FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Chapter 15: Small Islands 3 4 Coordinating Lead Authors: Michelle Mycoo (Trinidad and Tobago), Morgan Wairiu (Solomon Islands) 5 6 Lead Authors: Donovan Campbell (Jamaica), Virginie Duvat (France), Yimnang Golbuu (Palau), 7 Shobha Maharaj (Germany/Trinidad and Tobago), Johanna Nalau (Australia/Finland), Patrick Nunn 8 (Australia), John Pinnegar (United Kingdom), Olivia Warrick (New Zealand) 9 10 Contributing Authors: Giulia Anderson (USA/New Caledonia), Faye Abigail Cruz (Philippines), Eleanor 11 Devenish-Nelson (United Kingdom), Kris Ebi (USA), Johanna Loehr (Germany), Roché Mahon (Trinidad 12 and Tobago), Rebecca McNaught (Australia), Meg Parsons (New Zealand), Jeff Price (United Kingdom), 13 Stacy-Ann Robinson (Jamaica), Adelle Thomas (Bahamas) 14 15 Review Editors: John Agard (Trinidad and Tobago), Mahmood Riyaz (Maldives) 16 17 Chapter Scientist: Giulia Anderson (USA/New Caledonia) 18 19 Date of Final Draft: 1 October 2021 20 21 Notes: TSU Compiled Version 22 23 24 25 Table of Contents 26 27 Executive Summary..........................................................................................................................................3 28 15.1 Introduction ..............................................................................................................................................7 29 15.2 Points of Departure from AR5 ................................................................................................................8 30 15.2.1 Points of Departure on Exposure, Vulnerability, Impacts and Risks .............................................9 31 15.2.2 Points of Departure on Adaptation.................................................................................................9 32 15.3 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks of Climate Change...............................................................10 33 15.3.1 Synthesis of Observed and Projected Changes in the Physical Basis ..........................................10 34 15.3.2 Trends in Exposure and Vulnerability ..........................................................................................12 35 15.3.3 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks on Natural Systems ........................................................13 36 15.3.4 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks on Human Systems ........................................................23 37 Box 15.1: Key Examples of Cumulative Impacts from Compound Events: Maldives Islands and 38 Caribbean Region...................................................................................................................................32 39 Box 15.2: Loss and Damage and Small Islands ...........................................................................................34 40 15.4 Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts of Climate Change on Small Islands ...................36 41 15.5 Assessment of Adaptation Options and Their Implementation .........................................................37 42 15.5.1 Hard Protection ............................................................................................................................37 43 15.5.2 Accommodation and Advance as Strategies .................................................................................38 44 15.5.3 Migration ......................................................................................................................................39 45 15.5.4 Ecosystem-based Measures ..........................................................................................................39 46 15.5.5 Community-based Adaptation.......................................................................................................41 47 15.5.6 Livelihood Responses....................................................................................................................42 48 15.5.7 Disaster Risk Management, Early Warning Systems and Climate Services.................................43 49 15.6 Enablers, Limits and Barriers to Adaptation ......................................................................................45 50 15.6.1 Governance ...................................................................................................................................45 51 15.6.2 Health-Related Adaptation Strategies ..........................................................................................46 52 15.6.3 Adaptation Finance and Risk Transfer Mechanisms ....................................................................47 53 15.6.4 Education and Awareness-Raising ...............................................................................................49 54 15.6.5 Culture ..........................................................................................................................................49 55 15.7 Climate Resilient Development Pathways and Future Solutions in Small Islands ..........................51 56 15.8 Research Gaps ........................................................................................................................................52 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-1 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 FAQ 15.1: How is climate change affecting nature and human life on small islands, and will further 2 climate change result in some small islands becoming uninhabitable for humans in the near 3 future? .....................................................................................................................................................53 4 FAQ 15.2: How have some small-island communities already adapted to climate change? ...................54 5 FAQ 15.3: How will climate related changes affect the contributions of agriculture and fisheries to 6 food security in small islands?...............................................................................................................56 7 Large Tables....................................................................................................................................................58 8 References........................................................................................................................................................78 9 10 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-2 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Executive Summary 2 3 Observed Impacts 4 5 A sense of urgency is prevalent among small islands in the combating of climate change and in 6 adherence to the Paris Agreement to limit global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. Small 7 islands are increasingly affected by increases in temperature, the growing impacts of tropical cyclones (TCs) 8 , storm surges, droughts, changing precipitation patterns, sea-level rise (SLR), coral bleaching, and invasive 9 species, all of which are already detectable across both natural and human systems (very high confidence1) 10 {15.3.3.1, 15.3.3.2, 15.3.3.3, 15.3.4.1, 15.3.4.2, 15.3.4.3, 15.3.4.4, 15.3.4.5, 15.3.4.7}. 11 12 The observed impacts of climate change differ between urban and rural contexts, island types, and 13 tropical and non-tropical islands (high confidence). Coastal cities and rural communities on small islands 14 have been already impacted by sea-level rise, heavy precipitation events, tropical cyclones and storm surges. 15 Climate change is also affecting settlements and infrastructure, health and wellbeing, water and food 16 security, and economies and culture, especially through compound events (high confidence). As of 2017, an 17 estimated 22 million people in the Caribbean live below 6 metres elevation and 50% of the Pacific's 18 population lives within 10 km of the coast along with 50% of their infrastructure concentrated within 500 19 metres of the coast {15.3.4.1, 15.3.4.2, 15.3.4.3, 15.3.4.4, 15.3.4.5, 15.3.4.7}. 20 21 Tropical cyclones are severely impacting small islands (high confidence). The TC intensity and 22 intensification rates at a global scale have increased in the past 40 years with intensity trends generally 23 remaining positive. Intense TCs including categories 4 and 5 TCs have threatened human life and destroyed 24 buildings and infrastructural assets in small islands in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Among 29 Caribbean 25 islands, 22 were affected by at least one category 4 or 5 TC in 2017. TC Maria in 2017 destroyed nearly all 26 of Dominica's infrastructure and losses amounted to over 225% of the annual GDP. Destruction from TC 27 Winston in 2016 exceeded 20% of Fiji's current GDP. TC Pam devastated Vanuatu in 2015 and caused 28 losses and damages to the agricultural sector valued at USD 56.5 million (64.1% of GDP). Coast-focused 29 tourism is already extremely impacted by more intense TCs. {WGI 11.7.1, 12.4.7 15.2.1, 15.3.3.1, 15.3.3.3, 30 15.3.4.1, 15.3.4.2, 15,3.4.4, 15.3.4.5}. 31 32 Scientific evidence has confirmed that globally and in small islands tropical corals are presently at 33 high risk (high confidence). Severe coral bleaching, together with declines in coral abundance have been 34 observed in many small islands, especially those in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (high confidence). In the 35 Pacific, median return time between two severe bleaching events has diminished steadily since 1980. The 36 return time is now 6 years and often associated with the warm phase of ENSO events (high confidence). In 37 Mid-2016, a new ENSO event occurred which reduced living coral cover by 75% in the Maldives 38 {15.3.3.1.3, 15.3.4.8}. 39 40 Freshwater systems on small islands are exposed to dynamic climate impacts and are among the most 41 threatened on the planet. An 11-36% reduction is estimated in the volume of fresh groundwater lens of the 42 small atoll islands (area < 0.6 km²) of the Maldives due to SLR. The El Niño related 2015-16 drought in 43 Vanuatu led to reliance on small amounts of contaminated water left at the bottom of household tanks. A 44 Caribbean high-resolution drought atlas spanning 1950­2016 indicates that the region-wide 2013­2016 45 drought was the most severe event during the multi-decadal period. In Puerto Rico, the island experienced 80 46 consecutive weeks of moderate drought, 48 weeks of severe drought and 33 weeks of extreme drought 47 conditions between 2014 and 2016. Increasing trends in drought are apparent in the Caribbean although 48 trends in the western Pacific are not statistically significant {15.3.3.2, 15.3.4.3}. 49 50 Small islands host significant levels of global terrestrial species diversity and endemism. Due to the large 51 range of insular-related vulnerabilities, almost 50% of terrestrial species presently considered at risk of 52 global extinction also occur on islands (high confidence). Despite encompassing approximately two percent 1 In this Report, the following summary terms are used to describe the available evidence: limited, medium, or robust; and for the degree of agreement: low, medium, or high. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, and very high, and typeset in italics, e.g., medium confidence. For a given evidence and agreement statement, different confidence levels can be assigned, but increasing levels of evidence and degrees of agreement are correlated with increasing confidence. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-3 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 of the Earth's terrestrial surface, oceanic and other high-endemicity islands are estimated to harbour substantial 2 proportions of existing species including ~ 25% extant global flora, ~ 12% birds and ~10% mammals 3 {15.3.3.3}. 4 5 Projected Impacts 6 7 Projected climate and ocean-related changes will significantly affect marine and terrestrial ecosystems 8 and ecosystem services, which will in turn have cascading impacts across both natural and human 9 systems (high confidence). Changes in wave climate superimposed on SLR will significantly increase 10 coastal flooding (high confidence) and low-coastal and reef island erosion (limited evidence, medium 11 agreement). The frequency, extent, duration, and consequences of coastal flooding will significantly increase 12 from 2050 (high confidence), unless coastal and marine ecosystems are able to naturally adapt to SLR 13 through vertical growth (low confidence). These changes are a major concern for small islands given that a 14 high percentage of their population, infrastructure and economic assets are located in the low elevation 15 coastal zone of below 10 metres elevation {15.3.3.1.1, 15.3.3.1.2, 15.3.3.1.3, 15.3.3.1.4}. 