cultural, land-based practices (du Bray et al., 2017). For example,
24 fears of cultural loss in Tuvalu (Gibson et al., 2019) are resulting in worry, anxiety and sadness among local
25 people, with similar responses reported in Fiji and other Pacific islands (du Bray et al., 2017; Yates et al.,
26 2021) (Box 15.1).
27
28 There is high confidence that glacier retreat and increasing glacier runoff variability are negatively affecting
29 cultural beliefs and practices in high mountain areas. For example, the loss of glaciers threatens the ethnic
30 identity of the Indigenous Manangi community of the Annapurna Conservation Area of Nepal (Konchar et
31 al., 2015; Mukherji et al., 2019). Likewise, ice loss in the Cordillera Blanca in the Peruvian Andes has
32 challenged traditional approaches of interacting with the glaciers (Motschmann et al., 2020) (4.2.2). There is
33 high confidence that cryosphere changes in high mountain areas also impact traditional pastoral practices by
34 altering seasonal conditions, pasture quality, and water availability. For example, pasture quality in India
35 (Ingty, 2017), Tibet Autonomous Region (Nyima and Hopping, 2019), and Bolivia (Yager et al., 2019) has
36 been negatively impacted by climate-related hydrological changes, leading some Indigenous herders to
37 diversify livestock, while herders in Nepal (Popular and Rik, 2016) and Peru (Postigo, 2020) have altered
38 their routes in response to local water scarcity. Local communities in high mountain areas understand these
39 hydrological changes through cultural and spiritual frameworks (medium evidence, high agreement). For
40 instance, in the Peruvian Andes and the Hindu Kush Himalaya, changing ice is attributed to a lack of
41 spiritual devotion (Drenkhan et al., 2015; Konchar et al., 2015; Scoville-Simonds, 2018). Communities in the
42 Peruvian Andes also interpret climate impacts in the broader context of socio-economic and political
43 injustice and inequality (Drenkhan et al., 2015; Paerregaard, 2018).
44
45 In polar areas, there is high confidence that the appearance of land previously covered by ice, changes in
46 snow cover, and thawing permafrost are contributing to changing seasonal activities. These include changes
47 in accessibility, abundance and distribution of culturally important plant and animal species. These changes
48 are harming the livelihoods and cultural identity of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional
49 peoples. In northern Fennoscandia, for example, reindeer herders reported experiences of deteriorated
50 foraging conditions due to changes in the winter climate (Forbes et al., 2019; Rasmus et al., 2020). In
51 addition, Inuit and First Nations communities in Canada (Ford et al., 2019; Khalafzai et al., 2019) and
52 Alaskan Natives and Native American communities in the United States (Norton-Smith et al., 2016)
53 identified disruption to access routes to traditional hunting grounds and climate-related stresses to culturally-
54 important species.
55
56 Further research is needed to provide culturally informed integrated assessments of climate change impacts
57 on Indigenous Peoples', local communities' and traditional uses of water in the context of multiple stresses,
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1 disparities, and inequities (Yates et al., 2021). In the Arctic, for example, increased rates of development and
2 resource extraction, including hydropower dams, mining, fisheries, and sport hunting, all threaten water
3 quality, habitat condition, and the ecosystem services provided by Arctic freshwaters (Mustonen and
4 Mustonen, 2016; Knopp et al., 2020).
5
6 In summary, the cultural water uses of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples are
7 being impacted by climate change (high confidence), with implications for cultural practices and food and
8 income security, particularly in the Arctic, high mountain areas, and small low-lying islands.
9
10
11 Table 4.5: Selected Observed Impacts on Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples (also see Figure 4.6).
Region Indigenous Climate Water- Situated knowledge Reference
Peoples hazard related
impact
Asia Manangi Increased Glacier Manangi villagers reported a deep (Konchar et al.,
temperatures; retreat; sense of spiritual loss associated with 2015);(Mukherji
increased decreased the decline of mountain snows and the et al., 2019)
precipitation permanent receding glacier, which some
snow cover attributed to a lack of spiritual
devotion.
Asia Gurung Increased Decreasing Indigenous Gurung herders reported (Popular and
temperatures snow; water scarcity in traditional water Rik, 2016)
increased sources such as streams and wells
snowmelt along traditional livestock migration
routes. As a result of these changes,
they have altered their routes and camp
locations.
Asia Dokpa Increased Decreasing Dokpa herders reported that pasture (Ingty, 2017)
temperatures snowfall conditions have deteriorated due to
shallower snowpack, shorter winters
and erratic rainfall, which has
impacted sheep populations. As a
result of these changes, Dokpa herders
are replacing traditionally important
sheep with yaks, which are more
tolerant to poor-quality pasturage.
Asia Jagshung Increased Glacier Due to the expansion of the majority of (Nyima and
pastoralists temperatures melt large lakes on the Tibetan Plateau, Hopping, 2019)
herders in Jagshung Village have lost
large areas of pastures to inundation.
As a result, the quality of nearby feed
has also deteriorated, which has led to
reduced livestock populations and
productivity.
Central Aymara Increased Glacier loss Decreasing rain and snow have led to (Yager et al.,
and temperatures degraded and dry peatland pastures 2019)
South
(bofedales). This reduction of pasture
America contributes to out-migration, over-
grazing, and the loss of ancestral
practices and community commitment
to pasture management (Table 12.5).
Central Quelcaya Increased Decreased Pastoralists reported water scarcity in Postigo, 2020
and pastoralists temperatures; snow and traditional water sources along #4261}
South reduced ice migration routes. As a result, women
America rainfall; pastoralists had to herd livestock
increasing farther to find water. Pastoralists also
precipitation reported the deterioration of pasture
variability due to decreasing water availability
Table 12.5).
Europe Saami Increased Harder and Changes in the quality of winter (Forbes et al.,
Winter deeper pastures (especially decreased access 2019); (Rasmus
temperature; snow to forage and the amount of forage) et al., 2020)
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North Kashechewan Increased cover; have increased the number of working (Khalafzai et al.,
America First Nation Summer increased hours and altered reindeer herding 2019)
precipitation ice practices.
North Inuit formation; Rainy summers increase the difficulty (Ford et al.,
America Increased flooding of gathering and moving reindeer to 2019)
Inuit temperatures rivers and round-up sites and limit hay
North wet ground production for supplementary winter (Cunsolo et al.,
America Alaskan Increased Flooding feed (13.8.1.2). 2020)
Natives temperatures The timing and extent of spring
North (an average Changing flooding have changed, which, (Albert et al.,
America iTaukei of 2.18癈 ice combined with inadequate 2018); (Norton-
from 1985 to conditions infrastructure, have increased the Smith et al.,
Small 2016) frequency and risk of flooding for the 2016)
Islands Early Kashechewan community.
Increased snowmelt Earlier snowmelt has also affected the (Charan et al.,
temperatures; migration patterns of migratory birds 2017); (Piggott-
increased Increasing and reduced the duration of traditional McKellar et al.,
precipitation temperature hunting and harvesting camps for 2019a)
of culturally important species 14.4.6.7,
Increasing freshwater 14.4.7.1.
temperatures lakes; Trail access models showed that
permafrost overall land and water trail access in
Sea level rise melt; the Inuit Nunangat had been minimally
thinning ice affected by temperature increase
between 1985 to 2016. However, these
Flooding, findings illustrate that although Inuit
inundation are developing new trails and
and salt- alternative forms of transport, these
water changes could negatively impact
intrusion cultural identity and well-being
14.4.6.7, 14.4.7.1.
Inuit in Labrador, Canada, are grieving
the rapid decline of culturally
significant caribou, which is partly due
to rising temperatures in the
circumpolar north and the associated
changes to caribou habitat and
migration. In addition, the decline of
this species is negatively affecting
their sense of cultural identity because
of the importance of hunting and
cultural continuity 14.4.6.7, 14.4.7.1..
In Alaska, permafrost melting and the
shorter ice season make it more
difficult for hunters to access
traditional hunting grounds. Increased
temperatures are changing the habitats
and migration patterns of culturally
important freshwater species.
Declining fish health and populations
threaten requirements of treaty rights
and tribal shares of harvestable fish
populations 14.4.6.7, 14.4.7.1.
The village of Vunidogola was
relocated in response to inundation,
storm surges and flooding, which
villagers found emotionally and
spiritually distressing. Although the
village was relocated as a single unit
and on customary lands, the shift away
from the coast has impacted spiritual
relationships, as the ocean is an
integral part of village culture (15.6.5).
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Small iTaukei Sea level rise Coastal Villagers of Viti Levu reported their (du Bray et al.,
Islands erosion; grief at the potential loss of their 2017);
inundation traditions and livelihoods. In addition, (McNamara et
they are concerned as to how climate al., 2021)
change is affecting their cosmology
and cultural traditions and understand
possible relocation as another source
of cultural loss (15.6.5).
Small Funafuti Sea level rise Coastal In addition to climate impacts and (Gibson et al.,
Islands erosion; stresses affecting Tuvalu, the potential 2019); (Yates et
inundation for further environmental hardships in al., 2021);
the future exacerbated worry and (McNamara et
distress for local people, who are al., 2021)
anxious about future cultural loss
arising from sea level rise (15.6.5)..
1
2
3 4.4 Projected Changes in Hydrological Cycle due to Climate Change
4
5 The terrestrial hydrological cycle is projected to intensify through a higher exchange of water between the
6 land surface and the atmosphere. A rise of near-surface atmospheric water capacity is projected because of
7 greater warming leading to changes in the atmospheric circulation patterns, the intensification of the
8 convection processes, and the increased temperature of the underlying surface. Continuation of projected
9 warming and other physical mechanisms will further accelerate the melting of the snow cover, glaciers and
10 permafrost (high confidence).
11
12 Methodologically, the projected changes in the hydrological cycle due to climate change are assessed
13 directly from climate models or hydrological system models driven by the climate models' projections
14 (SM4.1). The latter is simulated by the CMIP-based multi-model experiments carried out under the scenarios
15 of future climate forcing and socio-economic changes (e.g., RCPs, SSPs scenarios) or the pre-assigned
16 global warming levels over the 21st century. Since AR5, there has been an improvement of the physical
17 basis of the climate change impact projections owing to the advances in modelling clouds, precipitation,
18 surface fluxes, vegetation, snow, floodplains, groundwater and other processes relevant to the water cycle
19 (Douville et al., 2021), SM4.1).
20
21 The sub-sections highlight the projected responses of these hydrological systems/processes to multiple
22 drivers, high variability and the uncertainty of the projections, depending on regions, seasons, temporal and
23 spatial scales, the influence of the non-climatic factors.
24
25 4.4.1 Projected Changes in Precipitation, Evapotranspiration, and Soil Moisture
26
27 4.4.1.1 Projected Changes in Precipitation and Heavy Precipitation
28
29 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) conclude with high confidence that without large-scale reduction in GHG
30 emissions, global warming is projected to cause substantial changes in the water cycle at both global and
31 regional scales. However, WG1 also note large uncertainties in many aspects of regional water cycle
32 projections by climate models. Water cycle variability and extremes are projected to increase faster than
33 average changes in most regions of the world and under all emission scenarios (high confidence). The
34 concept of "wetter-regions-get-wetter, drier-regions-get-drier" from AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) is assessed by
35 AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) as too simplistic. WG1 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) further conclude that
36 heavy precipitation will generally become more frequent and more intense with additional global warming.
37
38 In the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble, as in previous generations of ensembles, the projected changes in
39 annual mean precipitation vary substantially across the world. Importantly, in most land regions the future
40 changes are subject to high uncertainty even in the sign of the projected change (high confidence). Figure
41 4.10 illustrates this using the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile changes across the ensemble at individual grid
42 points. For any given location, the range of projected changes generally increases with global warming (high
43 confidence).
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1
2
3
4 Figure 4.10: Projected percentage changes in annual mean precipitation at global warming levels (GWLs) of 4癈 (top),
5 2癈 (middle) and 1.5癈 (bottom) for the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble of GCMs driven by the SSP5-85 scenario. For
6 any given GWL, similar ranges of changes are seen with other scenarios that reach that GWL, and the difference
7 between scenarios is smaller than the ensemble uncertainty (Seneviratne et al., 2021). The distribution of outcomes is
8 shown at local scales with the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile precipitation changes in individual grid boxes. Note that these
9 are uncertainties at the individual point and are not spatially coherent, i.e., they do not represent plausible global
10 patterns of change. Results for 1.5癈, 2癈 and 4癈 global warming are defined as 20-year means relative to 1850-1900
11 and use 40, 40 and 31 ensemble members respectively, due to some members not reaching 4癈 global warming.
12
13
14 For example, in parts of the Indian subcontinent, the projected changes in mean precipitation at 1.5癈 global
15 warming range from a 10-20% decrease to a 40-50% increase. The multi-model median change is close to
16 zero. Most other regions show a smaller range of changes (except for very dry regions where a small
17 absolute change in precipitation appears as a larger percentage change). Nevertheless, across most global
18 land regions, both increases and decreases in precipitation are projected across the ensemble. At 1.5癈 global
19 warming, a complete consensus on increased precipitation is seen only in the central and eastern Sahel,
20 south-central Asia, parts of Greenland and Antarctica, and the far northern regions of North America and
21 Asia, with projected increases in the latter ranging up to 20-30%. No land regions see a complete consensus
22 on decreased precipitation, but South America, southern Africa and the Mediterranean region show a
23 stronger consensus towards reduced precipitation.
24
25 The geographical patterns of local agreement/disagreement in projected precipitation change remain broadly
26 similar with increased global warming, but the range of uncertainty generally increases (high confidence).
27 For example, in the north-eastern Amazonia, the driest projections increase from a 10% decrease at 1.5癈
28 global warming to a 40% decrease at 4癈 global warming. In comparison, the wettest projections remain at
29 up to a 10% increase. In the far north of North America and Asia, the higher end of projected increases in
30 precipitation extends to approximately 40-60%. A few regions are projected to see a shift in the consensus on
31 the sign of the change. These include parts of the Indian subcontinent where at 4癈 global warming, the
32 projected changes shift to a consensus on increased precipitation ranging between a few per cent to over
33 70%.
34
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1 Notably, the multi-model median change in precipitation is relatively small in many regions � less than 10%
2 over most of the global land surface at 1.5癈 global warming. In contrast, in many locations, the 5th to 95th
3 percentile range can include changes that are much larger changes than the median and also changes that are
4 relatively large but opposite in sign. At 4癈 global warming, the median projected changes are larger,
5 ranging from a 20% decrease to a 40% increase (excluding very dry areas, where percentage changes can be
6 much larger due to very small baseline values), but nevertheless often remain a poor indicator of the range of
7 changes across the ensemble. Therefore, use of the median or mean projected changes for future adaptation
8 decisions could substantially underestimate the risk of large changes in precipitation. It could mean that the
9 risk of the opposite sign of changes are not accounted for. Indeed, for mean precipitation, different multi-
10 model ensembles can show different levels of significance of the central estimate of change ((Uhe et al.,
11 2021): Figure 4.11.a). Consequently, information on the range of possible outcomes can be valued by users
12 for effectively informing risk assessments (Lowe et al., 2018).
13
14
15
16 Figure 4.11: Agreement between different multi-model ensembles on significant changes in (a) annual mean
17 precipitation and (b) annual maximum 1-day precipitation (Rx1day), at 2癈 global warming (Uhe et al., 2021). Using
18 central estimates from 5 ensembles of climate models (CMIP5, CMIP6, HAPPI, HELIX and UKCP18) using different
19 models and different experimental designs for the ensembles, the maps show the number of ensembles for which the
20 central estimate shows a significant drying or wetting change at 2癈 global warming relative to pre-industrial. The
21 different ensembles reach 2癈 global warming at different times. The projected changes are aggregated over the new
22 climatic regions defined for IPCC AR6 (Iturbide et al., 2020). Hatched regions show where different ensembles project
23 significant changes in opposite directions, i.e., there is no agreement on either drying or wetting. Regions with thick
24 outlines are where CMIP6 disagrees with 3 of the other 4 ensembles on the significance of the change, highlighting
25 where over-relying on CMIP6 alone may not fully represent the level of confidence in the projections.
26
27
28 There is a stronger consensus on changes in heavy precipitation than mean precipitation within individual
29 ensembles such as CMIP6 (Figure 4.12, a,b,c) and especially between the means of the different ensembles
30 (Figure 4.11, b). At 4癈 global warming, the 50th percentile projection is for increased annual maximum 1-
31 day precipitation over virtually all global land, with the median increase being over 20% for a majority of the
32 land. The 95th percentile increase is 20-40% over most mid-latitude areas and at least 40-70% over the
33 tropics and sub-tropics, exceeding 80% over western Amazonia, central Africa, and most Indian
34 subcontinent. The 5th percentile also shows an increase over most global land, i. e: decreased heavy
35 precipitation has less than a 5% probability in these regions (Figure 4.12, a), although decreases remain
36 possible but of low probability in some regions particularly northern South America and northern and
37 western Africa. At the 50th and 95th percentiles, similar global patterns of change are projected at 2癈 and
38 1.5癈 global warming, with smaller local magnitudes (Figure 4.12, e,f,h,i). At the 5th percentile, decreased
39 Rx1day is seen over much larger land areas Figure 4.12, d,g), which may be a result of internal climate
40 variability being relatively larger than the long-term trend at lower GWLs In CMIP5, precipitation extremes
41 are projected to be more likely to increase than to decrease on average over both the humid and arid regions
42 of the world, but with larger uncertainty in arid areas (Donat et al., 2019).
43
44 Annual maximum daily precipitation (Rx1day)
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1
2 Figure 4.12: Projected percentage changes in annual maximum daily precipitation (RX1day) averaged over 20-years
3 centred at the time of first passing (a-c) 4癈, (d-f) 2癈 and (g-i) 1.5癈 global warming levels (GWLs) relative to 1851-
4 1900. Results are based on simulations from the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble under the SSP1-1.9, SSP1-2.6, SSP2-
5 4.5, SSP3-7.0, and SSP5-8.5 scenarios. Uncertainties in the projections are quantified with the (a,d,g) 5th, (b,e,h) 50th
6 and (c,f,i) 95th percentile local values from the ensemble at each GWL. Note that these are uncertainties at the
7 individual point and are not spatially coherent, i.e., they do not represent plausible global patterns of change. The 50th
8 percentile maps (b, e h,) present the same data over land as Figure 11.16 of (Seneviratne et al., 2021). The numbers on
9 the right indicate the number of simulations included at each warming level, including multiple realisations from some
10 models with varying initial conditions, depending on data availability. Results for the 1.5癈 GWL include 37 unique
11 models. Fewer models and realisations are available for the 2癈 and 4癈 GWLs as fewer scenarios and/or models reach
12 those warming levels. For individual models, the global patterns of changes are very similar across scenarios and any
13 differences between scenarios are smaller than the ensemble uncertainty for an individual scenario. The CMIP6
14 projections of changes in mean and extreme precipitation are discussed in more detail by WG1 (Doblas-Reyes et al.,
15 2021; Seneviratne et al., 2021).
16
17
18 In the 50th percentile projections at 4癈 global warming, dry spells are projected to become up to 40 days
19 longer in South America and southern Africa and up to 20 days shorter in large parts of Asia (Figure 4.13,
20 a,b,c). In most regions, the projected changes in dry spell lengths are highly uncertain. In southern Africa,
21 the increase in dry spell length ranges from 10 days to over 40 days. In northeast Asia, dry spells are
22 projected to become shorter by up to 20-30 days. In much of South America, dry spells could increase by
23 over 40 days or decrease by over 10 days. Similar global patterns with smaller magnitudes of change are
24 projected for 2癈 and 1.5癈 global warming in all three percentiles (Figure 4.13, d,e,f,g,h,i).
25
26 Consecutive dry days
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1
2 Figure 4.13: As Figure 4.12 for projected changes in annual consecutive dry days (CDD), the highest number of days
3 per year with precipitation < 1mm. The 50th percentile maps (b, e h,) present the same data as Figure 11.19 (a,b,c) of
4 (Seneviratne et al., 2021).
5
6
7 Taken together, these projections of more intense precipitation and changes in the length of dry spells give a
8 clear picture of increasingly volatile precipitation regimes, with many regions seeing both longer dry spells
9 and heavier events when precipitation does occur (high confidence).
10
11 The critical knowledge gap for precipitation projections is the ability to make precise projections. With such
12 large uncertainties in many regions, climate model projections can inform risk assessments but cannot
13 provide confident predictions of specific outcomes.
14
15 In summary, the annual mean precipitation range is projected to increase or decrease by up to 40% or more
16 at 4癈 global over many land areas. The ranges of projected precipitation changes are smaller at lower levels
17 of global warming (high confidence). Either an increase or decrease is possible in most regions, but there is
18 an agreement among models on the increase in the far north (high confidence). There is a stronger model
19 consensus on heavy precipitation increasing with global warming over most land areas (high confidence).
20 There are widely varying projections of change in dry spell length (high confidence), but in regions with
21 increasing projected dry spells, the potential increase is larger at higher levels of global warming (high
22 confidence).
23
24 4.4.1.2 Projected Changes in Evapotranspiration
25
26 AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) found that the CMIP5 model projections of ET increases or decreases followed the
27 same pattern over land as precipitation projections, with additional impacts of reduced transpiration due to
28 plant stomatal closure in response to rising CO2 concentrations. AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) assessed
29 that it is very likely that evapotranspiration will increase over land, with regional exceptions in drying areas.
30
31 In most CMIP5 and CMIP6 models, projected ET changes are driven not just by meteorological conditions
32 and soil moisture but also by plant physiological responses to elevated CO2, which themselves influence
33 meteorology and soil moisture through surface fluxes (Halladay and Good, 2017; Lemordant and Gentine,
34 2019). Elevated CO2 causes stomatal closure which decreases ET, but also increases leaf area index (LAI)
35 which in turn increases ET, but these do not necessarily compensate (Skinner et al., 2017). Higher LAI
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1 increases transpiration, depleting soil moisture but increasing shading, thus reducing soil evaporation
2 (Skinner et al., 2017), but LAI may not increase in areas where it is already high (Lemordant et al., 2018).
3 Projected ET decreases from physiological effects alone are widespread but greatest in tropical forests
4 (Swann et al., 2016; Kooperman et al., 2018).
5
6 Future changes in regional evapotranspiration (ET) are therefore highly uncertain. The CMIP6 multi-model
7 ensemble projects changes in ET varying both in magnitude and sign across the ensemble members (Figure
8 4.14). At 4癈 global warming, the ensemble median projection shows increased ET of approximately 25% in
9 mid/high latitudes but decreases of up to 10% across most of tropical South America, southern Africa, and
10 Australia. These CMIP6 ensemble projections resemble ET changes projected by the CMIP5 ensemble,
11 except over central Africa and Southeast Asia (Berg and Sheffield, 2019). However, the ensemble ranges are
12 wide and include both increases and decreases in projected ET in many locations, with mid-latitude ET
13 increases being up to approximately 50% and ET decreases in southern Africa being up to approximately
14 30%. Projected changes are proportionally smaller at lower levels of global warming, while patterns of
15 change remain similar.
16
17
18
19 Figure 4.14: Projected percentage changes in annual mean ET at global warming levels (GWLs) of 4癈 (top), 2癈
20 (middle) and 1.5癈 (bottom) for the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble of GCMs driven by SSP5-85 concentrations. The
21 distribution of outcomes is shown at local scales with the 5th, 50th and 95th percentile ET changes in individual grid
22 boxes. Note that these are uncertainties at the individual point and are not spatially coherent, i.e., they do not represent
23 plausible global patterns of change. Results for 1.5癈, 2癈 and 4癈 global warming are defined as 20-year means
24 relative to 1850-1900 and use 40, 40 and 31 ensemble members respectively, due to some members not reaching 4癈
25 global warming.
26
27
28 The relative importance of the physiological and radiative effects of CO2 on future ET is a crucial knowledge
29 gap, partly because many Earth System Model land surface schemes still use representations of this process
30 based on older experimental studies. Furthermore, large-scale experimental studies using Free-Air CO2
31 Enrichment (FACE) techniques to constrain the models have not yet been performed in certain critical
32 ecosystems, such as tropical forests. Finally, uncertainties in Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity (ECS) imply
33 uncertainties in the CO2 concentration accompanying any given level of warming (Betts et al., 2018).
34
35 In summary, the sign of projected ET change depends on region, but there is medium confidence that ET will
36 increase in the global mean and mid/high latitudes and decrease in northern South America and southern
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1 Africa. In addition, the impacts of rising CO2 concentrations on plant stomata and leaf area play a role in
2 model projections of evapotranspiration change (high confidence), but there is low confidence in their overall
3 contribution to global ET change.
4
5 4.4.1.3 Projected Changes in Soil Moisture
6
7 AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) mainly focused on surface (upper 10cm) soil moisture, summarizing multi-model
8 projections of 21st-century annual mean soil moisture changes as broadly decreasing in the subtropics and
9 Mediterranean region and increasing in east Africa and central Asia across the RCPs, with the changes
10 tending to become stronger as global warming increases. AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) draw broadly
11 similar conclusions based on new Earth System Models, noting that compared to CMIP5, the CMIP6 models
12 project more consistent drying in the Amazon basin, Siberia, westernmost North Africa and southwestern
13 Australia. WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) also note that soil moisture in the upper 10cm shows more
14 widespread drying than in the total soil column.
15
16 The CMIP6 multi-model ensemble of Earth System Models (ESMs) shows varying levels of consensus on
17 projected changes in surface soil moisture with global warming (Figure 4.15). As in CMIP5 (Cheng et al.,
18 2017), uncertainties are substantial, often associated with uncertainties in projected regional precipitation
19 changes (4.4.1.1), and in most regions, both increases and decreases are projected across the ensemble. In the
20 far north of North America and Asia, projected changes in soil moisture at 4癈 global warming range from a
21 20�30% decrease to an increase of 30-40%. In northern mid-latitudes, projection range from a 10-20%
22 decrease to an increase of 20-30%, except for eastern North America where the projected changes (both
23 increases and decreases) are less than 10%, and western Europe and the Mediterranean where there is a
24 stronger consensus towards decreased soil moisture of up to 25%. South America and southern Africa, and
25 Asia also show a stronger consensus towards decreased soil moisture of up to 40% or more in some regions.
26
27
28
29 Figure 4.15: Projected percentage changes in annual mean total column soil moisture relative to 1981-2010 at global
30 warming levels (GWLs) of 4癈 (top), 2癈 (middle) and 1.5癈 (bottom) for the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble of GCMs
31 driven by SSP5-85 concentrations. The distribution of outcomes is shown at local scales with the 5th, 50th and 95th
32 percentile soil moisture changes in individual grid boxes. Note that these are uncertainties at individual points and are
33 not spatially coherent, i.e., they do not represent plausible global patterns of change. Results for 1.5癈, 2癈 and 4癈
34 global warming are defined as 20-year means relative to 1850-1900 and use 34, 34 and 26 ensemble members
35 respectively, due to some members not reaching 4癈 global warming. Fewer models are shown here than in Figure 4.10
36 on precipitation and Figure 4.14 on ET because some do not provide soil moisture output.
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1
2
3 Most CMIP6 models simulate direct CO2 effects on plant transpiration, which has been shown to be a strong
4 influence on projected future changes in soil moisture (Milly and Dunne, 2016). Approaches that neglect this
5 process project greater decreases in soil moisture availability than the climate models (Roderick et al., 2015;
6 Swann et al., 2016). Therefore, although several studies project increased global aridity and dryland
7 expansion (Feng and Fu, 2013; Sherwood and Fu, 2014; Huang et al., 2016a), these may overestimate future
8 drying (Berg et al, 2017). Nevertheless, land surface models, including vegetation responses to CO2, still
9 project reduced soil moisture in many regions (Grillakis, 2019).
10
11 A critical knowledge gap concerns the relative importance of climate and CO2 physiological effects on soil
12 moisture, in relation to uncertainties in climate sensitivity. For a given level of global warming, the relative
13 importance of climate effects and the direct effects of CO2 on transpiration depend on the CO2 concentration
14 accompanying that level of warming (Betts et al., 2018). Some CMIP6 models have very high climate
15 sensitivities (Meehl et al., 2020), which are assessed as being of low probability on the basis of other lines of
16 evidence (Sherwood et al., 2020). This means that the CO2 concentration accompanying specific global
17 warming levels may be too low and lead to overly-large projections of soil moisture decrease in those
18 models.
19
20 In summary, projected soil moisture changes increase with levels of global warming (high confidence),
21 although there remains substantial disagreement on specific regional changes. In the CMIP6 multi-model
22 ensemble at 4癈 global warming, decreased soil moisture of up to 40% is projected in Amazonia, southern
23 Africa and western Europe in all models (high confidence). In all other regions, there is no consensus on the
24 sign of projected soil moisture changes, and projected changes at 4癈 global warming include decreases of
25 up to 30% and increases of up to 40%. Projected changes are smaller at lower levels of global warming, with
26 similar geographical patterns of change.
27
28 4.4.2 Projected Changes in Cryosphere (Snow, Glaciers, and Permafrost)
29
30 The AR5 noted that global glacier mass loss is very likely to increase further during the 21st century (Jim閚ez
31 Cisneros et al., 2014). According to the SROCC (Hock et al., 2019b), it is very likely that glaciers will
32 continue to lose mass throughout the 21st century: from 18% (by 2100, relative to 2015) for RCP2.6 to 36%
33 for RCP8.5. The AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) and the SROCC (Meredith et al., 2019) reported with high
34 confidence that permafrost would continue to thaw in the 21st century, but the projections are uncertain.
35 Constraining warming to 1.5癈 would prevent the thawing of a permafrost area of 1.5 to 2.5 million km2
36 compared to thawing under 2癈 (medium confidence) (IPCC, 2018b). The AR5 (Collins et al., 2013) and the
37 SROCC (Meredith et al., 2019) concluded that Northern hemisphere snow extent and mass would likely
38 reduce by the end of the 21st century, both in plain and mountain regions. AR6 assessed with medium
39 confidence that under RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 from 2015 to 2100, glaciers are expected to lose 18% and 36%
40 of their early 21st-century mass, respectively (AR6 WGI, (Fox-Kemper et al., 2021)).
41
42 Global glacier mass loss between 2015 and 2100 was estimated at the level 18 � 13% under the RCP2.6
43 scenario and 36 � 20% under the RCP8.5 scenario (Marzeion et al., 2020), which corresponds with previous
44 findings (Radi et al., 2014; Hock et al., 2019a; Shannon et al., 2019). The regional glacier loss rates
45 projections are unevenly distributed worldwide and considerably vary between scenarios (Huss and Hock,
46 2018; Hock et al., 2019a). In most regions `peak water' has already been reached, or is expected to be
47 reached, before mid-century (with an earlier `peak water' for RCP2.6 scenario compared with RCP8.5)
48 (Huss and Hock, 2018; Pritchard, 2019; Marzeion et al., 2020; Rounce et al., 2020). The influence of the
49 expected subsequent decrease in glacier run-off by the end of the 21st century will be more pronounced
50 during droughts and dry seasons (Farinotti et al., 2016; Huss and Fischer, 2016; Hanzer et al., 2018; Brunner
51 et al., 2019).
52
53 Such changes in run-off could potentially lead to water shortages for over 200 million people in the High
54 Mountains of Asia (Pritchard, 2019; Shahgedanova et al., 2020). There is medium confidence that under a
55 4oC warming scenario, 40% of current irrigated demand in sub-basins relying primarily on snow-melt run-
56 off would need to be supplemented from other water sources (Qin et al., 2020). Basins, where such alternate
57 sources are not available, will face agricultural water scarcity (4.5.1). Globally, 1.5 billion people are
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 projected to critically depend on run-off from the mountains by the mid-21st century under a `middle of the
2 road' (RCP6.0) scenario (Viviroli et al., 2020). Furthermore, there is medium confidence that projected
3 changes in snow and glacier melt run-off will affect water inputs to hydropower, leading to a decline in
4 hydroelectricity production in mountain basins, e.g., in India (Ali et al., 2018), Switzerland (Schaefli et al.,
5 2019), USA (Lee et al., 2016) (4.5.2), IPCC AR6 WGI, 2021 (Sections 9.5.1.3 and 8.4.1.7.1).
6
7 Projections of snow cover metrics (IPCC AR6 WGI, 2021 (Section 9.5.3.3)) suggest a further decrease in
8 snow water equivalent (SWE) and snow cover extent (SCE), though the inter-model spread is considerable
9 (Lute et al., 2015; Thackeray et al., 2016; Kong and Wang, 2017; Henderson et al., 2018) (high confidence).
10 The projected CMIP6 SCE and SWE changes share the broad features of the CMIP5 projections: SCE is
11 expected to decrease in the northern hemisphere by approximately 20%, relative to the 1995�2014 mean
12 value, around 2060 and stabilize afterwards under the RCP2.6 scenario, while RCP8.5 scenario leads to
13 snow cover losses up to 60% by 2100 (Mudryk et al., 2020). Regionally, the SWE loss will probably lead to
14 more frequent snow droughts, e.g., the frequency of consecutive snow droughts is projected to increase to
15 80-100% of years at 4癈 warming in western Canada (Shrestha et al., 2021) and 42% of years under the
16 RCP8.5 scenario in the western US (Marshall et al., 2019) by 2100. Thus, by the mid-to-late-21st century,
17 for more than 2/3 of snow-dominated areas in the western US, the ability to predict seasonal droughts and
18 prepare robust water management plans will decline (Livneh and Badger, 2020)(4.4.5).
19
20 There is a high agreement between the CMIP6 projections and the previous findings that permafrost will
21 undergo increasing thaw and degradation during the 21st century worldwide (IPCC AR6 WG1, 2021
22 (Sections 9.5.2.3)). The CMIP6 models project that the annual mean frozen volume in the top 2m of the soil
23 could decrease by 10%�40% for every degree increase of global temperature (Burke et al., 2020; Yokohata
24 et al., 2020b). The CMIP5-based equilibrium sensitivity of permafrost extent to stabilized global mean
25 warming is established to be about 4.0�106 km2 癈-1 (Chadburn et al., 2017). The southern boundary of the
26 permafrost is projected the move to the North: 1�3.5� northward (relative to 1986�2005), at the level of 1.5
27 癈 temperature rise (Kong and Wang, 2017).
28
29 The observational knowledge gaps (4.2.2) impede efforts to calibrate and evaluate models that simulate the
30 past and future evolution of the cryosphere and its social impacts.
31
32 In summary, in most basins fed by glaciers, runoff is projected to increase initially in the 21st century and
33 then decline (medium confidence). Projections suggest a further decrease in seasonal snow cover extent and
34 mass in mid-to-high latitudes and high mountains (high confidence) though the projection spread is
35 considerable. Permafrost will continue to thaw throughout the 21st century (high confidence). There is
36 medium confidence that future changes in cryospheric components will negatively affect irrigated agriculture
37 and hydropower production in regions dependent on snow-melt run-off.
38
39 4.4.3 Projected Changes in Streamflow
40
41 AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) concluded that increases in the mean annual run-off are projected in
42 high latitudes and the wet tropics and decreases in dry tropical regions, but with very considerable
43 uncertainty. Both the patterns of change and uncertainties were found to be primarily driven by projected
44 changes in precipitation. SR1.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) concluded with medium confidence that areas
45 with either positive or negative changes in mean annual run-off/streamflow are projected to be smaller for
46 1.5癈 than for 2癈 of global warming. AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) conclude with medium confidence
47 that global run-off will increase with global warming but with significant regional and seasonal variations.
48 WG1 further concluded with high confidence that run-off will increase in the high northern latitudes and
49 decrease in the Mediterranean and southern Africa. However, there was medium confidence that run-off will
50 increase in central and eastern African regions and decrease in Central America and parts of southern South
51 America. The magnitude of the change is projected to increase with emissions. There is medium confidence
52 that the seasonality of run-off and streamflow will increase with global warming in the subtropics. In snow-
53 dominated regions, there is high confidence that peak flows associated with spring snowmelt will occur
54 earlier in the year and medium confidence that snowmelt-induced run-off will decrease with reduced snow,
55 except in glacier-fed basins where run-off may increase in the near term.
56
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 Changes in run-off and streamflow are projected over most of the ice-free land surface with all recent
2 climate and hydrological model ensembles (Figure 4.16). Changes in streamflow could increase the number
3 of people facing water scarcity or insecurity (high confidence) (Schewe et al., 2014; Gosling and Arnell,
4 2016; McMillan et al., 2016). Projections of future run-off at basin scales show considerable uncertainty in
5 many regions, including differences in signs in many regions (Figure 4.16). This uncertainty is driven by
6 uncertainties in regional precipitation patterns and hydrological models (Koirala et al., 2014; Asadieh et al.,
7 2016), including vegetation responses to CO2 and its effects on ET (Betts et al., 2015). This uncertainty in
8 future water availability contributes to the policy challenges for adaptation, for example, for managing risks
9 of water scarcity ((Greve et al., 2018); Box 4.1). In many regions, some models project large changes in run-
10 off/streamflow but with low consistency between models on the sign of the change (Figure 4.16). In
11 streamflow projections driven by 11 CMIP5 models with the RCP8.5 scenario, strong model consistency
12 (agreement by at least ten models) is only seen over 21% of global land (Koirala et al., 2014). Consensus on
13 the sign of projected change is smaller with the RCP4.5 scenario.
14
15 Considering a wider set of projections, the consensus on increased flows becomes stronger at higher GWLs
16 in (for example) the Yukon, Mackenzie, Kemijoki, Amur, Hwang Ho, Yangtze, Mekong, Ganges-
17 Brahmaputra, Nile, Zaire and Parana basins (Figure 4.16). The consensus on decreased flows becomes
18 stronger for higher GWLs in (for example) the Colorado, Tagus, Helmand, Tigris-Euphrates and Amazon.
19 However, in both cases, some models have projected changes of the opposite sign to the consensus.
20 Moreover, the distribution of projected outcomes becomes notably broader at higher GWLs in (for example)
21 the Mississippi, Yangtze and Amazon. Therefore, even with a strong global climate change signal,
22 uncertainties in changes in mean run-off/streamflow can remain large or even increase. Nevertheless, since
23 projected changes typically increase with global warming, limiting warming to 1.5癈 or 2癈 substantially
24 reduces the potential for either large increases or decreases in mean streamflow compared to 3癈 or 4癈
25 ((Warszawski et al., 2014; Falkner, 2016; Gosling et al., 2017); Figure 4.16) (high confidence).
26
27 In CMIP5, strong model consistency on changes in high and low streamflows is seen with similar global
28 patterns to the mean flows, but over smaller areas (Koirala et al., 2014) (Koirala et al., 2014). By the end of
29 the 21st century with RCP8.5, increases in mean, high and low flows are projected for the Lena; mean and
30 low flows for the MacKenzie (Gelfan et al., 2017; Pechlivanidis et al., 2017; D鰈l et al., 2018). Increased
31 mean and high flows are projected in the Ganges, high flow in the Rhine and Mississippi while decreasing
32 mean and low flows in the Rhine (Krysanova et al., 2017; Pechlivanidis et al., 2017; Vetter et al., 2017).
33 Decreases in mean, high and low flows are projected for the Tagus Krysanova, 2017 #1394; Vetter, 2017
34 #697}. Low flows are projected to decrease in the Mediterranean region and increase in the Alps and
35 Northern Europe (Marx et al., 2018). A general shift in the run-off distribution towards more extreme low
36 run-off in Mexico, western United States, Western Europe, southeastern China, West Siberian Plain and
37 more extreme high run-off in Alaska, northern Canada, and large parts of Asia are projected (Zhai et al.,
38 2020).
39
40 While projected changes in high and low flows are similar to those in mean flows in many regions, this is not
41 the case everywhere. When a single hydrological model and a sample of climate models are selected to
42 explore uncertainties systematically, approximately 56% of the global population is projected to be affected
43 by increased extreme high flows at 1.5癈 warming, rising to 61% at 2癈 warming (Zhai et al., 2020). Those
44 affected by extreme low flows decrease is projected to remain close to 45% at both 1.5癈 and 2癈 warming.
45 However, these results are based on the median of the ensemble projections, so they are subject to high
46 uncertainty. At 1.5癈 global warming, 15% of the population is projected to be affected concurrently by
47 decreased extreme low flows and increased extreme high flows, increasing to 20% at 2癈 warming. In 25
48 combinations of five CMIP5 climate models and five global hydrological models under the RCP8.5 scenario
49 reaching approximately 4癈 GWL at the end of the century, 10% of the global land area is projected to face
50 simultaneously increasing high extreme streamflow and decreasing low extreme streamflow. These regions
51 include the British Isles and the shores of the North Sea, large parts of the Tibetan Plateau, South Asia, and
52 western Oceania, and smaller regions of Africa and North and South America, affecting over 2.1 billion
53 people with 2015 population distributions (Asadieh and Krakauer, 2017). With 11 CMIP5 models driving a
54 single hydrological model, simultaneous increases in high flows and decreases in low flows are projected
55 over 7% of global land (Koirala et al., 2014).