16 17 Projected changes in the wave climate superimposed on SLR will rapidly increase flooding in small 18 islands, despite highly contrasting exposure profiles between ocean sub-regions (high confidence). A 5- 19 10 cm additional SLR (expected for ~2030­2050) will double flooding frequency in much of the Indian 20 Ocean and Tropical Pacific, while TCs will remain the main driver of (rarer) flooding in the Caribbean Sea 21 and Southern Tropical Pacific. Some Pacific atoll islands will likely2 undergo annual wave-driven flooding 22 over their entire surface from the 2060s­2070s to 2090s under RCP8.5, although future reef growth may 23 delay the onset of flooding (limited evidence, low agreement) {15.3.3.1.1}. 24 25 Modelling of both temperature and ocean acidification effects under future climate scenarios (RCP 4.5 26 and RCP 8.5) suggest that some small islands will experience severe coral bleaching on an annual basis 27 before 2040 (medium confidence). Above 1.5°C, globally inclusive of small islands, it is projected there 28 will be further loss of 70­90% of reef-building corals, with 99% of corals being lost under warming of 2°C 29 or more above the pre-industrial period. Intact coral reefs, seagrass meadows and mangroves provide a 30 variety of ecosystem services that are important to island communities (high confidence). These include 31 provisioning services regulating services, cultural services and those that support community resilience (high 32 confidence). If coastal ecosystems are degraded and lost, then the benefits they provide cannot be easily 33 replaced (medium confidence) {15.3.3.1.3, 15.3.3.1.4}. 34 35 Projected changes in aridity are expected to impose freshwater stress on many small islands, especially 36 SIDS (high confidence). It is estimated that with a warming of 1.5°C or less, freshwater stress on small 37 islands would be 25% less as compared to 2.0°C. While some island regions are projected to experience 38 substantial freshwater decline, an opposite trend is observed for some western Pacific and northern Indian 39 Ocean islands. Drought risk projections for Caribbean SIDS aligned with observations from the Shared 40 Socio-Economic Pathway (SSP) 2 scenario, indicate that a 1°C increase in temperature (from 1.7°C to 41 2.7°C) could result in a 60% increase in the number of people projected to experience a severe water 42 resources stress from 2043­2071. In some Pacific atolls, freshwater resources could be significantly affected 43 by a 0.40 m SLR. Similar impacts are anticipated for some Caribbean countries with worst-case scenario 44 (RCP8.5) indicating a 0.5-m SLR by the mid-century (2046-2065) and 1-m SLR by the end-of-century 45 (2081-2100). In SIDS with high projected population growth rates, they are expected to experience the most 46 severe freshwater stress by 2030 under a 2°C warming threshold scenario {15.3.3.2} 47 48 The continued degradation and transformation of terrestrial and marine ecosystems of small islands 49 due to human-dominated will amplify the vulnerability of island peoples to the impacts of climate 50 change (high confidence). New studies highlight large population reductions with an extinction risk of 100% 51 for endemic species within insular biodiversity hotspots including within the Caribbean, Pacific and 2 In this Report, the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain 99­100% probability, Very likely 90­100%, Likely 66­100%, About as likely as not 33­66%, Unlikely 0­33%, Very unlikely 0­10%, and Exceptionally unlikely 0­1%. Additional terms (Extremely likely: 95­ 100%, More likely than not >50­100%, and Extremely unlikely 0­5%) may also be used when appropriate. Assessed likelihood is typeset in italics, e.g., very likely). This Report also uses the term `likely range' to indicate that the assessed likelihood of an outcome lies within the 17-83% probability range. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-4 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Suandaland regions by 2100 for > 3°C warming {15.3.3.3}. This is likely to decrease the provision of resources 2 (e.g. potable water) to the millions of people living on small islands, resulting in impacts upon settlements and 3 infrastructure, food and water security, health, economies, culture, and migration (high confidence) {15.3.3.2, 4 15.3.3.3, 15.3.4.1, 15.3.4.2, 15.4.3, 15.3.4.4, 15.3.4.5, 15.3.4.6, 15.3.4.7}. 5 6 Reef island and coastal area habitability in small islands is expected to decrease because of increased 7 temperature, extreme sea levels and degradation of buffering ecosystems, which will increase human 8 exposure to sea-related hazards (high confidence). Climate and non-climate drivers of reduced habitability 9 are context specific. On small islands, coastal land loss attributable to higher sea level, increased extreme 10 precipitation and wave impacts, and increased aridity have contributed to food and water insecurities that are 11 likely to become more acute in many places (high confidence). In the Caribbean, additional warming by 12 0.2°­1.0°C, could lead to a predominantly drier region (5%­15% less rain than present-day), a greater 13 occurrence of droughts along with associated impacts on agricultural production and yield in the region. 14 Crop suitability modelling on several commercially important crops grown in Jamaica found that even an 15 increase less than +1.5 °C could result in a reduction in the range of crops that farmers may grow. Most 16 Pacific Island Countries could experience 50% declines in maximum fish catch potential by 2100 relative 17 to 1980­2000 under both an RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenario {15.3.4.3, 15.3.4.4}. 18 19 Future Risks 20 21 The reduced habitability of small islands is an overarching significant risk caused by a combination of 22 several Key Risks facing most small islands even under a global temperature scenario of 1.5 degrees 23 (high confidence). These are loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services; submergence 24 of reef islands); loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services ; water insecurity ; destruction of 25 settlements and infrastructure ; degradation of health and well-being ; economic decline and livelihood 26 failure); and loss of cultural resources and heritage. Climate-related ocean changes, including those for slow 27 onset events, and changes in extreme events are projected to cause and/or amplify Keys Risks in most small 28 islands. Identification of Key Risks facilitates the selection of optimal context-specific adaptation options. 29 Moreover, it can distil the benefits and/or disadvantages and long-term implications of choosing such options 30 (high confidence) {15.3.4.9}. 31 32 The vulnerability of communities in small islands, especially those relying on coral reef systems for 33 livelihoods, may exceed adaptation limits well before 2100 even for a low greenhouse gas emission 34 pathway (high confidence). The impacts of climate change on vulnerable low-lying and coastal areas, 35 present serious threats to the ability of land to support human life and livelihood's (high confidence). 36 Climate-related migration is expected to increase, although the drivers and outcomes are highly context- 37 specific and insufficient evidence exists to estimate numbers of climate-related migrants now and in the 38 future (medium evidence, high agreement) {15.3.4.1, 15.3.4.6, CCB7-1}. 39 40 Small islands are already reporting loss and damage particularly from tropical cyclones and increases 41 in sea-level rise (high confidence). Despite the loss of human life and economic damage the methods and 42 mechanisms to assess climate-induced loss and damage remain largely undeveloped for small islands. 43 Further, there are no robust methodologies to infer attribution and such assessments are limited. A research 44 gap on loss and damage includes how to assess the economic costs of loss and damage. Specific data on 45 experienced loss and damage across socio-economic groups and demographics are needed. Monitoring and 46 tracking slow onset events are equally important and require robust data {15.7, 15.8}. 47 48 Options, Limits and Opportunities of Adaptation 49 50 Some island communities are resilient with strong social safety nets and social capital that support 51 responses and actions already occurring, but there is limited information on the effectiveness of the 52 adaptation practices and the scale of needed action (high confidence). This is in part due to a need for a 53 better understanding of the limits to adaptation and of what constitutes current resilience and/or successful 54 adaptation in small island contexts. Greater insights into which drivers weaken local and indigenous 55 resilience, together with recognition of the socio-political contexts within which communities operate, and 56 the processes by which decisions are made, can assist in identifying opportunities at all scales to enhance Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-5 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 climate adaptation and enable action towards climate resilient development pathways (medium evidence, 2 high agreement) {15.6.1, 15.6.5, 15.7}. 3 4 In small islands, despite the existence of adaptation barriers several enablers can be used to improve 5 adaptation outcomes and to build resilience (high confidence). These enablers include better governance 6 and legal reforms; improving justice, equity and gender considerations; building human resource capacity; 7 increased finance and risk transfer mechanisms; education and awareness programmes; increased access to 8 climate information; adequately downscaled climate data and embedding Indigenous Knowledge and Local 9 Knowledge (IKLK) as well as integrating cultural resources into decision-making (high confidence) {15.6.1 10 15.6.3, 15.6.4, 15.6.5}. 11 12 Small islands present the most urgent need for investment in capacity building and adaptation 13 strategies (high confidence) but face barriers and constraints which hinder the implementation of 14 adaptation responses. Barriers and constraints arise from governance arrangements, financial resources and 15 human resource capacity. Additionally, institutional and legal systems are often inadequately prepared for 16 managing adaptation strategies such as large-scale settlement relocation and other planned and/or 17 autonomous responses to climate risks (high confidence). Adaptation strategies are already being 18 implemented on some small islands although barriers are encountered including inadequate up-to-date and 19 locally relevant information, limited availability of finance and technology, lack of integration of IKLK in 20 adaptation strategies, and institutional constraints (high confidence) {15.5.3, 15.5.4, 15.6.3, 15.6.4, 15.6.5}. 21 22 For many small islands, adaptation actions are often incremental and do not match the scale of 23 extreme or compounding events (high confidence). Much of the currently implemented adaptation 24 measures remain small in scale (e.g., community-based adaptation projects), sectoral in focus and do not 25 address the needed structural and system level adaptations to combat climate impacts and achieve long term 26 sustainability of adaptation interventions. To address these shortcomings enablers are being integrated into 27 National Adaptation Plans and Disaster Risk Reduction Plans (high confidence) {15.6.3}. 28 29 Although international climate finance has increased in magnitude small islands face challenges in 30 accessing adaptation finance to cope with slow and rapid onset events (high confidence). In the 31 Caribbean, 38% of flows were concessional loans and 62% were grants whereas in the Atlantic and Indian 32 Oceans nearly 75% of the flows were in the form of concessional loans and 25% were grants. Solutions to 33 these barriers are being explored and some small islands have started adopting enablers such as insurance 34 and microfinance at both the national and local levels in responding to adaptation needs and to facilitate 35 resiliency building. COVID-19 has caused, however, economic shock in many small islands which will limit 36 adaptation, undermine the attainment of Sustainable Development Goals and slow down climate resilient 37 development transitions {15.8.3}. 