56
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 By the end of the 21st century, global changes in streamflow extremes are projected to be approximately
2 twice as large with RCP8.5 (over 4癈 GWL) than with RCP2.6 (approximately 2癈 GWL) (Asadieh and
3 Krakauer, 2017).
4
5
6
7 Figure 4.16: Projected changes in the annual mean run-off in selected river basins at Global Warming Levels (GWLs)
8 of 1.5癈, 2癈 and 4癈 in a combined ensemble. For each named basin, the sinaplot dots show individual model
9 outcomes for percentage increased flows (blue) and decreased flows (red) at each GWL. Black circles show the
10 ensemble median, and black bars show the 95% confidence range in the median. See inset with the Rio Grande sinaplot
11 for additional guidance on interpretation. In the map, the colours in the basins show the percentage model agreement on
12 the sign of the projected change in streamflow at the 4癈 GWL. The combined ensemble is comprised of 4 multi-model
13 ensembles: the CMIP5 multi-model ensemble of GCMs driven with RCP8.5; the CMIP6 multi-model ensemble of
14 GCMs driven with SSP5-85; varying combinations of hydrological models with 5 GCMs in the Inter-Sectoral Impacts
15 Model Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP), and; the JULES land ecosystems and hydrology model driven by GCMs from
16 the HELIX study (Betts et al., 2018; Koutroulis et al., 2019). In CMIP5 and CMIP6, the projected run-off changes are
17 directly from the GCM land surface schemes without bias correction. In ISIMIP and HELIX, bias-corrected climate
18 model outputs were used to drive the hydrology models. A comparison of the projected changes at the 4癈 GWL for the
19 four individual ensembles is shown in Figure Cross-Chapter Box CLIMATE.1 in Chapter 1.
20
21
22 Glacier retreat and associated run-off changes represent a major global sustainability concern (4.4.2). By
23 2100, using an ensemble of 14 CMIP5 climate models driven by the RCP4.5 scenario, 1/3rd of the 56 large-
24 scale glacierized catchments are projected to experience a mean annual run-off decline by over 10%, with
25 the most significant reductions in central Asia and the Andes (Huss and Hock, 2018). Thus, communities
26 dependent on glacier run-off are particularly vulnerable (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014).
27
28 Societal impacts of change in run-off spread throughout several socio-economic sectors, such as agriculture,
29 health, energy production, affecting overall water security (Wang et al., 2021a). Decreases in run-off may
30 lead to water scarcity and result in increased multisectoral effects in Sub-Saharan Africa (Serdeczny et al.,
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 2017), Western Africa, Middle East, Mexico, North Eastern Brazil, Central Argentina, Mediterranean Africa
2 and Europe (Gosling and Arnell, 2016; Greve et al., 2018), and South-Eastern Australia (Barnett et al.,
3 2015).
4
5 In summary, mean and extreme streamflow changes are projected over most of the ice-free land surface
6 (high confidence). The magnitude of streamflow change is projected to increase with global warming in most
7 regions (high confidence), but there is often high uncertainty on the sign of change. There is high confidence
8 that mean streamflows will increase in the northern high latitudes and decrease in the Mediterranean and
9 southern Africa. Annual mean run-off in one-third of glacierized catchments is projected to decline by at
10 least 10% by 2100, with the most significant reductions in central Asia and the Andes (medium confidence).
11 Elsewhere, projections include both increased and decreased flows. Substantial fractions of ensemble
12 projections disagree with the multi-model mean (high confidence), with implications for long-term planning
13 for water management. With 1.5癈 and 2癈 global warming, approximately 15% and 20% of the current
14 global population would experience both an increase in high streamflows and a decrease in low streamflows
15 (medium confidence). At 4癈 global at the end of the century, 10% of the global land area is projected to
16 simultaneously experience an increase in high extreme streamflow and decrease in low extreme streamflow.
17
18 4.4.4 Projected Changes in Floods
19
20 SR1.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) concluded with medium confidence that global warming of 2癈 would
21 lead to an expansion of the area affected by flood hazards, compared to conditions at 1.5癈 global warming.
22 Both AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) and SROCC (Hock et al., 2019b) concluded that spring snowmelt
23 floods would be earlier (high confidence), and hazards from floods involving meltwater will gradually
24 diminish, particularly at low elevation (medium confidence). SROCC (Hock et al., 2019b) and AR6 WGI
25 Chapter 9 stated that given limited evidence and the complexity of the process, the changes of glacier-related
26 floods under climate change are not clear. AR6 WGI Chapters 8 and 11 summarized that there is medium
27 confidence for a general increase in flooding due to warming, but there are significant regional and seasonal
28 variations.
29
30 There is high confidence that the frequency and magnitude of river floods are projected to change at a global
31 scale. For example, the frequency of river floods is projected to increase in many regions, including Asia,
32 central Africa, western Europe, Central and South America and eastern North America, and decrease in
33 northern North America, southern South America, Mediterranean, eastern Europe in 2050 and beyond
34 (Koirala et al., 2014; Arnell et al., 2016) (Figure 4.17). There is low agreement in projections in changes to
35 snowmelt flood magnitude. A negative trend in snowmelt flood magnitude, together with an increase in rain-
36 fed winter floods, is projected with medium confidence, for example, in mid-latitudes and low-altitude basins
37 of Scandinavia (Arheimer and Lindstr鰉, 2015; Vormoor et al., 2016) and throughout Europe as a whole
38 (Kundzewicz et al., 2017), and northeastern North America (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014). With medium
39 confidence, a positive trend is projected in high-latitude basins, e.g., for large Arctic Rivers, such as Lena
40 and Mackenzie (Eisner et al., 2017; Gelfan et al., 2017; Pechlivanidis et al., 2017) and high-altitude
41 upstreams, such as Ganges, Brahmaputra, Salween, Mekong and the upper Indus Basin (Lutz et al., 2014)
42 and Alpine catchments (Hall et al., 2014). Moderate decreasing trends or insignificant changes are projected
43 for snowmelt floods in the Fraser River Basin of British Columbia (Shrestha et al., 2017).
44
45 There is high confidence that climate change and projected socio-economic development would increase
46 exposure in inundation areas (Figure 4.17), resulting in a large increase in direct flood damages as several
47 times more in all warming levels (Table 4.6). (Alfieri et al., 2017) estimated a 120% and 400% increase in
48 population affected by river flooding for 2癈 and 4 癈 warming, respectively, and a 170% increase in
49 damage for 2癈 warming without socio-economic impact development (4.7.5). (Dottori et al., 2018)
50 estimated the same but with a 134% increase in fatalities with population increase under the SSP3 scenario.
51 The highest numbers of people affected by river flooding are projected for countries in southern, eastern and
52 south-eastern Asia, with tens of millions of people per year per country projected to be affected (Figure 4.17;
53 (Alfieri et al., 2017; Hirabayashi et al., 2021b). (Kinoshita et al., 2018) showed that climate change
54 contributes a 2.8 to 28.8% increase in global fatality for the period 2071-2100, compared to 1991-2005, but
55 socio-economic change (~131.3% increase) and associated vulnerability change (~72.1% reduction) have a
56 greater impact of the projected flood-related fatality rate than climate change alone. (Winsemius et al., 2016)
57 discussed that projected flood damage could be reduced to 1/20th in absolute value with adequate adaptation
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
1 strategies. Direct flood damages are projected to increase by 4-5 times at 4癈 compared to 1.5癈, highly
2 depending on scenarios and assumptions (Table 4.6; Box 4.7).
3
4
5
6 Figure 4.17: Multi-model median return period (years) in the 2080s for the 20th-century 100-year river flood, based on
7 a global river and inundation model, CaMa-Flood, driven by runoff output of 9 CMIP6 Models in the SSP1-2.6 (a),
8 SSP2-4.5 (b) and SSP5-8.5 (c) scenario respectively. All changes are estimated in 2071-2100 relative to 1970-2000. A
9 dot indicates regions with high model consistency (more than 7 models out of 9 show the same direction of change). (d)
10 Global or regional potential exposure (% to the total population affected by flooding) under different warming levels
11 with constant population scenario of CMIP5 (Alfieri et al., 2017) and with population scenario of SSP5 of CMIP6 (bar
12 chart, (Hirabayashi et al., 2021b)). Inundation is calculated when the magnitude of flood exceeds current flood
13 protection (Scussolini et al., 2016). Note that number of GCMs used to calculate Global Warming Level (GWL) 4.0 is
14 less than that for other SWLs, as the global mean temperature of some GCMs did not exceed 4癈.
15
16
17 Table 4.6: Projected economic impact by river flooding in billion US$ in different emission scenarios or for different
18 global warming levels (GWL). The percentage of the total GDP of the region is given in brackets.
Description The economic impact in billion US$ (% of GDP) Reference
No adaptation with current Current (1976-2005): 75 (0.11 %) (Alfieri et al.,
flood protection, no economic GWL 1.5癈: 145 (0.22 %) 2017), with
development (fixed at the level regional
of 2010), US$ at 2010 PPP, (Asia 92, Australasia 8, Europe 29, Africa 7, North America aggregation
mean of 7 GCMs with RCP8.5 3, Central and South America 5) and currency
scenario GWL 2癈: 172 (0.26 %) conversion
(Asia 114, Australasia 7, Europe 32, Africa 9, North America
4, Central and South America 7)
GWL 3癈: 249 (0.37 %)
(Asia 176, Australasia 9, Europe 38, Africa 11, North
America 4, Central and South America 11)
GWL 4癈: 343 (0.51 %)
(Asia 241, Australasia 19, Europe 55, Africa 9, North
America 6, Central and South America 14)
No adaptation with current Current (1976-2005): 142 (0.21 %) (Dottori et
flood protection, US$ at 2010 GWL 1.5癈, SSP3: 370 (0.55 %), SSP5: 485 (0.72%) al., 2018)
PPP, with
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FINAL DRAFT Chapter 4 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report
mean of 5 CMIP5 GCMs and GWL 2癈, SSP3: 597 (0.89 %), SSP5: 888 (1.32%) currency
10 hydrological models GWL 3癈, SSP3: 1,024 (1.52 %), SSP5: 1,616 (2.40%) conversion
No adaptation and no flood Current (1960-1999): 1,032 (1.6 %) (Winsemius
protection, mean value in 2030 RCP2.6, SSP1: 2030: 2,366 (1.44%), 2080: 7,429 (1.43%) et al., 2016)
(2010-2030) and 2080 (2010- RCP6.0, SSP3: 2030: 1,987 (1.44%), 2080: 3,353(1.14%)
2080), US$ at 2010 PPP, mean RCP8.5, SSP5: 2030: 2,304 (1.37%), 2080: 3,684(1.77%) (Winsemius
of 5 CMIP5 GCMs et al., 2016)
Partial adaptation (protected Current (1960-1999): 163 (0.25 %)
against 100-year floods in RCP2.6, SSP1: 2030: 558 (0.34%), 2080: 851 (0.48%) (Kinoshita et
high-income countries, against RCP6.0, SSP3: 2030: 418 (0.29%), 2080: 413(0.32%) al., 2018)
5-year floods for all others), RCP8.5, SSP5: 2030: 418 (0.33%), 2080: 441 (0.57%)
mean value in 2030 (2010- (Tanoue et
2030) and 2080 (2010-2080), Current (1991-2005): 14 (0.044 %) al., 2021)
US$ at 2010 PPP, mean of 5 RCP2.6, SSP1: 2081-2100, 121 (0.037 %)
CMIP5 GCMs RCP6.0, SSP2: 2081-2100, 133 (0.042 %) (Tanoue et
A model calibrated to fit RCP8.5, SSP3: 2081-2100, 130 (0.063 %) al., 2021)
reported damages, future
vulnerability scenarios Current (1961-2005): 102 (0.39 %)
considering autonomous RCP2.6, SSP1: 2020-2100, 2333 (0.99 %)
adaptation, US$ at 2005 PPP, RCP4.5, SSP2: 2020-2100, 2221 (0.99 %)
mean of 11 CMIP5 GCMs, RCP6.0, SSP3: 2020-2100, 1328 (0.80%)
No adaptation and current RCP8.5, SSP5: 2020-2100, 4007 (1.21 %)
flood protection, US$ at 2005 Current (1961-2005): 102 (0.39 %)
PPP, mean of 5 CMIP5 GCMs RCP2.6, SSP1: 2020-2100, 1621 (0.69 %)
RCP4.5, SSP2: 2020-2100, 1567 (0.70 %)
Optimized adaptation, US$ at RCP6.0, SSP3: 2020-2100, 872 (0.52 %)
2005 PPP, mean of 5 CMIP5 RCP8.5, SSP5: 2020-2100, 2558 (0.77 %)
GCMs
1
2
3 In all climate scenarios projected, earlier snowmelt leads to earlier spring floods (high confidence), for
4 example, in northern and eastern Europe (Gobiet et al., 2014; Hall et al., 2014; Etter et al., 2017; Lobanova
5 et al., 2018), northern North America (Vano et al., 2015; Musselman et al., 2018; Islam et al., 2019b), large
6 Arctic rivers (Gelfan et al., 2017; Pechlivanidis et al., 2017), and high-altitude Asian basins (Lutz et al.,
7 2014; Winsemius et al., 2016). There is high confidence that snowmelt floods will occur 25-30 days earlier
8 in the year by the end of the 21st century with RCP8.5, but there is only low agreement in the projected
9 magnitude of snowmelt flood (Arheimer and Lindstr鰉, 2015; Vormoor et al., 2016; Islam et al., 2019b).
10
11 Challenges to projecting flood risk are large because of the complexity of the projecting snowmelt, high-
12 intensity rainfall and soil wetness in large river basins. Even though increases in the number and area of
13 glacier lakes may cause increases in glacier-related floods (4.2.2), knowledge of the frequency or magnitude
14 of glacier-related projected floods is limited. Some local studies indicate that the severity of ice-jam flooding
15 is projected to decrease (Rokaya et al., 2019; Das et al., 2020), but a model study in Canada projected
16 increases in damage of ice-jam floods (Turcotte et al., 2020). While most flood risk projections do not
17 consider the impact of urban expansion, (G黱eralp et al., 2015) estimate that urban areas exposed to flooding
18 will increase by a factor of 2.7 due to urban growth by 2030 (4.5.4). Given the significant differences in
19 assumption in flood protection, exposure or vulnerability scenario among studies, uncertainties in the global
20 estimation of flood loss and damages are large (Table 4.6, 4.7.5).
21
22 Floods and their societal impacts, especially the enhancement of hazards and increase in vulnerability,
23 depend on complex political, economic, and cultural processes (Carey et al., 2017; Caretta et al., 2021).
24 Thus, assessments that analyze long term flood impacts need to account for the interplay of water and society
25 relations. Unfortunately, such studies remain scarce (Pande and Sivapalan, 2017; Ferdous et al., 2018;
26 Caretta et al., 2021). In particular, projected socio-economic, cultural and political impacts on the vulnerable
27 group are understudied, as is their resourcefulness through local knowledge, adaptive capacity and
28 community-led adaptation (4.6.9; 4.8.4; Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18).
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1
2 In summary, there is high confidence that the magnitude, frequency and seasonality of flood are projected to
3 increase in many regions, including Asia, central Africa, western Europe, Central and South America and
4 eastern North America, and decrease in northern North America, southern South America, Mediterranean
5 and Eastern Europe. Projected increases in flooding pose increasing risks, with a 1.2 to 1.8 and 4 to 5 times
6 increase in global GDP loss at 2癈 and 4癈 compared to 1.5癈 warming, respectively (medium confidence).
7 However, regional differences in risks are large because of the strong influence of socio-economic
8 conditions and significant uncertainty in flood hazard projection. In small river basins and urban areas, there
9 is medium confidence that projected increases in heavy rainfall would contribute to increases in rain-
10 generated local flooding. However, the snowmelt floods are projected to decrease (medium confidence) and
11 occur 25-30 days earlier in the year by the end of the 21st century with RCP8.5 (high confidence).
12
13 4.4.5 Projected Changes in Droughts
14
15 AR6 WG1 (Douville et al., 2021) concluded that the total land area subject to increasing drought frequency
16 and severity would expand (high confidence), and in the Mediterranean, south-western South America, and
17 western North America, future aridification will far exceed the magnitude of change seen in the last
18 millennium (high confidence). WG1 (Seneviratne et al., 2021) also find many consistencies among
19 projections of climate change effects on different forms of drought (meteorological, agricultural/ecological
20 and hydrological and drought, 4.2.5), but also significant differences in some regions, particularly in the
21 levels of confidence in projected changes.
22
23 Many studies focus on precipitation-based drought indices (Carr鉶 et al., 2018), but higher evaporative
24 demands and changes in snow cover are additional drivers of hydrological, agricultural and ecological
25 drought (medium confidence) in many regions of the world (Koirala et al., 2014; Prudhomme et al., 2014;
26 Touma et al., 2015; Wanders et al., 2015; Zhao and Dai, 2015; Naumann et al., 2018; Cook et al., 2020a).
27 Furthermore, these droughts (hydrological, agricultural and ecological) are often modulated by prevailing
28 soil and hydro-morphological characteristics. Therefore, the choice of drought definition can affect the
29 magnitude and even the sign of the projected drought change.
30
31 In a study with multiple climate models, global water models and scenarios, the choice of drought definition
32 was the dominant source of uncertainty in the sign of projected change in drought frequency in over 17% of
33 global land by 2070-2099, including several major wheat and maize-growing areas where agricultural (soil
34 moisture) drought is of high importance (Satoh et al., 2021). (Cook et al., 2020a) noted that in the CMIP6
35 projections, soil moisture and runoff drying is more robust, spatially extensive, and severe than precipitation,
36 resulting in the frequency of agricultural drought increasing over wider areas than for meteorological
37 drought. At 1.5癈 global warming, the likelihood of extreme agricultural (soil moisture) drought is projected
38 to at least double (100% increase) over large areas of northern South America, the Mediterranean, western
39 China and high latitudes in North America and Eurasia (Figure 4.18, left column). The likelihood is
40 projected to increase by 150% to 200% in these regions at 2癈 global warming, with an expansion of the
41 affected areas, and increase by over 200% at 4癈 global warming. Agricultural drought likelihood also
42 increases by 100% to 250% at 4癈 global warming in south-western North America, south-west Africa,
43 southern Asia and Australia. The likelihood of extreme drought is projected to decrease in central North
44 America, the Sahel, the horn of Africa, the eastern Indian sub-continent, and parts of western and eastern
45 Asia. Using eight global hydrological models driven by a subset of four of the CMIP5 climate models,
46 (Lange et al., 2020) projected a 370% (30�790%) increase of the global population annually exposed to
47 agricultural (soil moisture) droughts in response to 2癈 global warming. Therefore, it is essential to consider
48 the drought type when applying drought projections to impact and risk in decision-making, especially for
49 informing adaptation. For example, if responses are explicitly tailored to agricultural (soil moisture) drought
50 changes, projected changes in a meteorological (precipitation) drought metric may not provide accurate
51 information.
52
53 Compared to CMIP5, the CMIP6 ensemble projects more consistent drying in the Amazon basin (Parsons,
54 2020), more extensive declines in total soil moisture in Siberia (Cook et al., 2020a), and stronger declines in
55 westernmost North Africa and south-western Australia. Projected declines in soil moisture in these
56 geographies would cause a significant risk of agricultural drought. Also, importantly, projected changes in
57 drought in many regions depend on the season and may not be evident in annual mean changes. For example,
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1 in north-western Asia, hydrological (runoff) drought frequency is projected to decrease by 50-100% in
2 autumn and winter but increase by up to 250% in spring and summer (Cook et al., 2020a). In contrast,
3 meteorological (precipitation) drought frequency is projected to increase by up to 350% throughout the year.
4
5 Drought projections are subject to uncertainties due to limits of predictability and understanding of the
6 relevant biophysical processes. Uncertainties in regional climate changes are significant in many regions (see
7 Figure 4.10, Figure 4.13, Figure 4.15), and in climate model ensembles, the range of regional outcomes
8 generally increases with global warming. This widening of the range of outcomes can contribute to the
9 increased likelihood of extreme droughts across the ensemble as a whole (Figure 4.18, right column). The
10 response of transpiration to elevated CO2 is also a significant uncertainty. The inclusion of CO2
11 physiological effects leads to smaller projected increases in agricultural, ecological or hydrological drought
12 (Milly and Dunne, 2016; Yang et al., 2020). However, the level of uncertainties in representing the effects of
13 CO2 is still very high, precluding conclusive results in a global analysis (de Kauwe et al., 2013; Prudhomme
14 et al., 2014; Yang et al., 2016). Most CMIP6 climate models include CO2 physiological effects, but many
15 hydrological models used for impacts studies do not.
16
17
18
19 Figure 4.18: Projected changes in the likelihood of an extreme single-year agricultural (soil moisture) drought event,
20 with extreme drought defined as the driest 10% of years from 1995-2014, using total soil moisture projections pooled
21 from the CMIP6 ensemble following (Cook et al., 2020a). All ensemble members are treated as equally likely potential
22 outcomes, and likelihoods are calculated using the whole ensemble, left: Percentage change in the likelihood of extreme
23 drought at GWLs of 4癈 (top), 2癈 (middle) and 1.5癈 (bottom), with "extreme drought" defined locally as the 10th
24 percentile in individual grid boxes. Right: probability distribution functions of regional mean soil moisture anomalies
25 for the climatic regions Mediterranean (MED), South American Monsoon (SAM) and West Southern Africa (WSAF)
26 (Iturbide et al., 2020), at 1.5癈, 2癈 and 4癈 GWLs. The solid vertical line shows the baseline, i.e., 50th percentile in
27 1995-2014. The dashed vertical line shows the 10th percentile for 1995-2014, defining "extreme drought" at the regional
28 scale. Projections used the SSP5-8.5 scenario to maximize the number of ensemble members at higher GWLs, but
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1 global patterns of change are very similar for all scenarios (Cook et al., 2020a) and for any given GWL, similar results
2 can be expected with other scenarios (Seneviratne et al., 2021).
3
4
5 Terrestrial water storage (TWS) is the sum of continental water stored in canopies, snow and ice, rivers,
6 lakes and reservoirs, wetlands, soil and groundwater (Pokhrel et al., 2021). TWS drought can therefore be
7 considered to be a combination of agricultural, ecological and hydrological drought. The proportion of the
8 global population exposed to TWS drought is projected to increase with ongoing climate change (Figure
9 4.19). By the late 21st century, under RCP6.0, the global land area in extreme-to-exceptional TWS drought is
10 projected to increase from 3% to 7% (Pokhrel et al., 2021), with increasing uncertainty over time. Combined
11 with a medium population growth scenario (SSP2), this leads to the global population in this level of drought
12 increasing from 3% to 8%, again with increasing uncertainty over time. Hydrological droughts can also be
13 driven by direct human impact via water abstraction (Javadinejad et al., 2019).
14
15
16
17 Figure 4.19: Projected changes in the area under drought and population affected, defined with changes in Terrestrial
18 Water Storage � Drought Severity Index (TWS-DSI) projected with 7 terrestrial hydrology models driven by 4 CMIP5
19 climate models using the RCP6.0 concentration pathway. (a) Fractional global land area under moderate-to-severe
20 drought (blue), defined as -0.8TWS-DSI<-1.6, and extreme-to-exceptional drought (red), defined as TWS-DSI <
21 -1.6. (b) Fraction of global population exposed to moderate-to-severe (blue) and extreme-to-exceptional (red) drought,
22 using the SSP2 population projection. Dark lines show the ensemble means; shaded areas indicate uncertainty as �1
23 standard deviation. Reproduced from (Pokhrel et al., 2021).
24
25
26 Critical knowledge gaps include uncertainties in regional drought due to regional climate change
27 uncertainties, challenges in constraining plant physiological responses to atmospheric CO2, and the
28 uncertainties in modelling the role of different population projections in projecting regional drought risk.
29
30 In summary, the likelihood of drought is projected to increase in many regions over the 21st century (high
31 confidence) even with strong climate change mitigation, more severely in the absence of this. Different
32 forms of drought broadly show similar patterns of projected change in many regions (high confidence), but
33 the frequency of agricultural drought is projected to increase over wider areas than for meteorological
34 drought (medium confidence). Clarity on the definition of drought is therefore important for informing
35 decision-making. With the RCP6.0 and SSP2 scenarios, the global population exposed to extreme-to-
36 exceptional terrestrial water storage drought is projected to increase from 3% to 8% over the 21st century.
37
38 4.4.6 Projected Changes in Groundwater
39
40 AR5 concluded that the range of projected future changes in groundwater storage was large, from
41 statistically significant declines to increases due to several uncertainties in existing models (Jim閚ez
42 Cisneros et al., 2014). AR6 (Douville et al., 2021) concluded with high confidence that projected increases in
43 precipitation alone cannot ensure an increase in groundwater storage under a warming climate unless
44 unsustainable trends in groundwater extraction are also reversed.
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1
2 Projected impacts of climate change on groundwater systems are commonly simulated using models at local
3 to global scales (Bierkens and Wada, 2019). The relations between climate change and groundwater are
4 more complex than those embedded in current numerical models (Cuthbert et al., 2019b). For instance,
5 groundwater systems register effects of drought with several years of lag effect, and aquifer response times
6 to changes in hydraulic forcing also vary across aquifers (Cuthbert et al., 2019a). For instance, long
7 groundwater response times can buffer drought impacts and lengthen recovery times to sustained drought
8 events (Van Lanen et al., 2013; Opie et al., 2020).
9
10 Global total and non-renewable groundwater withdrawals are projected to increase from 952 km3 year-1
11 (2010) to 1,621 km3 year-1 (2099) and from 304 km3 year-1 (2010) to 597 km3 year-1 (2099), respectively
12 (Bierkens and Wada, 2019). At the same time, groundwater depletion is projected to increase from
13 approximately 204 (�30) km3 year-1 in 2000 to 427 (�56) km3 year-1 by 2099 (Wada, 2016). Much of the
14 projected depletion is a function of increased future abstraction of groundwater for irrigation and increased
15 evapotranspiration (Condon et al., 2020) in a warmer climate. For example, the projected doubling of
16 average water use by 2050 in Tunisia is attributed partly (3.8% to 16.4%) to climate change and mainly to
17 socioeconomic policies (Guermazi et al., 2019). Similarly, groundwater depletion in the Bengal Basin and
18 North China Plain is more due to irrigation development than climate change per se (Leng et al., 2015; Kirby
19 et al., 2016).
20
21 A recent synthesis of modelling studies conducted in various climates showed that out of 33 studies, 21
22 reported a decrease in the projected groundwater recharge or storage, eight reported an increase, and the rest
23 showed no substantial change (Amanambu et al., 2020). A global-scale multi-model ensemble study
24 projected decreasing recharge in southern Chile, Brazil, central continental USA, the Mediterranean, and
25 East China, but consistent and increasing recharge for northern Europe and East Africa (Reinecke et al.,
26 2021). In continental Spain, a modelling study (Pulido-Velazquez et al., 2018) projected significant
27 reductions in groundwater recharge in the central and southeast region but a small and localized increase in
28 east and north-eastern areas. In subarctic Alaska, increased contribution of glacier melts to streamflow and
29 aquifer recharge under a warming climate is projected (Liljedahl et al., 2017). In contrast, over the Iranian
30 and Anatolia Plateaus, groundwater recharge is projected to reduce by ~77% in the spring season (March-
31 May) due to a decrease in snowfall (Wu et al., 2020). Overall, several recent studies of climate change
32 impacts on groundwater in different parts of the world have concluded that projected groundwater recharge
33 could either increase or decrease, and results are often uncertain (high confidence) (Meixner et al., 2016;
34 Zaveri et al., 2016; Hartmann et al., 2017; Mehran et al., 2017; Tillman et al., 2017; Kahsay et al., 2018;
35 Herbert and D鰈l, 2019).
36
37 (Wu et al., 2020) report a projected increase in future groundwater storage in the semi-arid regions of
38 northwest India, North China Plain, Guarani Aquifer in South America, and Canning Basin in Australia due
39 to significant increases in projected precipitation. However, the projected irrigation expansion could negate
40 this positive gain in groundwater storage (Sishodia et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2020). In drylands (e.g., playas in
41 Southwestern USA), where focused groundwater recharge processes dominate, greater recharge is projected
42 to occur from the increased number of significant runoff-generating extreme precipitation events in the
43 future (McKenna and Sala, 2018). Overall, an emerging body of studies have projected amplification of
44 episodic recharge in the tropics and semi-arid regions due to extreme precipitation under global warming
45 (medium confidence).
46
47 Climate change is also projected to impact groundwater dependent ecosystems and groundwater quality
48 negatively (medium confidence). Projected increase in precipitation intensity and storms can contaminate
49 groundwater by mobilizing contaminants such as chemical fertilizers, pesticides, antibiotics, and leaching of
50 human waste from pit latrines into groundwater (Amanambu et al., 2020; Lall et al., 2020). By 2050,
51 environmentally critical streamflow is projected to be affected in 42% to 79% of the world's watersheds. The
52 majority of these watersheds currently experience intensive groundwater use, and changes in critical
53 streamflow are projected to negatively impact aquatic ecosystems (de Graaf et al., 2019). Using a global
54 synthesis of 9,404 data points from 32 countries across six continents, (McDonough et al., 2020) report
55 increases in dissolved organic carbon (DOC) concentrations in groundwater following projected changes in
56 precipitation and temperature. For example, hotspots of high DOC concentration (increases of up to 45%)
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1 are associated mainly with increased temperatures in the wettest quarter of the year in the south-eastern USA
2 under RCP8.5 scenarios.
3
4 The projected rise in sea levels can lead to saline intrusion into aquifers in low-lying areas and small islands
5 and threaten coastal ecosystems and livelihoods resilience, for example, in already vulnerable countries like
6 Bangladesh and vulnerable ecosystems like the Mangrove Forest of Sundarbans (Befus et al., 2020;
7 Dasgupta et al., 2020; Shamsudduha et al., 2020). However, hydrogeologic properties, aquifer settings, and
8 impacts of over-abstraction are more important determinants of salinization of coastal aquifers than slowly
9 rising sea levels (Michael et al., 2013; Taylor et al., 2013a). The projected contribution of global
10 groundwater depletion to sea-level rise is expected to increase from 0.57 (�0.09) mm year-1 in 2000 to 0.82
11 (�0.13) mm year-1 by 2050, driven by a growing trend in groundwater extraction (Wada, 2016). However,
12 several uncertainties around model parameterization remain (Wada et al., 2017).
13
14 There are several knowledge gaps in our understanding of the global-scale sensitivity of groundwater
15 systems to climate change and resulting feedbacks (Maxwell and Condon, 2016; Cuthbert et al., 2019a).
16 There are process uncertainties in groundwater recharge simulation due to the potential impact of
17 atmospheric CO2 on vegetation and resulting changes in evapotranspiration (Reinecke et al., 2021). There
18 are uncertainties in impact models due to poor representation of recharge pathways (diffuse vs. focused) and
19 inability to adequately capture feedbacks among climate, land use, and groundwater systems (Meixner et al.,
20 2016). Finally, there are gaps in long-term observational data, especially in less-developed countries
21 (Amanambu et al., 2020), making it challenging to evaluate the of performance of impact models (Gleeson et
22 al., 2020).
23
24 In summary, groundwater abstraction is projected to deplete the long-term, non-renewable storage as
25 withdrawals are projected to increase significantly in all major aquifers worldwide (medium evidence, high
26 agreement). In the tropics and semi-arid regions, growing precipitation intensification under global warming
27 may enhance the resilience of groundwater through increased episodic recharge (medium confidence).
28 However, in the semi-arid areas, over-abstraction continues to be a threat to groundwater storage and can
29 nullify the benefits of increased future recharge.
30
31 4.4.7 Projected Changes in Water Quality
32
33 AR5 concluded that climate change was projected to reduce water quality (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014).
34 SR 1.5 assessed with low confidence differences in projected impacts under 1.5癈 versus 2癈 of warming
35 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). In addition, SROCC reported the water quality degradation due to the release
36 of legacy contaminants in glaciers and permafrost (medium confidence) (Hock et al., 2019b). AR6 WGI
37 Report does not explicitly mention water quality issues.
38
39 Water insecurity due to water quality degradation is projected to increase under climate change due to
40 warming, enhanced floods and sea-level rise (Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes, 2014; Dyer et al., 2014; Whitehead
41 et al., 2015) (medium confidence). Drought-driven diminishing river and lake levels (Jeppesen et al., 2015)
42 and continued water abstraction for irrigation (Arags et al., 2015) may contribute to the salinization of soil
43 and water. In addition, warming is projected to disrupt the historical sequestration of contaminants in
44 permafrost in the Arctic and mountain regions (Bond and Carr, 2018).
45
46 Quantitative projections on climate-induced water quality degradation are sparse. Aminomethylphosphonic
47 acid and glyphosate are projected to exceed drinking water quality standards in dry years in a high emissions
48 scenario in the Meuse River in Europe by 2050 (Sjerps et al., 2017). From 2020 to 2050, based on scenarios
49 RCP2.6, RCP4.5, and RCP8.5, the incidences of total nitrogen pollution are projected as 97.3%, 97.1% and
50 94.6% in drought璮lood abrupt alternation months comparing to 69.3%, 69.7% and 67.5% in normal months
51 in the Luanhe river basin in China (Bi et al., 2019). From 2012 to 2050, freshwater river area is expected to
52 decrease from 40.8% to 17.1%-19.7% under different sea-level rise scenarios in the southwest coastal zone
53 of Bangladesh (Dasgupta et al., 2013). Under the warming scenario +4.8癈 increase by the end of the
54 century, the average nutrient abundance are projected to triple in a shallow lake in the Northwest of England
55 (Richardson et al., 2019).
56
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1 While there is some understanding of the potential effect of glacier and permafrost degradation on water
2 quality, projections are lacking. Research is limited mainly in Europe and North America, and quantifying
3 the future water quality changes is still incipient.
4
5 In summary, climate change is projected to increase water pollution incidences, salinization, and
6 eutrophication due to increasing drought and flood events, sea level rise, and water temperature rise,
7 respectively in some local rivers and lakes, but there is dearth of exact quantification at a global scale
8 (medium confidence).
9
10 4.4.8 Projected Changes in Soil Erosion and Sediment Load
11
12 AR5 stated that soil erosion and sediment load are projected to change (low confidence) due to warming and
13 increased rainfall intensity (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). SRCCL concluded that future climate change will
14 increase, with medium confidence, the potential for water-driven soil erosion in many dryland areas, causing
15 soil organic carbon decline (Mirzabaev et al., 2019). SR1.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018) concluded that,
16 because of the complex interactions among climate change, land cover, soil management, etc., the
17 differences between mean annual sediment load under 1.5癈 and 2癈 of warming are unclear.
18
19 Globally, climate change is estimated to be responsible for 30-66% increase of soil erosion by 2070, while
20 socioeconomic developments impacting land use may lead to �10% change of soil erosion (Borrelli et al.,
21 2020). At a regional scale, different effects of the climate change impact on soil losses are found owing to
22 the ensemble experiments with climate models coupled with regional/local models of soil erosion and
23 sediment yield. In the 21st century, the soil erosion rates are projected to increase for the European countries
24 (Czech Republic (Svoboda et al., 2016), Belgium (Mullan et al., 2019), Spain (Eekhout et al., 2018; Eekhout
25 and de Vente, 2019a; Eekhout and De Vente, 2019b), Germany (Gericke et al., 2019) by 10-80% depending
26 on the emission scenario and time period of the projection, as well as for the USA (Garbrecht and Zhang,
27 2015) and Australia (Yang et al., 2015b; Zhu et al., 2020). Only a few studies demonstrated decreasing trend
28 in soil erosion, e.g. up to 9% with RCP8.5 scenario in Greece (Vantas et al., 2020). Sediment yield is
29 projected to both increase (5-16% with the SRES A1, B1, B2 scenarios in Vietnam and Laos (Giang et al.,
30 2017), 11% with the RCP8.5 scenario and 8% with the SRES A2 scenario in the U.S. (Yasarer et al., 2017)
31 and (Wagena et al., 2018), respectively), 19-37% with the RCP4.5, RCP8.5 scenarios in Burkina Faso (Op
32 de Hipt et al., 2018)) and decrease (30% with the SRES A1B scenario in the southwest U.S. ((Francipane et
33 al., 2015), 8-11% with the SRES A1B scenario in Spain (Rodr韌uez-Blanco et al., 2016), 11-52% with the
34 RCP4.5, RCP8.5 scenarios in Ethiopia (Gadissa et al., 2018), 13-62% with the RCP2.6, RCP8.5 scenarios in
35 Canada (Loiselle et al., 2020)) over the different regions of the world in the 21st century.
36
37 Post-fire sedimentation is projected to increase for nearly nine tenths of watersheds by >10% and for more
38 than one third of watersheds by >100% by the 2041 to 2050 decade in the western USA with SRES A1B
39 scenario (Sankey et al., 2017).
40
41 In summary, soil losses mainly depend on the combined effects of climate and land use changes. Herewith,
42 recent studies demonstrate increasing impact of the projected climate change (increase of precipitation,
43 thawing permafrost) on soil erosion (medium confidence).
44
45
46 4.5 Projected Sectoral Water-related Risks
47
48 Observed sectoral water-related impacts have been documented across world regions. Climate change is
49 projected to further exacerbate many of these risks, especially at warming levels above 1.5癈 (Figure 4.20).
50 For some sectors and regions, climate change may also hold the potential for beneficial outcomes, though
51 feedback and cascading effects as well as risks of climate extremes are not always well understood and often
52 underestimated in impact projections. Risks manifest as a consequence of the interplay of human and natural
53 vulnerability, sector-specific exposure as well as the climate hazard as a driver of climate change. Challenges
54 to water security are driven by factors across these components of risk, where climate change is but one facet
55 of driving water insecurity in the face of global change. While the focus of this chapter is on climate change
56 and its effects on water security, for many sectors and regions the dynamics of socio-economic conditions is
57 a core driver. They play an essential role in understanding and alleviating water security risks. The following
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1 sections outline sectoral risks for both, risks driven by water-related impacts, such as drought, flood or
2 changes in water availability, as well as risks with effects on water uses, mainly focusing on changing water
3 demand as a consequence of climate change. It therefore does not cover all climate change driven risks to the
4 respective sectors, but is limited to those that stand in relation to water. The focus within this chapter is on
5 global to regional processes (additional regional to local information in Table SM4.4; Figure 4.20 as well as
6 across regional chapters of this report).
7
8 4.5.1 Projected Risks to Agriculture
9
10 AR5 concluded that overall irrigation water demand would increase by 2080, while the vulnerability of
11 rainfed agriculture will further increase (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). SR1.5 concluded that both the food
12 and the water sectors would be negatively impacted by global warming with higher risks at 2癈 than at
13 1.5癈, and these risks could coincide spatially and temporally, thus increasing hazards, exposures and
14 vulnerabilities across populations and regions (medium confidence). SR1.5 further reinforced AR5
15 conclusions in terms of projected crop yield reductions, especially for wheat and rice (high confidence), loss
16 of livestock, and increased risks for small-scale fisheries and aquaculture (medium confidence) (Hoegh-
17 Guldberg et al., 2018), conclusions which are further corroborated by SRCCL (Mbow et al., 2019).
18
19 Climate change impacts agriculture through various pathways (5.4 � crop-based systems), with projected
20 yield losses of up to 32% by 2100 (RCP8.5) due to the combined effects of temperature and precipitation.
21 Limiting warming could significantly reduce potential impacts (up 12% yield reduction by 2100 under
22 RCP4.5) (Ren et al., 2018a). Though overall changes differ across models, regions and seasons, differences
23 in impacts between 1.5癈 and 2癈 can also be identified (Ren et al., 2018a; Ruane et al., 2018; Schleussner
24 et al., 2018). Globally, 11% (�5%) of croplands are estimated to be vulnerable to projected climate-driven
25 water scarcity by 2050 (Fitton et al., 2019).
26
27 Overall drought-driven yield loss is estimated to increase by 9% to 12% (wheat), 5.6% to 6.3% (maize),
28 18.1% to19.4% (rice) and 15.1% to16.1%(soybean) by 2071-2100, relative to 1961-2016 (RCP8.5) (Leng
29 and Hall, 2019). In addition, temperature-driven increases in water vapour deficit could have additional
30 negative effects, further exacerbating drought-induced plant mortality and thus impacting yields (Grossiord
31 et al., 2020) (see also Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 5 of WGI report). Currently, global agricultural
32 models do not fully differentiate crop responses to elevated CO2 under temperature and hydrological
33 extremes (Deryng et al., 2016) and largely underestimate the effects of climate extremes (Schewe et al.,
34 2019).