38 39 The unavailability of up-to-date baseline data and contrasting scenarios/temperature levels continue 40 to impair the generation of local-to-regional observed and projected impacts for small islands, 41 especially those that are developing nations (high agreement). Climate model data based on the most 42 recent suite of scenarios (RCPs and especially SSPs) are still not widely available to primary modelling 43 communities in most small island developing nations (high agreement). Coastal sites of small islands are not 44 well-represented in global gridded population and elevation datasets, thereby making estimation of 45 population exposure to SLR difficult. The lack of data continues to impede the development of robust 46 impacts-based modelling output (e.g. for terrestrial biodiversity). Downscaling is pivotal for small islands 47 due to their high diversity which makes generalisation invalid. 48 49 50 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-6 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.1 Introduction 2 3 This chapter examines the climate change impacts and projected risks faced by small islands, including the 4 detection and attribution of observed impacts, the loss and damage they experience, and the enablers, limits 5 and barriers to the implementation of adaptation options applicable to them. The implications of climate 6 change impacts on the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the need for more climate- 7 resilient development pathways based on a systems transitions approach, and how both of these intersect 8 with future potential responses are assessed within the context of small island states. 9 10 The small islands covered in this chapter are located within the tropics of the southern, northern, and western 11 Pacific Ocean, the central, eastern and western Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, the eastern Atlantic off the 12 coast of West Africa, and in the temperate Mediterranean Sea. In contrast to the Intergovernmental Panel on 13 Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), non-sovereign island states and territories 14 dependent on continental states and islands of semi-autonomous, sub-national island jurisdictions are 15 included in this chapter. Further, Small Island Developing States (SIDS) consisting of 39 small island and 16 low-lying coastal developing states which belong to the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) are covered 17 in this assessment. Islands in the polar and sub-polar regions, North Atlantic Ocean, the Baltic Sea, the North 18 Sea, the Black Sea and the Arctic Ocean are not included. 19 20 Small islands share similarities such as geographical remoteness, isolation, narrow resource bases, heavy 21 dependency on external trade, vulnerability to exogenous economic shocks, economic volatility, and limited 22 access to development finance. Many are biodiversity hotspots and experience a disproportionate impact of 23 natural hazards associated with climate change. They are also diverse in physical and biophysical 24 characteristics, economic systems, political/governance systems, and exhibit social and cultural differences. 25 Adaptation responses vary among small islands because such diversity requires place-specific and culturally- 26 specific adaptation responses. 27 28 The chapter is structured in accordance with the overall format of the AR6 Working Group II report (Figure 29 15.1). This section presents points of departure from AR5 and IPCC (Section 15.2). As shown in Figure 30 15.1, this is followed by an assessment of current and future risks that are expected to be experienced by 31 small islands (Sections 15.3 and 15.4), what measures have been implemented (Section 15.5) and enablers, 32 limits and barriers that are being encountered (Section 15.6). Section 15.7 deals with the SDGs, climate- 33 resilient development pathways and potential future responses. The chapter ends with an identification of 34 research gaps (Section 15.8). 35 36 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-7 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 15.1: Schematic illustration of the interconnections of Chapter 15 themes, including on observed impacts and 3 projected risks (Section 15.3) and on adaptation options and their implementation (Sections 15.5 and 15.6). 4 5 6 15.2 Points of Departure from AR5 7 8 Points of departure from AR5 are highlighted in this section in relation to exposure, vulnerability, impacts and 9 risks (Section 15.2.1), and adaptation options (Section 15.2.2). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-8 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 15.2.1 Points of Departure on Exposure, Vulnerability, Impacts and Risks 3 4 Scientific studies since AR5 confirm that global temperature will continue to increase even if greenhouse gas 5 emissions are drastically reduced and will escalate the vulnerability, impacts and multiple interrelated risks 6 experienced by small islands (high confidence) (IPCC, 2018). A greater sense of urgency in lowering global 7 greenhouse gas emissions and a call for action now is resonating among small island states. 8 9 Post-AR5 new studies confirm observed impacts on the natural and human systems and indicate projected 10 risks in both these systems over time. Over the past four decades, there was a significant increase in the 11 probability of the global exceedances of tropical cyclones (TCs) of major intensity (Kossin et al., 2020), a 12 trend confirmed by the occurrence of a growing number of intense TCs affecting the Atlantic and Pacific 13 regions since AR5 (Magee et al., 2016; Bhatia et al., 2019; Knutson et al., 2019). Since AR5 also scientific 14 evidence has confirmed that tropical corals are presently at high risk (very high confidence) and if global 15 warming exceeds 1.5°C, known coral reef restoration options may be ineffective (IPCC, 2018). Even 16 achieving emissions reduction targets consistent with the ambitious goal of 1.5°C of global warming under 17 the Paris Agreement will result in the further loss of 70­90% of reef-building corals compared to today, with 18 99% of corals being lost under warming of 2°C or more above the pre-industrial period (high confidence) 19 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). 20 21 Additionally, since the last assessment more robust scientific evidence exists on the impacts of sea level rise 22 (SLR) and extreme sea level events (ESL) on small islands. Under Representative Concentration Pathways 23 emission scenarios, RCP2.6, RCP4.5 and RCP8.5, many low-lying coastal areas at all latitudes, including 24 small islands, will experience SLR and ESL events such as coastal storm surges and coastal flooding more 25 frequently in the coming decades (Section 4.2.3.4.1; IPCC, 2019 ). SLR and ESL events will affect atoll 26 islands and islands with higher elevations differently. New studies forecast that small islands are likely to 27 experience some of the largest increases in endemic extinctions and may substantially contribute to future 28 global biodiversity loss, as well as to impaired ecosystem functioning (Fortini et al., 2015; Vogiatzakis et al., 29 2016; Cramer et al., 2018). Scientific evidence points to large population reductions with an extinction risk 30 of 100% for endemic species within insular biodiversity hotspots by 2100 (IPBES, 2018; Manes et al., 31 2021). An overarching concern since AR5 is the reduced habitability of small islands. Eight key risks 32 affecting the habitability of small islands are identified in this assessment and these are covered in the 33 pertinent sections of this chapter which assess adaptation responses. 34 35 15.2.2 Points of Departure on Adaptation 36 37 New knowledge of adaptation responses used in small islands has grown significantly since AR5. Strategies 38 include hard protection, land reclamation and permanent relocation, with improved appreciation for when 39 each strategy is relevant (IPCC, 2019). Evidence of migration as an adaptation response to climate change 40 remains limited (Roland and Curtis, 2020). Understanding of ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) has 41 improved considerably but there is medium agreement regarding its benefits (Doswald et al., 2014; Nalau et 42 al., 2018a) and limited evidence and low agreement on its economic efficiency and long-term effectiveness 43 (Renaud et al., 2016; Oppenheimer et al., 2019). 44 45 Since the previous assessment, integration of Indigenous Knowledge and Local Knowledge (IKLK) into 46 adaptation is recognized as a major benefit in preparing and recovering from TCs and EbA (Narayan et al., 47 2020). The roles of social capital, health-related adaptation strategies and livelihood responses are more fully 48 understood (Nalau et al., 2018b; Nunn and Kumar, 2018; Abram et al., 2019; IPCC, 2019). Gender equity, 49 climate justice, climate services, early warning systems, and disaster risk reduction (Vaughan and Dessai, 50 2014; Newth and Gunasekera, 2018), which were data gaps in AR5, have received more treatment, 51 especially in the context of small islands. Stronger evidence confirms that education and awareness-raising 52 enhance household and community adaptation (high confidence). 53 54 Knowledge has improved on limits to adaptation, including projected timeframes of limits for hard 55 protection (high confidence) and EbA (medium confidence) (IPCC, 2019). There is also a better 56 understanding that barriers and governance challenges vary by island and island groups (high confidence) 57 and result in them having different adaptive capacities (IPCC, 2019). A major barrier to adaptation is limited Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-9 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 information on the feasibility, outcomes and sustainability of adaptation responses in small islands. 2 Moreover, limited time series data on monitoring and evaluation make evaluating the feasibility of 3 adaptation responses difficult. 4 5 Adaptation financing for small islands has increased since AR5 although leveraging finance is a constraint 6 and remains complex (Robinson and Dornan, 2017). Informal microfinancing has grown and risk transfer 7 mechanisms are being explored although funding and access to insurance schemes is limited (Handmer and 8 Nalau, 2019; Nunn and Kumar, 2019a; Petzold and Magnan, 2019). In small islands the methods and 9 mechanisms to assess climate-induced loss or damage remain undeveloped (medium confidence) (Thomas 10 and Benjamin, 2017; Handmer and Nalau, 2019). 11 12 Many small islands have experienced economic shock arising from COVID-19 and have had to re-direct 13 investment previously targeting sustainable development (Sheller, 2020). Adaptation will be affected by 14 economic contraction and indebtedness. Framing adaptation within climate-resilient development pathways 15 (CRDPs) that emphasise systems transition and are implemented at scale may bolster small islands' 16 resilience to multiple shocks like COVID-19. 17 18 19 15.3 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks of Climate Change 20 21 Compared to larger landmasses, many climate change driven impacts and risks are amplified for small 22 islands. This is due largely to their boundedness (surrounded by ocean), their comparatively small land areas, 23 and often their remoteness from more populated parts of the world, which restricts the global connectivity of 24 islands. This is true on all types of islands (Figure 15.2). 25 26 27 28 Figure 15.2: Classification of small island types - showing island characteristics and elements of human exposure 29 (based on Nunn et al. (2016); Kumar et al. (2018)). 30 31 32 15.3.1 Synthesis of Observed and Projected Changes in the Physical Basis 33 34 There is increased evidence of warming in the small islands, particularly in the latter half of the 20th century 35 (high confidence). The diversity of metrics and timescales used across studies makes it impossible to provide 36 explicit comparisons, however Table 15.1 provides a summary of observed changes. 37 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-10 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Table 15.1: Observed changes in basic climate metrics. RSLR: Relative Sea-Level Rise Phenomenon Location Basic Specific Metric Time Reference Trends period Literature Increase in daily mean minimum McGree et al. Air temp West Pacific Warmer 1951-2015 temp by 0.14C/ decade (2019) Increase in daily minimum temp Stephenson et Air temp Caribbean Warmer 1961-2010 by 0.28C/ decade al. (2014) Increase in annual mean surface Mariotti et al. Air temp Mediterranean Warmer 1960-2005 temp 0.19-0.25C/ decade (2015) Land & Sea Annual mean temperatures are (MedECC, Mediterranean Warmer now 1.54°C above the 1860- 2020) 1890 level for land and sea temp Rainfall Mediterranean Drier Decrease in annual mean 1960-2005 Mariotti et al. Rainfall precipitation by -0.6 (2015); Rainfall mm/day/decade Ducrocq et al. Rainfall (2016) Drought No clear No significant long-term trends McGree et al. Pacific Ocean Drought 1951-2015 pattern Tropical in rainfall (2019) Cyclones Tropical No clear Nguyen et al. Cyclones Indian Ocean 1983-2015 Tropical Cyclones pattern (2018) Caribbean No clear No significant long-term trends pattern Jones et al. in rainfall in the Caribbean over 1901-2012 (2015) the 20th century Low Inconsistent between subregions Herrera and confidence Caribbean in the 1950-2016 direction of change and not statistically significant Ault (2017) Pacific Ocean Low Inconsistent between subregions 1951-2015 McGree et al. confidence and not statistically significant (2016); McGree in the in the tropical Pacific. et al. (2019) direction of Significant decrease in Hawaii change and sub-tropical South Pacific North Atlantic Increase in Walsh et al. intensity 1975-2009 and decrease in (2016) frequency Western North Decreasing Decrease in frequency except Walsh et al. 1977-2010 Pacific frequency over central North Pacific. (2016) South Pacific Increase in 1989-2009 Walsh et al. intensity (2016) and Kuleshov et al. decrease in (2020) frequency Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-11 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Tropical No clear Poor data coverage 1961-2008 Tauvale and Cyclones Indian Ocean Tsuboki (2019); Kuleshov et al. pattern (2020) RSLR East Greater than Becker et al. Caribbean 3-5mm/year 1993-2014 average (2019) RSLR West/North Greater than Becker et al. Caribbean 2.5-3mm/year 1993-2014 average (2019) RSLR Western Greater than Becker et al. Tropical 5-11mm/year 1993-2014 Pacific average (2019) Mauritius/ Greater than Becker et al. 1993-2014 RSLR 4mm/year (2019) Indian Ocean average RSLR Rodrigues/ Greater than Becker et al. 6mm/year 1993-2014 Indian Ocean average (2019) 1 2 3 Some phenomena have no demonstrable trends in a region because of limited observed data, these include 4 Tropical Cyclone (TC) frequency in the North-Eastern Pacific and Indian Oceans (Walsh et al., 2016); other 5 phenomena are too variable to detect an overarching trend, including rainfall in regions where inter-annual 6 and decadal variabilities such as the El Niño-Southern Oscillation, North Atlantic Oscillation, Pacific 7 Decadal Variability, Atlantic Multidecadal Variability are dominant (Jones et al., 2015; McGree et al., 8 2019). 9 10 There are also marked regional variations in the rates of Sea Level Rise (SLR) (Merrifield and Maltrud, 11 2011; Palanisamy et al., 2012; Esteban et al., 2019) and Relative (that is, incorporating land movement) Sea- 12 level Rise (RSLR). Various factors, including interannual and decadal sea level variations associated with 13 low frequency modulation of ENSO and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and vertical land motion 14 contribute to both relative sea-level variations and related uncertainties. Increased distant-source swell height 15 from extra-tropical cyclones (ETCs) also contributes to Extreme Sea Levels (ESLs) (Mentaschi et al., 2017; 16 Vitousek et al., 2017). Together, these stressors increase ESLs and their impacts, including coastal erosion 17 and marine flooding and their impacts on both ecosystems and ecosystem services and human activities 18 (Section 15.3.3.1 and Table 15.3). 19 20 Like observed impacts, projected impacts include some high confidence assessments, which are distributed 21 across a diversity of models, timescales, and metrics. Generalised trends, and specific projections when 22 available, are provided in Table 15.2. However, actual values and spatial distribution of precipitation 23 changes remain uncertain as they are strongly model dependent (Paeth et al., 2017). Furthermore, the current 24 capabilities of climate models, to adequately represent variability in climate drivers including ENSO, and the 25 topography of small islands, limit confidence in these future changes (Cai et al., 2015a; Harter et al., 2015; 26 Guilyardi et al., 2016). 27 28 29 Table 15.2: A small subset of projected changes in basic climate metric. Med=Mediterranean; NC=no change 30 [INSERT TABLE 15.2 HERE] 31 32 33 15.3.2 Trends in Exposure and Vulnerability 34 35 Most of the research that has been conducted on exposure and vulnerability from climate change 36 demonstrates that factors including those that are geopolitical and political, environmental, socio-economic 37 and cultural, together conspire to increase exposure and vulnerability of small islands (Box 15.1; Betzold, 38 2015; McCubbin et al., 2015; Duvat et al., 2017b; Otto et al., 2017; Weir et al., 2017; Taupo et al., 2018; Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-12 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Barclay et al., 2019; Hay et al., 2019a; Ratter et al., 2019; Salmon et al., 2019; Bordner et al., 2020; 2 Douglass and Cooper, 2020; Duvat et al., 2020a). Additional pressures on coastal and marine environments, 3 including overexploitation of natural resources, may further exacerbate possible impacts in the future (Bell et 4 al., 2013; Pinnegar et al., 2019; Siegel et al., 2019). 5 6 Furthermore, these factors exacerbate climate change induced problems such as coastal flooding and erosion 7 faced by small islands. These impacts continue to worsen, which put small islands at increasingly higher risk 8 to the impacts of climate change (Box 15.1). There are multiple stressors that affect the vulnerability of small 9 islands to climate change (McNamara et al., 2019). 10 11 The problems of increasing exposure and vulnerability is most clearly seen in atoll islands. For example, in 12 the capital of Tuvalu, economic stressors, food related stressors, and overcrowding make the islands much 13 more vulnerable to climate impacts including changing precipitation patterns, ESLs, intense strong winds, 14 warming SST and ocean acidification (McCubbin et al., 2015). Small islands, in trying to address the 15 problem of limited land availability, put in place practices that lead to increasing exposure for island people. 16 In Majuro, Marshall Islands (Ford, 2012), Tarawa, Kiribati (Biribo and Woodroffe, 2013; Duvat, 2013), and 17 the Maldives Islands (Kench, 2012; Naylor, 2015; Duvat and Magnan, 2019b), population growth has led to 18 land reclamation and the building of coastal protection structures, such as seawalls. Land reclamation and 19 coastal protection structures negatively impact coastal and marine ecosystems, including reefs and 20 mangroves, which compromise the protection services that they deliver to island communities through wave 21 energy attenuation and sediment supply (Gracia et al., 2018; Curnick et al., 2019; Duvat and Magnan, 2019a) 22 and may impact the long term sustainable adaptive planning of islands (Giardino et al., 2018). In addition, 23 these construction activities disrupt natural coastal processes, thereby causing coastal erosion, which in turn 24 increases the risk of flooding (Yamano et al., 2007; Duvat et al., 2017b) (Figure 15.3). This becomes a 25 vicious cycle, with more land reclamation necessary to accommodate growing populations. Land 26 reclamation requires stabilisation by protection structures, which then contributes to environmental 27 degradation that increases the exposure and vulnerability of the communities living in these atolls (Duvat et 28 al., 2017b). 29 30 31 32 Figure 15.3: Percentage of current population in selected small islands occupying vulnerable land (the number of 33 people on land that may be exposed to coastal inundation--either by permanently falling below MHHW, or temporarily 34 falling below the local annual flood height) in 2100 under an RCP4.5 scenario (adapted from Kulp and Strauss (2019) 35 using the CoastalDEM_Perm_p50 model). Positions on the map are based on the capital city or largest town. 36 37 38 15.3.3 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks on Natural Systems 39 40 15.3.3.1 Impacts on Marine and Coastal Systems 41 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-13 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.3.1.1 Submergence and flooding of islands and coastal areas 2 Recent studies confirmed that observed ESL events causing extensive flooding generally resulted from 3 compound effects, including the combination of SLR (Section 3.2.2.2 and Cross-Chapter Box SLR in 4 Chapter 3) with ETCs, TCs and tropical depressions (WGI AR6 Sections 11.7.1 and 11.7.2), ENSO-related 5 high-water levels associated with high or spring tide and/or local human disturbances amplifying impacts 6 (high confidence). For example, the major floods that occurred in 1987 and 2007 in the Maldives involved 7 the combination of distant-source swells and high spring tides and the settlement of reclaimed low-lying 8 areas (Box 15.1; Wadey et al., 2017). In the Tuamotu atolls, French Polynesia, the 1996 and 2011 floods 9 were due to the combination of distant-source swells causing lagoon filling and the obstruction of inter-islet 10 channels by human-built structures (Canavesio, 2019). In 2011, the flooding of the lagoon-facing coast of 11 Majuro Atoll, Marshall Islands, resulted from the combination of high sea levels occurring during La Niña 12 conditions and seasonally high tides (Ford et al., 2018). Another example is the widespread flooding caused 13 by distant TC Pam (2015) in Kiribati and Tuvalu, which was attributed to the strong swell generated, the 14 long duration of the event and exceptionally high regional sea levels (Hoeke et al., 2021). On high tropical 15 islands, major floods often occurred during TC events, due to the cumulative effects of storm surge and river 16 flooding, the impacts of which were exacerbated by human-induced changes to natural processes in urban 17 areas. This for example occurred in 2014 (TC Bejisa) in Reunion Island, France, in a harbour area favourable 18 to water accumulation (Duvat et al., 2016); in 2015 (TC Pam) in Port Vila, Vanuatu, where urbanisation and 19 human-induced changes to the river exacerbated flooding (Rey et al., 2017); and in 2017 (TC Irma) in Saint- 20 Martin, Caribbean, where urbanisation had the same effect (Rey et al., 2019). Successive tropical 21 depressions generating heavy rains were also involved in extensive flooding, for example in 2012 in Fiji 22 (Kuleshov et al., 2014) and in 2014 in the Solomon Islands (Ha'apio et al., 2019). 