35
36 Flood-related risks to agricultural production are projected to increase over Europe, with a mean increase of
37 expected annual output losses of approximately 11million (at 1.5癈 GWL); 12m ( at 2癈 GWL) and 15
38 million (at 3癈 GWL) relative to the 2010 baseline (Koks et al., 2019). In parts of Asia, where flooding
39 impacts on agriculture are already significant, projections indicate an increase in damage to area under paddy
40 by up to 50% in Nepal; 16% in the Philippines; 55% in Indonesia; 23% in Cambodia and Vietnam and 13%
41 in Thailand (2075-2099 vs 1979-2003; RCP8.5) (Shrestha et al., 2019a).
42
43 Global crop water consumption of green water resources (soil moisture) is projected to increase by about
44 8.5% by 2099 relative to 1971-2000 as a result of climate drivers (RCP6.0), with additional smaller
45 contributions by land-use change (Huang et al., 2019) (4.4.1.3, 4.4.8). In India, a substantial increase in
46 green and blue water consumption is projected for wheat and maize, with a slight reduction of blue water
47 consumption for paddy (Mali et al., 2021). Temperate drylands, especially higher latitude regions, may
48 become more suitable for rain-fed agriculture (Bradford et al., 2017). Locally and regionally, however, some
49 of those areas with currently larger areas under rain-fed production, for example, in Europe, may become
50 less suitable for rain-fed agriculture (Table 1 to 4.5.1) (Bradford et al., 2017; Shahsavari et al., 2019).
51
52 While global crop models and estimates of yield impacts often focus on major staple crops relevant for
53 global food security, crops of high economic value are projected to become increasingly water dependent.
54 For example, climate-driven yield increases for tea are projected for various tea-producing regions if no
55 water limitations and full irrigation is assumed but decreases in yields are projected under continued present-
56 day irrigation assumptions (Beringer et al., 2020). Water-related impacts on global cotton production are
57 highly dependent on the CO2-fertilisation effect, with increases projected for higher CO2 concentration if no
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1 water limitations are implemented. However, substantial decreases in cotton production are projected if
2 lower or no fertilization effects are accounted for due to increasing water limitations (Jans et al., 2018).
3 Reductions in economically valuable crops will probably increase the vulnerability of population groups,
4 especially small-holder farmers with limited response options (Morel et al., 2019).
5
6 To stabilize yields against variations in moisture availability, irrigation is the often the most common
7 adaptation response (4.6.2, Box 4.3). Projections indicate a potentially substantial increase in irrigation water
8 requirements (Boretti and Rosa, 2019). Increasing agricultural water demand is driven by various factors,
9 including population growth, increased irrigated agriculture, cropland expansion and higher demand for bio-
10 energy crops for mitigation ((Chaturvedi et al., 2015; Grafton et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2019), 4.7.6).
11 Depending on underlying assumptions and the constraints on water resources implemented in the global
12 agricultural models, irrigation water requirements are projected to increase two to three-fold by the end of
13 the century (Hejazi et al., 2014; Bonsch et al., 2015; Chaturvedi et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2019). While the
14 combined effects of population and land-use change as well as irrigation expansion account for the
15 significant part of the projected increases in irrigation water demand by the end of the century, around 14%
16 of the increase are directly attributed to climate change (RCP6.0) (Huang et al., 2019).
17
18 With various degrees of water stress being experienced under current conditions and further changes in
19 regional water availability projected, as well as continuing groundwater depletion as a consequence of over-
20 abstraction for irrigation purposes (4.2.6 and 4.4.6), limitations to major irrigation expansion will occur in
21 some regions, including South and Central Asia, the Middle East, parts of North and Central America
22 (Grafton et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2019). Constraining projections of available irrigation water through
23 consideration of environmental flow requirements further reduces the potential for irrigation capacity and
24 expansion (Bonsch et al., 2015). Changes in land use and production patterns, e.g. expansion of rain-fed
25 production and increasing inter-regional trade, would be required to meet growing food demand while
26 preserving environmental flow requirements, though this may increase local food security-related
27 vulnerabilities (Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in Chapter 16) (Pastor et al., 2014). Where climate impacts
28 on yields are not a consequence of water limitations (mainly for C4 crops), irrigation cannot offset negative
29 yield impacts (Levis et al., 2018).
30
31 Over 50% of the global lowlands equipped for irrigation will depend heavily on run-off contributions from
32 the mountain cryosphere by 2041�2050 (SSP2璕CP6.0) and are projected to make unsustainable use of blue
33 water resources (Viviroli et al., 2020). Projected changes in snowmelt patterns indicate that for all regions
34 dependent on snowmelt for irrigation during warm seasons, alternative water sources will have to be found
35 for up to 20% (at 2癈 GWL) and up to 40% (at 4癈 GWL) of seasonal irrigation water use, relative to
36 current water use patterns (1986-2015) (Qin et al., 2020). Regional studies further corroborate these global
37 findings (Biemans et al., 2019; Malek et al., 2020). Basins, where such alternate sources are not available,
38 will face agricultural water scarcity.
39
40 Elevated CO2 concentrations play an important role in determining future yields in general and have the
41 potential to beneficially affect plant water use efficiency (Deryng et al., 2016; Ren et al., 2018a; Nechifor
42 and Winning, 2019). The elevated CO2 effects are projected to be most prominent for rain-fed C3 crops
43 (Levis et al., 2018). Combined results from field experiments and global crop models show that CO2
44 fertilization could reduce consumptive water use by 4-17% (Deryng et al., 2016). To account for
45 uncertainties, global agricultural models provide output with and without account for CO2 fertilization
46 effects, though recent progress on reducing model uncertainty indicates that non-CO2 model runs may no
47 longer be needed for adequate projections of yield impacts (Toreti et al., 2019).
48
49 Due to the complex interactions among determinants for livestock production, the future signal of water-
50 related risks to this sector is unclear. Globally, 10% (�5%) of pasture areas are projected to be vulnerable to
51 climate-induced water scarcity by 2050 (Fitton et al., 2019). Water use efficiency gains through elevated
52 CO2 concentrations have the potential to increase forage quantities, though effects of nutritional values are
53 ambiguous (Augustine et al., 2018; Derner et al., 2018; Rolla et al., 2019). In addition, spatial shifts in
54 temperature-humidity regimes may shift suitable regions for livestock production, opening up new suitable
55 areas for some regions or encouraging shifts in specific breeds better adapted to future climatic regimes
56 (Rolla et al., 2019) (5.5 � Livestock Systems and 5.10. Mixed Systems ).
57
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1 Projections of climate impacts on freshwater aquaculture are limited (5.9.3.1 � Projected Impacts; Inland
2 freshwater and brackish aquaculture). In particular, in tropical regions, reductions in water availability,
3 deteriorating water quality, and increasing water temperatures pose risks to terrestrial aquaculture, including
4 temperature-related diseases and endocrine disruption ((Kibria et al., 2017), Section 4.4.7). On the other
5 hand, freshwater aquaculture in temperate and arctic polar regions may benefit from temperature increases
6 with an extension of the fish growing season (Kibria et al., 2017).
7
8 Global crop models, which provide the basis for most projections of agricultural risk, continue to have
9 limitations in resolving water availability. As a result, they do not fully resolve the effects of elevated CO2
10 for changing water use efficiency, for example (Durand et al., 2018), potentially overestimating drought
11 impacts on maize yield (Fodor et al., 2017) and may underestimate limitations to further expansion of
12 irrigation (Elliott et al., 2014; Frieler et al., 2017b; Winter et al., 2017; J鋑ermeyr and Frieler, 2018; Kimball
13 et al., 2019; Yokohata et al., 2020a).
14
15 In summary, agricultural water use is projected to increase globally due to cropland expansion and
16 intensification and climate change-induced changes in water requirements (high confidence). Parts of
17 temperate drylands may experience increases in suitability for rain-fed production based on mean climate
18 conditions; however, risks to rain-fed agriculture increase globally because of increasing variability in
19 precipitation regimes and changes in water availability (high confidence). Water-related impacts on
20 economically valuable crops will increase regional economic risks (medium evidence, high agreement).
21 Regions reliant on snowmelt for irrigation purposes will be affected by substantial reductions in water
22 availability (high confidence).
23
24 4.5.2 Projected Risks to Energy and Industrial Water Use
25
26 AR5 concluded with high confidence that climate induced changes, including changes in water flows, will
27 affect energy production, and the actual impact will depend on the technological processes, and location of
28 energy production facilities (Arent et al., 2014). SR1.5 concluded with high confidence that climate change
29 is projected to affect the hydropower production of Northern European countries positively. However,
30 Mediterranean countries like Greece, Spain, and Portugal are projected to experience approximately a 10%
31 reduction in hydropower potential under 2癈 warming level, which could be reduced by half if global
32 warming could be limited to 1.5癈 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). In addition, SROCC concluded with high
33 confidence that an altered amount and seasonality of water supply from snow and glacier melt is projected to
34 affect hydropower production negatively (IPCC, 2019a).
35
36 Since AR5, a large number of studies have modeled future changes in hydropower production due to
37 climate-induced changes in volume and seasonality of streamflow and changes in sediment load due to
38 accelerated melting of cryosphere at both global (van Vliet et al., 2016b; Turner et al., 2017) and regional
39 scales (Tarroja et al., 2016; Ali et al., 2018; de Jong et al., 2018; Tobin et al., 2018; Arango-Aramburo et al.,
40 2019; Carvajal et al., 2019; Arias et al., 2020; Meng et al., 2021).
41
42 For hydropower production at a global scale, (Turner et al., 2017), projected an uncertainty in the direction
43 of change in global hydropower production to the tune of +5% to -5% by 2080s, under a high emissions
44 scenario. On the other hand, (van Vliet et al., 2016b), projected an increase in global hydropower production
45 between +2.4% to +6.3% under RCP 4.5 and RCP 8.5 respectively by 2080s, as compared to a baseline
46 period of 1971-2000, but with significant regional variations (high confidence). For example, regions like
47 Central Africa, India, Central Asia, and northern high-latitude areas are projected to see more than 20%
48 increases in gross hydropower potential (high confidence). On the other hand, Southern Europe, Northern
49 Africa, southern United States, and parts of South America, southern Africa, and southern Australia are
50 projected to experience more than 20% decreases in gross hydropower potential. The Mediterranean region
51 is projected to see almost a 40% reduction in hydropower production (high confidence) (Turner et al., 2017).
52 On the other hand, northern Europe and India are projected to add to their hydropower production capacity
53 due to climate change by mid-century (high confidence) (van Vliet et al., 2016b; Turner et al., 2017; Emodi
54 et al., 2019).
55
56 In hydropower plants located in the Zambezi basin, electricity output is projected to decline by 10-20% by
57 2070 compared to baseline (1948-2008) under a drying climate; only marginal increases are projected under
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1 a wetting climate (Spalding-Fecher et al., 2017). In the Mekong basin, the total hydropower generation is
2 projected to decline by 3.0% and 29.3% under 1.5癈 and 2癈 (Meng et al., 2021). In this context, 1.5癈 will
3 come up in 2036 under RCP2.6 and in 2033 under RCP6.0; and 2癈 will come up in 2056 under RCP6.0
4 (Frieler et al., 2017a). In India, hydropower production is projected to increase by up to 25% by the end of
5 the 21st century due to increased temperature and precipitation under the RCP8.5 scenario. However,
6 hydropower production is projected to decline in plants located in snow-dominated rivers due to earlier
7 snowmelt (Ali et al., 2018). In Colombia, hydropower production is projected to decrease by ~10% under the
8 RCP4.5 dry scenario by 2050 (Arango-Aramburo et al., 2019). In a sub-basin of the Amazon River (one of
9 the hydropower hotspots in Brazil), dry season hydropower potential is projected to decline by -7.4 to -5.4%
10 from historical baseline conditions under RCP4.5 (Arias et al., 2020). In the S鉶 Francisco basin of Brazil,
11 hydropower production is projected to reduce by -15% to -20% by 2100 under the IPCC A1B scenario (de
12 Jong et al., 2018), which will affect the Brazilian energy mix in the future. In Ecuador, under various policy
13 pathways and dry and wet scenarios under RCP4.5, hydropower production is projected to increase by +7%
14 to +21% or decline by -25% to -44% by 2050 (Carvajal et al., 2019). In Europe, different impacts are
15 projected across different sub-regions (WGII, Chapter 13, Table 13.7- Projected climate change risks for
16 energy supply in Europe by 2100). In Northern Europe, up to 20% of hydropower potential increases are
17 projected under 3癈 warming; increases of up to 15% and 10% are projected under 2癈 and 1.5癈 warming
18 levels. In Mediterranean parts of Europe, hydropower potential reductions of up to -40% are projected under
19 3癈 warming; while reductions below -10% and -5% are projected under 2癈 and 1.5癈 warming levels,
20 respectively (van Vliet et al., 2016b; Tobin et al., 2018). Hydropower plants in Switzerland are projected to
21 lose ~ 1.0 TWh of hydroelectricity production per year by 2070-90 due to net glacier mass loss in the earlier
22 part of the century (Schaefli et al., 2019). In the Italian Alps, under the warmest scenario of RCP8.4, up to
23 4% decreases in hydropower production are projected (Bombelli et al., 2019). The magnitude of change
24 differs significantly among models. In California, USA, the average annual hydropower generation is
25 expected to decline by 3.1% under RCP4.5 by 2040-2050, compared to the baseline 2000-2010 (Tarroja et
26 al., 2016). In the Skagit river basin in the US, hydropower generation is projected to increase by 19% in the
27 winter/spring, and a decline by 29% in summer by the 2080s (Lee et al., 2016).
28
29 Apart from climate impacts on hydropower production, climate-induced flood loads and reservoir water level
30 change may lead to dam failure under RCP2.6 and RCP4.5 scenarios (Fluix�-Sanmart韓 et al., 2018; Fluix�-
31 Sanmart韓 et al., 2019) (medium confidence). For example, the incidence of 100-year floods in the Skagit
32 river basin in the US and peak winter sediments are projected to increase by 49% and 335%, respectively, by
33 2080, necessitating fundamental changes in hydropower plant operation. Nevertheless, some risks, such as
34 floods, will remain unmitigated even with changes in hydropower operation rules (Lee et al., 2016). Overall,
35 impacts of future extreme events on energy infrastructure have been less studied than impacts of gradual
36 changes (Cronin et al., 2018). Furthermore, future hydropower development may also impact areas of high
37 freshwater megafauna in South America, South and East Asia, and in the Balkan region, and sub-catchments
38 with a high share of threatened freshwater species are particularly vulnerable (Zarfl et al., 2019). Therefore,
39 future hydropower dams will need to be sited carefully (Dorber et al., 2020).
40
41 There is high confidence that changes in future cooling water availability are projected to affect
42 thermoelectric production capacity negatively at global (van Vliet et al., 2016b; Zhou et al., 2018b) and
43 regional scales (Bartos and Chester, 2015; Behrens et al., 2017; Ganguli et al., 2017; Zhou et al., 2018b;
44 Emodi et al., 2019). Global mean water temperature is projected to increase by +1癈 for RCP2.6 and +2.7癈
45 for RCP8.5 (van Vliet et al., 2016b). Correspondingly, global cooling water sufficiency is projected to
46 decline by -7.9% to -11.4% by 2040-2069 and -11.3% to -18.6% by 2070-90 (Zhou et al., 2018b), thereby
47 impacting thermoelectric power production.
48
49 In Asia, under a 2癈 global warming scenario, coal power plants annual usable capacity factor in Mongolia,
50 Southeast Asia, and parts of China and India are projected to decrease due to water constraints (Wang et al.,
51 2019b). In the European Union, an assessment of 1326 thermal electric plants in 818 basins projected that
52 the number of basins with water stress would increase from 47 in 2014 to 54 in 2030 (Behrens et al., 2017)
53 with consequent impacts on cooling water supplies. In the Western USA, by 2050, vulnerable power plants
54 are projected to lose 1.1% to 3.0% of average summertime generation capacity, which could rise to 7.2 to
55 8.8% loss under a ten-year drought condition (Bartos and Chester, 2015). Further, 27% of thermoelectric
56 production in the USA may be at severe risk of low-capacity utilization due to water stress by 2030 (Ganguli
57 et al., 2017). Thermoelectric plant capacity on the hottest summer day in the USA and EU are projected to
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1 fall by 2% under a 2癈 global warming and by 3.1% under a 4癈 global warming requiring overbuilding of
2 electricity infrastructure by 1% to 7% given the current energy mix portfolio (Coffel and Mankin, 2020). A
3 systematic review showed consistent decreases in mid to end of the century in thermal power production
4 capacity due to insufficiency of cooling water in Southern, Western and Eastern Europe (high confidence);
5 North America and Oceania (high confidence), Central, Southern, and Western Asia (high confidence) and
6 Western and Southern Africa (medium confidence) (Emodi et al., 2019). Overall, apart from emissions
7 benefits, moving away from thermal power generation to other renewable energy will also lower the chances
8 of climate induced curtailment of energy production (high confidence).
9
10 Global freshwater demand for the energy sector is projected to increase under all 2癈 scenarios due to the
11 rapid increase in electricity demand in developing countries (Fricko et al., 2016). Despite the water shortage
12 and climate change impacts, industry and energy sectors' share in global water demand has been projected to
13 rise to 24% by 2050 (UN Water, 2020), which will increase the competition among various water-use sectors
14 (Boretti and Rosa, 2019). Furthermore, mining activities, which are highly dependent on sufficient water
15 availability, are also at risk due to climate change (Aleke and Nhamo, 2016). Given that some of the
16 intensely mined regions, such as the Atacama Desert in Chile, are already water-scarce, even small changes
17 in rainfall could destabilize water-intensive mining operations and affect the production and processing
18 activities at mines (Odell et al., 2018). Overall, there is a lack of literature on the impact of climate change
19 on future mining activities and other water-intensive industries.
20
21 In summary, globally, hydropower and thermoelectric power capacities are projected to increase and
22 decrease, respectively, due to changes in river run-off and increases in ambient water temperatures (high
23 confidence). In the future, freshwater demand for energy and industrial sectors is projected to rise
24 significantly at the global level, triggering competition for water across sectors. Although climate change
25 also poses risks to mining and other water-intensive industries, quantifying these risks is difficult due to
26 limited studies.
27
28 4.5.3 Projected Risks to Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH)
29
30 Climate-related extreme events impact WaSH services and local water security. While not WaSH-specific,
31 AR5 showed that more people would experience water scarcity and floods (high confidence) and identified
32 WaSH failure due to climate change as an emergent risk (medium confidence) leading to higher diarrhoea
33 risk (Field et al., 2014b). In addition, both SR 1.5 (IPCC, 2018a) and SRCCL (IPCC, 2019b) projected the
34 risk from droughts, heavy precipitation, water scarcity, wildfire damage, and permafrost degradation to be
35 higher at 2癈 warming than 1.5癈 (medium confidence) and all these could potentially impact water quality
36 and WaSH services.
37
38 Waterborne diseases result from complex causal relationships between climate, environmental, and socio-
39 economic factors that are not fully understood or modelled (Boholm and Prutzer, 2017) (high confidence).
40 WaSH-related health risks are related to extreme events, harmful algal blooms and WaSH practices (Chapter
41 7 WGII 7.3.2). In addition, changes in thermotolerance and chlorine resistance of certain viruses have been
42 observed in laboratory experiments simulating different temperatures and sunlight conditions (Carratal� et
43 al., 2020), increasing potential health risks even where traditional water treatment exists (Jim閚ez Cisneros
44 et al., 2014) (low confidence). Studies show that degraded water quality increases the willingness to pay for
45 clean water regardless of national economic status. However, payment for clean, potable water, particularly
46 in low- and middle-income countries, can represent a significant percentage of people's income, limiting
47 economic wellbeing and the possibility for re-investment in other livelihoods or activities (Constantine et al.,
48 2017; van Houtven et al., 2017; Price et al., 2019).
49
50 Collectively, drinking water treatment, sanitation, and hygiene interrupt disease transmission pathways,
51 particularly for water-related diseases. However, WaSH systems themselves are vulnerable to extreme events
52 (4.3.3). For example, sewage overflows resulting from heavy rainfall events are expected to increase
53 waterborne disease outbreaks (Khan et al., 2015). High diarrhoeal disease burdens mean that small changes
54 in climate-associated risk are projected to have significant impacts on disease burdens (Levy et al., 2018).
55 For example, up to 2.2 million more cases of E. coli by 2100 in Bangladesh under a 2.1癈 GWL is projected
56 (Philipsborn et al., 2016), while up to an 11-fold and 25-fold increase by 2050 and 2080, respectively under
57 2 to 4oC GWL, in disability-adjusted life years associated with cryptosporidiosis and giardiasis in Canada is
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1 projected (Smith et al., 2015). In addition, and an additional 48,000 deaths in children under 15 years of age
2 globally from diarrhoea by 2030 is also projected (WHO, 2014). Notably, high levels of treatment
3 compliance and boiling water before consumption offset the projected impact of climate change on giardiasis
4 in Canada in the 2050 scenario but could not wholly offset the projected impact in 2080 (Smith et al., 2015).
5 Climate change impacts on WaSH-attributable disease burden are also projected to delay China's progress
6 towards disease reduction by almost 9% under RCP 8.5 (Hodges et al., 2014). Disruptions in the drinking
7 water supply can lead to increased household water storage, potentially increasing vector larvae breeding
8 habitats (see Section 3.6.3). In combination with the projected expansion of vector ranges given climate
9 change (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2019), there is the potential for increased risk of vector-borne disease during
10 periods of water shortage or natural disasters (4.3.3). Moreover, energy requirements for water and
11 wastewater treatment are indirectly responsible for greenhouse gas emissions, while the breakdown of
12 excreta contributes directly to emissions (Box 4.5, Section 4.7.6). These contributions need to be better
13 articulated and accounted for as part of the WaSH and climate change dialogue (Dickin et al., 2020).
14
15 In summary, climate change is expected to compromise WaSH services, compounding existing
16 vulnerabilities and increasing water-related health risks (medium evidence, high agreement). Therefore,
17 additional research is required on disease-, country-, and population-specific risks due to future climate
18 change impacts (Baylis, 2017; Bhandari et al., 2020; Harper et al., 2020).
19
20 4.5.4 Projected Risks to Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors
21
22 AR5 reported with medium confidence that climate change would impact residential water demand, supply
23 and management (Revi et al., 2014). According to AR5, water utilities are also confronted by changes to the
24 availability of supplies; water quality; and saltwater intrusion into aquifers in coastal areas due to higher
25 ambient and water temperatures (medium evidence, high agreement), altered streamflow patterns, drier
26 conditions, increased storm runoff, sea-level rise, and more frequent forest wildfires in catchments (Jim閚ez
27 Cisneros et al., 2014). SR1.5 found with medium confidence that constraining warming to 1.5癈 instead of
28 2癈 might mitigate risks for water availability, but socioeconomic drivers could affect water availability
29 more than variations in warming levels, while the risks differ across regions (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).
30
31 In nearly a third of the world's largest cities, water demand may exceed surface water availability by 2050,
32 based on RCP6.0 projections and the WaterGAP3 modelling framework (Fl鰎ke et al., 2018). Under all
33 SSPs, the global volume of domestic water withdrawal is projected to reach 700-1500 km3yr-1 by 2050,
34 indicating an increase of 50 to 250%, compared to the 2010 water use intensity (400-450 km3yr-1) (Wada et
35 al., 2016). Increasing water demand by cities is already spurring competition between cities and agricultural
36 users for water, which is expected to continue (Garrick et al., 2019) (4.5.1). By 2030, South and Southeast
37 Asia are expected to have almost three-quarters of the urban land under high-frequency flood risk (10.4.6).
38 South Asia, South America and Mid-Latitudinal Africa are projected have the largest urban extents exposed
39 to floods and droughts (G黱eralp et al., 2015). An analysis of 571 European cities from the Urban Audit
40 database (using RCP8.5 projections without assessing urban heat island effects) found drought conditions are
41 expected to intensify (compared to the historical period 1951-2000) in southern European cities, particularly
42 in Portugal and Spain ((Guerreiro et al., 2018); CCP4.3.3). Changes in river flooding are projected to affect
43 cities in north-western European cities and the United Kingdom between 2051-2100 (Guerreiro et al., 2018)
44 (6.2.3.2, CCP2.2.1, CCP2.2.3).
45
46 Globally, climate change is projected to exacerbate existing challenges for urban water services. These
47 challenges include population growth, the rapid pace of urbanisation and inadequate investment, particularly
48 in less developed economies with limited governance capacity (high confidence) (Ceola et al., 2016; van
49 Leeuwen et al., 2016; Reckien et al., 2017; Tapia et al., 2017; Veldkamp et al., 2017). More specifically, in
50 Arusha (Tanzania), a combination of urban growth modelling, satellite imagery, and groundwater modelling
51 projected that rapid urbanisation would reduce groundwater recharge by 23% to 44% of 2015 levels by 2050
52 (under business as usual and RCP8.5 scenario), causing groundwater levels to drop up to 75m (Olarinoye et
53 al., 2020). Flood risk modelling showed a median increase in flood risk of 183% in 2030 based on baseline
54 conditions in Jakarta (Indonesia) with flood risks increasing by up to 45% due to land-use changes alone
55 (Budiyono et al., 2016). A probabilistic analysis of surface water flood risk in London (UK) using the
56 UKCP09 Weather Generator (with 10th and 90th percentile uncertainty bounds) found that the annual damage
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1 is expected to increase from the baseline by 101% and 128% under 2030 and 2050 high emission scenarios,
2 respectively (Jenkins et al., 2018).
3
4 Modified streamflow is projected to affect the amount and variability of inflow to urban storage reservoirs
5 (high confidence), which may exacerbate existing challenges to urban reservoir capacity, such as
6 sedimentation and poor water quality (Goharian et al., 2016; Howard et al., 2016; Yasarer and Sturm, 2016).
7 For example, in Melbourne (Australia), a combination of stochastic hydro-climatological modelling, rainfall-
8 runoff modelling and climate model data projects a mean precipitation shift over catchments by -2% at 1.5篊
9 and -3.3% at 2篊, relative to 1961-1990. Considering an annual water demand of 0.75 of the mean yearly
10 inflow, the median water supply shortage risk was calculated to be 0.6% and 2.9% at 1.5篊 and 2篊 warming
11 levels, respectively. At the higher demand level of 0.85 of the mean annual inflow, the median water
12 shortage risk is higher, between 9.6% to 20.4% at 1.5篊, and at 2篊 warming, respectively, without supply
13 augmentation desalination (Henley et al., 2019).
14
15 As climate change poses a substantial challenge to urban water management, further refinement of urban
16 climate models, downscaling and correction methods (e.g. (Goor� Bi et al., 2017; Jaramillo and Nazemi,
17 2018) is needed. Additionally, given that 90% of urban growth will occur in less developed regions, where
18 urbanisation is largely unplanned (UN-Habitat, 2019), further research is needed to quantify the water-
19 related risks of climate change and urbanisation on informal settlements ((Grasham et al., 2019;
20 Satterthwaite et al., 2020), 4.5.3).
21
22 In summary, rapid population growth, urbanisation, ageing infrastructure, and changes in water use are
23 responsible for increasing the vulnerability of urban and peri-urban areas to extreme rainfall and drought,
24 particularly in less developed economies with limited governance capacity (high confidence). In addition,
25 modified stream flows due to climate change (4.4.3) is projected to affect the amount and variability of
26 inflows to storage reservoirs that serve urban areas and may exacerbate challenges to reservoir capacity, such
27 as sedimentation and poor water quality (high confidence).
28
29 4.5.5 Projected Risks to Freshwater Ecosystems
30
31 AR5 concluded that climate change is projected to be an important stressor on freshwater ecosystems in the
32 second half of the 21st century, especially under high-warming scenarios of RCP6.0 and RCP8.5 (high
33 confidence), even though direct human impacts will continue to be the dominant threat (Settele et al., 2014).
34 Rising water temperatures are also projected to cause shifts in freshwater species distribution and worsen
35 water quality problems (high confidence), especially in those systems that already experience high
36 anthropogenic loading of nutrients (Settele et al., 2014).
37
38 Changes in precipitation and temperatures are projected to affect freshwater ecosystems and their species
39 through, for example, direct physiological responses from higher temperatures or drier conditions or a loss of
40 habitat for feeding or breeding (Settele et al., 2014; Knouft and Ficklin, 2017; Bl鰏chl et al., 2019b). In
41 addition, increased water temperatures could lead to shifts in the structure and composition of species
42 assemblages following changes in metabolic rates, body size, timing of migration, recruitment, range size
43 and destabilization of food webs. A review of the impact of climate change on biodiversity and functioning
44 of freshwater ecosystems found that under all scenarios, except the one with the lowest GHG emission
45 scenario, freshwater biodiversity is expected to decrease proportionally to the degree of warming and
46 precipitation alteration (Settele et al., 2014) (medium evidence, high agreement).
47
48 These are several examples of such projected changes. Due to higher water temperatures, changes in
49 macroinvertebrates and fish are projected under all future warming scenarios (Mantyka-Pringle et al., 2014).
50 Decreased abundance of many fish species, such as salmonids, under higher temperatures, are also projected,
51 although the effects between species are variable (Myers et al., 2017). Poleward and shifts of freshwater
52 species are projected as they try to stay within preferred cooler environmental conditions (Pecl et al., 2017).
53 Other anticipated changes include physiological adjustments with impacts on morphology with some species
54 shrinking in body size because large surface-to-volume ratios are generally favoured under warmer
55 conditions (Scheffers et al., 2016) and changes in species communities and food webs as a consequence of
56 increases in metabolic rates in response to increased temperatures with the flow-on effects for many
57 ecosystem processes (Woodward et al., 2010). Changes in the seasonality of flow regimes and variability
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1 (Bl鰏chl et al., 2019b) and more intermittent flows (Pyne and Poff, 2017) are also projected and could result
2 in decreased food chain lengths through the loss of large-bodied top predators (Sabo et al., 2010) and
3 changes in nutrient loadings and water quality (Woodward et al., 2010). The impacts on freshwater systems
4 in drylands are projected to be more severe (Jaeger et al., 2014; Gudmundsson et al., 2016). Changes to snow
5 and glacier melting, including the complete melting of some glaciers (Leadley et al., 2014; Kraaijenbrink et
6 al., 2017), are projected to reduce water availability and cause declines in biodiversity in high altitudes
7 through local extirpations and species extinctions in regions of high endemism. Lake nutrient dynamics are
8 expected to change, for example, at 2 癈 warming, net increase in CH4 emissions by 101% to 183% in
9 hypereutrophic lakes and 47 �56% in oligotrophic lakes in Europe are projected (Sepulveda-Jauregui et al.,
10 2018). Similarly, under the high GHG emission scenario, lake stratification is projected to begin 22.0 � 7.0
11 days earlier and end 11.3 � 4.7 days later by the end of this century (Woolway et al., 2021). While overall
12 future trends on climate change on freshwater species and habitats are largely negative, evidence indicates
13 that different species are projected to respond at different rates, with interactions between species expected to
14 be disrupted and which may result in novel biological communities and rapid change in ecological processes
15 and functions (Pecl et al., 2017).
16
17 These impacts are expected to be most noticeable where significant air temperature increases are projected,
18 leading to local or regional population extinctions for cold-water species because of range shrinking,
19 especially under the RCP 4.5, 6.0 and 8.5 scenarios (Comte and Olden, 2017). The consequences for
20 freshwater species are projected to be severe with local extinctions as the freshwater ecosystems dry. In the
21 Americas, under all scenarios that have been examined, the risk of extinction of freshwater species is
22 projected to increase above that already occurring levels due to biodiversity loss caused by pollution, habitat
23 modification, over-exploitation, and invasive species (IPBES, 2019). Freshwater ecosystems are also at risk
24 of abrupt and irreversible change, especially those in the higher latitudes and altitudes with significant
25 changes in species distributions, including those induced by melting permafrost systems (Moomaw et al.,
26 2018; IPBES, 2019).
27
28 While changes in the species distribution across freshwater ecosystems are projected, the extent of change
29 and the ability of individual species or populations to adapt is not widely known. Species that cannot move
30 to more amenable habitats may become extinct, whereas those who migrate may relocate. An unknown
31 outcome could be establishing novel ecosystems with new assemblages of species, including invasive alien
32 species, in response to changes in the environment with the prospect of irreversible changes in freshwater
33 ecosystems (Moomaw et al., 2018).
34
35 In summary, changes in precipitation and temperatures are projected to affect all types of freshwater
36 ecosystems and their species. Under all scenarios, except the one with the lowest GHG emission scenario,
37 freshwater biodiversity is expected to decrease proportionally to the degree of warming and precipitation
38 change (medium evidence, high agreement).
39
40 4.5.6 Projected Risks to Water-related Conflicts
41
42 AR5 concluded with medium confidence climate change can indirectly increase the risks of violent conflicts,
43 though the link to hydrological changes were not spelled out (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014). Furthermore,
44 according to IPCC SR1.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018), if the world warms by 2oC- 4oC by 2050, rates of
45 human conflict could increase, but again, role of hydrological change in this was not explicit (medium
46 confidence).
47
48 The impact of climate change on shared water resources might increase tensions among states, particularly in
49 the absence of strong institutional capacity (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017; Dinar et al., 2019). On the other
50 hand, although the mere existence of formal agreements does not necessarily reduce the risks of conflicts,
51 robust treaties and institutions can promote cooperative events, even under hydrological stress (Link et al.,
52 2016). Yet, since both conflictive and cooperative events are possible under conditions of climatic
53 variability, whether conflict arises or increases depends on several contextual socio-economic and political
54 factors, including the adaptive capacity of the riparian states (Koubi, 2019), the existence of power
55 asymmetries (Dinar et al., 2019) and pre-existing social tensions (medium confidence).
56
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1 At the intra-state level, analysis suggests that additional climate change will increase the probability of
2 conflict risks, with 13% increase probability at 2癈 GWL and 26% probability at 4癈 GWL scenario (Mach
3 et al., 2019). However, to date, other factors are considered more influential drivers of conflict, including
4 lack of natural resource use regulations (Linke et al., 2018b), societal exclusion (von Uexkull et al., 2016;
5 van Weezel, 2019), poor infrastructures and a history of violent conflict (Detges, 2016) (high confidence). In
6 addition, medium-high evidence exists that climate change imposes additional pressures on regions that are
7 already fragile and conflict-prone (Matthew, 2014; Earle et al., 2015) (medium agreement).
8
9 Recent research indicates that climatic change can multiply tensions in regions dependent on agriculture
10 when coupled with other socio-economic and political factors (Koubi, 2019), including a low level of human
11 development (Ide et al., 2020) and deterioration of individual living conditions (Vestby, 2019). On the other
12 side, intergroup cohesion (De Juan and H鋘ze, 2020) and policies that improve societal development and
13 good governance reduce the risk of conflict associated with the challenges to adaptation to climate change
14 (Hegre et al., 2016; Witmer et al., 2017) (medium confidence) at both the intra-state and inter-state level.
15
16 Increased risk of conflict between different sectors (agriculture, industry, domestic) and needs (urban, rural)
17 is projected to arise in several river basins due to climate change and socio-economic developments,
18 including urbanization (Fl鰎ke et al., 2018). Future climatic conditions and population growth are expected
19 to exert additional pressures on managing already stressed basins such as the Nile, the Indus, Colorado, the
20 Feni, the Irrawaddy, the Orange and the Okavango (Farinosi et al., 2018). In addition, recent scenario
21 analysis in global transboundary basins supports the finding that there is more potential for conflict in areas
22 already under water stress, such as Central Asia and the northern parts of Africa (Munia et al., 2020)
23 (medium confidence).
24
25 In summary, the impact of climate change on water resources might increase tensions, particularly in the
26 absence of strong institutional capacity. However, whether conflict arises or increases depends on several
27 contextual socio-economic and political factors. Evidence exists that climate change imposes additional
28 pressures on regions already under water stress or fragile and conflict-prone (medium confidence).
29
30 4.5.7 Projected Risks to Human Mobility and Migration
31
32 SR1.5 found with medium confidence that migration is expected to increase with further warming but that
33 there are major knowledge gaps preventing more detailed assessments (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018).
34 However, as in AR5, there was no specific focus on hydrological changes induced migration.
35
36 In general, the projected population growth in at-risk areas, especially in low-income countries, is expected
37 to increase future migration and displacement (McLeman et al., 2016; Rigaud et al., 2018). For example, a
38 study looking at potential flood exposure found that low-income countries, particularly in Africa, are at
39 higher risk for flood-induced displacement (Kakinuma et al., 2020). One model, focusing on slow-onset
40 climate impacts as water stress, crop failure, sea-level rise projected between 31 to 72 million people
41 (RCP2.6, SSP4) and 90 to 143 million people (RCP8.5, SSP4) internally displaced by 2050 in Sub-Saharan
42 Africa, South Asia and Latin America (Rigaud et al., 2018). Another estimate, incorporating temperature
43 increase and precipitation, projects that asylum applications to the EU could increase by between 0.098
44 million (RCP4.5) and 0.66 million (RCP8.5) per year, as a consequence of temperature increases in
45 agricultural areas of low-income countries (Missirian and Schlenker, 2017) (limited evidence; medium
46 agreement).
47
48 More detailed local and regional models are needed, incorporating migrant destinations (Abel et al., 2019)
49 and immobility (Zickgraf, 2018).
50
51 In summary, research that projects future migration changes due to climate-induced hydrological changes is
52 limited and shows significant uncertainties about the number of migrants and their destinations (limited
53 evidence; medium agreement).
54
55 4.5.8 Projected Risks to the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
56 Traditional Peoples
57
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1 AR5 found that climate change will threaten cultural practices and values, although the risks vary across
2 societies and over time (medium evidence, high agreement). Furthermore, AR5 concluded that significant
3 changes in the natural resource base on which many cultures depend would directly affect the cultural core,
4 worldviews, cosmologies and symbols of Indigenous cultures (Adger and Pulhin, 2014). SR1.5 concluded
5 with high confidence that limiting global warming to 1.5癈, rather than 2癈, will strongly benefit terrestrial
6 and wetland ecosystems and their services, including the cultural services provided by these ecosystems
7 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). SROCC found with high confidence that cultural assets are projected to be
8 negatively affected by future cryospheric and associated hydrological changes (Hock et al., 2019b).
9
10 There is high confidence that the cultural water uses of Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and
11 traditional peoples are at risk of climate change-related hydrological change (Table 4.7). Climate-driven
12 variations in streamflow, saltwater intrusion, and projected increases in water temperature will exacerbate
13 declines of culturally important species and lead to variations or depletion of culturally important places and
14 subsistence practices. For example, in New Zealand, the increasing risk of flood events may impact
15 culturally important fish species for Mori (Carter, 2019), while habitat changes may shift the distribution of
16 culturally significant plants (Bond et al., 2019). In Australia, Yuibera and Koinmerburra Traditional Owners
17 fear the saltwater inundation of culturally significant sites and waterholes (Lyons et al., 2019), while the
18 flooding of culturally significant wetlands will negatively affect the Lumbee Tribe (USA) (Emanuel, 2018).
19 Moreover, changes in the carrying capacity of ice, snow quality and formation will probably increase the
20 physical risks to Saami practising reindeer herding (Jaakkola et al., 2018).
21
22 Further research is necessary to assess the extent and nature of climate-driven risks to cultural water uses in
23 the context of broader socio-economic, cultural and political challenges facing diverse Indigenous Peoples,
24 local and traditional communities. In addition, given the significance of Indigenous Knowledge and local
25 knowledge to adaptive capacity and community-led adaptation, the potential risks of climate-related
26 hydrological changes to diverse cultural water uses warrant closer study (4.6.9, 4.8.4, Cross-Chapter Box
27 INDIG in Chapter 18).
28
29 In sum, there is high confidence that climate-driven hydrological changes to cultural water uses and
30 culturally significant ecosystems and species are projected to pose risks to the physical wellbeing of
31 Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples.
32
33
34 Table 4.7: Selected Projected Risks to Indigenous Peoples' Uses of Water.
Region Indigenous Climate Water- Situated knowledge Reference
People hazard related
Risk
Asia Ifugao Increased Flooding Increases in future wet season rainfall (Soriano
temperatures; (Wet pose increase risks of excess surface water and
increasing season); runoff and potential for soil erosion, Herath,
rainfall (wet Water which may cause the collapse of Ifugao 2020)
season); deficit rice terraces. Reductions in future dry
decreasing (dry season rainfall and warmer temperatures
rainfall (dry season) indicate significant water deficits during
season) the growing season of local tinawon rice.
Australasia Yuibera and Sea level rise Flooding Culturally important coastal waterholes, Lyons,
Australasia Koinmerburra wetlands and sites are at risk of saltwater 2019
Australasia Traditional Increased Flooding inundation due to rising sea levels. If #2810}
Owner precipitation inundated, traditional owners may not be
groups Ecosystem able to maintain cultural connections to (Carter,
Mori Increased change these important sites (11.4.1). 2019)
temperature; Increasing flood events may negatively
Mori impact spawning and fishing sites of the (Bond et
culturally important naka (whitebait; al., 2019)
Galaxias maculates) in the Waikuaiti
River (11.4.2).