23 24 Reconstructions of past storm surges and modelling studies assessing storm surge risk similarly highlighted 25 high variations of risk along island coasts, due to variations in exposure, topography and bathymetry (high 26 confidence). For example, the storm surge caused by TC Oli (2010) on the high volcanic island of Tubuai, 27 French Polynesia, ranged from a few centimetres to 2.5 m, depending on coast exposure (Barriot et al., 28 2016). Investigating the contribution of reef characteristics to variations in wave-driven flooding on Roi- 29 Namur Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, (Quataert et al., 2015) found that the coasts fronted by 30 narrow reefs with steep fore reef slopes and smoother reef flats are the most flood-prone. Modelling studies 31 assessing storm surge risk in Fiji (McInnes et al., 2014) and Samoa (McInnes et al., 2016) confirmed the 32 influence of coast exposure and water depth on risk distribution. In Apia, Samoa, Hoeke et al. (2015, p. 33 1117) found "differences in extreme sea levels in the order of 1 m at spatial scales of less than 1 km" and 34 estimated (p. 1131) that a "1 m SLR relative to constant topography increases wave energy reaching the 35 shore by up to 200% during storm surges." These studies reaffirmed the main control exerted by SLR on 36 ESL events and associated storm surges compared to ENSO (high confidence). In Hawaii and the Caribbean, 37 SLR is projected to exponentially increase flooding, with nearly every centimeter of SLR causing a doubling 38 of the probability of flooding (Taherkhani et al., 2020). Simulations of SLR-induced flooding resulting from 39 the combination of (i) direct marine flooding, (ii) flow reversal in drainage networks caused by extreme tide 40 levels and (iii) the elevation of groundwater levels, at Honolulu, Hawaii, highlighted the major influence of 41 this latter component (which is the most difficult to manage), as well as the increase of the proportion of 42 triple-mechanism flooding as sea level rises (Habel et al., 2020). Where coral reefs buffer flooding through 43 wave attenuation, flooding will be further aggravated by reef decline over time (Section 15.3.3.1.3). 44 45 Larger-scale studies confirmed that projected changes in the wave climate superimposed on SLR will rapidly 46 increase flooding in small islands, despite highly contrasting exposure profiles between ocean sub-regions 47 (high confidence) (Shope et al., 2016; Mentaschi et al., 2017; Shope et al., 2017; Vitousek et al., 2017; 48 Morim et al., 2019). In particular, Vitousek et al. (2017) showed that even a 5-10 cm additional SLR 49 (expected for ~2030­2050) will double flooding frequency in much of the Indian Ocean and Tropical 50 Pacific, while TCs will remain the main driver of (rarer) flooding in the Caribbean Sea and Southern 51 Tropical Pacific (Figure 15.3). Some Pacific atoll islands, which already experience major floods, will likely 52 undergo annual wave-driven flooding over their entire surface from the 2060s­2070s (Storlazzi et al., 2018) 53 to 2090s (Beetham et al., 2017) under RCP8.5, although future reef growth may delay the onset of flooding 54 (limited evidence, low agreement) (Key Risk KR2 in Figure 15.5). 55 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-14 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.3.1.2 Reef island destabilisation and coastal erosion 2 Over the past three to five decades, shoreline changes were dominated by stability on reef islands and 3 erosion on high islands; attribution of observed erosion to SLR and other climate change-related drivers is 4 challenged by the complex interplay of multiple climatic, ecological and human drivers (high confidence). 5 Since the 1950s-1970s, and even in regions exhibiting higher than global averaged SLR rates, atoll islands 6 maintained their land area (high confidence). A literature review including 709 Indian and Pacific Oceans 7 atoll islands showed that 73.1% of these islands were stable in area, while respectively 15.5% and 11.4% 8 increased and decreased in area (Duvat, 2018). The rates of change did not correlate with SLR rates, 9 suggesting that the impact of SLR on island land area was obscured by other climate drivers and human 10 disturbances on some islands (high confidence) (Kench et al., 2015; McLean and Kench, 2015; Duvat, 11 2018). However, reef island disappearance and reduction in land area was clearly observed in New 12 Caledonia and the Solomon Islands, and was attributed to the synergistic interactions of gradual SLR with 13 stronger trade winds causing higher sea levels and local tectonics in the Solomon Islands (Albert et al., 2016; 14 Garcin et al., 2016). Despite important knowledge gaps on coastal erosion in high tropical islands, recent 15 studies confirmed increasing shoreline retreat and beach loss over the past decades, mainly due to TC and 16 ETC waves and human disturbances (high confidence) (e.g., in the Caribbean region: Anguilla, Saint-Kitts, 17 Nevis, Montserrat, Dominica and Grenada (Cambers, 2009; Reguero et al., 2018)), and Pacific (Hawaii 18 (Romine and Fletcher, 2013); Tubuai, French Polynesia (Salmon et al., 2019)) and Indian Oceans (Anjouan, 19 Comoros (Ratter et al., 2016)). 20 21 Despite storm-induced erosion prevailing along some shoreline sections, recent studies reaffirmed the 22 contribution of TC and ETC waves to coastal and reef island vertical building through massive reef-to-island 23 sediment transfer (high confidence). For example, TC Ophelia (1958) and Category 5 TC Fantala (2016), 24 which respectively eroded the islands of Jaluit Atoll, Marshall Islands (Ford and Kench, 2016), and Farquhar 25 Atoll, Seychelles (Duvat et al., 2017c), also contributed to island and beach expansion. Likewise, tropical 26 depressions can have constructional effects, as reported on Fakarava Atoll, French Polynesia (Duvat et al., 27 2020b). On Saint-Martin/Sint Maarten and Saint-Barthélemy, the 2017 hurricanes, which caused marked 28 shoreline retreat at most beach sites, also allowed beach formation and beach ridge development along some 29 natural coasts (Duvat et al., 2019a; Pillet et al., 2019). Similarly, El Niño and La Niña were involved in rapid 30 and highly contrasting shoreline changes (high confidence), including reef island accretion in the Ryukyu 31 Islands, Japan (Kayanne et al., 2016), beach shifts on Maiana and Aranuka Atolls, Kiribati (Rankey, 2011), 32 and beach erosion on Hawaii, USA (Barnard et al., 2015). These contrasting shoreline responses were 33 respectively due to coral reef degradation from past bleaching events providing material to islands, wave 34 directional shifts, and increased wave energy. The role of bleaching events in increasing short-term sediment 35 generation in atoll contexts was confirmed by a study conducted on Gaafu Dhaalu Atoll, Maldives, which 36 reported an increase of sediment production from ~0.5 kg CaCO3 m­2 yr-1 to ~3.7 kg CaCO3 m-2 yr-1 37 between 2016 (pre-bleaching) and 2019 (bleaching + 3 years) (Perry et al., 2020). 38 39 There is high confidence that accelerating SLR and increased wave height will affect the geomorphology of 40 reef islands (Baldock et al., 2015; Costa et al., 2019; Tuck et al., 2019) and coastal systems on high islands 41 (Grady et al., 2013; Barnard et al., 2015; Bindoff et al., 2019), and that the responses of these systems will 42 highly depend on changes in boundary conditions (wave regime and direction, exposure to extreme events, 43 impacts of ocean warming and acidification on supporting ecosystems, bathymetry and reef flat roughness) 44 and the degree of disturbance of their natural dynamics by human activities (Smithers and Hoeke, 2014; 45 McLean and Kench, 2015; Bheeroo et al., 2016; Ratter et al., 2016; Shope et al., 2016; Duvat et al., 2017a; 46 Kench and Mann, 2017; Kench et al., 2018; Duvat et al., 2019a). Reef islands and beach and beach-dune 47 systems that are not disturbed by human activities are respectively expected to migrate lagoonward (Webb 48 and Kench, 2010; Albert et al., 2016; Beetham et al., 2017; Costa et al., 2019; Tuck et al., 2019) and 49 landward (Bindoff et al., 2019), and to also experience increased erosion as well as changes in configuration, 50 volume and elevation (Kench and Mann, 2017; Tuck et al., 2019) (Bramante et al., 2020; Kane and Fletcher, 51 2020). Small reef islands and narrow coastal systems affected by human disturbances will increasingly be at 52 risk of disappearance due to SLR (KR2 in Figure 15.5), enhanced sediment loss caused by extreme events 53 (Duvat et al., 2019a) and/or human activities (high confidence), as reported in Hawaii (Romine and Fletcher, 54 2013), Puerto Rico (Jackson et al., 2012), Sicily (Anfuso et al., 2012), and Takuu, Papua New Guinea (Mann 55 and Westphal, 2014). SLR will also increase coastal erosion in the Mediterranean Sea, (e.g., in the Aegean 56 Archipelago, Greece (Monioudi et al., 2017)), and Mallorca, Spain (Enríquez et al., 2017). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-15 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.3.1.3 Impacts on marine and coastal ecosystems 2 Loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services is a Key Risk in small islands (see KR1 in 3 Figure 15.5). Coral bleaching caused by elevated water temperatures is the most visible and widespread 4 manifestation of a climate change impact on coastal ecosystems in most small islands but is far from being 5 the only one (Section 3.4.2.1; Section 5.3.4; Spalding and Brown, 2015; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017; IPCC, 6 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019; Sully et al., 2019). Severe coral bleaching, together with declines in coral 7 abundance have been documented in many small islands, especially those in the Pacific and Indian 8 Oceans,(e.g., Guam, Fiji, Palau, Vanuatu, Chagos, Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles, and the Maldives (high 9 confidence) (Box 15.1; Golbuu et al., 2007; Woesik et al., 2012; Perry and Morgan, 2017; Hughes et al., 10 2018). During severe bleaching events, not only do reefs lose a significant amount of live coral cover, but 11 they also experience a decrease in growth potential, so reef erosion surpasses reef accretion (Perry and 12 Morgan, 2017). Median return time between two severe bleaching events has diminished steadily since 1980 13 and is now only 6 years (e.g.,Hughes et al., 2017b; Hughes et al., 2018) and is often associated with warm 14 phase of ENSO events (high confidence) (Lix et al., 2016). Modelling of both bleaching and ocean 15 acidification effects under future climate scenarios suggested that some Pacific small islands (e.g., Nauru, 16 Guam, Northern Marianas Islands) will experience conditions that cause severe bleaching on an annual basis 17 before 2040 and that 90% of the world reefs are projected to experience conditions that result in severe 18 bleaching annually by 2055 (medium confidence) (van Hooidonk et al., 2016). Models are currently 19 predicting the large-scale loss of coral reefs by mid-century under even low-emissions scenarios. Even 20 achieving emissions reduction targets consistent with the ambitious goal of 1.5°C of global warming under 21 the Paris Agreement will result in the further loss of 70­90% of reef-building corals compared to today, with 22 99% of corals being lost under warming of 2°C or more above the pre-industrial period (high confidence) 23 (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). 24 25 Satellite data and local field studies at 3351 sites in 81 countries including small islands show that not all 26 coral reefs are equally exposed to severe temperature stress events, and even similar coral reefs exposed to 27 similar conditions show local and regional variation and species-specific responses (Sully et al., 2019). There 28 is great variability in terms of sensitivity of corals to climate change, as also demonstrated in the Comoros 29 Archipelago (Cowburn et al., 2018), in the Pacific (Fox et al., 2019; Mollica et al., 2019; Romero-Torres et 30 al., 2020) and globally (Sully et al., 2019; McClanahan et al., 2020). It has been hypothesised that low- 31 latitude tropical reefs bleached less than those in higher latitudes because: (i) of the geographical differences 32 in species composition, (ii) of the higher genotypic diversity at low latitudes, and (iii) some corals were pre- 33 adapted to thermal stress because of consistently warmer temperatures at low latitude prior to thermal stress 34 events (Sully et al., 2019). However, latitudinal variation was not reported in other global surveys of coral 35 bleaching occurrence (Donner et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2017a; Hughes et al., 2017b; McClanahan et al., 36 2019). Ainsworth et al. (2016) and Ateweberhan et al. (2013) showed that coral bleaching can be mitigated 37 by pre-exposure to elevated temperatures. Regionally, recovery is also highly variable. While some reefs in 38 the Seychelles and Maldives were shown to recover to pre-disturbance levels of coral cover after previous 39 bleaching events (Box 15.1; Pisapia et al., 2016; Koester et al., 2020), other reefs underwent seemingly 40 permanent regime shifts toward domination by fleshy macro algae (Graham et al., 2015), or major declines 41 in carbonate budgets, and thus the capacity of reefs to sustain vertical growth under rising sea levels (Perry 42 and Morgan, 2017). 43 44 Despite their vital social and ecological value, substantial declines in seagrass communities have been 45 documented in many small islands (Section 3.4.2.5; Arias-Ortiz et al., 2018; Kendrick et al., 2019; Brodie et 46 al., 2020), including Fiji (Joseph et al., 2019), Reunion Island (Cuvillier et al., 2017), Bermuda, Cayman 47 Islands, US Virgin Islands (Waycott et al., 2009), Kiribati (Brodie et al., 2020), Federated States of 48 Micronesia, and Palau (Short et al., 2016), but attribution of such declines to climatic influences remains 49 weak (low confidence). Impact of climate change on seagrasses goes beyond the loss of seagrass but includes 50 acceleration of seagrass decomposition (Kelaher et al., 2018), palatability (Jimenez-Ramos et al., 2017) and 51 the cumulative effect of warming and eutrophication (Ontoria et al., 2019). Seagrasses face a multitude of 52 threats including physical disturbance and direct damage caused by rapidly growing human populations, 53 declines in water quality, and coastal erosion (Short et al., 2016). Experimental studies have shown increased 54 mortality, leaf necrosis, and respiration when seagrasses are exposed to higher-than-normal temperatures 55 (Hernan et al., 2017). As such, seagrass meadows growing near the edge of their thermal tolerance are at risk 56 from rising temperatures (Pedersen et al., 2016). In the Mediterranean, seagrass meadows are already 57 showing signs of regression, which may have been aggravated by climate change (high confidence). Some Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-16 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 studies suggest seagrasses have potential for acclimation and adaptation (Duarte et al., 2018; Ruiz et al., 2 2018; Beca-Carretero et al., 2020). Chefaoui et al. (2018) attempted to forecast the distribution of two 3 seagrasses in the future, including around the islands of Cyprus, Malta, Sicily and the Balearic Islands. 4 Under the worst-case scenario, Posidonia oceanica was projected to lose 75% of suitable habitat by 2050. 5 Conversely, it has been suggested that seagrasses could actually benefit from an increase in anthropogenic 6 carbon dioxide because of increased growth and photosynthesis (Hopley et al., 2007; Waycott et al., 2011; 7 Sunday et al., 2016; Repolho et al., 2017). However, Collier et al. (2017) argued that when faced with 8 increased heat waves, thermal stress will rarely be offset by the benefit of elevated CO2 and therefore that 9 the widespread belief that seagrasses will be a `winner' under future climate change conditions seems 10 unlikely (low confidence). 11 12 Since 2011, the Caribbean region has been experiencing unprecedented influxes of the pelagic seaweed 13 Sargassum. These extraordinary sargassum `blooms' have resulted in mass strandings of sargassum 14 throughout the Lesser Antilles, with significant damage to coastal habitats, mortality of seagrass beds and 15 associated corals (van Tussenbroek et al., 2017), as well as consequences for fisheries and tourism. Whether 16 or not such events are related to long-term climate change remains unclear, however it has been suggested 17 that the influx may be related to strong Amazon discharge, enhanced West African upwelling, together with 18 rising seawater temperatures in the Atlantic (low confidence) (Oviatt et al., 2019; Wang et al., 2019). Since 19 2011, the Pacific atoll nation of Tuvalu has also been affected by algal blooms, the most recent being a large 20 growth of Sargassum on the main atoll of Funafuti, and this phenomenon has been related to anthropogenic 21 eutrophication and high seawater temperatures (De Ramon N'Yeurt and Iese, 2014). 22 23 Mangroves face serious risks from deforestation and unsustainable coastal development (Section 3.4.2.5; 24 Gattuso et al., 2015). Large-scale die-offs around many small islands suggest that mangrove face increased 25 risks from climate change (Sippo et al., 2018). Mangrove seaward edge retreat has been demonstrated in 26 American Samoa and at Tikina Wai in Fiji, in Bermuda, West Papua, Grand Cayman and attributed to long- 27 term SLR or tectonic subsidence (Ellison, 1993; Ellison, 2005; Gilman et al., 2007; Ellison and Strickland, 28 2015). Inundation-related mortality of mangroves could, in theory, be mitigated if mangrove substrates can 29 "keep up" with rising sea level by accretion. Pacific Island studies using radionuclides (e.g., 210Pb, 137Cs) 30 have suggested that most mangroves are keeping up with current rates of sea level rise (Alongi, 2008; 31 MacKenzie et al., 2016), while surface elevation tables SETs suggest otherwise. Lovelock et al. (2015) 32 reported that nearly 70% of the mangroves monitored with SETs are not keeping up with current SLR rates. 33 If SLR exceeds 6 mm/yr, mangroves may be unable to maintain their elevation relative to sea level, a 34 threshold likely to be surpassed in the next 30 years under high emission scenarios (Ellison, 1993; Saintilan 35 et al., 2020). In these worst-case scenarios, flooding would result in tree, root, and rhizome death and an 36 abrupt change in elevation through peat collapse (Krauss et al., 2010; Lang'at et al., 2014), creating a 37 positive feedback loop between SLR and elevation loss. Geomorphology, hydrology, tidal range, and 38 suspended sediments are important factors that will determine if mangroves will survive increased rates of 39 SLR (Lovelock et al., 2015; Sasmito et al., 2015; Rogers et al., 2019). TCs can cause extensive damage to 40 mangroves (Short et al., 2016). While immediate physical damage is often considerable, trees can sometimes 41 recover by re-foliating, re-sprouting or regenerating (Kauffman and Cole, 2010). Examples of substantive 42 mangrove recovery include the regrowth of trees in the Bay Islands of Honduras following Hurricane Mitch 43 (October 1998) (Fickert, 2018) and in the Nicobar Islands, India, following the December 2004 Indian 44 Ocean Tsunami (Nehru and Balasubramanian, 2018). 45 46 Sandy beaches are an important ecosystem in small islands, with high socio-economic as well as ecosystem 47 services value (Ellison, 2018). Turtles and many seabirds nest just above the high-water mark on sandy 48 beaches or among sand dunes, but TCs, rising seas, storm surges and heavy rainfall as well as inappropriate 49 coastal development can erode beaches (Section 15.3.1.2) resulting in damage to nests and eggs (Fuentes et 50 al., 2011). Beach-nesting turtle populations are projected to become threatened around many small islands as 51 a result of future climate change (e.g., Bonaire - Netherlands Antilles (Fish et al., 2005), Bioko Island - 52 Equatorial Guinea (Veelenturf et al., 2020), Cyprus (Varela et al., 2019), Raine Island ­ Australia (Pike et 53 al., 2015)), although other populations such as those around the Cape Verde Islands are projected to remain 54 relatively robust (Abella Perez et al., 2016). Turtles are also threatened by temperature rise around some 55 small islands as warmer temperatures on nesting beaches can lead to an unbalanced sex-ratio in the 56 population (e.g. St. Eustatius island, (Laloë et al., 2016)). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-17 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.3.1.4 Marine and coastal ecosystem services 2 Intact coral reefs (Woodhead et al., 2019), seagrass meadows (Hejnowicz et al., 2015), and mangroves 3 (UNEP, 2014b) (Friess, 2016) provide a variety of ecosystem services that are key to island communities, 4 including provisioning services (e.g., timber, fisheries, aquaculture), regulating services (e.g., coastal 5 protection, carbon storage, filtering of pollutants), cultural services (Pascua et al., 2017) as well as 6 supporting community resilience (Förster et al., 2019). If coastal ecosystems are degraded and lost, then the 7 benefits they provide are also lost (Oleson et al., 2018; Förster et al., 2019; Brodie et al., 2020). In small 8 islands where the risk of loss to ecosystem services is high (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17), many 9 of these ecosystem services cannot be easily replaced (medium confidence). The beneficial role that coral 10 reefs play in coastal protection through wave attenuation, and therefore enhancing climate resilience in small 11 islands, has been extensively studied (e.g., Elliff and Silva, 2017; Harris et al., 2018; Reguero et al., 2018). 12 Indeed, it has been demonstrated that in small islands (such as the Cayman Islands, Grenada, Bahamas) 13 averted damages as a result of protecting intact coral reefs, can be considerable when expressed as a 14 percentage of GDP (Beck et al., 2018). Ferrario et al. (2014) conducted a global meta-analysis including 15 many small islands across the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Oceans and found that coral reefs reduce wave 16 height by an average of 84% (and wave energy by 97%) and that reef crests alone dissipate most of this 17 energy. Based on another meta-analysis of 69 case studies worldwide (wave heights measured before and 18 after the habitat), Narayan et al. (2016) observed that coral reefs, mangroves, and seagrass reduced wave 19 height by 70%, 31% and 36%, respectively (Figure 15.4) and thus perform an essential role in protecting 20 human lives and livelihoods (high confidence). Post-TC studies have provided additional evidence for the 21 protection services offered by coastal ecosystems. On some Caribbean islands (e.g., Saint-Martin/Sint 22 Maarten) where the dense indigenous vegetation belt was preserved, the vegetative structure buffered the 23 waves of TCs Irma and José (2017), reducing the extent of marine inundation and shoreline retreat to a 30 24 m-wide coastal strip against values >160 m in deforested areas (Duvat et al., 2019a; Pillet et al., 2019). By 25 contrast, the destruction of mangrove ecosystems, even a few trees around the fringes, can accelerate coastal 26 erosion, as exemplified by observations in Micronesia (Krauss et al., 2010; Nunn et al., 2017a). 27 28 As corals, mangroves and seagrasses disappear, so do fish and other dependent organisms that directly 29 benefit industries such as ecotourism and fisheries (high confidence) (Graham et al., 2015; Cinner et al., 30 2016). These impacts are sometimes exacerbated by catastrophic events such as tropical storms and marine 31 heatwaves that destroy habitats and hence the resources upon which coastal fisheries depend (Sainsbury et 32 al., 2018). There is high confidence that climate change impacts, together with local human disturbances, 33 will continue to denude coastal and marine ecosystem services in many small islands with serious 34 consequences for vulnerable communities (Elliff and Silva, 2017; Bindoff et al., 2019). 35 36 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-18 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 15.4: Ridge-to-reef interrelated protection services delivered by ecosystems on small islands. On small islands, 3 terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems are interconnected and interdependent, with each ecosystem contributing 4 towards maintaining the health of the others. Together, these ecosystems provide protection services against natural 5 hazards (including flooding, erosion, landslides, mudflows, glacial melting and sedimentation) to human populations 6 living on islands. As a consequence, the degradation of one or more of these ecosystems significantly reduces the 7 protection services provided by this continuum of ecosystems. Conversely, the protection or restoration of one or more 8 of these ecosystems also provides benefits to the other ecosystems and enhances the protection services provided to 9 island inhabitants. See Box CCP1.1 for more details. 10 11 12 15.3.3.2 Impacts on Freshwater Systems 13 14 Freshwater systems on small islands are exposed to dynamic climate impacts and are considered to be 15 among the most threatened on the planet (Key Risk 3 in Box 15.1; Settele et al., 2014; IPCC, 2018; Butchart 16 et al., 2019). Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2019) estimated that freshwater stress on small islands would be 25% Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-19 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 less with a warming of 1.5°C or less as compared to 2.0°C. While some island regions are projected to 2 experience substantial freshwater decline, an opposite trend is observed for some western Pacific and 3 northern Indian Ocean islands (Holding et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2016). Island topography and 4 ecophysiology influence water storage capacity and rainfall response potential (Dunn et al., 2018). On high 5 volcanic and granitic islands, freshwater ecosystems are often closely connected with coastal spaces, and 6 changes in freshwater supply from river systems have direct implications for salinity and sediment loads 7 (high confidence) (Yang et al., 2015; Zahid et al., 2018). Climate impacts on streamflow patterns in tropical 8 islands also create shifts in water supply for downstream users and habitat conditions for organisms 9 supporting a wide range of ecosystem services (high confidence) (Strauch et al., 2015; Frazier and 10 Brewington, 2019; Frauendorf et al., 2020). 11 12 Projected changes in aridity are expected to impose freshwater stress on many small islands, especially SIDS 13 (high confidence).These changes are congruent with drought risk projections for Caribbean SIDS (Lehner et 14 al., 2017; Taylor et al., 2018) and aligned with observations from the Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 15 (SSP) 2 scenario, where a 1°C increase in temperature (from 1.7°C to 2.7°C) could result in a 60% increase 16 in the number of people projected to experience a severe water resources stress from 2043­2071 (Schewe et 17 al., 2014; Karnauskas et al., 2018). In the Mediterranean region, freshwater resources will decline 10­30% 18 (medium confidence) (Koutroulis et al., 2016; Kumar et al., 2020). For example, analysis of annual and 19 seasonal streamflow data on the island of Mallorca shows a decreasing trend during spring and summer, with 20 a reduction of up to 17% in some basins (Garcia, 2017). 21 22 The influence of climate change spans several variables for atoll islands with multiple, interacting forces that 23 exacerbate impacts on freshwater ecosystems (Connell, 2016), including groundwater and freshwater 24 resources (Warix et al., 2017). Analysis of groundwater resources on Roi-Namur, in the Marshall Islands, 25 reveals that the extent of salinisation of fresh groundwater lenses varies with the scale of the overwash 26 (Gingerich et al., 2017). Alsumaiei and Bailey (2018) estimated an 11-36% reduction in the fresh 27 groundwater lens volume of the small atoll islands (area < 0.6 km²) of the Maldives due to SLR. Small 28 overwash events lead to saline conditions that last for up to 3 months (Oberle et al., 2017). 29 30 SLR undermines the long-term persistence of freshwater-dependent ecosystems on islands (Goodman et al., 31 2012) and is one of the greatest threats to the goods and services these environments provide (Box 16.1; 32 Mitsch and Hernandez, 2013). Hoegh-Guldberg et al. (2019) posit that as sea level rises, managing the risk 33 of salinisation of freshwater resources will become increasingly important. On Roi-Namur, Marshall Islands, 34 Storlazzi et al. (2018) found that the availability of freshwater is impacted by the compounding effect of 35 SLR and coastal flooding. In other Pacific atolls, Terry and Chui (2012) showed that freshwater resources 36 could be significantly affected by a 0.40 m SLR. Similar impacts are anticipated for some Caribbean 37 countries (Stennett-Brown et al., 2017). Such changes in SLR could increase salinity in estuarine and aquifer 38 water, affecting ground and surface water resources for drinking and irrigation water (Mycoo, 2018a) across 39 the region (high confidence). SLR also affects groundwater quality (Bailey et al., 2016), salinity (Gingerich 40 et al., 2017), and water-table height (Masterson et al., 2014). 41 42 15.3.3.3 Impacts on Terrestrial Biodiversity Systems 43 44 Despite encompassing approximately two percent of the Earth's terrestrial surface, oceanic and other high- 45 endemicity islands are estimated to harbour substantial proportions of existing species including ~ 25% 46 extant global flora, ~ 12% birds and ~10% mammals (Alcover et al., 1998; Wetzel et al., 2013; Kumar and 47 Tehrany, 2017). Islands also have higher densities of critically endangered species, hosting just under half of 48 all species currently considered to be at risk of extinction (Spatz et al., 2017a; Spatz et al., 2017b), hence 49 making the loss of terrestrial biodiversity and related ecosystem services a Key Risk (KR3) for small islands 50 (Figure 15.5). Impacts from developing synergies between changing climate, natural and anthropogenic 51 stressors on islands (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17) could lead to disproportionate changes in 52 global biodiversity. The most prominent drivers include: SLR, increasing intensities of extreme events 53 (human activities -- especially continuing/accelerating habitat destruction/degradation) and the introduction 54 of invasive alien species (IAS) (Tershy et al., 2015). When coupled with characteristic small island traits 55 such as spatial and other resource limitations, these synergies play a critical role towards increasing the 56 vulnerability of these insular ecosystems (Box CCP1.1). This is likely to hinder the adaptation response of 57 terrestrial biota increasing the risk of biodiversity loss and in turn, impairing the resilience capacity of Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-20 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 ecosystem functioning and services (high confidence) (Heller and Zavaleta, 2009; Ferreira et al., 2016; 2 Vogiatzakis et al., 2016). 3 4 Current observations of insular species response to climate change generally report geographic range 5 shifts/reductions for species and vegetation associations in addition to resulting impacts on local ecology 6 (Virah-Sawmy et al., 2016; Koide et al., 2017; Maharaj et al., 2019). These include changes in plant/animal 7 phenology and resulting community alterations such as for the common Mediterranean island species 8 Quercus ilex (holly oak) and Ficus carica (common fig). Species have been shifting greater distances to 9 access not only suitable climate conditions but also by association, suitable breeding conditions and seasonal 10 food. Examples include: migratory birds such as Coturnix coturnix now having earlier spring arrival dates in 11 the Mediterranean compared to six decades ago and the increased mortality of the iconic Argyroxyphium 12 sandwicense (Hinahina) as result of warmer drier trends at Hawaiian high altitudes (Krushelnycky et al., 13 2012; Taylor and Kumar, 2016a; Vogiatzakis et al., 2016). There have also been die-offs of some species 14 from temperature extremes (e.g., flying fox species: Pteropus species) within the Pacific islands (Taylor and 15 Kumar, 2016a). 16 17 Recorded alterations of ecological interactions include increased competition, changes to migratory routes 18 (Harter et al., 2015) and mismatches between species, such as increased pathogen attacks on Mediterranean 19 forest species (Vogiatzakis et al., 2016). Also, in some areas of Madagascar there has been increased 20 vulnerability to fire, due to the replacement of succulents by less fire resilient species (Virah-Sawmy et al., 21 2016). Further, the low functional redundancy of island ecosystems implies a comparatively higher 22 proportion of keystone species than continents, many of them being endemics (Harter et al., 2015), with 23 potentially unpredictable system consequences due to climate-induced ecological changes. For example, 24 Caribbean land crabs have been observed to alter their food intake as a response to drying conditions 25 (McGaw et al., 2019) and Aldabra giant land tortoises have reduced their activity in response to increasing 26 temperature and decreasing precipitation (Falcon and Hansen, 2018); such changes in both these ecosystem 27 engineers are of potential consequence for seed dispersal, among other ecological functions. 28 29 The majority of studies modelling geographical range changes of small island species, to even the most 30 optimistic 21st century climate change scenarios imply a reduction in climate refugia (Table 15.3, Box 31 CCP1.1). This is due to projected strong shifts, reductions or even complete losses of climatic niches 32 resulting from inadequate geographic space for species to track suitable climate envelopes (high confidence) 33 (e.g., Maharaj and New, 2013; Fortini et al., 2015; Struebig et al., 2015b). Because of the high proportion of 34 global endemics hosted within small and especially isolated islands, the resulting increased extinction risk of 35 such species (up to 100%) could lead to disproportionate losses in global biodiversity (medium to high 36 confidence) (Harter et al., 2015; Manes et al., 2021). 37 38 SLR has been projected to impact the terrestrial biodiversity of low-lying islands and coastal regions via 39 large habitat losses both directly (e.g., submergence) and indirectly (e.g., salinity intrusion, salinisation of 40 coastal wetlands and soil erosion) at even the 1m scenario (medium to high confidence). However, these 41 impacts vary depending on the islands' topographical differences. In a study of SLR impacts on insular 42 biodiversity hotspots, (Bellard et al., 2013a) reported that the Caribbean islands, Sundaland and the 43 Philippines were projected to suffer the most habitat loss while the East Melanesian islands were projected to 44 be lesser (but not minimally) affected. The most threatened of these, the Caribbean, was projected to have 45 between 8.7% to 49.2% of its islands entirely submerged respectively from 1m to 6 m SLR (Bellard et al., 46 2013a). However, many current projection studies consider marine flooding directly and seldom incorporate 47 other indirect impacts such as increased habitat losses from horizontal erosion loss, increased salinity levels, 48 tidal ranges and extreme events. These projections are considered to be conservative, underestimating the 49 extent of habitat loss to terrestrial biodiversity (Bellard et al., 2013b). 50 51 Marine flooding is expected to destroy habitats of coastal species, particularly range-restricted coastal and/or 52 single-island endemics (many already listed as at least `threatened' by the International Union for 53 Conservation of Nature [IUCN]) within the limited terrain on atoll islands. These species have limited 54 opportunities to accommodate such direct impacts of climate change apart from shifting further inland or to 55 other neighbouring atolls which might have favourable habitat. However, fragmentation of habitat due to 56 anthropogenic activity may hinder migration further inland, while shifting to neighbouring islands is not 57 viable due to the water barrier between islands (high confidence) (Bellard et al., 2013b; Wetzel et al., 2013; Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-21 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Kumar and Tehrany, 2017). Additionally, migratory birds, which use small islands (e.g. atolls) for stopovers 2 or breeding/nesting sites, are projected to become impacted. Within the Mediterranean and Caribbean, 3 significant losses to coastal wetlands - critical habitat for migratory birds has already been observed, with 4 further significant habitat losses, redistribution and changes in quality being projected across island systems 5 such as the Bahamas (Caribbean) and Sardinia (Mediterranean) (Vogiatzakis et al., 2016; Wolcott et al., 6 2018). 7 8 Indirect impacts of SLR may potentially result in equal or more biodiversity loss than direct impacts 9 (medium confidence). Relocation of displaced coastal human populations and associated intensive 10 agriculture and urban areas inland to natural habitat may result in greater biodiversity loss than direct 11 impacts ­ especially on islands with large coastal populations and urban centres (Wetzel et al., 2012; Bellard 12 et al., 2013b). Given the dense population of insular hotspots (~31.8% of existing humans within ~ 15.9% of 13 inhabited global land area) and the fact that on many islands, large proportions of human populations live 14 within coastal regions, it has been suggested that immense impacts from such relocations should be factored 15 into projection and adaptation studies (Wetzel et al., 2012). 