Changes in temperature and precipitation
are projected to shift the range of wetland
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precipitation plants (Kmarahou and Kuta) in New
variability Zealand, which may decrease access to
these culturally significant species, which
Central Warao Sea level rise Flooding are used for medicinal and weaving (Vegas-
and South purposes. The changing distribution of Vilarr鷅ia
America these plants may lead to a loss of et al.,
Indigenous Knowledge and affect inter- 2015)
Europe Saami Increased Winter tribal reciprocity and gifting practices
temperatures; thaw (11.4.2). (Jaakkola
changes in The partial or total inundation of the et al.,
precipitation Orinoco Delta will result in the loss of 2018);
freshwater wetlands and species, which (Markkula
North Lumbee Increased Flooding will produce rapid shifts in the culturally et al.,
America Tribe temperatures; significant lands and resources of the 2019)
increased Warao. Among the affected species is the
rainfall Mauritia palm, on which Warao culture (Emanuel,
variability and livelihoods are based. 2018)
Reindeer herding is culturally important
for Saami and provides a means to
maintain traditions, language and cultural
identity, thus constituting an essential part
of Saami physical and mental wellbeing.
More frequent ice formation on soil and
snow, which will reduce the availability
and quality of winter forage for reindeer,
will negatively impact reindeer herding
and thus Saami identity and wellbeing
(13.8.1.2).
Climate-related degradation and flooding
of wetlands and streams in the Lumbee
River watershed will negatively affect
cultural practices of fishing and harvesting
that rely on access to and resources
obtained from the area.
1
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1
2
3
4
5
6 Figure 4.20: Regional synthesis of changes in water and consequent impacts assessed in this chapter. (a) Regional
7 changes and impacts of selected variables. Confidence levels higher than medium are shown. (b) Assessment result of
8 all variables. For each region, physical changes, impacts on ecosystems, and impacts on human systems are shown. For
9 physical changes, upward/downward triangles refer to an increase/decrease, respectively, in the amount or frequency of
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1 the measured variable, and the level of confidence refers to confidence that the change has occurred. For impacts on
2 ecosystems and human systems, plus or minus marks depicts whether an observed impact of hydrological change is
3 positive (beneficial) or negative (adverse), respectively, to the given system, and the level of confidence refers to
4 confidence in attributing an impact on that system to a climate-induced hydrological change. The hydrological impact
5 may be different to the overall change in the system; for example, over much of the world, crop yields have increased
6 overall, largely for non-climatic reasons, but in some areas hydrological impacts of climate change are countering this.
7 Circles indicate that within that region, both increase and decrease of physical changes are found, but are not
8 necessarily equal; the same holds for cells showing `both' assessed impacts. Cells assigned `na' indicates variables not
9 assessed due to limited evidences. Decrease (increase) in water quality refers to adverse (positive) change in quality.
10 Agriculture refers to impacts on crop production. Note - Energy refers to impacts on hydro and thermoelectric power
11 generation. Ecosystems refers to impacts on freshwater ecosystem.
12
13
14 4.6 Key Risks and Adaptation Responses in Various Water Use Sectors
15
16 Anthropogenic climate change has impacted every aspect of the water cycle (4.2), and risks are projected to
17 intensify with every degree of global warming (4.4), with impacts already visible in all sectors of the
18 economy and ecosystems (4.3) and projected to intensify further (4.5). In response to climate and non-
19 climate induced water insecurity, people and governments worldwide are undertaking various adaptation
20 responses across all sectors. In addition, there are several projected studies for future adaptation responses.
21 We draw upon a list of 359 case studies of observed adaptation and 45 articles on projected future
22 adaptation. Further information on selection and inclusion criteria is available in SM4.2. In this section, we
23 document those adaptation responses (current and future) in different water-use sectors. In the next section
24 (4.7.1, 4.7.2, 4.7.3) benefits of current adaptation, and effectiveness of future adaptation are discussed.
25
26 4.6.1 Key Risks Related to Water
27
28 The preceding sections have outlined the various pathways along which climate affects water resources and
29 water-using sectors. In synthesis, fundamental changes in observed climate are already visible in water-
30 related outcomes (high confidence), including ~500 million people experiencing historically unfamiliar
31 precipitation regimes (4.2.1.1); cryosphere changes impacting various societal and ecosystem components
32 (4.2.2); increasing vulnerability to flood impacts, driven both by climate as well as socio-economic factors
33 (4.2.4); as well as climate change-driven increases in drought impacts (4.2.5).
34
35 Further increases in risks are projected to manifest at different levels of warming. Climate change is
36 impacting all components of the hydrological cycle, but the water use sectors are also facing the
37 consequences of climate change, given the central role of water for all aspects of human and environmental
38 systems (4.1, Box 4.1). Therefore, risks to water security are also identified as a Representative Key Risk
39 (RKR) (WGII, Chapter 16, Section 16.5.2.3.7).
40
41 Approximately, 4 billion people globally face physical water scarcity for at least one month per year which is
42 driven by climatic as well as non-climatic factors (Mekonnen and Hoekstra, 2016). Increases in physical
43 water scarcity are projected, with estimates between 800 million and 3 billion for 2癈 global warming and
44 up to approximately 4 billion for 4癈 global warming (Gosling and Arnell, 2016). Projected increases in
45 hydrological extremes pose increasing risks to societal systems globally (high confidence), with a potential
46 doubling of flood risk between 1.5癈 and 3癈 of warming (Dottori et al., 2018) and an estimated 120% to
47 400% increase in population at risk of river flooding at 2癈 and 4癈, respectively (Alfieri et al., 2017). Also
48 projected are increasing risks of fatalities and socio-economic impacts (4.4.4). Similarly, a near-doubling of
49 drought duration (Naumann et al., 2018) and an increasing share of the population affected by various types,
50 durations and severity levels of drought are projected (high confidence) (4.4.5). Increasing return periods of
51 high-end hydrological extremes pose significant challenges to adaptation, requiring integrated approaches to
52 risk management, which take into account the various economic and non-economic, as well as direct and
53 indirect losses and damages into account (Jongman, 2018).
54
55 Increasing sectoral risks are reported across regions and sectors with rising temperatures and associated
56 hydrometeorological changes (Cross-Chapter Box INTEREG in Chapter 16). Risks to agricultural yields due
57 to combined effects of water and temperature changes, for example, could be three times higher at 3癈
58 compared to 2癈 (Ren et al., 2018b), with additional risks as a consequence of increasing climate extremes
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1 (Leng and Hall, 2019). In addition, climate-driven water scarcity and increasing crop water demands,
2 including for irrigation, pose additional challenges for agricultural production in many regions (high
3 confidence). Regional water-related risks to agricultural production are diverse and vary strongly across
4 regions and crops (4.5.1). As there are limitations to how well global agricultural models can represent
5 available water resources (Elliott et al., 2014; J鋑ermeyr et al., 2017), water limitations to agricultural
6 production may well be underestimated. For example, the potential for irrigation, commonly assumed to play
7 an important role in ensuring food security, could be more limited than models assume (Box 4.3).
8
9 With higher levels of warming, risks to water-dependent energy production increase substantially across
10 regions (van Vliet et al., 2017). While there are increasing potentials of ~2% to 6% for hydropower
11 production by 2080 (medium confidence), risks to thermoelectric power production increase for most regions
12 (high confidence), for example, with potentially near doubling risks to European electricity production from
13 1.5癈 to 3癈 (Tobin et al., 2018). Shifting to a higher share of renewable sources less dependent on water
14 resources for energy production could substantially reduce the vulnerability of this sector (4.5.2).
15
16 Increasing hydrological extremes also have consequences for the maintenance and further improvement of
17 the provision of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) services (medium confidence). Risks related to the
18 lack or failure of WaSH services under climate change include increased incidence and outbreaks of water-
19 related diseases, physical injuries, stress, exacerbation of the underlying disease, and risk of violence, which
20 is often gendered (4.5.3). Although globally, the regional potential infestation areas for disease-carrying
21 vectors could be five times higher at 4癈 than at 2癈 (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2019), climate projections
22 suggest up to 2.2 million more cases of E. coli by 2100 (2.1oC increase) in Bangladesh (Philipsborn et al.,
23 2016), up to an 11-fold and 25-fold increase by 2050 and 2080, respectively (2-4oC increase), in disability-
24 adjusted life years associated with cryptosporidiosis and giardiasis in Canada (Smith et al., 2015), and an
25 additional 48,000 deaths in children under 15 years of age globally from diarrhoea by 2030 (WHO, 2014).
26
27 Increasing water demand in conjunctions with changing precipitation patterns will pose risks to urban water
28 security by mid-century, with water demand in nearly a third of the world's largest cities potentially
29 exceeding surface water availability by 2050 (RCP6.0) (Fl鰎ke et al., 2018) and the global volume of
30 domestic water withdrawal projected to increase by 50 to 250% (Wada et al., 2016) (4.5.4). Globally, climate
31 change will exacerbate existing challenges for urban water services, driven by further population growth, the
32 rapid pace of urbanization and inadequate investment, particularly in less developed economies with limited
33 governance capacity (high confidence).
34
35 Risks to freshwater ecosystems increase with progressing climate change, with freshwater biodiversity
36 decreasing proportionally with increasing warming if 1.5癈 is exceeded (medium evidence, high agreement).
37 Risks include range shift, a decline in species population, extirpation as well as extinction (4.5.5).
38
39 The potential for climate change to influence conflict is highly contextual and depends on various socio-
40 economic and political factors. However, water-specific conflicts between sectors and users may be
41 exacerbated for some regions of the world (high confidence) (4.5.7).
42
43 Human migration takes many forms and can be considered a consequence and impact of climate change and
44 an adaptation response (4.5.8). Projections indicate a potentially substantial increase in internal and
45 international displacement due to water-related climate risks (Missirian and Schlenker, 2017; Rigaud et al.,
46 2018). In the context of water-related adaptation, short-term migration as an income diversification approach
47 is commonly documented. However, permanent relocation and fundamental changes to livelihoods are more
48 transformational and yet can be associated with tangible and intangible losses (Mechler et al., 2019). In the
49 context of climate-induced hydrological change, increased vulnerability among migrants and the risk of
50 trapped populations poses significant additional risks. However, quantifications that disentangle different
51 climate drivers and show specific risks emanating from hydrological change are unavailable (Rigaud et al.,
52 2018).
53
54 Hydrological change, especially increasing extreme events, pose risks to the cultural uses of water of
55 Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples (high confidence), with implications for the
56 physical of these groups (high confidence). Increasing risks are documented across groups and regions,
57 however, partly due to the unquantifiable nature of these risks, the lack of research funding for the social
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1 dimensions of climate change, particularly in the Global South, and the systemic underrepresentation of
2 marginalized groups in scientific research, quantitative projections are limited (4.5.8).
3
4 Adaptation is already playing an integral part in reducing climate impacts and prepare for increasing climate
5 risk, and it will grow in importance evermore with increasing risks at higher levels of warming. Remaining
6 sub-sections describe these adaptation responses.
7
8
9 [START BOX 4.2 HERE]
10
11 Box 4.2: Observed Risks, Projected Impacts and Adaptation Responses to Water Security in Small
12 Island States
13
14 AR5 and SR1.5 recognized the exceptional vulnerability of islands, especially concerning water security and
15 potential limits to adaptation that may be reached due to freshwater resources (Klein et al., 2014; Hoegh-
16 Guldberg et al., 2018; Roy et al., 2018).
17
18 Small islands are already regularly experiencing droughts and freshwater shortages (high confidence)
19 (Holding et al., 2016; Pearce et al., 2018; Gheuens et al., 2019; MacDonald et al., 2020). Freshwater supply
20 systems vary from household or small community systems such as rainwater harvesting systems and private
21 wells to large public water supply systems using surface, groundwater and, in some cases, desalinated water
22 (Alsumaiei and Bailey, 2018b; Falkland and White, 2020). In many cases, communities rely on more than
23 one water source, including a strong reliance on rainwater and groundwater (Elliott et al., 2017; MacDonald
24 et al., 2020). Groundwater resources in freshwater lenses (FWLs) are essential in providing access to
25 freshwater resources, especially during droughts when the collected rainwater is insufficient (Barkey and
26 Bailey, 2017; Bailey et al., 2018). lead to greater risks of water-borne diseases, with significant effects on
27 nutrition (Elliott et al., 2017; Savage et al., 2020), and improper sanitation poses additional risks to the
28 limited groundwater resources (MacDonald et al., 2017). Drought events have also severely affected
29 freshwater lenses (FWL) recharge (Barkey and Bailey, 2017), with extraction rates further threatening
30 available groundwater volumes (Post et al., 2018). In conjunction with sea-level rise, this poses serious risks
31 to groundwater salinization (Alsumaiei and Bailey, 2018b; Storlazzi et al., 2018; Deng and Bailey, 2019). In
32 addition, FWLs are threatened by climate change due to changes in rainfall patterns, extended droughts and
33 wash over events caused by storm surges and SLR (high confidence) (see Chapter 15) (Chui and Terry,
34 2015; Alsumaiei and Bailey, 2018a; Alsumaiei and Bailey, 2018b; Post et al., 2018; Storlazzi et al., 2018;
35 Deng and Bailey, 2019). After small-scale wash over events, the FWLs have been shown to recover to pre-
36 wash over salinity levels within a month (Oberle et al., 2017).
37
38 Due to wash over events exacerbated by sea-level rise (SLR) and lens thinning due to pumping, recovery
39 time for FWLs is projected to take substantially longer (Oberle et al., 2017; Alsumaiei and Bailey, 2018a;
40 Storlazzi et al., 2018). Projections indicate that atolls may be unable to provide domestic freshwater
41 resources due to the lack of potable groundwater by 2030 (RCP8.5+ice- sheet collapse), 2040 (RCP8.5), or
42 2060s (RCP4.5) (Storlazzi et al., 2018). Projections of future freshwater availability in Small Islands further
43 underline these substantial risks to island water security (Karnauskas et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2018).
44 Population growth, changes in rainfall patterns and agricultural demand are projected to increase water stress
45 in Small Islands (Gohar et al., 2019; Townsend et al., 2020). While some islands are projected to experience
46 an increase in rainfall patterns, this may refer to shorter intense rainfall events, thereby increasing the risk of
47 flooding during the wet season, while not decreasing their risk of droughts during dry periods (Aladenola et
48 al., 2016; Gheuens et al., 2019). In addition, projected shifts in the timing of the rainfall season might pose
49 an additional risk for water supply systems (Townsend et al., 2020).
50
51 Observed adaptation during drought events includes community water-sharing (Bailey et al., 2018; Pearce et
52 al., 2018) as well as using alternative water resources such as water purchased from private companies
53 (Aladenola et al., 2016), desalination units (Cashman and Yawson, 2019; MacDonald et al., 2020) or
54 accessing deeper or new groundwater resources (Pearce et al., 2018). Rainwater harvesting to adapt the water
55 supply system in the Kingston Basin in Jamaica was able significantly alleviate water stress, for example.
56 Still, it would not fill the total supply gap caused by climate change (Townsend et al., 2020). Likewise,
57 groundwater sustainability with increasing climate change in Barbados cannot be ensured without aquifer
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1 protection, leading to higher optimized food prices if no additional adaptation measures are implemented
2 (Gohar et al., 2019). The potential of using multiple water sources is rarely assessed in future water supply
3 projections in Small Islands (Elliott et al., 2017). In the Republic of Marshall Islands, more than half of all
4 interviewed households have already had to migrate once due to a water shortage (MacDonald et al., 2020).
5 In Cariacou, Grenada, increases in migration rates have been observed following drought events (Cashman
6 and Yawson, 2019). with long-term cross border and internal migration shown to be having significant
7 impacts on well-being, community-cohesion, livelihoods and people-land relationships (Yates et al., 2021).
8
9 In sum, small islands are already regularly experiencing droughts and freshwater shortages (high
10 confidence). For atoll islands, freshwater availability may be severely limited as early as 2030 (low
11 confidence). The effects of temperature increase, changing rainfall patterns, sea level rise and population
12 pressure, combined with limited options available for water-related adaptation leave small islands partially
13 water insecure currently, with increasing risks in the near-term and at warming above 1.5癈 (high
14 confidence).
15
16 [END BOX 4.2 HERE]
17
18
19 4.6.2 Adaptation in the Agricultural Sector
20
21 AR5 reported a range of available hard and soft adaptation options for water-related adaptation in the
22 agricultural sector. However, the evidence on the effectiveness of these adaptation responses, now and in the
23 future, was not assessed (Noble et al., 2014; Porter et al., 2014). Assessing the feasibility of different
24 irrigation measures as adaptation, SR1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018) found mixed evidence, depending on the
25 applied methodology.
26
27 There is high confidence that water-related adaptation is occurring in the agricultural sector (Acevedo et al.,
28 2020; Ricciardi et al., 2020), and water-related adaptation in the agricultural sector makes up the majority of
29 documented local, regional and global evidence of implemented adaptation (high confidence) (4.7.1, Figure
30 4.23 and Figure 4.24, Table 4.8). However, while there is increasing evidence of adaptation and its benefits
31 across multiple dimensions, the link between adaptation benefits and climate risk reduction is unclear due to
32 methodological challenges (medium confidence) (4.7.1). On the other hand, while it is methodologically
33 possible to measure the effectiveness of future adaptation in reducing climate risks, here the main limitation
34 is that not all possible range of future adaptations can be modelled given the limitations of climate and
35 impact models (high confidence) (4.7.2). Furthermore, findings on current adaptation are constrained by
36 what is documented in peer-reviewed articles. At the same time, there may be a range of options
37 implemented on the ground by local governments or as a part of corporate social responsibility that is not
38 published in peer-reviewed publications.
39
40 Water and soil conservation measures (e.g. reduced tillage, contour ridges, or mulching) are frequently
41 documented as adaptation responses to reduce water-related climate impacts (Kimaro et al., 2016; Traore et
42 al., 2017). This measure features in all continents' top four adaptation responses except Australasia (Figure
43 4.27). Especially for rain-fed farming, which currently is the norm in most of Africa, large parts of Central
44 and South America and Europe, water and soil conservation measures and various components of
45 conservation agriculture are some of the most frequently used adaptation responses (Jat et al., 2019). This
46 measure is deemed to have economic benefits and benefits for vulnerable communities who adopt this
47 measure (high confidence) and benefits in terms of water-saving and positive ecological and socio-cultural
48 benefits (medium confidence). However, this measure can be sometimes maladaptive (low evidence, medium
49 agreement) and can have mitigation co-benefits (low evidence, high agreement) (Figure 4.29). Furthermore,
50 water and soil management related measures show high potential efficacy in reducing impacts in a 1.5癈
51 world, with declining effectiveness at higher levels of warming (Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29)
52
53 Changes in cropping patterns, the timing of sowing and harvesting, crop diversification towards cash crops,
54 and the adoption of improved crop cultivars that can better withstand hazards like floods and drought are
55 among the most used adaptation responses by farmers. This is among the top two measures in Asia and
56 Africa (Figure 4.27). Extra income allows households to re-invest in improved agricultural techniques and
57 improved cultivars (Taboada et al., 2017; Khanal et al., 2018b). Beneficial outcomes are documented in
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1 terms of increases in incomes and yields and water-related outcomes (medium confidence, from robust
2 evidence, but medium agreement), but benefits to vulnerable communities are not always apparent on the
3 whole (Figure FAQ4.4.1). Changes in cropping patterns and systems are also among those adaptation
4 options assessed for their potential to reduce future climate impacts, though effectiveness is shown to be
5 limited (Brouziyne et al., 2018; Paymard et al., 2018). Assessments of the future effectiveness of crop
6 rotation systems for adaptation show a continued reduction in required irrigation water use, though studies of
7 effectiveness beyond 2癈 global mean temperature increase are not available (Kothari et al., 2019; Yang et
8 al., 2019b) (Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29).
9
10 Conservation agriculture and climate-smart agriculture (includes improved cultivars and agronomic
11 practices) have proven to increase soil carbon, yields and technical efficiency (Penot et al., 2018; Salat and
12 Swallow, 2018; Ho and Shimada, 2019; Makate and Makate, 2019; Okunlola et al., 2019). Some water-
13 related measures in conservation agriculture include allowing for shading and soil moisture retention, with
14 the co-benefit of reducing pest attacks (Thierfelder et al., 2015; Raghavendra and Suresh, 2018; Islam et al.,
15 2019a). Especially for traditional food grains in smallholder agriculture, improved practices such as modern
16 varieties or integrated nutrient management can play an important role in making production more resilient
17 to climate stress (Handschuch and Wollni, 2016). This measure is also among the top four most frequent
18 adaptation measures in all continents except Australia and North America (Figure 4.27). In addition, this
19 measure is shown to have positive economic benefits (high confidence) and also benefits on other parameters
20 (medium confidence) (Figure FAQ4.4.1). Such approaches are also among those most frequently assessed for
21 their effectiveness in addressing future climate change but show limited effectiveness across warming levels
22 (Figure 4.28 and Figure 4.29).
23
24 The use of non-conventional water sources, i.e. desalinated and treated waste-water, is emerging as an
25 important component of increasing water availability for agriculture (DeNicola et al., 2015; Mart韓ez-
26 Alvarez et al., 2018b; Morote et al., 2019). While desalination has a high potential in alleviating agricultural
27 water stress in arid coastal regions, proper management and water quality standards for desalinated irrigation
28 water are essential to ensure continued or increased crop productivity. In addition to the energy intensity
29 (4.7.6), risks of desalinated water include lower mineral content, higher salinity, crop toxicity, and soil
30 sodicity (Mart韓ez-Alvarez et al., 2018b). Similarly, waste-water reuse can be an important contribution to
31 buffer against the increasing variability of water resources. However, waste-water guidelines that ensure the
32 adequate treatment to reduce adverse health and environmental outcomes due to pathogens or other chemical
33 and organic contaminants will be essential (Angelakis and Snyder, 2015; Dickin et al., 2016) (Box 4.5;
34 4.6.4).
35
36 Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge are crucial determinants of adaptation in agriculture for many
37 communities globally. Indigenous Peoples have intimate knowledge about their surrounding environment
38 and are attentive observers of climate changes. As a result, they are often best placed to enact successful
39 adaptation measures, including shifting to different crops, changing cropping times or returning to traditional
40 varieties (Mugambiwa, 2018; Kamara et al., 2019; Nelson et al., 2019) (4.8.4).
41
42 Migration and livelihood diversification is often an adaptation response to water-related hazards and
43 involves securing income sources away from agriculture, including off-farm employment, temporary or
44 permanent migration, and these are particularly important in Asia and Africa (Figure 4.27). Income and
45 remittances are sometimes re-invested, for instance, for crop diversification (Rodriguez-Solorzano, 2014;
46 Musah-Surugu et al., 2018; Mashizha, 2019). While there is extensive documentation on the benefits of
47 migration, the quality of studies is such that links between migration and subsequent benefits are not clear,
48 making our conclusion of benefits from this measure as having medium confidence. On the other hand, there
49 is more rigorous evidence on the maladaptive nature of migration as an adaptation measure (Figure
50 FAQ4.4.1). However, adverse climatic conditions, especially droughts, have been found to reduce
51 international migration, as resources are unavailable to consider this option (Nawrotzki and Bakhtsiyarava,
52 2017), resulting in limits to adaptation (Ayeb-Karlsson et al., 2016; Brottem and Brooks, 2018; Ferdous et
53 al., 2019). In addition, it is difficult to model this option in future climate adaptation models.
54
55 Policies, institutions, capacity building, are important adaptation measures in agriculture and often have
56 beneficial outcomes, with quality of studies precludes a high degree of certainty about those impacts (Figure
57 FAQ4.4.1). Access to credits, subsidies or insurance builds an important portfolio of reducing reliance on
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1 agricultural income alone (Rahut and Ali, 2017; Wossen et al., 2018). Training and capacity building are
2 essential tools to ensure effective adaptation in agriculture, increasing food security (Chesterman et al., 2019;
3 Makate and Makate, 2019), through better understanding the implementation of available responses reduce
4 exposure to climate impacts. In addition, public regulations, including water policies and allocations and
5 incentive instruments, availability of appropriate finance play an essential role in shaping and enabling
6 (4.8.5, 4.8.6, 4.8.7), but also limiting (4.8.2), water-related adaptation for agriculture (see also Chapter 17).
7
8 Water stressed regions already rely on importing agricultural resources, thus importing water embedded in
9 these commodities (D'Odorico et al., 2014). Virtual water trade will continue to play a role in reducing
10 water-related food insecurity (Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in Chapter 16) (Pastor et al., 2014; Graham et
11 al., 2020b).
12
13 While an increasing body of literature documents water-related adaptation in the agricultural sector, both in
14 reducing current climate impacts and addressing future climate risk, knowledge gaps remain about assessing
15 the effectiveness of such measures to reduce impacts and risks. Additional considerations on co-benefits of
16 trade-offs for overall sustainable development are not always sufficiently considered in the available
17 literature.
18
19 In sum, water-related adaptation in the agricultural sector is widely documented, with irrigation, agricultural
20 water management, crop diversification and improved agronomic practices among the most common
21 adaptation measures adopted (high confidence). However, the projected future effectiveness of available
22 water-related adaptation for agriculture decreases with increasing warming (medium evidence, high
23 agreement).
24
25
26 [START BOX 4.3 HERE]
27
28 Box 4.3: Irrigation as an Adaptation Response
29
30 Irrigation has consistently been used as a crop protection and yield enhancement strategy and has become
31 even more critical in a warming world (Siebert et al., 2014). Approximately 40% of global yields come from
32 irrigated agriculture, with a doubling of irrigated areas over the last 50 years and now constituting around
33 20% of the total harvested area (FAO, 2018b; Meier et al., 2018; Rosa et al., 2020b). Thus, irrigation is one
34 of the most frequently applied adaptation responses in agriculture and features centrally in projections of
35 adaptation at all scales. Expansions of irrigated areas over the coming century are projected, leading to shifts
36 from rain-fed to irrigated agriculture in response to climate change (Malek and Verburg, 2018; Huang et al.,
37 2019; Nechifor and Winning, 2019). However, there are regional limitations to this expansion due to
38 renewable water resource limitations, including water quality issues (Zaveri et al., 2016; Turner et al., 2019).
39 Depending on the specific spatial, temporal and technological characteristics of irrigation expansion, up 35%
40 of current rain-fed production could sustainably shift to irrigation with limited negative environmental
41 effects (Rosa et al., 2020b).
42
43 Irrigation increases resilience and productivity relative to rain-fed production by reducing drought and heat
44 stress on crop yields and by lowering ET demand by cooling canopy temperatures (Siebert et al., 2014; Tack
45 et al., 2017; Li and Troy, 2018; Zaveri and B. Lobell, 2019; Agnolucci et al., 2020; Rosa et al., 2020b).
46 Large-scale irrigation also affects local and regional climates (Cook et al., 2020b). While cooling effects,
47 including reduction of the extreme heat due to irrigation, have been observed (Qian et al., 2020; Thiery et al.,
48 2020), increases in humid heat extremes because of irrigation with potentially detrimental health outcomes
49 have also been reported (Krakauer et al., 2020; Mishra et al., 2020). For the heavily irrigated North China
50 Plain, a night-time temperature increase overcompensated daytime cooling effects, leading to an overall
51 warming effect (Chen and Jeong, 2018). In addition, modification of rainfall patterns has been linked to
52 irrigation (Alter et al., 2015; Kang and Eltahir, 2019; Mathur and AchutaRao, 2020). For example, increases
53 in extreme rainfall in Central India in recent decades has been linked to the intensification of irrigated paddy
54 cultivation in northwest India (Devanand et al., 2019).
55
56 Different irrigation techniques are associated with significant differences in irrigation water productivity
57 (Deligios et al., 2019) and replacing inefficient systems can reduce average non-beneficial water
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1 consumption by up to 76% while maintaining stable crop yields (J鋑ermeyr et al., 2015). Several
2 adjustments can improve water use efficiency, including extending irrigation intervals, shortening the time of
3 watering crops or reducing the size of the plot being irrigated (Caretta and B鰎jeson, 2015; da Cunha et al.,
4 2015; Dumenu and Obeng, 2016). Deficit irrigation is an important mechanism for improving water
5 productivity (Zheng et al., 2018) and increasing regional crop production under drying conditions (Malek
6 and Verburg, 2018). Access to irrigation can also play a role in alleviating poverty, contributing to reducing
7 vulnerability and risks (Balasubramanya and Stifel, 2020). However, the diversity of irrigation related
8 techniques and the consequent differences in effect and water-use intensity is often underreported
9 (Vanschoenwinkel and Van Passel, 2018).
10
11 The use of water-saving technologies like laser levelling, micro-irrigation, efficient pumps and water
12 distribution systems (Kumar et al., 2016); increasing irrigation efficiency (Wang et al., 2019a) through
13 improved agronomic practices (Kakumanu et al., 2018) and economic instruments like water trading in
14 developed countries like Australia (Kirby et al., 2014) are known to reduce water application rates and
15 increase yields, and "save" water at the plot level, but may exacerbate basin-scale water scarcity (van der
16 Kooij et al., 2013; Zhou et al., 2021).
17
18 Asia accounts for 69-73% of the world's irrigated area. However, irrigation currently plays a relatively
19 minor role in most Africa, except in the contiguous irrigated area along the Nile basin and North Africa and
20 South Africa (Meier et al., 2018). In India, long-term data (1956-1999) on the irrigated area shows that
21 farmers adjust their irrigation investments and crop choices in response to medium-run rainfall variability
22 (Taraz, 2017). (da Cunha et al., 2015) report that farmers' income tends to be higher on irrigated lands in
23 Brazil. In Bangladesh, farmers invest a part of their increased incomes in improving irrigation access
24 (Delaporte and Maurel, 2018). The severity of drought increases the likelihood of farmers adopting
25 supplementary irrigation in Bangladesh (Alauddin and Sarker, 2014). In Vietnam, irrigation improvement
26 had the highest positive impact on crop yield among all farm-level adaptive practices (Ho and Shimada,
27 2019). In South Africa, access to irrigation was one of the most important predictors of whether or not
28 farmers would adopt a whole suite of other adaptation responses (Samuel and Sylvia, 2019).
29
30 Irrigation is also associated with adverse environmental and socio-economic outcomes, including
31 groundwater over-abstraction, aquifer salinization (Foster et al., 2018; Pulido-Bosch et al., 2018; Quan et al.,
32 2019; Blakeslee et al., 2020); land degradation (Singh et al., 2018). Further, while irrigation expansion is one
33 of the most commonly proposed adaptation responses, there are limitations to further increases in water use,
34 as many regions are already facing water limitations under current climatic conditions (Rockstr鰉 et al.,
35 2014; Steffen et al., 2015; Kummu et al., 2016).
36
37 Projections of the future effectiveness of irrigation indicate a varying degree of effectiveness depending on
38 the region and specific type and combination of approaches used. At the same time, overall residual impacts
39 increase at higher levels of warming (4.7.1.2). Uncertainties in regional climate projections and limitations in
40 the ability of agricultural models to fully represent water resources are important limitations in our
41 understanding of the potential of further irrigation expansion (4.5.1) (Greve et al., 2018).
42
43 In light of the volume of irrigated agriculture globally, and the projected increase in water requirements for
44 food production, increasing water productivity and thus improving the ratio of water used per unit of
45 agricultural output, is necessary globally to meet agricultural water demand (4.5.1) (J鋑ermeyr et al., 2015;
46 J鋑ermeyr et al., 2017). For example, assuming a doubling of global maize production by 2050 increased
47 water productivity could reduce total water consumption compared to the baseline productivity by 20 to 60%
48 (Zheng et al., 2018). Under economic optimization assumptions, shifts towards less water-intensive and less
49 climate-sensitive crops would be optimal in terms of water use efficiency and absolute yield increases;
50 however, this could pose risks to food security as production shifts away from main staple crops (Nechifor
51 and Winning, 2019). Shifting currently rain-fed production areas to irrigation will be an important element in
52 ensuring food security with increasing temperatures, though investment in storage capacities to buffer
53 seasonal water shortage will be essential to ensure negative environmental impacts are minimised (Rosa et
54 al., 2020b).
55
56 [END BOX 4.3 HERE]
57
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1
2 4.6.3 Adaptation in Energy and Industrial Sectors
3
4 While AR5 (Arent et al., 2014) had looked at demand and supply changes in the energy sector due to climate
5 change, none of the AR5 chapters had assessed adaptations in the energy sector per se. A modeling study by
6 (van Vliet et al., 2016b) demonstrated that increasing the efficiency of hydropower plants by up to 10%
7 could offset the impacts of decreased water availability in most regions by mid-century, under both RCP2.6
8 and RCP8.5 scenarios (medium confidence). Changing hydropower operation protocol and plant design can
9 be effective adaptation measures, yet may be insufficient to mitigate all future risks related to increased
10 floods and sediment loads (Lee et al., 2016).
11
12 (van Vliet et al., 2016b) projected that even a 20% increase in efficiency of thermoelectric power plants
13 might not be enough to offset the risks of water stress by mid-century (medium confidence). Therefore,
14 thermoelectric power plants will need additional adaptation measures such as changes in cooling water
15 sources and alternative cooling technologies (van Vliet et al., 2016c). In China, many coal-fired power plants
16 in water-scarce North China have adopted air cooling technologies (Zhang et al., 2016a). In Europe, wet/dry
17 cooling towers (Byers et al., 2016) and seawater cooling (Behrens et al., 2017) have been the preferred
18 options. Overall, freshwater withdrawals for adapted cooling systems under all scenarios are projected to
19 decline by -3% to -63% by 2100 compared to the base year of 2000 (Fricko et al., 2016) (medium
20 confidence).
21
22 Diversifying energy portfolios to reduce water-related impacts on the energy sector is another effective
23 adaptation strategy with high mitigation co-benefits. A modelling study from Europe shows that for a 3癈
24 scenario, an energy mix with an 80% share of renewable energy can potentially reduce the overall negative
25 impacts on the energy sector by a factor of 1.5 times or more (Tobin et al., 2018). In addition, hydropower
26 can also play a role in compensating for the intermittency of other renewable energies (Fran鏾is et al., 2014).
27 For example, integrating hydro, solar, and wind power in energy generation strategies in Grand Ethiopian
28 Renaissance Dam can potentially deliver multiple benefits, including decarbonization, compliance with
29 environmental flow norms, and reduce potential conflicts among Nile riparian countries (Sterl et al., 2021).
30 Furthermore, reducing the share of thermoelectric power with solar and wind energy (Tobin et al., 2018;
31 Arango-Aramburo et al., 2019; Emodi et al., 2019) can be synergistic from both climate and water
32 perspectives, as solar and wind energy has lower water footprints (high confidence).
33
34 Indigenous Peoples, mountain communities, and marginalized minorities often bear the brunt of
35 environmental and social disruptions due to hydropower. As a consequence, hydropower operators face
36 resistance prior to and during construction. Benefit sharing mechanisms help redistribute some of the gains
37 from hydropower generation to the communities in the immediate vicinity of the project. For instance,
38 sharing of hydropower revenues and profits to fund local infrastructure and pay dividends to local people has
39 been practiced in Nepal and in some countries of the Mekong basin to enhance the social acceptability of
40 hydropower projects (Balasubramanya et al., 2014; Shrestha et al., 2016) (low confidence).
41
42 Most water-intensive industries are increasingly facing water stress, making the reuse of water an attractive
43 adaptation strategy (see Box 4.5). For example, Singapore, where the share of industrial water use is
44 projected to grow from 55% in 2016 to 70% in 2060, is increasing its NEWater (highly treated wastewater)
45 supply share from 30% to 55% to meet the growing demand of industrial and cooling activities (PUB, 2016).
46 In addition, the mining industry has also adopted water adaptations measures, such as water recycling and
47 reuse; using brackish or saline sources; and working with regional water utilities to reduce water extraction
48 and improve water use efficiency (Northey et al., 2017; Odell et al., 2018).
49
50 In summary, energy and industrial sector companies have undertaken several adaptation measures to reduce
51 water stress, with varying effectiveness levels. However, residual risks will remain, especially at higher
52 levels of warming (medium confidence).
53
54 4.6.4 Adaptation in Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WaSH) Sector
55
56 AR5 pointed to adaptive water management techniques (limited evidence, high agreement) (Field et al.,
57 2014b), while SR1.5 documented the need for reducing vulnerabilities and promoting sustainable
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1 development and disaster risk reduction synergies (high confidence) (IPCC, 2018a). WaSH has also been
2 identified as a low regrets adaptation measure (Cutter et al., 2012).
3
4 Access to appropriate, reliable WaSH protects against water-related diseases, particularly after climate
5 hazards such as heavy rainfalls and floods (Carlton et al., 2014; Jones et al., 2020). WaSH interventions have
6 been demonstrated to reduce diarrhoea risk by 25-75% depending on the specific intervention (Wolf et al.,
7 2018) (high confidence). Conversely, inadequate WaSH is associated with an estimated annual loss of 50
8 million Daily Adjusted Life Years (Pr黶s-Ust黱 et al., 2019), of which 89% of deaths are due to diarrhoea,
9 and 8% of deaths from acute respiratory infections (Chapter 7 WGII 7.3.2), making universal access to
10 WaSH (i.e., achievement of SDG 6.1, 6.2), a critical adaptation strategy (high confidence). However, not all
11 WaSH solutions are suited to all climate conditions (Sherpa et al., 2014; Howard et al., 2016) so health
12 outcome improvements are not always sustained under changing climate impacts (Dey et al., 2019) (medium
13 evidence, high agreement). As such, WaSH infrastructure also needs to be climate-resilient (Smith et al.,
14 2015; Shah et al., 2020). In addition to new WaSH infrastructure design and implementation, expansion and
15 replacement of existing infrastructure offer opportunities to implement climate-resilient designs and reduce
16 greenhouse emissions (Boholm and Prutzer, 2017; Dickin et al., 2020) (medium evidence; high agreement).
17
18 Effective adaptation strategies include protecting source water and managing both water supply and demand.
19 Source water protection (Shaffril et al., 2020) has proven effective in reducing contamination. Improved
20 integrated (urban) water resources management (Kirshen et al., 2018; Tosun and Leopold, 2019), governance
21 (Chu, 2017; Miller et al., 2020), and enhanced ecosystem management (Adhikari et al., 2018b) lead to
22 policies and regulations that reduce water insecurity and, when developed appropriately, reduce inequities
23 (medium confidence). Supply (source) augmentation, including dams, storage, and rainwater/fog harvesting,
24 can increase the supply or reliability of water for drinking, sanitation, and hygiene (DeNicola et al., 2015;
25 Pearson et al., 2015; Majuru et al., 2016; Poudel and Duex, 2017; Lucier and Qadir, 2018; Goodrich et al.,
26 2019) (high confidence). For example, rainwater harvesting in an Inuit community increased water for
27 hygiene by 17%, reduced water retrieval efforts by 40%, and improved psychological and financial health
28 (Mercer and Hanrahan, 2017). However, climate change impacts will affect amounts of rainwater available.
29 A recent study concluded that domestic water demand met through rainwater harvesting generally improves
30 under climate change scenarios for select communities in Canada and Uganda, with the exception of drier
31 summers in some areas of Canada (Schuster-Wallace et al., 2021). Further, it is important to recognize that
32 many of these interventions require financial investments that make them inaccessible to the poorest (Eakin
33 et al., 2016). Demand for water can be decreased through reductions in water loss from the system (e.g., pipe
34 leakage) (Orlove et al., 2019) and water conservation measures (Duran-Encalada et al., 2017) (medium
35 confidence).
36
37 During periods of water insecurity, people often implement maladaptive strategies (Magnan et al., 2016),
38 i.e., strategies that can increase the risk of adverse health impacts, increase exposure to violence, or cause
39 malnutrition (Kher et al., 2015; Pommells et al., 2018; Collins et al., 2019a; Schuster et al., 2020) (medium
40 evidence, high agreement). Examples include walking further, using less safe water sources, prioritizing
41 drinking and cooking over personal/household hygiene, or reducing food/water intake. Conversely, some
42 rebalancing of gender roles can occur when women and girls cannot source sufficient water, with men
43 building additional water supply or storage infrastructure or fetching water (Singh and Singh, 2015; Magesa
44 and Pauline, 2016; Shrestha et al., 2019b). Some adaptation strategies create unintended health threats such
45 as increased odds (1.55) of mosquito larvae in water storage pots (Ferdousi et al., 2015), which could have
46 even more significant impacts in the future given projected range expansion for vectors as a result of climate
47 change (Liu-Helmersson et al., 2019). Other unintended consequences include pathogen contamination
48 (Gwenzi et al., 2015) and time or financial tradeoffs (Schuster et al., 2020) (medium evidence, high
49 agreement). Wastewater reuse for irrigation may have adverse health impacts if wastewater is not treated
50 (Dickin et al., 2016). Conversely, especially where women are responsible for domestic and productive water
51 management, adaptive agricultural water strategies, such as water-efficient irrigation or low-water crops,
52 mean that less water from finite water supplies are used for agriculture, leaving more water locally available
53 for domestic purposes (see section 4.6.2). These co-benefits across sectors become important community
54 water stress adaptations (Chinwendu et al., 2017), with water savings from one use leading to more water
55 available for other uses. This can reduce domestic water burdens and, therefore, gender inequities (4.8.3)
56 (limited evidence, high agreement). Further analyses of co-benefits, particularly employing a gender lens, are
57 required to improve adaptation strategies (McIver et al., 2016).
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1
2 In summary, ensuring access to climate-resilient WaSH infrastructure and practices represents a key
3 adaptation strategy that can protect beneficiaries against water-related diseases induced by climate change
4 (high confidence). Better management of water resources, supply augmentation, and demand management
5 are important adaptation strategies (high confidence). Reliable, safe drinking water reduces adverse physical
6 and psychological impacts of climate-related water stress and extreme events (robust evidence, medium
7 agreement). WaSH infrastructure expansion and replacement provide opportunities to redesign and increase
8 resilience in rural and urban contexts (limited evidence, high agreement).
9
10
11 [START BOX 4.4 HERE]
12
13 Box 4.4: COVID-19 Amplifies Challenges for WaSH Adaptation
14
15 While COVID-19 is an airborne disease (see Cross-Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7), public health
16 responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated socio-economic and environmental impacts of
17 these measures intersect with WaSH (Armitage and Nellums, 2020a). Notably, COVID-19 and climate
18 change act as compound risks in the context of water-induced disasters, exacerbating existing threats to
19 sustainable development (Neal, 2020).
20
21 The principal WaSH response to COVID-19 relates to hand hygiene, an infection control intervention that
22 requires access to sufficient, clean and affordable water beyond cooking, hydration, and general sanitation
23 needs, as outlined in SDG6 (Armitage and Nellums, 2020a). However, despite significant progress, more
24 than 800 million people in Central and Southern Asia, and 760 million in sub-Saharan Africa, lack basic
25 hand-washing facilities in the home (UNICEF, 2020). Notably, one in four healthcare facilities in select low-
26 and middle-income countries lack basic water access, and one in six lack hand-washing facilities (WHO,
27 2019) (4.3.3). Moreover, household water insecurity also impacts marginalised and minority groups in the
28 Global North (Deitz and Meehan, 2019; Rodriguez-Lonebear et al., 2020; Stoler et al., 2021).
29
30 Compound disasters have arisen due to either the co-occurrence of drought, storms or floods and COVID-19.
31 COVID-19 acts as a stress multiplier for women and girls in charge of water collection and minorities and
32 disabled people who are not engaged in water management (Phillips et al., 2020; Rodriguez-Lonebear et al.,
33 2020). Across the world, existing inequalities deepened due to lockdowns, which further limited access to
34 clean water and education for women and girls, and reinstated gendered responsibilities of child, elderly and
35 sick care, which had been previously externalised (Cousins, 2020; Neal, 2020; Zavaleta-Cortijo et al., 2020).
36 Accordingly, COVID-19 has further steepened the path to reach SDGs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 11 (Lambert et al.,
37 2020; Mukherjee et al., 2020; Neal, 2020; Pramanik et al., 2021). In addition, the pandemic exacerbated food
38 insecurity in drought-affected eastern and southern Africa (Phillips et al., 2020; Mishra et al., 2021). As the
39 twin risk of COVID-19 and hurricanes on the US Gulf Coast (Pei et al., 2020; Shultz et al., 2020) and
40 cyclone Amphan in Bangladesh (Pramanik et al., 2021) showed, increased hand-washing, additional WaSH
41 and evacuation and shelter infrastructures proved essential for preventing further spread of COVID-19
42 (Baidya et al., 2020; Ebrahim et al., 2020; Guo et al., 2020; Mukherjee et al., 2020; Pei et al., 2020; Shultz et
43 al., 2020; Pramanik et al., 2021). Moreover, while immediate steps can be taken during disaster response to
44 minimise climate-attributable loss of life, climate adaptation requires long-term strategies that intersect with
45 pandemic preparedness (Phillips et al., 2020).
46
47 Public health responses to COVID-19 geared towards infection control and caring for the sick can trigger
48 increased water demand where population numbers and density are high (Mukherjee et al., 2020; Sivakumar,
49 2021). As COVID-19 has highlighted the importance of WaSH (4.3.3), this pandemic could also result in
50 long-term positive outcomes in community resilience, improved infection control, and health protection
51 while addressing longer-term environmental challenges of climate change (Phillips et al., 2020).
52
53 [END BOX 4.4 HERE]
54
55 4.6.5 Adaptation in Urban and Peri-Urban Sectors
56
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1 AR5 reported that although case studies of the potential effectiveness of adaptation measures in cities are
2 growing, not all considered how adaptation would be implemented in practice (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al.,
3 2014). Furthermore, AR5 concluded that more attention had been given to adaptations that help ensure
4 sufficient water supplies than to increasing the capacity of sewage and drainage systems to adapt to heavier
5 rainfall or sea-level rise (Revi et al., 2014).
6
7 Since AR5 knowledge on urban adaptation has advanced, even though there is still a limited documentation
8 of urban of water adaptation in urban context as compared to other adaptation responses (Figure 4.23.)
9 Majority of the case studies on urban documentation are also from developed countries, with case studies on
10 adaptation in the urban sector being most common in Europe and Australasia (Figure 4.24). Water-related
11 urban and peri-urban climate change adaptation can involve `hard'-engineering structures (grey), managed or
12 restored biophysical systems (green and blue), or hybrid approaches that combine these strategies (Ngoran
13 and Xue, 2015; Palmer et al., 2015) (Figure 4.21, also see Figure 4.22 for types of urban adaptation options).
14
15
16
17 Figure 4.21: Strategies for Urban Water Adaptation a) Green and blue strategies of urban water adaptation prioritise
18 ecosystem restoration, such as wetlands restoration. b) Grey water strategies are hard engineering approaches to urban
19 water adaptation, including infrastructure such as pipes and canals, with extensive areas of impervious surfaces. c)
20 Hybrid approaches combine green, blue, and grey adaptation strategies, such that ecosystem functions are
21 complemented by engineered infrastructure, such as constructed wetlands, green roofs, and riparian buffers. Green and
22 blue, and hybrid approaches are variously classified in terms of circular economy, water sensitive urban design, nature-
23 based solutions (NBS), integrated urban water management, and ecological infrastructure. Adapted from (Depietri and
24 McPhearson, 2017).
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1
2
3 In most regions, hybrid adaptation approaches are underway. For example, sustainable urban drainage
4 systems (SUDS) are a common adaptation measure that can reduce flooding and improve stormwater quality
5 while reducing the urban heat island effect (e.g. (Chan et al., 2019; Loiola et al., 2019; Song et al., 2019;
6 Huang et al., 2020; Lin et al., 2020)) (Box 4.6; 12.5.5.3.2; 12.7.1). Municipal, catchment and local
7 community plans to minimise water-related climate risks are another form of adaptation (Stults and Larsen,
8 2018). Plans involve supply augmentation (Chu, 2017; Bekele et al., 2018), as well as floodplain
9 management, land-use planning, stakeholder coordination, and water demand management (Andrew and
10 Sauquet, 2017; Flyen et al., 2018; Robb et al., 2019; Tosun and Leopold, 2019), with some US cities
11 including strategies to address social inequalities that climate change may exacerbate (Chu and Cannon,
12 2021).
13
14 Such adaptation measures are concentrated in more developed countries (Olazabal et al., 2019). For example,
15 about 80% of European cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants have either mitigation and/or adaptation
16 plans (Reckien et al., 2018). In contrast, a survey of cities with more than one million inhabitants found 92%
17 of Asian cities, 89% African cities, and 87% of Latin American cities did not report adaptation initiatives
18 (Araos et al., 2016) (12.5.8.1). Autonomous adaptation measures (e.g., elevating housing and drainage
19 maintenance) are pursued to reduce flood risk in urban Senegal (Schaer, 2015), Kenya (Thorn et al., 2015),
20 Brazil (Mansur et al., 2018), and Guyana (Mycoo, 2014) (Box 4.7; 9.8.5.1; 12.5.5.3; FAQ 12.2).
21
22 Further studies are required to ascertain the effectiveness of adaptation measures implemented since AR5,
23 particularly for the growing populations of informal and peri-urban settlements. For example, in urban
24 Africa, such informal settlements are sites of political contestation as residents resist municipal relocation
25 strategies for flood alleviation (Douglas, 2018). In addition, the growing complexity of challenges facing
26 urban water management, such as climate change, urbanisation and environmental degradation, warrants a
27 transformative shift away from prevailing siloed approaches of water supply, sanitation and drainage to more
28 integrated systems that enhance adaptive capacity (Ma et al., 2015; Franco-Torres et al., 2020).
29
30 In summary, although water-related adaptation is underway in the urban, peri-urban and municipal sectors of
31 some nations, governance, technical, and economic barriers remain in implementing locally-informed
32 strategies, particularly in developing countries (high confidence).
33
34
35 [START BOX 4.5 HERE]
36
37 Box 4.5: Reduce, Remove, Re-use and Recycle (4Rs): Wastewater Re-use and Desalination as an
38 Adaptation Response
39
40 Circular economies can increase the available sustainable adaptation space by moving away from a linear
41 mode of production of "extract-produce-use-discard" to a `4Rs' closed loop to reduce pollution at the source,
42 remove contaminants from wastewater, re-use treated wastewater, and recover valuable by-products ((UN
43 Water, 2017)}, see WGIII 11.3.3).
44
45 It is estimated that 380 billion m3 of wastewater is produced annually worldwide, which equals about 15% of
46 agricultural water withdrawals. The recovery of nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium from wastewater can
47 offset 13.4% of the global agriculture demand for these nutrients (Jim閚ez and Asano, 2008; Fern醤dez-
48 Ar関alo et al., 2017). Recycling human waste worldwide could satisfy an estimated 22% of the global
49 demand for phosphorus (UN Water, 2017). It has been estimated that some 36 million ha worldwide (some
50 12% of all irrigated land) re-use urban wastewater, mainly for irrigation. However, only around 15% is
51 adequately treated (Thebo et al., 2017), thus the need to invest in sustainable, low-cost wastewater treatment
52 to protect public health. The irrigation potential of this volume of wastewater stands at 42 million ha.
53 Wastewater production is expected to increase globally to 574 billion m3 by 2050, a 51% increase compared
54 to 2015, mainly due to a growing urban population (Qadir et al., 2020). Water re-use with treated wastewater
55 for potable and nonpotable purposes can be practised in a manner that is protective of public health and the
56 environment (WHO, 2006; WHO, 2017). For example, when implemented with sufficient treatment
57 standards, the use of recycled water for the irrigation of crops is protective of public health (Blaine et al.,
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1 2013; Paltiel et al., 2016), as was determined by an appointed panel of experts in the state of California
2 (Cooper et al., 2012). However, there are several barriers to the adoption of wastewater re-use, these include
3 technical barriers and public health aspects related to microbiological and pharmaceuticals risks (Jim閚ez
4 and Asano, 2008; Jaramillo and Restrepo, 2017; Saur� and Arahuetes, 2019). These are currently being
5 addressed by strengthening regulatory standards, with, e.g., 11 out of 22 Arab States adopting legislation
6 permitting the use of treated wastewater (WHO, 2006; US EPA, 2017; WHO, 2017; EC, 2020). Benefits of
7 wastewater re-use usually outweigh the costs (Stacklin, 2012; Hern醤dez-Sancho et al., 2015; UN Water,
8 2017).
9
10 Desalination is particularly important in arid and semi-arid climates, coastal cities, and small island states
11 (Box 4.2). There are 16,000 operational desalination plants globally, with a daily desalinated water
12 production of 95 million m3 per day in 2017 (IDA, 2020). In 2012 desalinated water was equivalent to 0.6%
13 of the global water supply and 75.2 TWh of energy per year was used to generate desalinated water i.e. about
14 0.4% of the worldwide electricity consumption (IRENA, 2012). Unfortunately, only 1% of total desalinated
15 water uses renewable sources (IRENA, 2012; Amy et al., 2017; Balaban, 2017; Mart韓ez-Alvarez et al.,
16 2018a; Jones et al., 2019) (4.7.6). Desalination has already helped to meet urban and peri-urban water
17 supply, particularly during annual or seasonal drought events, with half of the world's desalination capacity
18 in the Arab region (UN Environment, 2019; UN Water, 2021). In addition, seawater desalination could help
19 address water scarcity in 146 (50%) large cities (including 12 (63.2%) megacities) (He et al., 2021).
20 Desalination is also being adopted for irrigation. For example, in the island of Gran Canary (Spain), 30% of
21 the agricultural surface area is irrigated with desalinated water to irrigate high-value crops (Burn et al., 2015;
22 Mart韓ez-Alvarez et al., 2018a; Monterrey-Vi馻 et al., 2020). The expected growth of desalination, if not
23 coupled with renewable energy (RE), causes a projected 180% increase in carbon emissions by 2040
24 (GCWDA, 2015; Pistocchi et al., 2020). There have been advances in large scale and on-farm renewable
25 desalination (Abdelkareem et al., 2018). Using renewable energy to decarbonize desalination has meant that
26 the projected global average levelised cost of water has decreased from 2.4 /m3 (2015) to approximately
27 1.05/m3 by 2050, considering unsubsidized fossil fuel costs (Caldera and Breyer, 2020). Desalination will
28 be maladaptive if fossil fuel is used (Tubi and Williams, 2021).
29
30 In summary, a resilient circular economy is central to deliver access to water, sanitation, wastewater
31 treatment, desalination, and water re-use as viable adaptation options compatible with the Paris agreement,
32 while safeguarding ecological flows according to the SDG6 targets for climate-resilient development
33 (medium evidence, high agreement).
34
35 [END BOX 4.5 HERE]
36
37
38 4.6.6 Adaptation for Communities Dependant on Freshwater Ecosystems
39
40 AR5 concluded that some adaptation responses in the urban and agricultural sectors could negatively impact
41 freshwater ecosystems (medium confidence) (Settele et al., 2014).
42
43 Adaptation measures to cope with changes in ecosystems, including freshwater ecosystems, include
44 Ecosystem-based Adaptation (EbA) interventions and gained wide recognition at the global policy level
45 (Reid, 2016; Barkdull and Harris, 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019b).These have been implemented in
46 many locations around the world, yet, challenges remain, including improving the evidence base of their
47 effectiveness, scaling up of these interventions, mainstreaming across sectors and receiving more adaptation
48 finance (medium confidence).
49
50 A systematic review of 132 academic papers and 32 articles from non-peer-reviewed literature (Doswald et
51 al., 2014) provided a comprehensive global overview of EbA, which showed that EbA interventions were
52 used in various ecosystems, including inland wetlands (linked to 30 publications). An investigation of EbA
53 effectiveness by (Reid et al., 2019), where nine case studies covering South Asia, Africa and South America
54 were associated with freshwater systems, concluded that EbA enabled the enhancement of the adaptive
55 capacity or resilience to climate change, particularly for the more vulnerable groups in the community. An
56 assessment of the potential for EbA in three sub-basins of the Murray-Darling Basin, Australia, concluded
57 that EbA can augment catchment management practices but that there were also institutional challenges
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1 (Lukasiewicz et al., 2016). In urban settings, EbA has been associated with ecological structures for reducing
2 risks, including the use of urban wetlands (Barkdull and Harris, 2019). EbA is a subset of Nature based
3 Solutions (NbS) that is rooted in climate change adaptation and covers both mitigation (Pauleit et al., 2017)
4 (4.6.5, Box 4.6). Although adaptation measures for freshwater ecosystems have been implemented in many
5 places (Shaw et al., 2014; Lukasiewicz et al., 2016; Karim and Thiel, 2017; Milman and Jagannathan, 2017;
6 FAO, 2018a; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019b), the evidence base for the effectiveness of these measures to
7 cope with changes in freshwater ecosystems needs improvement. These measures also require further
8 financial support, mainstreaming across sectors, and the scaling up of individual measures (medium
9 confidence).
10
11 In summary, adaptation measures to cope with changes in freshwater ecosystems have been implemented in
12 many locations around the world. However, challenges remain, including improving the evidence base of
13 their effectiveness, scaling up these interventions, mainstreaming across sectors and receiving more
14 adaptation finance (medium confidence).
15
16
17 [START BOX 4.6 HERE]
18
19 Box 4.6: Nature Based Solutions for Water-related Adaptation
20
21 In the context of climate change-induced water insecurity, NbS are an adaptation response that relies on
22 natural processes to enhance water availability, water quality and mitigates risks associated with water-
23 related disasters (IUCN, 2020).
24
25 Until recently, NbS has been considered mainly for mitigation (Kapos et al., 2020; Seddon et al., 2020). Yet,
26 NbS increases the low-cost adaptation options that expand the adaptation space due to its multiple co-
27 benefits (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2). Furthermore, a meta-review of 928 NbS measures
28 globally shows that NbS largely addresses water-related hazards like heavy precipitation (37%) and drought
29 (28%) }(Kapos et al., 2020).
30
31 Natural infrastructure (green and blue) uses natural or semi-natural systems, e.g., wetlands, healthy
32 freshwater ecosystems, etc., to supply clean water, regulate flooding, enhance water quality, and control
33 erosion (6.3.3.1 to 6.3.3.6.). Grey infrastructure can damage biophysical and hydrological processes, seal
34 soils, and bury streams. Compared with grey physical infrastructure, natural infrastructure is often more
35 flexible, cost-effective, and can provide multiple societal and environmental benefits simultaneously
36 (McVittie et al., 2018; UN Water, 2018; IPBES, 2019). There is increasing evidence and assessment
37 methods on the role of NbS for climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction at different scales
38 (Chausson et al., 2020; Seddon et al., 2020; Cassin and Matthews, 2021) (4.6.5).
39
40 At the landscape scale, there is evidence that impacts from fluvial and coastal floods can be mitigated
41 through water-based NBS like detention /retention basins, river restoration, and wetlands (Thorslund et al.,
42 2017; Debele et al., 2019; Huang et al., 2020). Several examples show the effectiveness of floodplain
43 restoration, natural flood management and making room for the river measures (see FAQ 2.5, (Hartmann et
44 al., 2019; Mansourian et al., 2019; Wilkinson et al., 2019)) (medium evidence, high agreement). Likewise,
45 the use of managed aquifer recharge (MAR) in both urban and rural settings will be crucial for groundwater-
46 related adaptation (Zhang et al., 2020a).
47
48 At the urban and peri-urban scale, the use and effectiveness of NbS is a crucial feature to build resilience in
49 cities for urban stormwater management and heat mitigation (Depietri and McPhearson, 2017; Carter et al.,
50 2018; Huang et al., 2020; Bab� Almenar et al., 2021) (high confidence). NbS have been used for stormwater
51 management by combining water purification and retention functions (Prudencio and Null, 2018; Oral et al.,
52 2020). NbS have also been used to mitigate impacts from high impact extreme precipitation events by
53 integrating large scale NBS investment plans into urban planning in cities like New York and Copenhagen,
54 highlighting the importance of blended finance and investment (including insurance) to mainstream NbS
55 investments (Liu and Jensen, 2017; Rosenzweig et al., 2019; Lopez-Gunn et al., 2021). According to the
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1 CDP database, one in three cities use NBS to address climate hazards, and this trend is growing (Kapos et
2 al., 2020).
3
4 NbS are cost-effective and can complement or replace grey solutions (Cross-Chapter Box FEASIB in
5 Chapter 18, 3.2.3), (Chausson et al., 2020)). Moreover, estimates of NbS are increasingly based on integrated
6 economic valuations that incorporate co-design with stakeholders to incorporate local knowledge (Pagano et
7 al., 2019; Giordano et al., 2020; H閞ivaux and Le Coent, 2021; Palomo et al., 2021) (medium evidence, high
8 agreement). Yet, the performance of NbS themselves may be limited at higher GWLs (Calliari et al., 2019;
9 Morecroft et al., 2019).
10
11 More knowledge is needed on the long term benefits of NbS, particularly to hydro-meteorological hazards
12 (Debele et al., 2019). There is still low evidence for slow onset events, including the applicability of NbS to
13 manage highly vulnerable ecosystems and in agriculture (Sonneveld, 2018),
14
15 In summary, there is growing evidence on NBS effectiveness as an adaptation measure and critical role for
16 transformative adaptation to address climate change water-related hazards and water security (medium
17 evidence, high agreement). Moreover, several NBS� as, e.g. natural (blue and green) and grey infrastructure
18 can help address water-related hazards, e.g., coastal hazards, heavy precipitation, drought, erosion and low
19 water quality (high confidence).
20
21 [END BOX 4.6 HERE]
22
23
24 4.6.7 Adaptation Responses for Water-related Conflicts
25
26 AR5 concluded with high confidence that challenges for adaptation actions (though not water) are
27 particularly high in regions affected by conflicts (Field et al., 2014a). Although climate-conflict linkages are
28 disputed (4.3.6), the potential for synergies between conflict risk reduction and adaptation to climate change
29 exists (Mach et al., 2019). For example, discourses around climate-conflict inter-linkages can present
30 opportunities for peace-building and cooperation (Matthew, 2014; Abrahams, 2020). Indeed, adaptation
31 efforts are needed in the context of conflict, where the pre-existing vulnerability undermines the capacity to
32 manage climatic stresses. In addition, adaptive capacity depends on contextual factors such as power
33 relations and historical, ethnic tensions (Petersen-Perlman et al., 2017; Eriksen et al., 2021), which need to
34 be adequately considered in the design of adaptation strategies.
35
36 Some adaptation options, such as water conservation, storage and infrastructure, voluntary migration,
37 planned relocation due to flood risk/sea-level rise, and international water treaties, can reduce vulnerability
38 to climate change and conflicts. However, on the other hand, these adaptation options sometimes may have
39 unintended consequences by increasing existing tensions (Milman and Arsano, 2014); displacing climate
40 hazards to more vulnerable and marginalized groups (Milman and Arsano, 2014; Mach et al., 2019), e.g.
41 pastoralists (Zografos et al., 2014); favouring some over others, e.g. industry over agriculture (Iglesias and
42 Garrote, 2015)� upstream countries over downstream countries (Veldkamp et al., 2017), men over women
43 (Chandra et al., 2017). Such unintended consequences may happen when adaptation measures intended to
44 reduce vulnerability produce maladaptive outcomes by rebounding or shifting vulnerability to other actors
45 (Juhola et al., 2016). For example, in the Mekong River basin, the construction of dams and water reservoirs
46 contributes to the adaptation efforts of the upstream southeast Asia countries while increasing current/future
47 vulnerability to floods and droughts in downstream countries and can emerge as a cause of conflict (Earle et
48 al., 2015; Ng� et al., 2016).
49
50 Furthermore, adaptation in the context of water-related conflicts is also constrained by economic,
51 institutional, political, competing for development (Anguelovski et al., 2014) and gender considerations
52 (Sultana, 2014; Chandra et al., 2017), which need to be taken into account when designing adaptation
53 plans/measures.
54
55 4.6.8 Adaptations Through Human Mobility and Migration
56
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1 AR5 noted that whether migration is adaptive or maladaptive depends on the context and the individuals
2 involved, however it did not focus specifically on hydrological changes-induced migration (Noble et al.,
3 2014). Migration is often regarded as a transformational adaptation strategy in response to climate-induced
4 hydrological changes (Gemenne and Blocher, 2017) but rarely as the primary or only adaptation measure
5 ((Wiederkehr et al., 2018; de Longueville et al., 2020), Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7).
6 Migration is among one of the top five adaptation responses documented in Asia and Africa (Figure 4.27)
7 and confers several benefits to migrants yet maladaptations are also documented (Figure 4.29). This strategy
8 is not available to everyone. Vulnerable populations exposed to hydrological changes may become trapped
9 due to a lack of economic and social capital required for migration (Adams, 2016; Zickgraf, 2018) (medium
10 confidence).
11
12 Spontaneous migration, undertaken without outside assistance, has shown the potential to improve the
13 resilience of migrants and communities (Call et al., 2017; Jha et al., 2018a) but may also lead to increased
14 vulnerability and insecurity in some instances (Adger et al., 2018; Linke et al., 2018a; Singh and Basu,
15 2020). Migration is not a viable strategy for everyone, but age, gender and socio-economic status play a
16 significant role in encouraging or inhibiting the chances of successful migration (Maharjan et al., 2020;
17 Bergmann et al., 2021; Erwin et al., 2021). Migration has increased vulnerability among women and female-
18 headed households (Patel and Giri, 2019) but has also triggered gender positive processes, e.g., increased
19 female school enrolment (Gioli et al., 2014) (medium confidence). Remittances, i.e., transfers of money from
20 migrants to beneficiaries in sending areas, may reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity to
21 climate-induced hydrological changes (Ng'ang'a et al., 2016; Jha et al., 2018b) (medium confidence).
22 Managed retreat refers to the planned and assisted moving of people and assets away from risk areas, such as
23 government- or community-led resettlement (Hino et al., 2017; Maldonado and Peterson, 2018; Tadgell et
24 al., 2018; Arnall, 2019). Such initiatives may reduce exposure to risk (Lei et al., 2017). However, they often
25 fail to include affected populations in the process and may lead to greater impoverishment and increased
26 vulnerability (Wilmsen and Webber, 2015) (medium confidence).
27
28 More research on how to ensure migration becomes a successful adaptation strategy is needed (McLeman et
29 al., 2016). In addition, impacts on women, youth and marginalized groups (McLeman et al., 2016; Miletto,
30 2017) and immobility issues need more attention (Zickgraf, 2018).
31
32 In summary, measures that facilitate successful migration and inclusive resettlement may facilitate
33 adaptation to climate-induced hydrological changes (medium confidence).
34
35 4.6.9 Adaptation of the Cultural Water Uses of Indigenous Peoples, Local Communities and
36 Traditional Peoples
37
38 AR5 reported that religious and sacred values inform actions taken to adapt to climate change (Noble et al.,
39 2014). Neither AR5 nor SR1.5 reviewed adaptation of Indigenous, local and traditional uses of water.
40 SROCC highlighted the context-specific adaptation strategies of vulnerable communities in coastal, polar
41 and high mountain areas, reporting that adaptive capacity and adaptation limits are not only physical,
42 technical, institutional and financial, but also culturally-informed (Hock et al., 2019b; Meredith et al., 2019;
43 Oppenheimer et al., 2019).
44
45 There is high confidence that some Indigenous Peoples, local communities, and traditional peoples could and
46 are adapting to climate-driven hydrological changes and their impacts on culturally-significant sites, species,
47 ecosystems, and practices in polar, high mountain and coastal areas, where sufficient funding, decision-
48 making power and resourcing exist (e.g., (Golden et al., 2015; Bunce et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2018).
49 However, there is also high confidence that there are significant structural barriers and limits to their
50 adaptation, and that the outcomes of some adaptation strategies can be uneven and maladaptive (medium
51 evidence, high agreement) (4.7.4; 4.8.3). These barriers include the lack of recognition of Indigenous
52 sovereignty and exclusion of Indigenous Peoples from decision-making institutions (Ford et al., 2017; Labb�
53 et al., 2017; Eira et al., 2018; McLeod et al., 2018; MacDonald and Birchall, 2020) (14.4.4.2.2; 13.8.1.2). At
54 the same time, the rate and scale of climate change can impede the ability of vulnerable communities to turn
55 their adaptive capacity into effective adaptation responses (Ford et al., 2015; Herman-Mercer et al., 2019).
56
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1 There is high confidence that local people are adapting to the cultural impacts of climate-driven glacier
2 retreat and decline in snow cover and ice in polar and high mountain areas. However, there is also high
3 confidence that such adaptation can be detrimental and disrupt local cultures. For example, in the Peruvian
4 Andes, concerns about water availability for ritual purposes has led to restrictions on pilgrims' removal of
5 ice and limiting the size of ritual candles to preserve the glacier (Paerregaard, 2013; Allison, 2015).
6 Relatedly, some local people have questioned the cosmological order, and re-oriented their spiritual
7 relationships accordingly (Paerregaard, 2013; Carey et al., 2017). In Siberia (Mustonen, 2015) and northern
8 Finland (Turunen et al., 2016), community-led decisions among herders favour alternative routing, pasture
9 areas, and shifts in nomadic cycles in response to changing flood events and permafrost conditions (Box
10 13.2). However, loss of grazing land and pasture fragmentation pose adaptation limits, and some strategies
11 such as supplementary feeding and new technologies may further affect cultural traditions of herding
12 communities (Risvoll and Hovelsrud, 2016; Jaakkola et al., 2018).
13
14 There is high confidence that relocation (managed retreat) is an adaptation response for communities in areas
15 impacted by, or at risk of, inundation and other hydrological changes (15.3.4.7; 15.5.3). However, relocation
16 can be culturally, socially, financially, politically and geographically constrained due to the importance of
17 cultural relationships with traditional, customary or ancestral lands (high confidence) (Albert et al., 2018;
18 Narayan et al., 2020; Yates et al., 2021). Among Pacific islands, for example, the prospect of migration
19 raises concerns about the loss of cultural identity and Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and practices, which can
20 impact emotional well-being (Yates et al., 2021).
21
22 As cultural beliefs influence risk perception, there is medium confidence that some cultural understandings
23 can foster a false sense of security among Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples
24 regarding climate-driven hydrological changes. For example, some members of the Rolwaling Sherpa
25 community in Nepal believe that mountain deities protect them from glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs)
26 (Sherry and Curtis, 2017)(4.2.2). Elsewhere, such as in the islands of Fiji and St. Vincent, cultural beliefs can
27 diminish human agency because change is viewed as inevitable and beyond human intervention (Smith and
28 Rhiney, 2016; Currenti et al., 2019). Yet such cultural beliefs are not necessarily maladaptive, as they
29 potentially support other resilience factors, such as IK and local knowledge (4.8.5; (Ford et al., 2020)), as
30 well as cultural connections and social ties (Yates et al., 2021).
31
32 In sum, although some Indigenous Peoples, local communities and traditional peoples can and are adapting
33 to climate-driven hydrological changes, and their impacts on and risks to culturally significant practices and
34 beliefs (medium confidence), these strategies are constrained by structural barriers and adaptation limits
35 (high confidence).
36
37
38 [START BOX 4.7 HERE]
39
40 Box 4.7: Flood-related Adaptation Responses
41
42 Floods, due to their rapid onset and destructive force, require specific adaptation measures. Historically, to
43 address flood damages and risk protection, retreat and accommodation were most common, emphasizing
44 protecting and retreating (Wong et al., 2014; Bott and Braun, 2019). Figure 4.22 identifies five major
45 adaptation strategies from a meta-review of water-related adaptation responses that helps in protecting,
46 retreating and accommodating (4.7.1).
47
48 Globally, structural measures for flood protection through hard infrastructure are the most common measures
49 as they directly manage flood hazards by controlling flow through streams and prevent water overflow
50 (Andrew and Sauquet, 2017; Duz� et al., 2017). These measures include dikes, flood control gates, weirs,
51 dams, storage and proper waste management (Barua et al., 2017; Egbinola et al., 2017). Infrastructure
52 measures require high maintenance, such as dredging clearing channels and overpasses (Egbinola et al.,
53 2017). A negative aspect of protective infrastructural measures is that, while they eliminate the hazard up to
54 a certain magnitude (Di Baldassarre et al., 2013), they also generate an illusion of no risk by diminishing
55 frequent floods (Duz� et al., 2017; Logan et al., 2018). In addition, specific engineering solutions that might
56 be introduced from other localities without proper contextual adjustments may lead to maladaptation
57 (Mycoo, 2014; Pritchard and Thielemans, 2014). Nature-Based Solutions (NbS, Box 4.6) have shifted
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1 infrastructure measures from purely grey onto mixed engineering and environmental measures. Examples
2 include Sustainable Urban Drainage Systems (SUDS), which aid in decreasing flow peaks and are
3 affordable, aesthetically pleasing and socially acceptable while also reducing heat and hence the production
4 of storms (Chan et al., 2019) (4.6.5).
5
6 Non-structural or soft measures for flood adaptation include human actions that generate capacities,
7 information and, therefore, awareness of floods (Du et al., 2020). Soft measures aim to integrate flood
8 resilience within city management and planning (Wijaya, 2015; Andrew and Sauquet, 2017; Abbas et al.,
9 2018). Social support between members of a community and economic mechanisms such as loans or
10 remittances are soft measures that promote recovery or resilience to floods (Barua et al., 2017; Musah-
11 Surugu et al., 2018; Bott and Braun, 2019). Communities with heightened awareness and knowledge of
12 floods are probably going to elect political leaders that will affect flood protection and policies that include
13 adaptation (Abbas et al., 2018). Soft measures can be an anchoring factor for policies that promote early
14 warning systems, infrastructure, flood resilient housing and environmental restoration (Andrew and Sauquet,
15 2017; Abbas et al., 2018). However, soft measures, especially at large scale, may also lead to maladaptation
16 as lack of synchronization between international, national and local levels (Hedelin, 2016; Lu, 2016; Jamero
17 et al., 2017), and can further be hampered by bureaucracy (Pinto et al., 2018).
18
19 Early warning systems (EWS) are defined as integrated systems of hazard monitoring, forecasting and
20 prediction, disaster risk assessment, communication, and preparedness activities systems to enable
21 individuals, communities, governments, businesses to take timely action to reduce disaster risks in advance
22 of hazardous events (UNISDR, 2021). By this definition, EWS are directly dependent on soft and hard
23 infrastructure measures that increase capacity and reduce hazard (Abbas et al., 2018). Aside from the
24 capacity dependent on soft measures and the monitoring infrastructure, communication at all scales, from
25 national weather services to local leaders, needs to be effective for prompt action (Devkota et al., 2014). In
26 many cases, early warning systems might be the only option to reduce flood casualties (Kontar et al., 2015).
27
28 Accommodating floods has gained popularity as the effects of climate change become more apparent, and
29 notable hydroclimatic events exceed the limitations of protective measures (Pritchard and Thielemans,
30 2014). NbS measures like wetland restoration can act as modern infrastructure protection with clear
31 mitigation co-benefit and provides opportunities for accommodating floods. For example, initiatives such as
32 Room for the River consider flood safety combined with other values such as landscape, environment and
33 cultural values (Zevenbergen et al., 2015). A popular ecosystem-based adaptation measure has been wetland
34 restoration, which can control flood peaks, serve as storage ponds in addition to restoring the environment
35 (Pinto et al., 2018; Saroar, 2018). However, its effectiveness under different conditions is yet to be assessed
36 (Wamsler et al., 2016). Flood resilient housing is another form of accommodating and living with floods.
37 These comprise mostly of elevated homes or different flood protection measures considering vegetation
38 around the house to make those flood resilient (Ling et al., 2015; Abbas et al., 2018; Ferdous et al., 2019).
39
40 Despite different degrees of effectiveness, no flood adaptation measure is uniquely effective to eliminate
41 flood risk. Adaptation to floods needs to be considered at a local level, considering the types of floods,
42 community's capacities and available livelihoods (Fenton et al., 2017a). Ideally, flood adaptation strategies
43 need to include short term actions linked to long term goals, be flexible, consider multiple strategies and
44 interlink investment agendas of stakeholders (Zevenbergen et al., 2015). Most importantly, flood adaptation
45 and management options have been proven effective to reduce loss of human lives, but not entirely at
46 sustaining livelihoods and reducing infrastructure damages (Rahman and Alam, 2016; Bower et al., 2019;
47 Ferdous et al., 2019).
48
49 [END BOX 4.7 HERE]
50
51
52 4.7 Benefits and Effectiveness of Water-Related Adaptations, Their Limits and Trade-offs
53
54 The previous section documented adaptation responses in water use sectors we assess in this chapter (4.6),
55 and noted that in many instances, effectiveness of those responses is not clear. While, there are thousands of
56 case studies of implemented adaptation responses (observed adaptation) to water insecurity, there is a lack of
57 synthesized understanding about the effectiveness and benefits of adaptation (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a)
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1 and whether or not those benefits also translate into climate risk reduction (Singh et al., 2021). In contrast,
2 literature on the effectiveness of future projected adaptation in reducing climate risks is limited in number.
3 Yet, even then, the findings are not synthesized across various options to make an overall assessment of the
4 effectiveness of future projected adaptation. In this section, we draw on two meta-review protocols (see
5 SM4.2 for a description of each protocol) and assess the benefits of current adaptation and effectiveness of
6 future projected adaptation in reducing climate risks. We also assess limits to adaptation and trade-offs and
7 synergies between adaptation and mitigation.
8
9 4.7.1 Current Water-related Adaptation Responses, Benefits, Co-benefits and Maladaptation
10
11 AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014) concluded that developing countries needed a larger share of adaptation
12 investments for anticipatory adaptation in the water sector (medium evidence, high agreement) and that
13 adaptive water management measures were critical in addressing climate-related uncertainty. (Noble et al.,
14 2014) listed various examples of adaptation options, and water-related adaptation featured prominently in
15 almost all categories. They also discussed the challenges of developing metrics for measuring adaptation
16 outcomes; and stressed the importance of transformational adaptation instead of incremental adaptation.
17 Finally, SR 1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018) made one of the first attempts to systematically assess the
18 feasibility of adaptation options (Singh and Basu, 2020).
19
20 4.7.1.1 Current Water-related Adaptation Responses
21
22 We define an adaptation response as a water-related adaptation if the hazard is water-related (e.g., floods,
23 droughts, extreme rainfall events, groundwater depletion, melting and thawing of cryosphere (Figure 4.25);
24 or the adaptation intervention is water-related (e.g., irrigation, rainwater harvesting, soil moisture
25 conservation etc.). Adaptation responses were implemented across all water use sub-sectors assessed in this
26 chapter (4.6, Figure 4.23). Given the overall interest in assessing adaptations that documents outcomes, we
27 limited our analysis to a set of 359 unique articles that measures outcomes of adaptation across pre-defined
28 outcome categories (SM4.2, Table SM4.5, (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a; Mukherji et al., 2021). A total of
29 1054 adaptation responses were documented in the 359 case studies; these were categorized into 16
30 categories (Figure 4.22). These adaptation responses are not always specific to long term climate change
31 impacts (that is, changes in annual mean fluxes) but rather respond to changes in variability in the water
32 cycle and specific water hazards. Adaptation to internal variability is needed to increase the resilience to
33 projected water cycle changes because water cycle changes primarily manifest as changes in variability
34 (Douville et al., 2021).
35
36 There is high confidence that a significant share of water-related adaptations is occurring in the agriculture
37 sector. Agriculture accounts 60-70% of total water withdrawals (Hanasaki et al., 2018; Burek et al., 2020;
38 M黮ler Schmied et al., 2021) and supports the livelihoods of a large majority of people in the developing
39 countries. Within the agriculture sector, there is high confidence in the quality and quantity of evidence of
40 adaptation responses such as improved cultivars and agronomic practices, on-farm irrigation and water
41 management and water and soil moisture conservation, and medium confidence, derived from robust
42 evidence, and medium agreement for other most other adaptation responses (Figure 4.23 and Figure 4.24).
43 Most of these adaptation case studies are from Asia and Africa, and agriculture is the pre-dominant sector
44 where most of these adaptation responses are being implemented (high confidence) (4.6.2). However, the
45 sectoral nature of adaptation responses varies across continents. Agriculture is the most important sector in
46 all continents, except Europe and Australasia, where the most adaptation occurs in the urban sector (high
47 confidence) (Figure 4.24).
48
49
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1
2 Figure 4.22: Decision tree, documenting the classification of water-related adaptation responses across 48
3 subcategories, into16 intermediate and 8 larger categories. We use the 16 intermediate categories of adaptation
4 responses for further analysis in this section.
5
6
7
8 Figure 4.23: Sectoral distribution of documented water-related adaptation responses (observed adaptation) across the
9 16 categories derived from Figure 4.22. The quantity of evidence is derived from the number of papers in a particular
10 adaptation response category where High >40 papers, Medium: 10-40 papers; Low <10 papers. Confidence in evidence
11 relates to the way the article links outcomes of adaptation with the adaptation response. Category 1: studies causally
12 link adaptation outcomes to the adaptation response by constructing credible counterfactuals; Category 2: studies
13 correlate responses and outcomes without causal attribution; Category 3: studies describe adaptation outcomes without
14 making any causal or correlation claims between adaptation outcomes and adaptation responses. High confidence: more
15 than 67% of the studies fall in categories 1 and 2; medium confidence: 50-67% of the studies are in categories 1 and 2,
16 and low confidence is less than 50% of studies are in categories 1 and 2.
17
18
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1
2 Figure 4.24: Location of case studies on water-related adaptation which measure adaptation outcomes (n=359) and
3 their sectoral distribution across all regions. Circles denote the number of case studies in a particular location in the
4 continent. The pie chart shows the sectors in which adaptation is taking place. The sectors correspond to water use
5 sectors described in sections 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6 of this chapter.
6
7
8 The top four adaptation responses in terms of frequency of documentation are changes in the cropping
9 pattern and crop systems (145 responses), improved crop cultivars and agronomic practices (139 responses),
10 irrigation and water management practices (115 responses) and water and soil conservation measures (102
11 responses). These top four responses provide several benefits such as higher incomes and yields, better water
12 use efficiencies and related outcomes (high confidence) (Table 4.9 and Figure 4.27). However, those benefits
13 are incremental, that is, it helps improve crop production and incomes, at least in the short run, but may not
14 automatically lead to transformative outcomes and climate risk reductions (Pelling et al., 2015; Fedele et al.,
15 2019). One way to move from incremental to transformative adaptation could be to invest gains from
16 incremental adaptation in education and capacity building to improve overall adaptive capacity (Vermeulen
17 et al., 2018). Responses such as migration, including spontaneous and planned relocation, are also relatively
18 well documented (medium confidence), as are responses such as collective action, training and capacity
19 building and economic and financial measures for increasing adaptive capacities (medium confidence). These
20 categories of adaptation can potentially lead to transformative outcomes, such as a shift to livelihoods that
21 are less exposed to climate hazards. However, transformative pathways are not always straightforward (Pahl-
22 Wostl et al., 2020) (Table 4.8).
23
24
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1 Table 4.8: Illustrative examples of case studies of water-related adaptation responses where outcomes were measured (n=359). These cases include instances where adaptation
2 benefits were positive, negative, or neutral. Examples also include studies with or without causal and correlation links between adaptation response and outcomes (categories 1, 2 and
3 3 studies as described in caption of Figure 4.23. The purpose of the table is to provide a list of illustrative examples to showcase the wide range of adaptation responses that are being
4 implemented. Table 4.9 zooms into examples where adaptation had positive benefits on any of the selected parameters described in 4.7.1.2.
Name of the adaptation Description of adaptation response Sources
response (number of
documented responses that
category)
Changes in the cropping Changes in cropping pattern; e.g., the introduction of sugarcane and rice in Costa Rica; (Singh et al., 2014; Warner et al., 2015; Asmare et al., 2019;
pattern and crop systems crop diversification in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe; crop diversification in Tanzania. Lalou et al., 2019; Makate et al., 2019)
(145 responses) Changes in the timing of sowing and harvesting, e.g., in China; India and Pakistan (Yu et al., 2014; Macchi et al., 2015)
On-farm diversification, e.g., an integrated crop-livestock system in France (Havet et al., 2014)
Improved crop cultivars Improved crop cultivars, e.g., short-duration paddy varieties in Nepal; saline tolerate (Kabir et al., 2016; Wossen et al., 2017; Khanal et al.,
and agronomic practices rice cultivar in Bangladesh; drought-tolerant maize varieties in Malawi, Nigeria, 2018a; Makate et al., 2019)
(139 responses) Zimbabwe, Uganda
Improved agronomic practices, e.g., conservation agriculture to conserve soil moisture (Thierfelder et al., 2015; Kimaro et al., 2016; Traore et al.,
in Malawi, Tanzania; climate-smart agricultural practices in Zambia; alternate wetting 2017; Kakumanu et al., 2019)
and drying and direct seeding of rice in India.
Irrigation and water Irrigation, e.g., construction of local irrigation infrastructure in Chile; funding of (Hurlbert and Pittman, 2014; Ferchichi et al., 2017; Rey et
management practices community wells in Canada; drilling of borewells in Thailand; irrigation in Ethiopia; al., 2017; Pak-Uthai and Faysse, 2018; Fadul et al., 2019;
(115 responses) spate irrigation in Sudan; night-time irrigation scheduling to reduce evaporative demand Lemessa et al., 2019; Lillo-Ortega et al., 2019; Torres-
in the UK Slimming et al., 2020)
On-farm water management and water-saving technologies, e.g., use of surface pipes (Hong and Yabe, 2017; Tan and Liu, 2017; Deligios et al.,
for irrigation water conveyance in China; drip irrigation in China; and use of water- 2019; Rouabhi et al., 2019)
saving measures in India
Water and soil On-farm water and soil conservation measures, e.g., in Burkina Faso; terraces and (West Colin et al., 2016; Kosmowski, 2018)
conservation (102 contour bunds in Ethiopia.
responses) Water harvesting through on sand dams in Kenya; in-situ and ex-situ water harvesting (Ngigi et al., 2018; Sullivan-Wiley and Short Gianotti,
in Uganda and India 2018; Kalungu et al., 2021)
Watershed conservation programs, e.g., in Ethiopia. (Siraw et al., 2018)
Revival of water bodies; e.g., creation of artificial lakes in Portugal. (Santos et al., 2018)
Collective action, policies Collective action and cooperation; e.g., grassroots-level collective action for conflict (Hellin et al., 2018; Tembata and Takeuchi, 2018)
and institutions (95 resolution in Guatemala; collective decision to reduce water withdrawals during drought
responses) in Japan.
Community-based adaptation in Bangladesh, community-based management of (Fern醤dez-Gim閚ez et al., 2015; Roy, 2018)
rangelands in Mongolia.
Local institutions, e.g., multi-stakeholder platforms for disaster risk reduction and (Mapfumo et al., 2017; Lindsay, 2018)
agriculture in Peru; and several African countries; Adaptation Learning Program.
Water dispute resolution; e.g., water conflict mitigation in Costa Rica. (Kuzdas et al., 2016)
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Migration and off-farm Institutional and policy reforms; e.g., local water and land use planning instruments in (Fallon and Sullivan, 2014; Zevenbergen et al., 2015;
diversification (92 Australia; the Dutch Delta Program in the Netherlands; implementation of EU Flood Hedelin, 2016)
responses) Directives in Sweden.
Spontaneous migration, e.g., voluntary relocation in the Solomon Islands and rural to (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Iqbal et al., 2018)
Livestock and fishery- urban migration in Ethiopia and Pakistan.
related (63 responses) Employment and remittances, e.g., in Senegal. (Romankiewicz et al., 2016)
Planned relocation; e.g., the Massive Southern Shaanxi Migration Program in China; (Islam et al., 2014; Lei et al., 2017)
Training and capacity resettlement of flood-prone communities in Bangladesh.
building (57 responses) Off-farm diversification; e.g., migration to towns and engaging in off-farm labour (Mussetta et al., 2016; Basupi et al., 2019)
Agro-forestry and wage-earning in Niger, Ghana Bangladesh; shifting to non-pastoral livelihoods in
forestry-related responses Ethiopia. (Opiyo et al., 2015; Yung et al., 2015; Wako et al., 2017;
(56 responses) Livestock related, e.g., livestock species diversification in Ethiopia and Kenya; insuring Rahut and Ali, 2018)
Economic and financial livestock in Pakistan; changes in range management practices in the USA (Yang et al., 2019a)
incentives (54 responses) Fishery related, e.g., non-destructive fishery gears and techniques in Ghana and
Tanzania (Bacud, 2018; McKune et al., 2018; Chesterman et al.,
IK and LK based Information, training and capacity building; e.g., climate information services in Kenya 2019)
adaptations (41 responses) and Senegal; Training contributed new learning about digging canals to avoid prolonged
water logging in the Philippines; soil conservation training program in Ethiopia. (Weston et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 2017; Fuchs et al., 2019;
Agro-forestry related measures in India, Kenya, Nigeria, Farmer-Managed Natural Okunlola et al., 2019)
Regeneration FMNR in Ghana (Pandey et al., 2016; Barrucand et al., 2017; Barua et al.,
Forestry related; e.g., Coastal afforestation by planting salinity-resistant trees in 2017)
Bangladesh, in Colombia. (Dewi et al., 2018; Elum et al., 2018)
Insurance; rice crop insurance program in Indonesia; agricultural insurance program in
South Africa. (Fenton et al., 2017b)
Micro-finance and credit programs, e.g., in Bangladesh. (Mesquita and Bursztyn, 2017; Sain et al., 2017;
Social safety nets; e.g., food-based safety net programs in Brazil, food for work Tesfamariam and Hurlbert, 2017; Gao and Mills, 2018)
programs in Ethiopia. (Hurlbert, 2014; Kawaye and Hutchinson, 2018)
Subsidies and incentives, e.g., farm input subsidy program in Malawi; financing
programs in Canada to help producers with resources to improve/maintain the quality of (Kayaga and Smout, 2014; Zhang et al., 2016b)
soil, water, biodiversity for drought mitigation.
Water markets and tariffs; e.g., urban water tariffs in Zaragoza, Spain; informal (Newsham et al., 2018)
groundwater markets in China. (Sarkar et al., 2015; Burchfield and Gilligan, 2016;
Payment for ecosystems services, e.g., in Mexico. Kodirekkala, 2018; Ahmed and Atiqul Haq, 2019)
Use of traditional knowledge of Konda Reddy's in India to shift agro-forestry practices;
and among Khasia and Tripura communities in Bangladesh; use of local ecological (Petzold, 2018; Bott and Braun, 2019)
knowledge is by small-scale fisher-farmers in the Amazon floodplains, Brazil;
traditional water sharing system "bethma" in Sri Lanka; Indigenous methods of water
harvesting in India
Non-structural measures for flood management; e.g., changes in day-to-day practices in
Indonesia; place-specific social structures in the UK.
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Flood risk reduction Structural measures for flood management; improvement of the drainage system in (Bahinipati and Patnaik, 2015; Wijaya, 2015; Egbinola et
measures include (40 Indonesia; flood walls in Beira, Mozambique; dredging and construction of culverts in al., 2017; Spekker and Heskamp, 2017)
responses) Nigeria.
Early warning systems; e.g., flood forecasting in Nepal, Indonesia, Nigeria. (Ajibade and McBean, 2014; Devkota et al., 2014; Sari and
Prayoga, 2018)
Flood resilient housing; e.g., houses on stilts in Guyana, in Pakistan, Vietnam, (Mycoo, 2014; Ling et al., 2015; Abbas et al., 2018)
Philippines.
Wetland restoration; e.g., in USA and Netherlands. (Zevenbergen et al., 2015; Pinto et al., 2018)
Urban water management Urban water management, e.g., incorporating low impact development and urban design (Flyen et al., 2018; Rodr韌uez-Sinobas et al., 2018;
(22 responses) features for sustainable urban drainage systems in Spain and Malaysia; demand Stavenhagen et al., 2018; Chan et al., 2019)
management and tariff reforms in several European countries.
Green infrastructure; e.g., ecological stormwater management and re-naturalization (Hendel and Royon, 2015; Wamsler et al., 2016; Tauhid
processes in Sweden; pavement watering in France, Ghana, India, Kenya, Bangladesh and Zawani, 2018; Birtchnell et al., 2019)
Desalinization for water supplies in Spain (Mart韓ez-Alvarez et al., 2016; Morote et al., 2019)
Energy related adaptations Hydropower related; e.g., hydropower benefit sharing in the Mekong basin and Nepal (Balasubramanya et al., 2014; Suhardiman et al., 2014;
(8 responses) Shrestha et al., 2015)
Other renewable energy-related, e.g., "Raising Water and Planting Electricity project" (Lin and Chen, 2016)
in Taiwan
WaSH related adaptations Hand washing and hygiene, e.g., provision of latrines and washing hands with soap in (Dey et al., 2019)
(5 responses) Bangladesh
Safe drinking water and sanitation; e.g., piped water supply, China (Su et al., 2017)
Any other including Reduction in consumption, selling off assets etc.; e.g., selling of household property and (Musah-Surugu et al., 2018; Rai et al., 2019)
coping strategies (20 livestock in Nigeria; consumption smoothing in Ghana; reducing consumption in Nepal
responses)
1
2
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1 Droughts, followed by precipitation variability and extreme precipitation, are the two most common hazards
2 against which adaptation responses are forged. The other three top hazards are general climate impacts, heat-
3 related hazards and inland and riverine flooding (Figure 4.25). The majority of the adaptation responses
4 across all categories were introduced by individuals and households, followed by the civil society, and hence
5 autonomous (Figure 4.26). The private sector (defined as profit-making companies and distinct from
6 individual farmers and households) has played a relatively minor role in initiating adaptation responses.
7 However, the low participation of the private sector in initiating adaptation responses could be partly an
8 artefact of the nature of documentation.
9
10
11
12 Figure 4.25: Water-related adaptations and climate hazards against which adaptation responses are forged. Evidence
13 and confidence are derived in the same way as in Figure 4.23.
14
15
16
17 Figure 4.26: Water-related adaptations and their initiators. Initiator of adaptation is defined broadly, and includes the
18 entities who initiates a response, implements that response, or engages in that response in any way, including leading,
19 financing or enabling. Evidence and confidence are derived in the same way as in Figure 4.23.
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1
2
3 4.7.1.2 Benefits, Including Co-benefits of Water-related Adaptation Responses and Resulting Maladaptation
4
5 There is no consensus in the literature about ways of measuring the effectiveness of current adaptation
6 responses in reducing climate-related impacts (Singh et al., 2021). However, various methodologies,
7 including feasibility assessment, has been deployed (Williams et al., 2021). Given the methodological
8 challenges in defining and measuring the effectiveness of adaptation in reducing climate risks, in this
9 section, we focus on outcomes of water-related adaptation across several dimensions. A total of 359 studies
10 were identified to contain sufficiently robust evidence of documented adaptation outcomes to form the basis
11 of this assessment (SM4.2, Table SM4.5, (Berrang-Ford et al., 2021a; Mukherji et al., 2021)). Positive
12 outcomes denote benefits of adaptation, while negative outcomes may mean that adaptation wasn't effective
13 in bringing any benefits or that it was maladaptive (Schipper, 2020).
14
15 We assess outcomes across five indicators: a) economic and financial indicators, such as improvements in
16 crop yields and resulting incomes; increase in profits, higher savings, or lesser losses from hazards; b)
17 impacts on vulnerable people, e.g. on women, children; Indigenous Peoples; c) water-related impacts, e.g.
18 improved water use efficiency, water saving, reduction in water withdrawals and application; d) ecological
19 and environmental impacts such as lesser energy use, better soil structures, and better thermal comfort.; e)
20 institutional and socio-cultural impacts such as improved social capital and stronger communities of practice,
21 equity; and strengthening of local institutions or national policies. Of these 359 studies, 319 documented
22 beneficial outcomes across one or more indicators, while the remaining 40 presented no beneficial outcomes.
23 Illustrative examples are shown in Table 4.9, while the distribution of these responses with positive
24 outcomes are shown in Figure 4.27, and indicates that economic benefits of adaptation are more common in
25 developing countries, while benefits along ecological dimensions are more common in the developed
26 countries,
27
28
29 Table 4.9: Illustrative examples of adaptation responses and their benefits across different outcome indicators. All these
30 studies are either category 1 or category 2 studies in that the link between adaptation response and the outcome is either
31 causal or correlated with one another. These benefits notwithstanding, links of adaptation benefits to climate and
32 associated risk reduction are not always clear. Some of these adaptation responses can have beneficial outcomes in one
33 of the five parameters but can have maladaptive outcomes in others.
Hazard Adaptation Outcome Adaptation outcome Reference
responses category
Droughts, Improved crop Economic and Farming households that adapted (Khanal et al.,
floods, and cultivars, financial produced about 33% more rice than 2018a)
general agronomic outcomes households that did not adapt after
climate practices, controlling for all heterogeneity.
impacts in irrigation, soil
Nepal water
conservation
measures
Increased Farmer's training The capacity building and water-saving (Kakumanu et al.,
rainfall on agronomic increased crop yields by 960kg/ha, 930 2019)
variability in measures, e.g., kg/ha and 770 kg/kg through the
India alternate drying adoption of AWD, MSRI and DSR,
and wetting respectively. The three practices have
AWD, modified increased farmers' income and
system of rice decreased the cost of cultivation by up to
intensification US$169/ha.
MSRI and direct-
seeded rice DSR
Droughts and Adjusting sowing Household income and wheat yields (Rahut and Ali,
changes in time of wheat were higher for households who 2017)
the adjusted the sowing time to cope with
seasonality climate risks than those who did not,
of rainfall in after controlling for other factors.
Pakistan
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Droughts in Irrigation Adding one extra irrigation could (Wang et al.,
North China increase wheat yield by up to 12.8% in a 2019a)
Plains Soil and water severe drought year.
Soil conservation Millet grain yield in 2012-14 was (Traore et al.,
degradation; using contour statistically higher in contour ridge 2017)
extreme ridges and terrace plots than the control, with yield
rainfall improved millet differences ranging from 301kg/ha in
events high and sorghum 2012 to 622 kg/ha in 2013. Improved
run-off cultivars varieties produced on average 55% more
causing yield than the local ones.
erosion in On-farm
Mali agricultural water The net revenue from adopting a (Teklewold et al.,
Drought, management combination of agricultural water 2017)
floods, management and modern seeds or
hailstorm inorganic fertilizer is significantly (Elum et al., 2018)
and erratic higher by 7600 and 1500 Birr/ha
rainfall, respectively than adopting modern seeds (Ng'ang'a et al.,
Ethiopia or inorganic fertilizer alone. Birr is the 2016)
Ethiopian currency.
Droughts and Crop insurance Farmers who insured their farm (Wossen et al.,
general and irrigation business, and had access to irrigation, 2017)
climate had relatively higher net revenue than (Schembergue et
impacts, those who did not, but this link is not al., 2017)
South Africa causal. Instead, it shows causality could
go either way, including those farmers
Droughts and Migration who were better off getting their
floods in business insured.
Kenya Remittance income enables uptake of
costlier adaptation measures such as a
Droughts in Drought-tolerant change in livestock species, which also
have higher returns for households.
Nigeria varieties Therefore, the study was not causal in its
inference.
General Agro-forestry Per capita, food expenditure of those
climate systems as land who adopted drought-tolerant maize was
impacts, use in rural significantly lower than those who did
including municipalities not after controlling for everything else
rainfall and causal inference.
variability in Water, sanitation The land value in the municipalities with
Brazil and health WaSH agro-forestry was higher than that of the
Water program municipalities where the agro-forestry
quality scheme was not implemented.
deterioration Adoption of
due to floods drought-tolerant Outcomes for Children: Prevalence of childhood (Dey et al., 2019)
in maize varieties by vulnerable diarrhoea reduced by 35% in midline
Bangladesh smallholder people prevalence 8.9% and by 73% in end line
Droughts in farmers prevalence 3.6% compared to baseline
Zimbabwe prevalence 13.7%. Inferences are causal.
General Crop Smallholder farmers: Smallholder (Makate et al.,
climate diversification farmers practising conservation 2019)
impacts, agriculture CA were as likely to adopt
including drought-tolerant maize varieties as other (Asfaw et al.,
farmers and thus benefit from increased 2018)
yields and incomes.
Poor households: Crop diversification
mainly benefits the most vulnerable
households; the impact on the poorest
group ranges from double to triple the
impact on the wealthiest group.
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droughts in Conservation Female farmers: Yield and income (Makate et al.,
Niger agriculture; effects on the adoption of conservation 2019)
Droughts and drought-tolerant agriculture and improved varieties of
general maize and maize and legumes were both positive (Gao and Mills,
climate improved legume for men and women 2018)
impacts in varieties
Malawi and Government Poor households: PSNP transfers reduce (Ryan and Elsner,
Zimbabwe safety net program chronic poverty level from 15.7% to 2016)
Historically called Productive 10.6% and increase the never poor share (Kirby et al.,
widespread Safety Net from 11.5% to 15.8%. 2014)
and severe Program PSNP (Andrew and
droughts in Water-related Sand dams increase groundwater storage Sauquet, 2017)
Ethiopia in Water harvesting outcomes
1999, 2002, structures, e.g., in riverbanks by up to 40%, which is (Hochman et al.,
2003, 2005 sand dams Ecological 2017b)
and 2008. Water trading and maintained throughout the year (Barua et al.,
Droughts in environmental 2017)
Kenya Agreement signed outcomes Irrigation application rates fell in the
between water and (Schembergue et
Millennium electricity utilities Institutional dairy industry from 4.2 million litres/ha al., 2017)
drought in and farmers and socio-
Australia cultural in 2000�2001 to 3.5 million litres/ha in (Kosmowski,
The reducing area outcomes 2018)
Droughts, under irrigated 2005�2006
floods, and rice crop (Imran et al.,
soil erosion Planting of vetiver Agreement between water and 2019)
and sediment grass for
load in a stabilizing coastal electricity utilities to compensate (Villamayor-
river basin in embankments Tomas and
France farmers for reducing water use resulted Garc韆-L髉ez,
Drought in Agro-forestry 2017)
India systems as land in a decrease in water demand from 310
use in rural
Floods due to municipalities 3 3
cyclonic Mm in 1997 to 220 Mm in 2012 in the
storms and Contour ridge
tidal terraces as soil Durance Valley irrigation system in
inundation in water
Bangladesh conservation France
General measure
climate Climate-smart Reduced rice irrigation resulted in over
impacts, agricultural
including practices 60 mm/ha of water savings compared to
rainfall
variability in Strengthening of irrigated rice crops on that land.
Brazil local water users'
Drought in associations Households who planted vetiver grass
2015 in through external
Ethiopia assistance around their homestead and nearby road
programs
Drought and managed to save their houses and assets
rainfall
variability in from the recent cyclonic storm and tidal
Pakistan
inundation
Droughts,
Mexico Trees planted as a part of the agro-
forestry program provide thermal
comfort to both animals and humans
Contour ridge terraces primarily
controlled water run-off and soil erosion
and acted as a buffer during the 2015
Ethiopian drought
Farmers who adopted climate-smart
practices also tended to form a better
relationship with local extension agents
and reached out to them more
frequently. Again, however, causality
might as well lie the other way round.
Local water user's associations were
able to reduce water abstractions during
years of severe droughts.
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Rainfall Community-based More robust social networks where (Vardakoulias and
women were able to take important Nicholles, 2015)
variability in adaptation and decisions.
Niger through
adaptation
learning programs
1
2
3
4 Figure 4.27: Top panel: location of case studies of water-related adaptation responses (996 data points from 319
5 studies). In these 996 data points, at least one positive outcome was recorded in one of the five outcome indicators.
6 These outcome indicators are economic/financial, outcomes for vulnerable people, ecological/environmental, water-
7 related, and socio-cultural and institutional. Middle panel: the top six documented adaptation options per region as a
8 fraction of the total of reported studies, with grey bars containing the share of all other adaptation responses. In most
9 th
instances, the top six adaptation categories include nearly 3/4 of the studies. Bottom panel: The spider diagrams show
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1 the number of studies reporting beneficial outcomes for one or more dimensions for the top six adaptation
2 options identified in each region. Due to a small number of studies in small island states, a spider diagram was not
3 generated for the Small Island States.
4
5
6 Co-benefits are defined as mitigation benefits resulting from an adaptation response (Deng et al., 2017).
7 Around a quarter of papers that documented positive adaptation outcomes also reported mitigation co-
8 benefits. Agro-forestry, community forests and forest-based adaptations are the most oft-cited examples of
9 mitigation co-benefits ((Bhatta et al., 2015; Etongo et al., 2015; Weston et al., 2015; Pandey et al., 2017;
10 Sain et al., 2017; S醤chez and Izzo, 2017; Wood et al., 2017; Adhikari et al., 2018a; Hellin et al., 2018;
11 Aniah et al., 2019; Quandt et al., 2019), also see Box 5.11). Other examples include mitigation benefits of
12 climate-smart agricultural practices that reduce input intensity and helps in carbon sequestration (Arslan et
13 al., 2015; Somanje et al., 2017); retrofitting buildings in urban areas with energy-efficient devices for
14 lowering electricity bills and emissions (Fitzgerald and Lenhart, 2016) and re-use of treated wastewater for
15 irrigation and urban uses (Morote et al., 2019) (Box 4.5, 4.7.6,).
16
17 Not all adaptation responses reduce risks, and some may have long term maladaptive outcomes, even if they
18 are beneficial in the short term. Maladaptation often stems from poor planning and implementation of
19 adaptation responses and because of not addressing the root causes of vulnerability (Schipper, 2020; Eriksen
20 et al., 2021). Of the 319 case studies where adaptation response was found to have some beneficial
21 outcomes, around 1/3rd of them also mentioned the possibility of maladaptation. Migration can often have
22 maladaptive outcomes because migration can exacerbate the inherent vulnerabilities of migrants (4.6.8). For
23 example, slum dwellers in cities may earn higher incomes, but their quality of life worsens (Ayeb-Karlsson
24 et al., 2016). In some instances, even wage rates in migration hotspots can remain low due to the high
25 volume of the migrant population (Fenton et al., 2017b); as such, it does not help buffer consumption against
26 rainfall shocks (Gao and Mills, 2018). Migration also has gendered impacts, with girls from migrating
27 families being taken out of school (Gioli et al., 2014) or interrupting children's education overall (Warner
28 and Afifi, 2014). In planned relocation from vulnerable urban slums, relocation sites can be far from job sites
29 and increase social conflicts (Tauhid and Zawani, 2018).
30
31 Adaptation responses that focus on improving incomes through production intensification can have
32 maladaptive outcomes. An oft-cited example of this is groundwater over-use as a result of irrigation
33 intensification. There is widespread evidence of groundwater over-use in many countries in Africa
34 (Mapfumo et al., 2017) and in the Middle East and North Africa (Petit et al., 2017; Daly-Hassen et al.,
35 2019); in Asia (Burchfield and Gilligan, 2016; Zhang et al., 2016b; Kattumuri et al., 2017), in Spain (Petit et
36 al., 2017) and Australia (Kirby et al., 2014) (4.2.6, 4.6.2, Box 4.3). Intensification based approaches also
37 increase costs of cultivation (Mussetta et al., 2016; Wang and Chen, 2018; Quan et al., 2019), can lead to
38 more use of fertilizers and herbicides (Thierfelder et al., 2015; Sujakhu et al., 2016; Khanal et al., 2018a;
39 Yamba et al., 2019). Diversification away from food crops can also compromise domestic food security
40 (Kloos and Renaud, 2014; Br黶sow et al., 2017).
41
42 Even interventions that have positive carbon co-benefits like forestry and agro-forestry can have maladaptive
43 consequences on land and water resources, especially if inappropriate species (Etongo et al., 2015) with
44 higher water demands are grown (Krishnamurthy et al., 2019) (4.7.6).
45
46 In summary, current adaptation responses have benefits across several dimensions. In developing countries,
47 most adaptation measures improve economic outcomes (high confidence). Adaptation responses also have
48 benefits in terms of water outcomes and environmental and ecological parameters, and these benefits are
49 more commonly manifested in developed countries (high confidence). Of the papers assessed for water-
50 related adaptation, roughly 1/4th reported adaptation co-benefits (high confidence). In contrast, 1/3rd of
51 studies reported maladaptive outcomes, now or in the future (high confidence), underscoring the importance
52 of looking at synergies and trade-offs. Despite many adaptation case studies, there is a knowledge gap in
53 understanding if the benefits of adaptation also translate into a reduction of climate impacts, and if so, to
54 what extent, and under conditions (high confidence). In view of this critical knowledge gap, our assessment
55 is limited to benefits of current adaptation responses.
56
57 4.7.2 Projections of Future Effectiveness of Adaptation Responses
58
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1 Several adaptation options have been shown to have beneficial effects on societally relevant outcomes under
2 current climate conditions (4.7.1.2) and will remain critical to adapt to future climate change. However, there
3 is limited quantitative information on the future viability of available responses to reduce projected climate
4 impacts effectively. However, the context-specific nature of adaptation on the ground and the uncertainties
5 associated with future climate outcomes, both in terms of policy decisions around mitigation and model-
6 inherent uncertainties, make long-term projections of adaptation effectiveness of limited use for decision-
7 making on the ground. However, such projections are still needed to understand the efficacy of current
8 technical and managerial solutions to reduce climate risk. Consequently, an increasing body of literature
9 focuses on the effectiveness of specific interventions to reduce projected climate risks in a local to regional
10 setting.
11
12 This section provides a quantitative aggregate assessment of effectiveness of projected water-related climate
13 adaptations at different levels of GWLs (SM4.2). Effectiveness is defined as the potential of a given
14 adaptation measure to address projected changes in climate and return the system under analysis to baseline
15 conditions. If the measure cannot fully compensate for the projected climate risk, residual risks remain,
16 defined as the fraction of risk remaining after adaptation. For example, in many regions, projected
17 temperature-driven yield loss can be reduced by shifting to or increasing irrigation. However, yields often do
18 not always fully return to baseline conditions without climate change, leaving residual risk after adaptation.
19 Assessed option are limited to technical solutions, which have quantitative entry-points to global climate
20 impact models.
21
22 Most adaptation projections focus on water-related interventions in the agricultural sector, including
23 irrigation-related responses, shifting planting dates, changing crops and cultivars, and water and soil
24 conservation. Sectoral projections of adaptation effectiveness are limited in forestry and agro-forestry related
25 responses, flood protection measures (excluding here options that are solely related to effects of sea-level
26 rise), urban water-related adaptation as well as energy-related responses. The majority of assessed studies
27 focus on comparing different variations of one or several response options in terms of timing or duration, for
28 example, a shift in planting dates of 10 days and 20 days, relative to present-day practice and provide results
29 for a range of scenarios and (or) timeframes.
30
31 A total of 45 studies were identified for this assessment, based on their quantitative assessment of the effects
32 of adaptation on projected impacts (SM4.2 for the method of future projected effectiveness assessment).
33 From each study, the distinct combinations of specific variations of adaptations, scenarios and timeframes
34 assessed were considered as individual data points, providing a total of 450 unique data points for the
35 assessment (Table SM4.6). The study-specific temperature increase was classified relative to the 1850-1900
36 baseline for each data point, based on the model and scenario specifications provided and grouped into
37 outcomes at 1.5癈, 2癈, 3癈 and 4癈. The effectiveness is assessed based on the fraction of risk that an
38 option can reduce. Co-benefits are defined as a situation where outcomes improve relative to baseline
39 conditions, whereas maladaptive outcomes describe a situation where risks increase after adaptation has been
40 implemented.
41
42 Several studies assess the future effectiveness of improved cultivars and agronomic practices, such as
43 changing fertilizer application or switching to drought-resistant crops (5 studies; 85 data points). Results
44 show a range of effectiveness levels across regions and warming levels and vary depending on the tested
45 response options (Qin et al., 2018) (Figure 4.29), with moderate to small effectiveness, large residual impacts
46 or potential maladaptive outcomes as well as decreasing effectiveness with increasing warming (Figure 4.28)
47 (high confidence). For studies testing results across a range of scenarios, approaches show increasingly
48 mixed (Qin et al., 2018) and limited effects (Amouzou et al., 2019) with higher warming, with overall
49 reductions across warming levels for most tested responses (Qin et al., 2018).
50
51 Changes in cropping patterns and crop systems (Figure 4.28) (5 studies; 31 data points) indicate limited
52 potential to reduce projected climate risks, with the majority of studies providing results of up to 1.5癈 of
53 warming and limited evidence for higher warming levels. At 1.5癈, effectiveness in Africa is mostly
54 insufficient, with substantial maladaptive potential (Brouziyne et al., 2018). Over Asia, effectiveness is
55 mostly small at 1.5癈 with substantial residual impacts, further reducing to insufficient effectiveness at large
56 residual risks at 4癈 (Figure 4.28 Projected effectiveness) (robust evidence; medium agreement)
57 (Boonwichai et al., 2019; Dai et al., 2020; Mehrazar et al., 2020). Amongst the options related to changes in
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1 cropping patterns and crop systems, shifting planting dates is projected to retain moderate to high residual
2 risks under some specifications in Iran (Paymard et al., 2018) and Morocco (Brouziyne et al., 2018), while
3 high effectiveness is reported for similar specifications in Thailand (Boonwichai et al., 2019), Australia (Luo
4 et al., 2016), Morocco ((Brouziyne et al., 2018) and Iran (Mehrazar et al., 2020). Of the assessed adaptation
5 options, changes in cropping patterns and cropping systems appear least effective in reducing climate risk,
6 with decreasing effectiveness at higher levels of warming.
7
8 Studies assessing the future effectiveness of irrigation related responses (Figure 4.28) focus on a range of
9 specific approaches, including increasing irrigation efficiency, deficit irrigation, irrigated area expansion or
10 shifting from rain-fed to irrigated agriculture, as well as specific types of irrigation (21 studies; 103 data
11 points). As a frequently implemented option with direct entry points to agricultural models, this option
12 provides the most robust set of data points across regions and warming levels. For all regions, a reduction in
13 effectiveness is apparent from 1.5癈 to higher levels of warming, leading to increased residual risk with
14 increasing warming (high confidence). Irrigation can increase yield relative to present-day, showing co-
15 benefits for some regions, though the share of co-benefits decreases with higher warming (high confidence)
16 (Figure 4.28). However, since many of these studies rely on global agricultural models and these do not fully
17 represent the actual availability of water, further expansion of irrigation at the scale assumed in those studies
18 may not be realistic (4.3.1.2. 4.3.1.3) (Elliott et al., 2014).
19
20 A wide range of water and soil management-related options (Figure 4.28), including mulching, no tilling, or
21 contour farming, has been assessed for future effectiveness (8 studies; 49 data points). Results underline the
22 context-specific nature and need to carefully adjust the specific options to a regional setting, with variations
23 of options leading to effective outcomes or residual impacts within individual studies (Qiu et al., 2019) and
24 across regions and warming levels.
25
26 Similar to observed adaptation, studies assessing combinations of the agricultural adaptation options outlined
27 above (11 studies; 36 data points) show the highest effectiveness across agricultural adaptation outcomes and
28 generally project moderate to high effectiveness with the potential for co-benefits (Figure 4.28). Though
29 maladaptive outcomes are also documented, residual risks are limited, also at higher levels of warming.
30 Therefore, developing integrated plans of synergistic options linked to adequate monitoring and evaluation
31 approaches and designed to adjust to changing conditions continuously is desirable to minimize climate risk
32 and ensure food security (Babaeian et al., 2021).
33
34 Globally, agro-forestry related adaptation (4 studies; 18 data points) is moderate to highly effective, with the
35 potential for substantial co-benefits at 1.5� and 2癈 of warming, with a sharp decline in effectiveness at 3癈
36 and 4癈 and a substantial increase in residual risk and maladaptive outcomes (Figure 4.28).
37
38 Flood risk related adaptation (4 studies; 47 data points) is associated with the potential for substantial co-
39 benefits relative to present-day flood risk, indicating a current adaptation gap larger than for other impact
40 areas. These co-benefits decline with increasing warming. Limits to the tested options become increasingly
41 apparent at 3癈 and 4癈 of warming, where residual risks increase for most assessed cases (Figure 4.28).
42
43 Adaptation projections for urban water risks as well as the energy sector are limited to one study each, with
44 one data point for urban adaptation (Rosenberger et al., 2021) and 80 data points for different variations of
45 adaptation outcomes across regions and scenarios for the energy sector (van Vliet et al., 2016c). Sustainable
46 stormwater management, focusing on a combination of nature-based solutions, is shown to be highly
47 effective and yields co-benefits at 3癈. However, these results were gained in a specific case study setting in
48 a European city with limited generalizability (Figure 4.28).
49
50 The assessment of adaptation in the hydropower and thermo-electric power-generation sector indicates high
51 effectiveness and co-benefits across all regions for 1.5癈, with decreasing effectiveness and increasing
52 residual risks for 2癈 and 3癈 of warming and highest reductions in effectiveness for Central and South
53 America (Figure 4.28).
54
55
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1
2 Figure 4.28: Projected effectiveness of adaptation options in returning the system to a study-specific baseline state
3 relative to the projected climate impact; and level of residual risk retained after adaptation, relative to baseline
4 conditions. Regional summaries are based on IPCC regions. Warming levels refer to the global mean temperature
5 (GMT) increase relative to a 1850-1900 baseline. For each data point, the study-specific GMT increase was calculated
6 to show effectiveness at 1.5癈, 2癈, 3癈 and 4癈. Based on the ability of an implemented option to return the system to
7 its baseline state, the effectiveness is classified based on the share of risk the option can reduce: Large (>80%);
8 Moderate (80-50%); Small (<50-30%); Insufficient (<30%). Where the system state is improved relative to baseline,
9 Co-benefits are identified. Residual impacts show the share of remaining impacts after adaptation has been
10 implemented: Negligible (<5%); Small (5 to <20%); Moderate (20 to <50); Large (50% and more). Where risks
11 increase after adaptation, data points are shown as maladaptation. All underlying data is provided in Table SM4.6.
12
13
14 Quantitative projections of future adaptation depend on available impact models to analyze the effect of
15 specific adaptation interventions. However, since not all possible future adaptation responses can be
16 incorporated in climate impact models, this is a major limitation to assessing the full scope of options
17 available in the future. For example, many frequently implemented measures showing effective outcomes,
18 such as behavioral and capacity building focused responses or migration and off-farm diversification
19 (4.7.1.2), are not incorporated in quantitative water-related climate impact projection models. In addition,
20 projections of future adaptation depend on currently available technologies or approaches, but new methods
21 and technologies will probably emerge. Thus, improving the representation of adaptation in future
22 projections is a significant knowledge gap that remains to be addressed.
23
24 Whether specific adaptation responses are shown to be effective and even lead to co-benefits or are
25 associated with residual impacts is highly contextual, location and crop-specific. In addition, the specific
26 climate-impact-scenario combinations play an important role in determining assessed outcomes.
27
28 In practice, responding to increasing climate risk will need to be context-specific and sufficiently agile to
29 respond to ever-changing realities on the ground. The adaptive pathways approach underline that a sequence
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1 of different options responding to climate change over time may be most effective (Babaeian et al., 2021). In
2 addition, impact models generally underestimate or underrepresent climate extremes (Schewe et al., 2019),
3 limiting the ability of the present analysis to reflect adaptation requirements to extremes, which are likely to
4 push systems to their limits (4.7.4). While currently known structural adaptation responses can reduce some
5 of the projected risks across sectors and regions, residual impacts remain at all levels of warming, and
6 effectiveness decreases at higher levels of warming. Adaptation generally performs more effectively at
7 1.5癈, though residual damages are projected at this warming level across sectors and regions (high
8 confidence). A range of options also shows the potential for further increasing negative effects
9 (maladaptation) across sectors, regions, and warming levels, further underlining the need for contextualized
10 approaches.
11
12 4.7.3 Comparing Current and Future Water-related Adaptation Responses
13
14 Water-related adaptation is being observed across sectors and regions (4.6), and beneficial outcomes are
15 documented across different dimensions (4.7.1). A limited set of frequently documented adaptation
16 responses is also represented in quantitative projections of adaptation effectiveness (4.7.2, Figure 4.29).
17 However, due to the largely different assessment methodologies for measuring beneficial outcomes for
18 current adaptations and effectiveness to reduce impacts for future adaptations, comparing current and future
19 adaptation outcomes is not straightforward. For current adaptation responses, beneficial outcomes may or
20 may not translate to climate risk reduction, making risk reduction potential of observed adaptation a
21 significant gap in our current understanding. The large diversity of outcomes across regions and assessed
22 options becomes apparent for future adaptation options, with the group of `inconclusive' outcomes indicating
23 a large spread of results across regions. This underlines the contextual nature of adaptation and boundary
24 conditions for implementation that can determine the success of adaptation outcomes, now or in the future.
25
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2 Figure 4.29: Panel on the left side shows observed benefits of adaptation. Observed outcomes are reported across five
3 dimensions of benefits, co-benefits as well as maladaptation outcomes. Benefits are measured across five dimensions.
4 Strength of evidence is high if >80% of adaptation responses in that category has at least one beneficial outcome;
5 medium if between 50-80% of adaptation responses in that category has at least one beneficial outcome, and low if
6 <50% of adaptation responses have at least one beneficial outcome. Confidence in evidence relates to the way the
7 article links outcomes of adaptation with the adaptation response. Category 1: studies causally link adaptation outcomes
8 to the adaptation response by constructing credible counterfactuals; Category 2: studies correlate responses and
9 outcomes without causal attribution; Category 3: studies describe adaptation outcomes without making any causal or
10 correlation claims between adaptation outcomes and adaptation responses. High confidence: more than 67% of the
11 studies fall in categories 1 and 2; medium confidence: 50-67% of the studies are in categories 1 and 2, and low
12 confidence is less than 50% of studies are in categories 1 and 2. The panel on the right-hand side shows the
13 effectiveness of future adaptations. Future outcomes are assessed in terms of their effectiveness to reduce climate
14 impacts at 1.5癈, 2癈, 3癈 and 4癈 of global temperature increase relative to 1850-1900. Effectiveness is defined as the
15 fraction of adaptation that the option is able to reduce; residual risks is the fraction of risk remaining after adaptation.
16 If>66% of assessed data points agree on the effectiveness class, a response-temperature combination is shown as
17 belonging to that class. Where results diverge, the result is inconclusive, with studies showing high and low
18 effectiveness across regions and studies. Confidence is based on the number of data points available for each response-
19 temperature combination with high confidence: 5 or more data points; medium confidence: 2-4 datapoints; low
20 confidence: 1 datapoint. Also, see Figure 4.28 for further explanations and Tables SM4.5 and SM4.6 provide underlying
21 data.
22
23
24 Documented implemented adaptations show several beneficial outcomes, with most studies (319 of 356)
25 documenting positive rather than negative outcomes. However, there may be a positive reporting bias in the
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1 literature, as positive outcomes are more likely to be reported than negative ones. Also, positive outcome in
2 one parameter does not preclude negative outcomes in others, so maladaptation is still possible even when an
3 adaption has some positive benefits (4.7.1.2). In addition, much of the adaptation happening on the ground
4 may not be published in peer-reviewed publications and, therefore, not covered by the literature assessed in
5 this report. Further, there is limited knowledge about the effectiveness of current adaptation in reducing
6 climate-related risks due to documentation and methodological challenges elaborated in 4.7.1.2 (SM4.2).
7
8 In contrast, evaluating the effectiveness for future projected adaptations is methodologically possible (4.7.2,
9 and SM4.2), but every adaptation that is happening now cannot be modelled for the future. Therefore,
10 projections of future adaptation effectiveness are limited to those options that can be incorporated into
11 (global) quantitative climate impact models. Unfortunately, an extensive range of options, such as capacity
12 building or training, migration and employment, which are essential building blocks in the portfolio of
13 available (water-related) adaptation options, are currently not quantitatively represented in adaptation
14 projections. In addition, the future will probably bring further development in technical solutions, which are
15 currently also not modelled. While implementing the modelled technical options may be feasible in general,
16 several barriers and constraints (4.7.4) and enabling conditions, which influence adaptation action in
17 practice, are not included in current modelling studies. Therefore, the modelling studies may present
18 optimistic assessments of adaptation effectiveness for the future.
19
20 Adaptations that are beneficial now (e.g., crop and water-related ones) are also projected to be effective to
21 varying extents in reducing future risks, with the degree of effectiveness strongly depending on future
22 GWLs. For example, beyond a certain level of warming (2癈 and upwards), the effectiveness of most
23 options is projected to reduce, and residual impacts are projected to increase. Reduction in the effectiveness
24 of future adaptation at higher global warming levels underscores the need for limiting warming to 1.5癈, as
25 space for adaptation solution starts to shrink beyond that for most options for which future projections exists
26 (high confidence).
27
28 To sum up, there are two significant knowledge gaps in our understanding of water-related adaptations. First,
29 the nature of literature on current adaptation makes it challenging to infer their effectiveness in reducing
30 climate risks, even though the benefits of adaptation are clear (high confidence). Second, not all adaptation
31 responses that are possible in the future can be modelled because of inherent limitations to what can be
32 modelled. Thus, advancement in tools and metrics for measuring the effectiveness of current adaptation in
33 reducing climate risks and suitable downscaled climate and impact models that incorporate economic, social,
34 cultural and management aspects for an extensive range of future adaptation options is needed.
35
36 4.7.4 Limits to Adaptation and Loss and Damage
37
38 The core constraints identified in AR5 (Klein et al., 2014) for freshwater-related adaptation were lack of
39 governance, financial resources and information, while water availability was singled out as a core constraint
40 to diversifying options for water-dependent sectors. SR1.5 showed that increasing aridity and decreased
41 freshwater availability, including limited groundwater supply in fossil aquifers in conjunction with rising sea
42 levels may pose hard limits to adaptation for Small Islands (Roy et al., 2018). SR1.5 also shows that water-
43 related risks can be reduced substantially by limiting warming to 1.5癈 (high confidence) (Hoegh-Guldberg
44 et al., 2018), thereby also reducing the potential to reach hard limits to adaptation. SROCC highlighted that
45 several barriers and limits to adapt to reduced water availability in mountain areas, such as lack of finance
46 and technical knowledge (Hock et al., 2019b). The SRCCL further highlighted the critical importance of
47 water-related climate change adaptation, and potential limits to adaptation in the land sector, when extreme
48 forms of desertification lead to a complete loss of land productivity (high confidence) (Mirzabaev et al.,
49 2019).
50
51 Institutional constraints, including path-dependency and lengthy decision-making processes, remain major
52 limitations to successful adaptation globally (high confidence) (Barnett et al., 2015; Oberlack, 2017), as well
53 as for the water sector (Kingsborough et al., 2016; Oberlack, 2017; Azhoni and Goyal, 2018). For example, a
54 lack of institutional support has limited the ability of farmers to implement adaptation, even if information
55 about the benefits is acknowledged (Nambi et al., 2015). A lack of inter-sectoral coordination and
56 communication within institutions and conflicting interests between water sectors limit the potential for
57 integrated policies. For all water related adaptation options, which have shown to be effective in one or more
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1 dimensions (4.7.1.2), governance and institutional constraints were identified to be the most commonly
2 encountered to a moderate or significant extent (Figure 4.30). Water-energy-food-nexus approaches can help
3 overcome these inter-sectoral barriers (Box 4.8) (Rasul and Sharma, 2016; Ernst and Preston, 2017). In
4 addition, trade-offs between different policy goals must be considered to ensure the broader significance of
5 the implemented adaptation strategies, such as water quality implication of adaptation efforts in the
6 agricultural or energy sectors (4.7.6) (Fezzi et al., 2015).
7
8 The lack of financial and technological resources constrains adaptation implementation (Castells-Quintana et
9 al., 2018; Iglesias et al., 2018) and were identified as significant or moderate across all water-related
10 adaptation responses, with significant constraints especially present in options related to the agricultural
11 sector (Figure 4.30). For example, financial resources were significant constraints to implementing Climate
12 Smart Agriculture in Guatemala, a relevant adaptation strategy to improve food security, resilience, and low
13 emission development (Sain et al., 2017).
14
15 While financial barriers played an important role in adopting new technologies at the farm level in Spain,
16 acceptance, common understanding and awareness were amongst the most frequently identified barriers
17 across different adaptation options (Esteve et al., 2018). Limitations in knowledge and understanding of
18 complex processes, feedback effects and interconnections in the water sector pose challenges to effective
19 adaptation and adaptation decision-making (Kundzewicz et al., 2018). Such constraints are identified as
20 moderate across the range of options assessed in this chapter (Figure 4.30). For tropical and mountainous
21 regions and the African continent, in particular, significant uncertainties in available data and a lack of
22 reliable climate projections remain one of the biggest obstacles in long-term adaptation planning (Antwi-
23 Agyei et al., 2015), especially in the water sector (Watson et al., 2017; Azhoni and Goyal, 2018; Hirpa et al.,
24 2018; Gonz醠ez-Zeas et al., 2019). There is also often a discrepancy between the level of awareness among
25 different stakeholders, for example, between affected farmers whose agency is limited by the lack of
26 knowledge by local authorities (Chu, 2017).
27
28 For some regions of the world, such as Small Islands (Karnauskas et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2018) (Box
29 4.2) and the Mediterranean (Cross-Chapter Paper 4) (Schleussner et al., 2016), aridity increases have the
30 potential to pose hard adaptation limits. In mountain and polar regions, changes in the cryosphere (4.2.2,
31 4.4.2) may limit water availability for irrigation systems that depend on melt-water (4.5.1) (Qin et al., 2020).
32 Biophysical limits may also be reached through impacts of hydrological extremes, such as crop loss as a
33 consequence of extreme precipitation events (Huggel et al., 2019; van der Geest et al., 2019). Such limits are
34 reported to a limited to moderate extent across all adaptation options assessed (Figure 4.30). However,
35 knowledge gaps remain about physical and biological constraints to adaptation in the water sector. Climate
36 impacts, such as droughts in East Africa or glacier melt in the cryosphere, indicate that biophysical limits to
37 adaptation may exist, even under current climate conditions (Figure 4.31) (Warner and van der Geest, 2013;
38 Huggel et al., 2019; van der Geest et al., 2019). A lack of investment in relevant infrastructure, such as dikes
39 for example, as well as maladaptive effects of certain measures could increase existing risks and exacerbate
40 impacts (van der Geest et al., 2019).
41
42
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1
2 Figure 4.30: Adaptation constraints manifest across a range of dimensions and here are assessed based on a meta-
3 review of water-related adaptation (4.7.1, SM4.2, and Table SM4.5). Where less than five articles are available for
4 assessment, data is insufficient to assess the extent to which a constraint is present. Where less than 20% of the articles
5 reporting on the respective adaptation option identify the presence of a constraint, it is classified as `limited', where 20
6 to 50% report on a specific constraint it is considered as `moderate'. Where more than 50% of articles report on the
7 presence, the constraint is considered `significant'. This assessment is based on the available peer-reviewed literature
8 assessing adaptation benefits in the water sector - in practice, these or other constraints may still be significant, but have
9 not have been identified in peer-review sources.
10
11
12 Integrated approaches, such as linking land-use and water policies (Mehdi et al., 2015), inter-institutional
13 networks (Azhoni et al., 2017), nexus approaches (Box 4.8) (Conway et al., 2015) as well as consideration of
14 linkages to the SDGs (4.8) (Gunathilaka et al., 2018) are crucial to overcoming constraints in water
15 adaptation. In addition, monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of adaptation measures, policies and
16 actions can contribute to knowledge, awareness and data to support adaptation implementation in the future
17 (4.7.1; 4.8) (Klostermann et al., 2018). Although the information on climate change adaptation that has
18 beneficial impacts, including enabling conditions and success factors specific to the water sector, is
19 emerging, significant knowledge gaps remain (4.7.1.2) (Gotgelf et al., 2020). Further understanding the
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1 constraints and limits that exist with regard to adaptation in the water sector is becoming urgent in light of
2 increasing slow (e.g., droughts) and rapid (e.g., floods) onset impacts associated with climate change.
3
4 Taking action towards adaptation critically determines the outcomes and impacts of climate change
5 processes across space and time. Where efforts to reduce risk do not effectively occur, losses and damages
6 occur as a consequence of climate change, some of which can have irreversible and existential effects (van
7 der Geest and Warner, 2015; Page and Heyward, 2016; Thomas and Benjamin, 2018a; Mechler et al., 2019).
8 Water-related impacts that occurred despite implemented adaptation have been documented across all world
9 regions (high confidence) (Figure 4.31).
10
11
12
13 Figure 4.31: Examples of regional studies where experienced negative impacts despite or beyond implemented
14 adaptation have been documented. Panels indicate the climate hazard that leads to the need for adaptation, the
15 adaptation option implemented and the recorded impacts per region (A � Arctic (Landauer and Juhola, 2019), B �
16 Africa (van der Geest et al., 2019), C � Caribbean (Lashley and Warner, 2015), D � South Asia (Kusters and Wangdi,
17 2013; van der Geest and Schindler, 2016; Bhowmik et al., 2021), E � Southeast Asia (Acosta et al., 2016; Beckman and
18 Nguyen, 2016), F - Pacific the Small Island States (Gawith et al., 2016; Handmer and Nalau, 2019), G � Global effect:
19 Mountain Cryosphere (Huggel et al., 2019)). Presented examples are limited to the available peer-reviewed literature
20 that focuses explicitly on impacts that have been documented despite documented evidence that adaptation in relation to
21 water hazards had previously been implemented. Section 4.3 provides a full assessment of observed impacts across
22 sectors and regions.
23
24
25 Advances in climate change attribution (4.2; SM4.3; Figure 4.20) show the direct effects of anthropogenic
26 climate change, also with regard to climate extremes. These advances also provide the basis for climate
27 litigation (Marjanac and Patton, 2018) to hold countries/companies accountable for climate change impacts,
28 for example, concerning risks of glacial lake outburst in Peru (Frank et al., 2019).
29
30 A further increase in the frequency and/or intensity of water-related extremes (4.4) will also increase
31 consequent risks and associated losses and damages (4.5), primarily for exposed and vulnerable communities
32 globally (Bouwer, 2019). After assessing the future potential of currently available technologies to reduce
33 projected water-related climate impacts, there is evidence that residual impacts will remain after adaptation
34 for most adaptation options and levels of warming, with increasing residual risks at higher warming levels
35 (4.7.2). Financial, technical and legal support will be needed when hard limits are transgressed and loss and
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1 damage occurs (Mechler et al., 2020). Knowledge gaps remain regarding quantified information on limits
2 and constraints to adaptation in the water sector.
3
4 In summary, institutional constraints (governance, institutions, policy), including path dependency and
5 financial and information constraints, are the main challenge to adaptation implementation in the water
6 sector (high confidence). Water-related losses and damages that manifest despite or beyond implemented
7 adaptation have been observed across world regions, primarily for exposed and vulnerable communities
8 (high confidence). Hard limits to adaptation due to limited water resources will emerge for Small Islands
9 (medium evidence, high agreement) and regions dependent on glacier- and snowmelt (medium evidence, high
10 agreement).
11
12 4.7.5 Costs of Adaptation and Losses due to Non-Adaptation
13
14 Estimating adaptation costs for climate change impacts on the various water use sectors is vital for decision-
15 making, budgeting, and resource allocation (Chambwera et al., 2014). However, in AR5, studies on
16 adaptation costs for water were deemed to have `limited coverage' and mainly focused on `isolated case
17 studies'; costs in agriculture were `extremely limited' (Chambwera et al., 2014).
18
19 One estimate on observed losses due to climate change from the United Kingdom notes that almost 50% of
20 freshwater thermal capacity is lost on extreme high-temperature days, causing losses in the range of average
21 GBP 29-66 million/year (Byers et al., 2020). However, global estimates of current losses because of climate
22 change impacts on water resources remain few. Most of the evidence is focused on projected damages rather
23 than actual ones (World Bank, 2016; Rozenberg and Fay, 2019).
24
25 Without adaptation, water-related impacts of climate change are projected to reduce global GDP by 0.49% in
26 2050 under SSP3, with significant regional variations for the Middle East (14%); Sahel (11.7%); Central
27 Asia (10.7%), and East Asia (7%) (World Bank, 2016). In Asia, water-related impacts of climate change on
28 all sectors of the economy are projected to reduce GDP by 0.9% (in high-income Asia) to 2.7% (in low-
29 income Asia) by 2050 without adaptation or mitigation. Under the A1B scenario, real GDP is projected to
30 fall by 0.78% by 2030 in South Asia (Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014). In Sub-Saharan Africa, damages
31 from floods in 2100 are projected at 0.5% of GDP under a 2篊 temperature rise without adaptation; and will
32 be non-uniformly spread across countries (Markandya, 2017; Dottori et al., 2018). In Europe, annual
33 damages due to coastal flooding are projected at 93 billion by 2100 under RCP 8.5-SSP3 (Ciscar et al.,
34 2018). Global direct damages from fluvial floods are projected to rise to 1250 billion per year under a 3oC
35 global warming level and SSP5 socio-economic scenario (Dottori et al., 2018). A model-based study of
36 selected water-related sectors like fluvial and coastal flooding, agricultural productivity of major crops,
37 hydroelectric power generation, and thermal power generation provides much conservative estimates of GDP
38 loss (Takakura et al., 2019). The study shows that without adaptation, loss of global GDP could be 0.094%
39 under RCP8.5 and SSP5 and 0.013% under RCP2.6 and SSP1 scenarios in 2090 (2080-2099), with regional
40 values for Africa (0.017 to 0.286%), Asia (0.015 to 0.104%), Australasia (-0.012 to 0.003%), North America
41 (-0.002 to 0.005%) and South and Central America (0.011 to 0.055%) (Takakura et al., 2019). So, while
42 there is general agreement about negative impacts on GDP due to water-related risks in the future, the
43 magnitude of GDP loss estimates varies substantially and depends on various model assumptions (high
44 confidence). Updating costs while improving the modelling of uncertainties is essential for evidence-based
45 decision-making (Ginbo et al., 2020).
46
47 Costs of water-related infrastructure in adaptation have received attention at the global and regional level to
48 bridge the `adaptation gap' (Hallegatte et al., 2018; UNEP, 2018; Dellink et al., 2019; GCA, 2019). For
49 example, (Rozenberg and Fay, 2019) estimated that subsidizing capital costs to extend irrigation to its full
50 potential would cost 0.13% of the GDP per year of low-and middle-income countries between 2015 and
51 2030. The coastal and riverine protection cost was between 0.06% to 1% of these countries' GDP per year
52 over the same period. Projected economic damage due to coastal inundation was US$ 169�482 billion in
53 2100 under RCP8.5-SSP3 without adaptation, but US$ 43-203 billion cost to raise dike height will reduce
54 40% of the total damage (Tamura et al., 2019). Hard infrastructure for river floods, costing $4-9 billion per
55 year, can reduce damage by US $22-74 billion per year (Tanoue et al., 2021). Damages are estimated to be
56 up to six-time larger than the cost of implementing efficient adaptation measures (H2020., 2014). (GCA,
57 2019) reported that investing US$1.8 trillion globally, e.g., in early warning systems, climate-resilient
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1 infrastructure; dryland crop production; mangrove protection; and improving the resilience of water
2 resources between 2020 and 2030 could generate US$ 7.1 trillion in benefits.
3
4 Comparatively, less attention has been paid to low-regret options, especially at the national and local levels.
5 Conservation agriculture and integrated production systems, early-warning systems, restoration of wetlands,
6 and zoning are postulated to have lower investment and lock-in costs than engineering-based options
7 (Mechler, 2016; Cronin et al., 2018; Johnson et al., 2020). However, they require regular maintenance and
8 high technical and human capacity, which are likely to vary by scale, location, and context (Chandra et al.,
9 2018; Khanal et al., 2019; Mutenje et al., 2019; Rahman and Hickey, 2019). Global studies suggest
10 improvements in returns on adaptation investments by delivering better services and reducing water wastage
11 through appropriate water pricing and regulations (Damania et al., 2017; Bhave et al., 2018). For example,
12 under scenarios SSP1 and SSP3, water pricing and regulation are projected to reverse losses in expected
13 2050 global GDP of 0.49% to gains of 0.09%. GDP losses are projected to drastically reduce in the Middle
14 East, eliminated in the Sahel and Central Africa, and reversed into gains in Central Asia and East Africa,
15 with benefits concentrated in worst-affected regions (World Bank, 2016). More local and national studies are
16 needed to identify low regret options and their benefits and actual costs (Blackburn and Pelling, 2018;
17 Abedin et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2019; Momblanch et al., 2019; Page and Dilling, 2020) (limited evidence,
18 high agreement).
19
20 In summary, climate change impacts on water resources are projected to lower GDP in many low-and
21 middle-income countries without adequate adaptation measures (high confidence). However, estimating the
22 exact quantum of future GDP loss due to water-related impacts of climate change is fraught with several
23 methodological challenges. Adaptation measures that focus on reducing water-related impacts of climate
24 change will help stem losses further. Still, more work needs to be done on actual benefits and costs of
25 adaptation strategies and residual impacts and risks of delaying adaptation action (medium confidence). In
26 addition, better evidence on the costs and benefits of low-regret solutions, such as water pricing, increasing
27 water use efficiency through technology and service improvements, and enhanced support for autonomous
28 adaptation, is also needed for informed decision-making (high confidence).
29
30 4.7.6 Trade-offs and Synergies between Water-related Adaptation and Mitigation
31
32 In AR5, there was medium evidence and high agreement that some adaptation and mitigation measures can
33 lead to maladaptive outcomes, such as a rise in GHG emissions, while further exacerbating water scarcity
34 leading to increased vulnerability to climate change, now or in the future (Noble et al., 2014). In addition,
35 SR1.5 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018a) and SRCCL (IPCC, 2019b) reiterated the challenge of
36 trade-offs that may undermine sustainable development. Conversely, adaptation, when framed and
37 implemented appropriately, can synergistically reduce emissions and enhance sustainable development.
38
39 Different mitigation pathways can either increase or decrease water withdrawals or water consumption (or
40 both, or either) depending on the specific combination of mitigation technologies deployed (high confidence)
41 (Fricko et al., 2016; Jakob and Steckel, 2016; Mouratiadou et al., 2016; Fujimori et al., 2017; Parkinson et
42 al., 2019). For example, the impacts of climate change mitigation on future global water demand depend
43 largely on assumptions regarding socioeconomic and water policy conditions and range from reduction of
44 15,000 km3 to an increase of more than 160,000 km3 by the end of century (Mouratiadou et al., 2016). This
45 section assesses some of the mitigation and adaptation measures from a water trade-off and synergy lens.
46
47 Solar pumps for irrigation are increasingly introduced where conventional energy is not available (Senthil
48 Kumar et al., 2020) or supply is intermittent or expensive (Shah et al., 2018), e.g., in Africa (Schmitter et al.,
49 2018), Europe (Rubio-Aliaga et al., 2016) and South Asia (Sarkar and Ghosh, 2017). Solar pumps can
50 replace diesel and electric pumps (Rajan et al., 2020), potentially reduce 8-11% of India's carbon emissions
51 (~45.3�62.3 MMT of CO2) attributable to groundwater pumping while also boosting agricultural
52 productivity (Gupta, 2019). However, in the absence of incentives to deter groundwater over-exploitation
53 (Shah et al., 2018), solar pumps may exacerbate groundwater depletion (Closas and Rap, 2017; Gupta, 2019)
54 (low evidence, medium agreement).
55
56 In many places, treatment and reuse of wastewater from urban residential and industrial sources may be the
57 principal supply option under acute water scarcity (US EPA, 2017) and help reduce other freshwater
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1 withdrawals (Tram Vo et al., 2014; Diaz-Elsayed et al., 2019). While reuse may recover valuable nutrients,
2 capture energy as methane, and save water, effluent containing heavy metals may degrade land and surface
3 and groundwater quality and pose a salinization risk in semi-arid regions (medium evidence, high
4 agreement). Agricultural reuse of poor-quality wastewater will become increasingly necessary, but treatment
5 is energy-intensive and may contribute to further GHG emissions (Qadir et al., 2014; Salgot and Folch,
6 2018) (Box 4.5).
7
8 Desalination of seawater or brackish water is an adaptation measure in many coastal water-scarce regions
9 (Hanasaki et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2019). Solar desalination is developing rapidly, and it lessens the carbon
10 footprint of conventional, fossil-fuel-powered desalinization plants (Pouyfaucon and Garc韆-Rodr韌uez,
11 2018) (also see Box 4.5). However, the desalinization process is energy-intensive (Caldera et al., 2018); it
12 ejects brine that is difficult to manage inland, has high salinity and other contaminants (Wilder et al., 2016)
13 (medium evidence, high agreement) (Box 4.5).
14
15 Negative-emission technologies, such as direct air capture (DAC) of CO2, could reduce emissions up to
16 3GtCO2/year by 2035, equivalent to 7% of 2019 global emissions. However, they can increase net water
17 consumption by 35 km3/year in 2050 (Fuhrman et al., 2020) under the low-overshoot emissions scenario.
18 According to other estimates, capturing 10Gt of CO2 could translate to water losses between 10-100 km3,
19 depending on the technology deployed and climatic conditions (temperate vs. tropical) (Chapter 12, WGIII).
20 Some DAC technologies that include solid sorbents also produce water as a by-product, but not in quantities
21 that can offset total water losses (Beuttler et al., 2019; Fasihi et al., 2019)(medium confidence).
22
23 Developing countries are projected to witness the highest increase in future energy demand under 2癈 global
24 warming leading to significant increases in water use for energy production (Fricko et al., 2016) (4.5.2).
25 Results from a simulation study on retrofitting coal-fired power plants built after 2000 with carbon capture
26 and storage (CCS) technologies show an increase in global water consumption, currently at 9.66 km3/year,
27 by 31% to 50% (to 12.66 km3/year and 14.47 km3/year, respectively) depending on the cooling and CCS
28 technology deployed, and hence are best deployed in locations which are not water scarce (Rosa et al.,
29 2020c) (medium confidence). In Asia, the near-term mitigation scenario with high CCS deployment increases
30 the average regional water withdrawal intensity of coal generation by 50-80% compared to current
31 withdrawals (Wang et al., 2019b). Carbon can be `scrubbed' from thermo-electric power-plant emissions and
32 injected for storage in deep geological strata (Turner et al., 2018), but this can lead to pollution of deep
33 aquifers (Chen et al., 2021) and have health consequences (low confidence).
34
35 Bio-energy crop with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) involves CO2 sequestration as biofuel or forest
36 bioenergy (Creutzig et al., 2015). BECCS has profound implications for water resources (Ai et al., 2020),
37 depending on factors including the scale of deployment, land use, and other local conditions. Evaporative
38 losses from biomass irrigation and thermal bioelectricity generation are projected to peak at 183 km3/year in
39 2050 under a low overshoot scenario (Fuhrman et al., 2020). (Senthil Kumar et al., 2020) projected that
40 while BECCS strategies like irrigating biomass plantations can limit global warming by the end of the 21st
41 century to 1.5癈, this will double the global area and population living under severe water stress compared to
42 the current baseline. Both BECCS (Muratori et al., 2016) and DAC can significantly impact food prices via
43 demand for land and water (Fuhrman et al., 2020). The direction and magnitude of price movement will
44 depend on future carbon prices, while vulnerable people in the Global South will be most severely affected
45 (medium evidence, high agreement).
46
47 Afforestation and reforestation are considered one of the most cost-effective ways of storing carbon. An
48 additional 0.9 billion ha of canopy cover in suitable locations could store 205 Gt of carbon (Bastin et al.,
49 2019), but this estimate is deemed unrealistic. Aggressive afforestation and reforestation efforts can result in
50 trade-offs between biodiversity, carbon sequestration, and water use (Smith et al., 2008). In northern China,
51 ecological restoration by regreening drylands resulted in several environmental and social benefits
52 (Mirzabaev et al., 2019) but also led to increased freshwater use in some pockets (Zhao et al., 2020).
53 Afforestation and reforestation with appropriate broad-leaf species in temperate Europe (Schwaab et al.,
54 2020) can offer water quality and quantity-related benefits, mitigate extreme heat, and buffer against drought
55 (Staal et al., 2018). A global assessment on forest and water showed that forests influence the overall water
56 cycle, including downstream water availability via rainfall-runoff dynamics and downwind water availability
57 via recycled rainfall effects (Creed and van Noordwijk, 2018). The study concluded that afforestation and
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1 reforestation should be concentrated (Ellison et al., 2017) in water-abundant locations (to offset downstream
2 impacts) and where transpiration can potentially be captured downwind as precipitation (Creed et al., 2019)
3 (Cross-Chapter Box NATURAL in Chapter 2). Overall, extensive BECCS and afforestation/reforestation
4 deployment can alter the water cycle at regional scales (high confidence) (Cross-Chapter Box 5.1 in Chapter
5 5, WGI, (Canadell et al., 2021)).
6
7 On the other hand, demand-side mitigation options, such as dietary changes to more plant-based diets,
8 reduced food waste (Aleksandrowicz et al., 2016; Springmann et al., 2018; Kim et al., 2020), can reduce
9 water use (medium evidence, high agreement).
10
11 In summary, many adaptation and mitigation measures have synergistic or maladaptive consequences for
12 water use, depending on associated incentives, policies, and governance that guide their deployment. Many
13 mitigation measures have a considerable water footprint (high confidence), which must be managed in
14 socially and politically acceptable ways to reduce the water intensity of mitigation while increasing synergies
15 with sustainable development (medium evidence, high agreement).
16
17
18 [START BOX 4.8 HERE]
19
20 Box 4.8: Water-Energy-Food (WEF) Nexus Approaches for Managing Synergies and Trade-offs
21
22 WEF nexus is an approach that recognizes that water, energy, and food are linked in a complex web of
23 relationships in the hydrological, biological, social, and technological realms (D'Odorico et al., 2018; Liu et
24 al., 2018b; M鋜ker et al., 2018). For instance, agricultural production requires significant energy inputs due
25 to intensive groundwater pumping (Siddiqi and Wescoat, 2013; Gurdak, 2018; Putra et al., 2020). Similarly,
26 hydropower production often has trade-offs with irrigation, affecting food production, carbon emission, and
27 forest protection (Meng et al., 2020). New technologies, such as desalination plants for urban water supply
28 against future climate change and drought, are also very energy-intensive (Caldera et al., 2018) (Box 4.5).
29 Quantifying the complex interdependencies among food, energy, and water is critical to achieving the SDGs;
30 and reducing trade-offs (Liu et al., 2018a; Liu et al., 2018b; UN, 2019). A key benefit of the nexus approach
31 is to leverage the interconnection of WEF and achieve the most efficiency in the overall systems. Hence, this
32 approach allows for widening the set of salient stakeholders and, therefore solution possibilities, that may
33 otherwise not be possible in single domain efforts and helps connect these stakeholders to achieve
34 synergistic goals (Ernst and Preston, 2017; Mercure et al., 2019).
35
36 The WEF nexus approach thus opens up possibilities for strategic interventions across sectors through a
37 better understanding of trade-offs (Albrecht et al., 2018). Policies and strategies aiming to cope with climate
38 change may amplify rather than reduce negative externalities and trade-offs within the nexus: low carbon
39 transition, the shift to non-conventional water resources, and agricultural intensification, all implemented to
40 mitigate and adapt to climate change, are not always nexus-smart. Hence, a nexus approach that integrates
41 management and governance across these three sectors can enhance WEF security by minimizing trade-offs
42 and maximizing synergies between sectors. At the same time, renewable energy offers the opportunity to
43 decouple water and food production from fossil fuel supply, leading to several advantages from both a socio-
44 economic and environmental point of view (Cipollina et al., 2015; Pistocchi et al., 2020). WEF nexus
45 approaches can achieve overall system efficiency when maximizing the use and recovery of water, energy,
46 nutrients, and materials (Pistocchi et al., 2020; Tian et al., 2021). These types of holistic system thinking of
47 WEF show promising strategies to catalyze transformative changes. Suppose the specific types and extent of
48 WEF linkages in a region are well understood. In that case, it becomes possible to intervene through one
49 element to cause an effect on another connected component that may have proven difficult for direct
50 intervention (Mukherji, 2020).
51
52 Several challenges remain for sound operationalization of the nexus, notably insufficient data, information,
53 and knowledge in understanding the WEF inter-linkages and lack of systematic tools to address trade-offs
54 involved in the nexus and to generate future projections (Liu et al., 2017a; Liu et al., 2018b). There are
55 recent signs of progress in developing models and tools for addressing the nexus trade-offs, e.g., the
56 bioenergy瓀ater nexus (Ai et al., 2020). There is a need to move beyond viewing the WEF nexus as a way
57 of problem identification to seek integrated solutions to interconnected problems.
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1
2 [END BOX 4.8 HERE]
3
4
5 4.8 Enabling Principles for Achieving Water Security, Sustainable and Climate Resilient
6 Development Through Systems Transformations
7
8 Sustainable development is a global policy priority and commitment, as is keeping temperatures well below
9 2癈 as per the Paris Agreement. Water is central to almost all SDGs (Box 4.1). Water is explicitly referred to
10 in SDG6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG11 (sustainable communities and cities) (UN, 2015) (4.1).
11 SDG1 (no poverty) is statistically linked to SDG6 (clean water and sanitation) (Pradhan, 2019), since
12 reducing poverty can help increase adaptive capacity in line with the Paris Agreement adaptation goals (see
13 Chapter 1 and Chapter 18). SDG2 (zero hunger) cannot be achieved without access to adequate water for
14 agriculture. Meeting SDG 3 (health and wellbeing) will rely on access to basic infrastructure like water and
15 sanitation ((Delany-Crowe et al., 2019), see Cross-Chapter Box HEALTH in Chapter 7, 4.3.3, 4.3.5), while
16 SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), will need water for hydropower production under changing climate
17 (Berga, 2016; Byers et al., 2016) (4.5.2). Meeting SDG11 (sustainable cities and communities) will require
18 reducing the impacts from water related disasters.
19
20 Water is also fundamental to all systems transitions, namely, transitions in energy, industrial, land and
21 ecosystem and urban systems. Within energy and industrial system transitions, water stress for electricity
22 generation has already caused impacts (4.3.2). Therefore, water efficiency measures are increasingly applied
23 in both energy and industrial systems with benefits for mitigation and adaptation (4.6.3). Water is
24 inextricably entwined with land and ecosystems transitions, with forested areas and ecosystems being
25 integral components of the water cycle, regulating streamflow, fostering groundwater recharge and
26 contributing to atmospheric water recycling (Takata and Hanasaki, 2020) (4.2). However, mitigation action
27 of large afforestation, can have negative water impacts (Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 5 of WGI repor,
28 4.7.6), making it imperative to consider water footprint of land and forest-based mitigation (Muricho et al.,
29 2019; Seddon et al., 2020) (4.7.6). Sustainable forest management and nature-based solutions (NbS) are
30 promising alternatives for good water management (Muricho et al., 2019; Seddon et al., 2020). Water will
31 also play a crucial role in sustainable urban transitions. Cities are already facing water related impacts
32 (4.3.4), which are projected to intensify with every degree of global warming (Fl鰎ke et al., 2018; Nazemi
33 and Madani, 2018) (4.5.4). Mitigation and adaptation measures in urban spaces, such as green infrastructure
34 (Liu and Jensen, 2018), sustainable water supply management through recycling of wastewater and storm
35 water runoff (Box 4.5), and NbS like sponge cities are fundamentally about water (Box 4.6).
36
37 Thus, water remains central to achieving SDGs, and will play a fundamental role in systems transitions
38 needed for climate resilient development. We outline a set of seven enabling principles that are needed to
39 achieving water security, and will also help in achieving SDGs and facilitate systems transitions.
40
41 4.8.1 Appropriate Technologies
42
43 AR5 concluded that successful adaptation across all sectors depends on access to technology, and technology
44 transfer can play an essential role in building up adaptive capacity (Noble et al., 2014). SR1.5 discussed the
45 role of efficient irrigation technologies in adaptation (de Coninck et al., 2018).
46
47 Technologies that reduce carbon emissions by promoting the efficient use of water can support successful
48 adaptation (Biagini et al., 2014), provided they do not have adverse distributional outcomes (medium
49 evidence, high agreement). Water management in agriculture has long seen the use of technology. For
50 example, the use of technology to improve access to water, e.g., through the diffusion of groundwater pumps
51 in the 1970s in South Asia, had several livelihood benefits but made agriculture more carbon-intensive
52 (Zaveri et al., 2016). More recently, technology has been used to improve water use efficiency in agriculture
53 through the adoption of drip and sprinkler irrigation (Zhuo and Hoekstra, 2017; Grafton et al., 2018); and the
54 use of the Internet of Things (IoT) (Keswani et al., 2019). In addition, innovations to re-use water through
55 various wastewater recovery technologies (Diaz-Elsayed et al., 2019; Capodaglio, 2020); and to create
56 potable water through desalinization (Caldera et al., 2018); and re-use of wastewater in agriculture (Salgot
57 and Folch, 2018) are also on the rise (Box 4.5). Solar technologies are increasingly used for irrigation,
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1 wastewater recovery, desalinization, and water harvesting (Algarni et al., 2018; Pouyfaucon and Garc韆-
2 Rodr韌uez, 2018; Tu et al., 2018; Zhao F. et al., 2020). Machine learning and artificial intelligence
3 technologies (Doorn, 2021) have started being used in many water-use sectors, such as urban (Nie et al.,
4 2020); wastewater management (Abdallah et al., 2020; Ben Ammar et al., 2020), and agricultural water
5 management, but mostly in high-income countries mostly on an experimental basis (Tsang and Jim, 2016;
6 Gonz醠ez Perea et al., 2018). Technology is being increasingly used in hydrological sciences for
7 measurements and monitoring (SM4.1), as well as for creating comprehensive hydrometeorological warning
8 systems (Funk et al., 2015). Lack of technology and knowledge transfer, especially related to remote sensing,
9 is an adaptation barrier in states with less resources (Funk et al., 2015).
10
11 Adoption of technologies depends on the availability of finance (4.8.2). The effectiveness of technology in
12 reducing climate-related risks depends on its appropriateness to the local context (Biagini et al., 2014;
13 Mfitumukiza et al., 2020) and other factors, including institutional and governance frameworks (high
14 confidence). Water technologies can also have unintended outcomes leading to maladaptation in some cases.
15 For example, efficient irrigation technologies like drip and sprinkler irrigation, while reducing water
16 application rates per unit of land, can increase overall water extraction by increasing total land under
17 irrigation (van der Kooij et al., 2013; Grafton et al., 2018; Mpanga and Idowu, 2021). Water-related
18 technologies can also have adverse distributional outcomes when gains from technology adoption accrue
19 disproportionately to a small section of the population; for example, only rich and male farmers can adopt
20 high-cost technologies like solar irrigation pumps (Gupta, 2019) (medium confidence).
21
22 In summary, technology is an important part of water adaptation response, and outcomes of technology
23 adoption are mediated through other societal factors, including institutions, governance frameworks, and
24 equity and justice issues (medium evidence, high agreement).
25
26 4.8.2 Adequate and Appropriate Financing
27
28 Although AR5 did not explicitly mention finance for water-related adaptation actions, it considered urban
29 adaptation (Revi et al., 2014) and risk financing (Arent et al., 2014). SR1.5 (de Coninck et al., 2018)
30 discussed governance and finance limitations, while SRCCL discussed finance in adapting to floods and
31 droughts (Hurlbert et al., 2019).
32
33 Mitigation garners the significant share of committed climate finance. For example, of the total US$ 15.4
34 billion climate finance commitments through Green Bonds, 79% accrued to mitigation and the rest to
35 adaptation (World Bank, 2017). However, within adaptation finance, water garners a significant share of
36 adaptation funds, with 13% of the Adaptation Fund's investments were for water management, 12% for
37 coastal management, and 10% for disaster risk reduction (Adaptation Fund, 2018). Similarly, within the
38 urban adaptation landscape, which got ~3% to 5% of total adaptation finance flows of US$ 30.8 billion
39 tracked in 2017-18 (Richmond et al., 2021), water and wastewater management projects received the largest
40 share of urban adaptation finance (US$ 761 million annually) followed by disaster risk management
41 (US$ 323 million) (Richmond et al., 2021). However, more frequent tracking of public financing is required,
42 with a greater focus on transparency and accountability (Ciplet et al., 2018; Khan et al., 2020) and justice
43 and social equity (Emrich et al., 2020) (also see Cross-Chapter Box FINANCE in Chapter 17).
44
45 Private financing remains a minor source of adaptation financing (World Bank, 2019). Around 39% of green
46 bonds issued in 2017 were for water, wastewater, and solid waste management (World Bank, 2017). In 2018,
47 US$100.5 billion of water-themed bonds were issued, mainly in Europe (63%), the Asia Pacific (19.6%), and
48 North America (14.9%) (Filkova et al., 2018; World Bank, 2019). Such financing focuses on returns and
49 scale (Cholibois, 2020), and as such, local needs, especially those of the poor, may not be adequately
50 represented (Manuamorn et al., 2020; Williams, 2020) (medium confidence).
51
52 COVID-19 will probably affect adaptation financing in water. Countries will be fiscally stretched to finance
53 public investments domestically and through international development aid (Barbier and Burgess, 2020).
54 However, investments in flood and drought management (Phillips et al., 2020) and water and sanitation
55 (Armitage and Nellums, 2020b; Bhowmick et al., 2020) are critical for building resilience against
56 pandemics, are also crucial elements of adaptation in water. Therefore, integrated approaches that achieve
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1 both goals need to be deployed (Barbier and Burgess, 2020; Newell and Dale, 2020) (Box 4.4., Cross-
2 Chapter Box COVID in Chapter 7).
3
4 In summary, water garners a significant share of public and private adaptation funds (high confidence).
5 However, current COVID-related cuts in adaptation financing may further impede developing countries'
6 ability to invest in adequate water adaptation.
7
8 4.8.3 Gender, Equity and Social Justice
9
10 SR 1.5 acknowledged that the adaptative capacity of a population was going to reduce with each degree of
11 warming and that vulnerability to climate change was due to gender, race and level of education, which can
12 compound existing and future vulnerabilities (IPCC, 2018a).
13
14 Gender, class, race, age, physical ability and educational level determine access to water, financial and
15 societal resources, potentially adverting climate-induced water hazards, reducing vulnerability and
16 facilitating adaptation. However, insufficient attention has been given to the role of improving equity in
17 access to water (Abedin et al., 2019; Eakin et al., 2020). Not all water adaptation strategies are accessible to
18 the poorest, who may turn to maladaptive strategies if their access to water is negatively affected (Eakin et
19 al., 2016). Consequently, there have been calls for mainstreaming equity considerations into adaptation
20 (Blackburn and Pelling, 2018) (medium evidence, high agreement). It has been shown that people living in
21 poverty, racial minorities and those ageing are more vulnerable to climate-induced water hazards and that
22 their adaptive capacity is limited (Szewraski et al., 2018; Winsemius et al., 2018; Nyantakyi-Frimpong,
23 2020; Erwin et al., 2021). Among these categories, gender is the one that has been most analyzed in the
24 context of water and climate change.
25
26 Women's water rights are hampered by societal patriarchal norms that prevent women from accessing water
27 and participating in water management. Gender power relations effectively limit women's decision-making
28 power, mobility and access to resources, including water, which makes them more vulnerable to climate-
29 related hazards (Caretta and B鰎jeson, 2015; Djoudi et al., 2016; Sultana, 2018; Yadav and Lal, 2018). In
30 most societies in developing countries, women and girls are in charge of fetching water. The necessity of
31 water collection takes away time from income-generating activities and education (high confidence)
32 (Fontana and Elson, 2014; Kookana et al., 2016; Yadav and Lal, 2018). In addition, the distances women and
33 girls would have to walk as a result of growing water scarcity due to climate change may increase (limited
34 evidence, high confidence) (Becerra et al., 2016) (4.3.3, 4.5.3). Numerous studies substantiate a male bias in
35 information access, employment opportunities, resource availability, and decision-making in water-related
36 adaptation measures (Huynh and Resurreccion, 2014; Sinharoy and Caruso, 2019).
37
38 Although women are often depicted as victims of climate change-induced water scarcity (Huynh and
39 Resurreccion, 2014; Djoudi et al., 2016; Gonda, 2016; Yadav and Lal, 2018), they are also proactive
40 adaptation actors (Singh and Singh, 2015) (Cross-Chapter Box GENDER in Chapter 18). Notably, women
41 are not a homogenous group, and local gender roles are not immutable or generalizable (Carr and Thompson,
42 2014; Djoudi et al., 2016; Gonda, 2016; Sultana, 2018). Coping responses and adaptation mechanisms to
43 climate change are profoundly gendered. Women and men approach the diversification of agricultural and
44 pastoral livelihoods differently in response to climate change (Caretta and B鰎jeson, 2015; Kankwamba et
45 al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Basupi et al., 2019). For example, reliance on women's self-help groups and
46 associations has proven successful in ensuring women's participation in decision-making in adaptation
47 interventions as a response to climate change-induced shifting precipitation patterns and increasing droughts
48 (Chu, 2017; Mersha and van Laerhoven, 2018; Phuong et al., 2018; Walch, 2019). Studies feature water
49 harvesting, crop diversification, cash transfer programs, and food subsidies as adaptation measures that
50 enhance gender equality. Adaptation to climate change in these instances promoted gender equality because
51 it allowed women to reap the benefits of these new measures in terms of economic and health wellbeing
52 (Tesfamariam and Hurlbert, 2017; Lindoso et al., 2018; Walch, 2019).
53
54 Meanwhile, adaptation interventions such as drip irrigation, the adoption of more labor-intensive crops, and
55 livelihood diversification through male out-migration have proven to increase women's burden (Caretta and
56 B鰎jeson, 2015; Kattumuri et al., 2017). Hence, a lack of gender-sensitive analysis before implementing
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1 water management projects can lead to maladaptation and increase gender vulnerability (Phan et al., 2019;
2 Eriksen et al., 2021) (high confidence).
3
4 Acknowledging and understanding the implications of climate-related water adaptation policies in terms of
5 equity and justice is a prerequisite for ensuring their legitimacy and inclusiveness and promotes social justice
6 (Carr and Thompson, 2014; Djoudi et al., 2016; Jost et al., 2016; Sultana, 2018). Furthermore, integrating the
7 principle of gender inclusivity in adaptation is morally and ethically appropriate and effective because
8 women hold much of the local and traditional knowledge in many agricultural communities and can
9 fruitfully provide insights on how to design and implement adaptation responses (Fauconnier et al., 2018;
10 James, 2019).
11
12 In summary, there is high confidence that the effects of climate change-induced water insecurity are not
13 evenly felt across populations. Particularly vulnerable groups are women, children, disabled and Indigenous
14 Peoples, whose ability to access adequate water is limited and varies across race, ethnicity and caste. Equity
15 and justice are central to climate change adaptation and sustainable development, as the world's poorest
16 people and countries feel the adverse impacts of a changing climate most acutely. These groups can become
17 even more vulnerable due to adaptation actions that are not equitable.
18
19 4.8.4 Inclusion of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge
20
21 AR5 concluded that there is robust evidence that mutual integration and co-production of local and
22 traditional and scientific knowledge increase adaptive capacity and reduce vulnerability (Adger and Pulhin,
23 2014). SROCC stated with medium confidence that Indigenous Knowledge (IK) and local knowledge (LK)
24 provide context-specific and socio-culturally relevant understandings for effective climate change responses
25 and policies (Abram et al., 2019). SRCCL found that IK and LK contribute to enhancing resilience against
26 climate change and combating desertification (medium confidence). The combination of IK and LK with new
27 sustainable land management techniques, SRCCL stated with high confidence, can contribute to raising
28 resilience to the challenges of climate change and desertification (Mirzabaev et al., 2019).
29
30 There is high confidence that adaptation efforts benefit from the inclusion of IK and LK (Mustonen et al.,
31 2021). IK and LK can inform how climate change impacts and risks are understood and experienced.
32 Holders of IK and LK can also help to develop place-based and culturally appropriate adaptation strategies
33 that meet their expectations (Comberti et al., 2019; Martinez Moscoso, 2019) (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in
34 Chapter 18).
35
36 There is high confidence that genuine partnerships with Indigenous Peoples and local communities can assist
37 in decolonising approaches to freshwater management (Arsenault et al., 2019; Wilson et al., 2019), which
38 recognise the importance of knowledge that is not grounded on the technocratic division between nature and
39 society (Goldman et al., 2018). There is also high confidence that Indigenous-led freshwater management
40 can facilitate culturally inclusive decision-making and collaborative planning processes at the local and
41 national levels (Somerville, 2014; Harmsworth et al., 2016; Parsons et al., 2017). However, market-based
42 models of water rights regimes can impede the ability of Indigenous Peoples to exercise their rights and
43 deploy traditional ecological knowledge regarding freshwater protection (Nursey-Bray and Palmer, 2018)
44 (medium evidence, high agreement).
45
46 Community-led actions and restoration measures are helping to ameliorate climate impacts and provide "safe
47 havens" to affected freshwater species (high confidence). For example, the Skolt S醡i of Finland have
48 introduced adaptation measures to aid survival of culturally-significant Atlantic salmon stocks in the
49 N滗t鋗� watershed. Atlantic salmon had declined as northern pike, which preys on juvenile salmon,
50 expanded its range in response to warmer water temperatures. Indigenous co-management measures included
51 increasing the catch of pike and documenting important sites (such as lost spawning beds) to ensure
52 ecological restoration encourages further habitat and increased salmon reproduction (Pecl et al., 2017;
53 Mustonen and Feodoroff, 2018).
54
55 Community-led applications of IK and LK in conjunction with external knowledge and funding can improve
56 water security (high confidence). For example, Borana pastoralists in Ethiopia (Iticha and Husen, 2019) and
57 Ati and Suludnon people (Philippines) (Nelson et al., 2019) utilise both IK and technical information for
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1 weather forecasting, while Calanguya people (Philippines) collaborated with local government and NGOs to
2 diversify crops and protect the watershed (Gabriel and Mangahas, 2017). With assistance from
3 municipalities, Indigenous Peoples are rehabilitating springs and traditional water wells in Bangladesh hill
4 tracts (Sultana et al., 2019) and Micronesia (McLeod et al., 2019). In response to changing cryosphere
5 conditions in the Peruvian Andes, Indigenous Quechua farmers use IK and technical information in
6 community-led research to preserve biocultural knowledge and emblematic crops (Sayre et al., 2017). In
7 Galena, Alaska (USA), a flood-preparedness and response program have benefitted from the long-term
8 cooperation between emergency management and tribal officials (Kontar et al., 2015) (12.5.3.2 Main
9 concepts and approaches). IK and LK can enhance the visibility of Indigenous Peoples and local
10 communities that are excluded from official decision-making processes. In southwest Burkina Faso, for
11 example, Indigenous Peoples are using IK and LK to balance (and sometimes resist) official technical
12 estimates of water availability, which enhances their political visibility and enables them to address water
13 scarcity (Roncoli et al., 2019).
14
15 There are structural and institutional challenges in knowledge co-production between holders of IK and LK
16 and "technical" knowledge. These challenges include issues of water rights, language, and extractive
17 research practices (Ford et al., 2016; Simms et al., 2016; Stefanelli et al., 2017; Arsenault et al., 2019), and
18 colonial uses of IK and LK (Castleden et al., 2017), which can produce distrust among holders of IK and LK
19 (David-Chavez and Gavin, 2018). In addition, some IK is sacred and cannot be shared with outsiders
20 (Sanderson et al., 2015).
21
22 In summary, IK and LK are dynamic and have developed over time to adapt to climate and environmental
23 change in culturally specific and place-based ways (high confidence). Ethical co-production between holders
24 of IK and LK and technical knowledge is a key enabling condition for successful adaptation measures and
25 strategies pertaining to water security, as well as other areas (medium evidence, high agreement). Knowledge
26 co-production is a vital and developing approach to the water-related impacts of climate change that
27 recognises the culture, agency and concerns of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. It is critical to
28 developing effective, equitable and meaningful strategies for addressing the water-related impacts of global
29 warming (Cross-Chapter Box INDIG in Chapter 18).
30
31 4.8.5 Participative, Cooperative and Bottom-up Engagement
32
33 Participation, cooperation and bottom-up engagement are critical to optimal adaptation (medium evidence-
34 high agreement). There is high confidence that many of the countries and social groups most threatened by
35 climate change have contributed the least to global emissions and do not have not the resources to adapt.
36 Effective participation of these actors in climate change adaptation planning in the water sector can
37 contribute to more just adaptation actions (high confidence).
38
39 There is medium evidence, high agreement that optimal adaptation depends critically on inter-state
40 cooperation (Banda, 2018), which in turn requires trust and norms of reciprocity among all those involved
41 (Ostrom, 2014). Reciprocity is central to international cooperation on climate change, where actors are more
42 inclined to cooperate when they perceive that the expected outcome will be fair in terms of costs and benefits
43 of implementation (Keohane and Oppenheimer, 2016). Indeed, cooperation at the international level is less
44 probable to occur if participants do not trust each other's (Hamilton and Lubell, 2018). In climate-related
45 water adaptation, transboundary cooperation is essential, as 60% of global freshwater resources contained in
46 276 river and lake basins are shared between countries (Timmerman et al., 2017). Yet, more than 50% of the
47 world 310 international river basins lack any type of cooperative framework (McCracken and Meyer, 2018).
48
49 SDG 6 on water and sanitation includes a specific indicator (6.5.2) to assess cooperation over transboundary
50 waters. While the methodology for measuring this indicator is debated, it is clear that its composition will
51 influence international and national water policy and law (McCracken and Meyer, 2018) and possibly help
52 build an environment of trust among riparian states. Moreover, although the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
53 Development (A/RES/70/1) makes it clear that without the participation of local communities (e.g., SDG 6,
54 target 6. B) and women (e.g., SDG5, target 5.5.), the SDGs will not be met, the involvement of these actors
55 in formal water governance processes and water management is still limited (Fauconnier et al., 2018). This is
56 due partly to the absence, in many regions of the world, of adequate legal, regulatory and institutional
57 frameworks for effective stakeholder's participation, partly to the influence of local social and cultural
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1 contexts, which can discourage inclusive water governance (Andajani-Sutjahjo et al., 2015; Dang, 2017).
2 Yet, inclusion and effective participation in bottom-up decision-making processes of those
3 disproportionately affected by climate change � including women and Indigenous Peoples - is particularly
4 important to ensure the legitimacy and inclusiveness of the decision-making process and the design of
5 socially just adaptation actions (Shi et al., 2016). Moreover, incentives for bottom-up and participative
6 decision-making in the water sector can facilitate effective stakeholder engagement (OECD, 2015), which
7 helps build public confidence and trust in water governance.
8
9 4.8.6 Polycentric Water Governance
10
11 SR1.5 concluded with high confidence that cooperation and coordinated actions at various governance levels
12 are vital to ensuring participation, transparency, capacity-building and learning among different actors
13 (IPCC, 2018a). According to SRCCL, adaptive governance builds on multi-level and polycentric governance
14 (Hurlbert et al., 2019), where efforts taken by multiple actors across different scales provide learning
15 opportunities for all (Hurlbert, 2018).
16
17 Polycentrism is characterized by the absence of a unique centre of authority. Therefore, the legitimacy of the
18 decisions taken by multiple decision-makers at different levels of water governance derives from the
19 perceived fairness of the decision-making process (Baldwin et al., 2018) and the inclusion of women,
20 Indigenous Peoples and young people (Iza, 2019) (medium confidence). Evidence-based approaches can also
21 enhance the legitimacy of polycentric governance (Boelens et al., 2015; Arriagada et al., 2018) by generating
22 knowledge to support localized and multileveled decision-making, as in the case of water user communities
23 in Peru (Buytaert et al., 2014; Buytaert et al., 2016).
24
25 The advantages of polycentric approaches to climate governance include improved communication,
26 inclusiveness, consensus and better outcomes (Ostrom, 2014; Cole, 2015; Keohane and Victor, 2016;
27 Morrison et al., 2017; Tormos-Aponte and Garc韆-L髉ez, 2018) (high agreement). However, polycentric
28 governance systems require cross-scale information sharing, coordination and democratic participation to
29 work appropriately (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Carlisle and Gruby, 2017; Morrison et al., 2017;
30 Biesbroek and Lesnikowski, 2018; Frey et al., 2021) (high confidence). For example, efficient information
31 sharing has been necessary to implement groundwater governance in transboundary contexts (Albrecht et al.,
32 2017).
33
34 Empirical studies that examined the potential of polycentric governance to address water challenges in the
35 face of climate change showed that polycentrism could encourage and support participatory, decentralized
36 and deliberative adaptation. These, in turn, can produce better environmental outcomes and improve water
37 governance outcomes (high confidence). Polycentric water governance can be an effective enabler for
38 adaptation when it ensures interconnectedness with multiple public and private actors across the different
39 sectors (e.g. irrigation users, domestic users, industrial users, watershed institutions, etc.) and across different
40 levels (e.g. local, regional and national governments) to help come up with well-coordinated water
41 adaptation responses (high confidence) (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; McCord et al., 2017; Baldwin et al.,
42 2018; Hamilton and Lubell, 2018; Kellner et al., 2019).
43
44 Questions remain about the extent to which polycentrism can result in either greater climate justice or
45 exacerbate existing inequalities due, for example, to existing power inequalities which may affect the
46 performance and effectiveness of a polycentric system (Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014; Morrison et al., 2017;
47 Hamilton and Lubell, 2018; Okereke, 2018). For instance, historical inequities and injustices due to settler
48 colonialism and top-down water policies, governance and laws (Collins et al., 2017; Arsenault et al., 2018;
49 Johnson et al., 2018; Robison et al., 2018) have resulted in long-term water insecurity in many Indigenous
50 communities in North America (Simms et al., 2016; Medeiros et al., 2017; Conroy-Ben and Richard, 2018;
51 Diver, 2018; Emanuel, 2018) (high confidence) (4.6.9). Additionally, studies highlight that power dynamics
52 can undermine the success of those initiatives. For example, in the Sao Paulo water crisis, polycentric
53 governance did not fully realize its potential when it was guided by authoritarian governance favouring
54 political interests over social, territorial and environmental justice (Frey et al., 2021). Likewise, in the Thau
55 basin (France), the most important and influential actors shaped policy measures in response to climate
56 change, thus limiting the potential for radical changes in water use (Aubin et al., 2019).
57
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1 In summary, polycentric governance can enable improved water governance and effective climate change
2 adaptation (medium confidence). However, it can also exacerbate existing inequalities as long as less
3 powerful actors, such as women, Indigenous Peoples and young people, are not adequately involved in the
4 decision-making process (high confidence).
5
6 4.8.7 Strong Political Support
7
8 According to AR5 (Jim閚ez Cisneros et al., 2014), barriers to adaptation in the water sector include lack of
9 institutional capacity, which, together with political support, constitutes one of the feasibility dimensions
10 towards limiting global warming to 1.5oC (de Coninck et al., 2018). As the IPCC SROCC (IPCC, 2019a) and
11 SRCCL (Shukla et al., 2019) suggest, limited institutional support can challenge adaptation efforts in water
12 management.
13
14 Climate adaptation planning approaches can be constrained by several economic, institutional,
15 developmental and political barriers (Anguelovski et al., 2014; Eisenack et al., 2014), including strong
16 political support, that is, the lack of collective willingness to take action. Despite the ongoing accumulation
17 of scientific evidence as to the seriousness of the impact of climate change on water resources, state action
18 has not always been effective. There are now a rising number of case laws addressing the state's failure to
19 implement adaptation policies and resultant climate change litigation (Setzer and Vanhala, 2019; Peel and
20 Osofsky, 2020), including in the water sector, as in the leading case Leghari v Federation of Pakistan (2015
21 WP. No. 25501/201), in which a farmer sued the national government for failure to carry out national climate
22 change policies impacting on the constitutional right to life (Preston, 2016).
23
24 The 2015 Paris Agreement made a significant impact on the status quo, with almost all the countries
25 agreeing to limit global warming to 2癈 or less. The preparation of NDCs under the Paris Agreement
26 contributed positively to national climate policies and helped focus on the centrality of water in adaptation
27 planning (R鰏er et al., 2020). 92% of countries that mention adaptation in NDCs also include water (GWP,
28 2018). Low-income countries make specific reference to rainfed or irrigated agriculture and livestock. In
29 contrast, middle and high-income countries include developing management, governance mechanisms and
30 increased disaster risk reduction in their NDC pledges (GWP, 2018). Floods were the critical climate hazards
31 identified in the adaptation components of NDCs, followed by droughts (85 out of countries for floods and
32 80 out of 137 for drought). Also, the water sector was identified as the top priority sector for adaptation
33 actions in the NDCs for 118 out of 137 countries, followed closely by the agricultural sector with 100 out
34 137 (GWP, 2018) based on data from (UNFCCC, 2017). Many developing countries have included
35 quantitative targets for adaptation in the water sector (Pauw et al., 2018). Similarly, water-related impacts
36 and adaptation often feature prominently in NAPs (DEFRA, 2018).
37
38 Evidence suggests that adaptation failure in the water sector is due to policy and regulatory failures
39 (Keohane and Victor, 2016; Oberlack and Eisenack, 2018; Javeline et al., 2019) reflecting political myopia
40 (Muller, 2018; Empinotti et al., 2019; Pralle, 2019) (high confidence).
41
42 International donors and supranational/transnational legislation (e.g. EU law) can support the capacity of
43 national and sub-national governments to act and remove possible barriers to the effective implementation of
44 climate change adaptation policies in the water sector, including obstacles posed due to lack of financial
45 support for the developing countries (Massey et al., 2014; Tilleard and Ford, 2016; Biesbroek et al., 2018;
46 Rahman and Tosun, 2018) (medium confidence).
47
48
49 [START FAQ4.1 HERE]
50
51 FAQ4.1: What is water security, and how will climate change affect it?
52
53 Water is essential for all societal and ecosystems needs. Water security is multi-dimensional and not just
54 about water availability. Water needs to be available in sufficient quantity and quality and needs to be
55 accessible in an acceptable form. Accordingly, a situation of water security indicates the availability and
56 accessibility of sufficient clean water to allow a population to sustainably ensure its livelihoods, health, and
57 socio-economic development and political stability. Many socio-economic factors, such as population
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1 growth and food consumption patterns, play an important role in determining water security. Still, climate
2 change is increasingly shown to be an important contributor to water insecurity worldwide, with some
3 regions more at risk than others.
4
5 Climate change can affect these different dimensions of water security in different ways. Most directly,
6 climate change is affecting the overall availability of water across regions and during important seasons.
7 More extended periods of dry spells and droughts are already affecting water availability, especially in the
8 arid areas of India, China, the USA and Africa. Other extremes, such as heavy precipitation and flooding,
9 can affect water quality, making water unsafe for drinking, for example. In coastal regions and small islands,
10 the combined effects of higher sea levels and more intense storms affect water security by increasing the
11 salinization of groundwater resources. Indirect effects of climate change on water security include impacts
12 on infrastructure for the provision and recovery of water resources, which can affect the safe access to
13 adequate water resources, both in terms of quality and quantity.
14
15 In terms of assessing the extent of water scarcity, studies estimate that currently, between 1.5 and 2.5 billion
16 people live within areas exposed to water scarcity globally. These numbers are projected to increase
17 continuously, with estimates of up to 3 billion at 2癈 and up to 4 billion at 4癈 by 2050. Many socio-
18 economic factors, such as population growth and food consumption patterns, determine water scarcity. Still,
19 climate is increasingly shown to be an important component that drives scarcity across the world. Water
20 scarcity is often a seasonal occurrence, and climate change is projected to increase seasonal extremes. Often
21 consecutive years with drier conditions lead to a long-term decrease in groundwater tables, affecting water
22 availability directly and soil moisture in the longer term.
23
24 As an essential component of water security, climate change will affect water quality in different ways. Drier
25 conditions lead to a reduction in water availability, causing a potential increase in the concentration of
26 contaminants. Increasing runoff and floods can wash pollutants into water bodies. With climate change
27 projected to increase the variability of rain over space and time, such impacts on water quality are becoming
28 increasingly likely. Higher temperatures add to deteriorating water quality by reducing oxygen levels.
29
30 Another critical component to ensure secure access to water resources is adequate water infrastructure for
31 access, disposal and sanitation. Unfortunately, increasing extremes due to climate change, especially floods
32 and increasing storm activity, have great potential to damage such infrastructure, especially in developing
33 world regions, where infrastructure is much more susceptible to damage and pollution.
34
35 There are substantial differences in the distribution of risks across regions, with some areas facing a much
36 higher risk burden than others. Also, projections of the potential impacts of climate change on water security
37 vary across regions. However, patterns of projected water-related extremes are emerging more clearly
38 globally with increasing confidence.
39
40 [END FAQ4.1 HERE]
41
42
43 [START FAQ4.2 HERE]
44
45 FAQ4.2: Which places are becoming wetter and which are becoming drier, and what risks do these
46 bring to people?
47
48 Due to climate change, substantial numbers of people are now living in climates with average precipitation
49 levels significantly different to the average over the 20th century. Nearly half a billion people are living in
50 unfamiliar wet conditions, mostly in mid- and high-latitudes, and over 160 million people are living in
51 unfamiliar dry conditions, mostly in the tropics and sub-tropics. In addition to changes in average
52 precipitation, precipitation patterns over time are also changing, as well as river flows. Societal impacts and
53 increased risks from both wetter and drier conditions are starting to emerge.
54
55 Some parts of the world are becoming wetter and some are becoming drier, in terms of either changes in
56 precipitation and/or the water available in the soil, in rivers, or underground. Soil moisture, river water and
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1 groundwater are affected by changes in precipitation and also by changes in evaporation, which is affected
2 by temperature and by uptake by vegetation.
3
4 All these factors are affected by climate change. Rising temperatures drive higher evaporation, which dries
5 the landscape, although this can be offset in some areas by reduced uptake of water from the soil by plants in
6 response to rising CO2 concentrations. A warming climate brings more precipitation overall, although
7 changes in global wind patterns mean that some areas are seeing less precipitation.
8
9 As a result, substantial numbers of people are now living in climates with average precipitation levels
10 significantly different to the average over the 20th century. Nearly half a billion people are living in
11 unfamiliar wet conditions, mostly in mid- and high-latitudes, and over 160 million in unfamiliar dry
12 conditions, mostly in the tropics and sub-tropics (Figure FAQ4.2.1).
13
14
15
16 Figure FAQ4.2.1: Numbers of people seeing increases and decreases in precipitation.
17
18
19 In addition to changes in average precipitation, the patterns over time are also changing, such as the length of
20 dry spells and the amount of precipitation falling in heavy events. Again, these changes vary across the
21 world due to shifting wind patterns. Approximately 600 million people live in places with longer dry spells
22 than in the 1950s, mostly in West Africa, south Asia and parts of South America. Approximately 360 million
23 people experience shorter dry spells, in North America, northern Asia and other parts of South America.
24
25 In contrast, far more people (about 600 million people) are seeing heavier precipitation than less heavy
26 precipitation (80 million). A more widespread increase in heavy precipitation is expected in a warming
27 world, where the warmer atmosphere takes up more moisture and hotter ground drives more intense storms.
28
29 River flows are also changing in many parts of the world, often due to changes in precipitation, although
30 direct human impacts are also important. Generally, the most widespread increased river flows are seen high
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1 latitudes, while decreasing flows are seen in mid- and low- latitudes, although there are major exceptions to
2 these trends and data is sparse in many regions (Figure FAQ4.2.2).
3
4
5 Figure FAQ4.2.2: Observed changes in mean river flows from 1971-2010
6
7
8 Some of these changes are starting to have impacts on society. For example, increasing rainfall in the USA
9 has led to increased crop yields. Heavy rainfall and long periods of rainfall lead to flooding, causing deaths,
10 injuries, infrastructural damage, spread of disease, disruptions to employment and education, psychological
11 trauma, and territorial displacement. The weather conditions associated with many recent major flooding
12 events were made more likely by climate change, although non-climatic factors remain the dominant driver
13 of increased flooding.
14
15 Drier soils have made heatwaves more severe. A drying of the landscape has increased the length of the fire
16 season across much of the world, contributing to unprecedented severity of wildfires in recent years. In
17 recent years, several major drought events with impacts on agriculture were made more likely by climate
18 change.
19
20 Overall, the general picture is of increased average precipitation and/or longer periods of precipitation in the
21 mid and high latitudes, but decreased precipitation and/or longer times between precipitation across much of
22 the tropics and sub-tropics. Where heavy precipitation is changing, this is mostly towards increasing
23 intensity. Societal impacts and increased risks from both wetter and drier conditions are starting to emerge.
24
25 [END FAQ4.2 HERE]
26
27
28 [START FAQ4.3 HERE]
29
30 FAQ4.3: How will climate change impact the severity of water-related disasters, such as droughts and
31 floods?
32
33 Climate change will lead to populations becoming more vulnerable to floods and droughts due to an
34 increase in the frequency, magnitude, and total area affected by water-related disasters. Floods and
35 droughts will also affect more people in the course of this century as a result of population growth and
36 increased urbanization, especially if warming cannot be limited to 1.5癈. The impact of floods and droughts
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1 are expected to increase across all economic sectors, resulting in negative outcomes for the global
2 production of goods and services, industry output, employment, trade, and household consumption. Floods
3 will pose additional risks to people's lives and health through inundation, facilitating the further spread of
4 waterborne diseases. At the same time, droughts can have adverse health impacts due to the limited
5 availability of food and water for drinking and hygienic purposes. All losses, both in terms of lives and in
6 economic terms, will be more limited in a 1.5癈 than in a 3癈 warmer world.
7
8 Anthropogenic land-use changes and climate change will exacerbate the intensity, frequency and spatial
9 extent of floods and droughts, leading to populations becoming more vulnerable. According to projections,
10 these increases in extreme events will be more significant with higher levels of global warming. However,
11 the location and severity of floods and droughts are context-dependent and complex phenomena.
12
13 The processes that lead to droughts include lack of or less frequent precipitation, increased
14 evapotranspiration, and decreased soil moisture, snow cover, runoff, and streamflow. For example, warming
15 temperatures may result in higher evapotranspiration, in turn leading to drier soils. In addition, reduced soil
16 moisture diminishes the amount of water filtering into rivers in both the short and long term while also
17 increasing the aridity that can foster the conditions for fire. Moreover, decreased snow cover represents less
18 runoff supply to downstream areas during warmer seasons. Depending on this process and the propagation of
19 a meteorological drought onto further systems, a drought can be defined as hydrological, agricultural or
20 ecological. Agricultural drought threatens food production through crop damage and yield decreases, and
21 consequent economic impacts and, therefore, can be the most impactful to humans. Geographically the
22 likelihood of agricultural drought is projected to increase across most of southern Africa, Australia, the
23 majority of Europe, the southern and western United States, Central America and the Caribbean, north-west
24 China, parts of South America, and the Russian Federation; but due to increased precipitation, it is projected
25 to decline in, Southeastern South America, Central Africa, central Canada, western India and the south of the
26 Arabian Peninsula.
27
28 Flood hazard natural processes usually result from increases in heavy precipitation events, but they can also
29 be caused by saturated soils, increased runoff and land-use changes. A warming climate usually causes
30 greater energy for the intense upward motion for storm formation and increases evapotranspiration, which
31 leads to heavier precipitation. Many places around the world will experience more than average rainfall,
32 which may increase soil moisture. Wetter soils saturate faster during precipitation events, resulting in
33 increased runoff that can muddy the waters and lead to floods. Anthropogenic land-use changes, such as
34 urbanization, deforestation, grasslands, and agricultural extension, can also reduce the amount of water
35 infiltrating the soil and leading to frequent flooding. Floods are expected to increase in Asia, the U.S., and
36 Europe, particularly in areas dependent on glaciers' water where melting will lead to earlier spring floods.
37 Additionally, fluvial floods are projected to be more frequent in some regions in central Africa and northern
38 high latitudes and less frequent in the southern areas of North America, southern South America, the
39 Mediterranean, parts of Australia and southern parts of Europe.
40
41 Globally, socioeconomic development will lead to heightened societal hazards. Due to population growth
42 and increased urbanization, floods and droughts will affect more people in the course of this century,
43 especially if warming cannot be limited to 1.5癈. All losses, both in lives and in economic terms, will be
44 more limited in a 1.5癈 than in a 3癈 warmer world. The impacts of floods and droughts are expected to
45 increase across all economic sectors, from agriculture to energy production, resulting in negative outcomes
46 for our global production of goods and services, industry output, employment, trade and household
47 consumption. Landslides, sinkholes and avalanches arising from heavy rainfall events will increasingly
48 threaten infrastructure and agricultural production. In cities, increased flood frequency could disrupt waste
49 management systems, resulting in the clogging of waterways. In addition, unprecedented flood magnitudes
50 could overwhelm hydraulic infrastructure, affecting the energy, industry, and transportation sectors. An
51 expansion in inundation area, coupled with urban sprawl, would increase flood damage. Floods will pose
52 additional risks to people's lives and health through inundation, facilitating the spread of waterborne
53 diseases. At the same time, drought can have adverse health impacts due to the limited availability of food
54 and water for drinking and hygienic purposes. Although there are no agreed-upon projections for migration
55 and displacement due to water-related disasters, it is known that drought and desertification cause harvest
56 failures, which may lead subsistence farmers to relocate to urban areas. Whether temporary or permanent,
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1 displacement is often mired with diminished safety, loss of social ties, and a weakened sense of place and
2 cultural identity.
3
4 Finally, vulnerable groups such as people living in poverty, women, children, Indigenous Peoples, uninsured
5 workers, and the elderly will be the most affected by water-related disasters.
6
7 [END FAQ4.3 HERE]
8
9
10 [START FAQ4.4 HERE]
11
12 FAQ4.4: Globally, agriculture is the largest user of water. How will climate change impact this sector,
13 and how can farmers adapt to these changes?
14
15 Climate-induced changes in the global hydrological cycle are already impacting agriculture through floods,
16 droughts and increased rainfall variability, which have affected yields of major crops such as maize,
17 soybeans, rice and wheat. These changes are projected to continue in a warmer world, which will cause
18 yields of rain-fed crops to decline and reduce the amount of water available for irrigation in water-stressed
19 regions. Farmers already use adaptation and coping strategies to manage agricultural water use. Some of
20 the most important adaptation responses are the application of irrigation, on-farm water and soil
21 conservation; changing cropping patterns; adopting improved cultivars, and improved agronomic practices.
22 In many parts of the world, farmers increasingly use Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge to inform
23 their decisions of what to grow, when to grow, and how much to irrigate. To offset the risks of market-
24 related volatility coupled with climate change, farmers also adopt economic and financial instruments such
25 as index-based crop insurance. Training and capacity building programs and social safety nets are other
26 forms of adaptation that farmers are using to respond to these changes.
27
28 Worldwide, and especially in developing countries, agriculture (including crop cultivation and livestock and
29 fisheries) is the largest water user, accounting for 50% to 90% of all water use. Moreover, a substantial part
30 of the water used in agriculture is "consumptive" use, which means that the water is "consumed" for crop
31 growth and is not immediately available for other uses. This is different from other sectors, such as energy
32 production, where only a fraction of the water is "consumed", and other downstream users can re-use the
33 rest. Agriculture also accounts for a large share of employment in developing countries, with 60 to 80% of
34 the rural population dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods. Agriculture provides food security for all.
35 This makes farmers and agriculture particularly vulnerable to climate change.
36
37 Climate-induced changes in the global hydrological cycle are already impacting agriculture through floods,
38 droughts and increased rainfall variability. For example, loss in yields has been reported for major crops such
39 as maize (by 4.1%), soybeans (by 4.5%), rice (by 1.8%) and wheat (by 1.8%) due to changes in precipitation
40 between 1981 to 2010. In addition, drought has affected both the area under cultivation and the yields of
41 major crops. According to one estimate, globally, there has been a loss of 9 to 10% of total cereal production
42 due to droughts and other weather extremes. Similarly, floods are one of the significant reasons for crop
43 losses worldwide. Climate change-induced losses in livestock and fisheries have also been documented. In
44 some parts of the world, especially in cold temperate zones, agro-climatic zones have become more
45 conducive to yield growth in crops like maize and soybean due to increases in summer precipitation. Yet,
46 negative impacts far outweigh positive impacts.
47
48 Projected impacts on agriculture due to changes in water availability are also severe. For example, yields of
49 rain-fed crops such as maize are projected to decline by 1/5th to 1/3rd by the end of the century. In contrast,
50 many areas which currently support multiple crops may become unsuitable for rain-fed farming or support
51 only one crop in a year. Irrigation, which is often one of the most effective adaptive strategies against water-
52 induced stress, is also projected to be affected by a reduction of the amount of water available for irrigation
53 in some parts of the world that are already water-stressed or as a result of groundwater depletion in places
54 such as India, North China, and the north-western United States. Overall, future droughts and floods will
55 pose a major risk to food security, and agriculture and impacts will be more severe on countries and
56 communities that are already food insecure.
57
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1 Given that farmers are already dealing with variability in the amount and timing of rainfall. In many places,
2 demand for agricultural water is greater than supply, and farmers are using many adaptations and coping
3 strategies to meet water demands for their crops, fish and livestock. Some of the most popular adaptation
4 responses around crops and water include:
5 � changing cropping patterns to less water-intensive crops, and changes in the timing of sowing and
6 harvesting to respond to unfamiliar trends in the onset of rains;
7 � adoption of improved cultivars, such as drought and flood-resistant seed varieties;
8 � improved agronomic practices, including conservation agriculture that helps reduce water
9 application rates;
10 � irrigation and water-saving technologies such as efficient irrigation and on-farm water management
11 techniques;
12 � on-farm water and soil moisture conservation.
13
14 Most of these measures are beneficial across multiple indicators (water saving, increased incomes etc.),
15 however, whether they also reduce climate related risks is not well understood and remains a knowledge gap.
16 Irrigation and changes in crop choices and cultivars are also shown to be effective for future adaptation,
17 especially at 1.5癈 global warming levels, but much less effective at 2癈 and 3癈 when these responses will
18 not mitigate a large part of the climate risk. Most of these adaptation measures mentioned above are
19 autonomous. However, some, such as improved seeds and cultivars, are supported by national agricultural
20 research agencies, international research coalitions such as the CGIAR, and private seed companies. In many
21 parts of the world, farmers are also increasingly using Indigenous Knowledge and local knowledge to inform
22 these decisions of what to grow, when to grow, and how much to irrigate.
23
24 Given the predominance of market economies worldwide, most farmers also depend on the market to sell
25 their produce, and market fluctuations affect their incomes. In addition, market-related volatility coupled
26 with climate change is a source of increased risk for farmers. Several economic and financial instruments are
27 being used with varying levels of success to offset some of these interlinked impacts. Index-based crop
28 insurance is one such instrument that compensates farmers for losing crops due to hazards such as floods and
29 droughts. However, several limitations in their implementation remain.
30
31 In cases of severe droughts and floods, which have debilitating impacts on already poor and vulnerable
32 populations, national governments provide social safety programs, such as food or cash-for-work programs,
33 which are shown to be successful in reducing risks for the most vulnerable people, even though there are
34 often concerns with targeting efficiency. Providing training and capacity building of farmers to adopt new
35 farming practices and technologies to manage risk better are also known to be effective when the training is
36 conceptualized, targeted and implemented in consultation with farmers. Planned adaptation practices include
37 managing weather and market risks through insurance products, social safety nets for vulnerable populations,
38 and providing the right mix of training and capacity building. These adaptation practices are generally
39 implemented by civil society, governments and the private sector.
40
41
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1
2 Figure FAQ4.4.1: Water-related adaptation responses in agriculture sector: benefits, co-benefits with mitigation, and
3 possible maladaptation
4
5
6 [END FAQ4.4 HERE]
7
8
9 [START FAQ4.5 HERE]
10
11 FAQ4.5: Which principles can communities implement to sustainably adapt to the ways that climate
12 change is impacting their water security?
13
14 For communities to sustainably adapt to climate impacts on water security, their participation, cooperation,
15 and bottom-up engagement are critical in all stages of decision-making processes. In addition to enhancing
16 the legitimacy of the decision-making process, the community's involvement can increase the equitability
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1 and effectiveness of the adaptation approach. As water insecurity disproportionately affects marginalised
2 social groups, their participation in water governance and implementation can help improve their water
3 security. Combining and integrating local, Indigenous and traditional ecological knowledge with Western
4 understandings of climate change can enhance the effectiveness of adaptation measures and strategies while
5 ensuring that the adaptation is equitable and just. Improving water security is fundamental to achieving
6 many of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
7
8 For decades, communities worldwide have already been adapting to climate change-induced hydrological
9 changes to maintain their livelihood and safety. Adaptation is a multi-faceted process that is implemented
10 differently depending on the sector affected by changes in the hydrological cycle and the region where these
11 changes happen. For instance, farmers in the semi-arid areas might adapt to changing rain patterns through
12 irrigation (see also FAQ4.4). At the same time, urban dwellers can adopt measures such as rainwater
13 harvesting and other nature-based solutions. Several principles have been documented as crucial for
14 achieving sustainable adaptation as they support communities in becoming more resilient to climate change.
15 However, these principles can be implemented singularly or in tandem, and it is essential to acknowledge
16 that long-term adaptation success is context-specific. Therefore, it is critical to involve local communities in
17 co-designing effective adaptation responses.
18
19 For communities to sustainably adapt to climate impacts on water security, participation, cooperation, and
20 bottom-up engagement are critical in all stages of the decision-making processes, from planning to full
21 implementation. Many of the countries and social groups most threatened by climate change have
22 contributed least to global warming and do not have access to adequate resources to adapt. Effective
23 participation of these actors in water-related climate change adaptation planning can contribute to more
24 equitable adaptation actions. The involvement of the most vulnerable in the design of adaptation responses
25 makes it more probable that these solutions will suit their needs and have therefore a higher change of being
26 effective to be effective. Accessible, inclusive and well-coordinated efforts to enhance water security will
27 improve the legitimacy of water governance and work synergistically with reducing inequalities (UN
28 Sustainable Development Goal, SDG 10) and encouraging more sustainable communities (SDG 11).
29 Communities can also be involved in sector-specific adaptation responses. These are often water-related and
30 help ensure that climate action (SDG13) is well aligned with clean water and sanitation (SGD6).
31
32 The participation of traditionally excluded groups such as women and marginalised communities and
33 Indigenous people and ethnic minorities contributes to more equitable and socially just adaptation actions.
34 Water insecurity disproportionately affects these marginalised groups, and their participation in water
35 governance and implementation can help alleviate this burden.
36
37 Recognising the importance of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge in improving water security is
38 vital to ensuring that decisions and solutions align with the interests of Indigenous and local peoples and
39 benefit their communities culturally and economically. Furthermore, the effectiveness of adaptation
40 measures and strategies improves when local, Indigenous Knowledge and traditional ecological knowledge
41 is combined and integrated with technical understandings of climate change.
42
43 The climate adaptation plans led by national governments and local authorities will only be accepted and
44 adequately implemented when supported by the community. Therefore, strong political and societal support
45 is necessary to ensure effective policy changes, whether local or national. Significantly, access to financial
46 assistance from private and public sources expands the range of strategies that communities can consider for
47 enhancing their water security.
48
49 These principles are also conducive to the achievement of the United Nations Sustainable Development
50 Goals. Actions that reduce climate risk and enhance water security can positively interact with sustainable
51 development objectives (synergies). Therefore, improving water security is fundamental to achieving many
52 of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
53
54
55
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