16 17 Tropical island natural habitats/systems are highly vulnerable to extreme weather events such as TCs, due to 18 their small size, unique ecological systems and often low socio-economic capacity (high confidence) (Box 19 15.2; Goulding et al., 2016; Schütte et al., 2018). Growing evidence suggests high resilience of forest 20 habitats (Keppel et al., 2014; Luke et al., 2017), especially within intact forest ecosystems to hurricanes and 21 cyclones (Goulding et al., 2016). While initial damage can be high, relatively fast recovery rates have been 22 reported for both floral and faunal components of these ecosystems (Cantrell et al., 2014; Shiels et al., 2014; 23 Monoy et al., 2016; Richardson et al., 2018). Within the Caribbean in particular, high resilience of forest 24 types has been associated with the current intensity and return rate of hurricanes over the last 150 years. 25 26 It should however be underscored that these relatively fast recovery rates are associated with the present 27 intensity and return rate of TCs. They do not reflect the impacts of increasingly intense events such as 28 Hurricane Dorian (2019), which resulted in almost complete inundation of several low-lying islands of the 29 Bahamas from storm surges. Severe weather events also have indirect effects on islands' biodiversity -- 30 interacting synergistically with other stressors, such as increased invasion by non-native species and land use 31 change. For example, TCs within Papua New Guinea resulted in the destruction of subsistence gardens, 32 which led inhabitants to clear forest areas for new farming areas and for harvesting of timber resources to 33 rebuild (Goulding et al., 2016). 34 35 The most recent projections suggest that TC intensity is predicted to increase as climate continues to change 36 (Walsh et al., 2016; Kossin et al., 2017). There are too few studies available to suggest potential future 37 response trends of these ecosystems to this increased intensity, however it seems plausible that present 38 resilience capacities may be adversely impacted (medium confidence) (Marler, 2014). Further, the potential 39 for stressors such as forest fragmentation/degradation or IAS combining with these increasingly intense 40 events to cause precipitating ecosystem cascades is a real concern (Goulding et al., 2016). 41 Continued high rates of habitat loss and degradation have been reported for many small islands as natural 42 habitats continue to be cleared to meet increasing demands upon natural resources from rising human 43 populations, agriculture, urbanisation, unsustainable tourism, overgrazing and fires. This increases the 44 vulnerability of ecosystems within especially oceanic islands -- where isolation has given rise to high levels 45 of endemism but simple biotic communities, with low functional redundancy (Box CCP1.1). There is high 46 confidence that climate change may exacerbate the effects of this habitat loss upon the biodiversity of these 47 islands as the climate refugia (Table 15.3) and the upslope shifts of range-restricted, dispersal-limited and 48 poorly competitive species, confined within narrow latitudinal (and decreasing altitudinal) gradients, are 49 increasingly challenged by fragmented and degraded landscapes (e.g., Struebig et al., 2015a; IPBES, 2019). 50 Additionally, high-altitude ecosystems such as cloud forests which harbour high levels of endemism are 51 projected to shrink due to increasing atmospheric temperature and competition from upward-shifting 52 lowland species (Taylor and Kumar, 2016a). These may ultimately increase the risk of multiple extinctions, 53 negatively impacting upon global biodiversity levels (high confidence) (Taylor and Kumar, 2016a; Portner et 54 al., 2021). 55 56 Analyses of historical and current threats indicate that IAS and disease have been the primary drivers of 57 insular extinctions in modern history (Bellard et al., 2016). Impacts of IAS on islands are projected to Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-22 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 increase with time due to synergies between climate change and other traditional drivers such as increasing 2 global trade, tourism, agricultural intensification, over exploitation and urbanisation (Bellard et al., 2014; 3 Russell et al., 2017). Changing climate conditions may not necessarily increase the rate of IAS introductions 4 but is expected to improve chances of IAS establishment via (i) altering IAS transport and introduction 5 mechanisms, (ii) increasing the impacts and distributions of existing IAS and (iii) altering the effectiveness 6 of existing control strategies (Hellmann et al., 2008; Russell et al., 2017). These are likely to enhance IAS 7 impacts on islands including: restructuring of ecological communities leading to declines and 8 extinctions/extirpations in flora and fauna, habitat degradation, declining ecosystem functioning, services 9 and resilience, and in extreme cases, potential community homogenisation (high confidence) (Russell and 10 Blackburn, 2017; IPBES, 2019). Given the high degree of endemicity within oceanic islands and their 11 associated vulnerabilities, such exacerbation by changing climate pose a serious threat to decreasing global 12 biodiversity (medium to high confidence) (van Kleunen et al., 2015). 13 14 Compared to continents, terrestrial IAS are disproportionately prevalent on islands (almost three-quarters of 15 global species currently threatened by IAS and disease are found on islands) and also generate stronger 16 impacts (e.g., within alpine ecosystems of high islands) than on continents (high confidence)(Bellard et al., 17 2014; Bellard et al., 2016; Frazier and Brewington, 2019). Russell and Blackburn (2017) suggested a 18 correlation between small island size and increased numbers of IAS. SIDS within the Indian Ocean and in 19 particular, the Pacific SIDS region were reported to have significantly more IAS (medium confidence), while 20 the Caribbean and Atlantic SIDS have fewer numbers but faster accumulation of IAS. Finally, while there 21 have been developments in the eradication of IAS on islands (Jones et al., 2016), there is sparse evidence and 22 hence assessment of the degree to which measures designed to prevent introduction and to manage invasion 23 pathways and establishment have been successful. 24 25 26 Table 15.3: Percentage of selected islands classified as refugia for biodiversity at increasing levels of warming. While 27 protected land is still `protected' this table demonstrates the difficulty of protecting lands which might be `more 28 resilient' to climate change under increasing levels of warming and current land use practices. Derived from current and 29 future projected distributions of ~130,000 terrestrial fungi, plants, invertebrates and vertebrates (Warren et al., 2018a). 30 Refugia =areas remaining climatically suitable for >75% of the species modelled (Warren et al., 2018b). Projections: 31 based on mean impacts from 21 CMIP5 climate model patterns (no dispersal) and elevationally downscaled to 1km 32 under interpolated warming levels derived from RCP 2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.0 (Warren et al., 2018a). First column-set = % 33 island/island chain classified as a refugia based on climate alone ; second column-set = % natural land projected to be 34 climate refugia -- illustrating potential refugia `space' already lost to habitat conversion. Colour Key: white > 50%; 35 yellow = 30%-50%; red = 17%-30% and dark red <17% of land classified as refugia. 36 [INSERT TABLE 15.3 HERE] 37 38 39 15.3.4 Observed Impacts and Projected Risks on Human Systems 40 41 15.3.4.1 Island Settlements and Infrastructure 42 43 As a result of slow onset ocean and climate changes and changes in extreme events, settlements and 44 infrastructure of small islands are at growing risk due to climate change in the absence of adaptation 45 measures (high confidence). Ocean acidification and deoxygenation, increased ocean temperatures and 46 relative sea level rise are impacting marine, coastal and terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services, 47 making settlements more exposed and vulnerable to climate-related hazards. Changes in rainfall patterns 48 such as heavy precipitation result in annual flood events that damage major assets and result in a loss of 49 human life. Examples of settlements where this has occurred are Port of Spain (Mycoo, 2014b; Mycoo, 50 2018a) , Haiti (Weissenberger, 2018), Viti Levu (Brown et al., 2017; Singh-Peterson and Iranacolaivalu, 51 2018), urban areas of Fiji and Kiribati (McAneney et al., 2017; Cauchi et al., 2021), Male', Maldives 52 (Wadey et al., 2017), and Mahé, in the Seychelles (Etongo, 2019). 53 54 The main settlements of small islands are located along the coast and with decades of high density coastal 55 urban development, their population, buildings and infrastructure are currently exposed to multiple climate 56 change-related hazards (Kumar and Taylor, 2015; Mycoo, 2017) and face key risks (high confidence) (KR5 57 in Figure 15.5). In many small islands, population is concentrated in the Low Elevation Coastal Zone 58 (LECZ) which is defined as coastal areas below 10 metres elevation. Approximately 22 million in the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-23 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Caribbean live below 6 metres elevation (Cashman and Nagdee, 2017) and an estimated 90% of Pacific 2 Islanders live within 5 km of the coast, if Papua New Guinea is excluded (Andrew et al., 2019). In the 3 Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, over 60% of the population lives within 1 km of the coast (Andrew et al., 4 2019). Most Pacific islands have 50% of their infrastructure within 500 metres of the coast (Kumar and 5 Taylor, 2015), and in Kiribati, Marshall Islands and Tuvalu, >95% of the infrastructure is located in the 6 LECZ (Andrew et al., 2019) (Figure 15.3). Sustainable development challenges including insufficient land 7 use planning and land use competition contribute to increased vulnerability of human settlements to climate 8 change in small islands (Kelman, 2014)(Mycoo, 2021). 9 10 Categories 4 and 5 TCs are severely impacting settlements and infrastructure in small islands. TC Maria in 11 2017 destroyed nearly all of Dominica's infrastructure and losses per unit of GDP amounted to more than 12 225% of the annual GDP (Eckstein et al., 2018). Destruction from TC Winston in 2016 amounted to more 13 than 20% of Fiji's current GDP (Cox et al., 2018). Additionally, living conditions in human settlements are 14 changing due to storm surge which is already penetrating further inland compared with a few decades ago 15 (IPCC, 2018 Section 3.4.4.3; Brown et al., 2018). 16 17 A growing percentage of the population in small islands lives in informal settlements which occupy marginal 18 lands leading to increased population exposure and vulnerability to climate-related hazards (Mycoo and 19 Donovan, 2017). Unplanned settlements have compounded flooding brought on by slow onset hazards such 20 as coastal and riverine flooding and fast onset events such as TCs and storm surges (Butcher-Gollach, 2015; 21 Chandra and Gaganis, 2016; Mycoo, 2017). Unsustainable land use practices and difficulties in enforcing 22 land use zoning and building guidelines in informal settlements make them highly vulnerable to such events 23 (Butcher-Gollach, 2015; Mecartney and Connell, 2017; Mycoo, 2017; Mycoo, 2018b; Trundle et al., 2018; 24 Mycoo, 2021). 25 26 TC intensification in the future is likely to cause severe damage to human settlements and infrastructure in 27 small islands. Additionally, SLR is expected to cause significant loss and damage (Martyr-Koller et al., 28 2021). Based on SLR projections, almost all port and harbour facilities in the Caribbean will suffer 29 inundation in the future (Cashman and Nagdee, 2017). In Jamaica and St Lucia, SLR and ESLs are projected 30 to be key risks to transport infrastructure at 1.5°C unless further adaptation is undertaken (Monioudi et al., 31 2018). Similar findings were reported for Samoa (Fakhruddin et al., 2015). Even islands of higher elevation 32 are expected to be threatened, given the high amount of infrastructure located near to the coast, for example 33 Fiji (Kumar and Taylor, 2015). 34 35 15.3.4.2 Human Health and Well-being 36 37 Small islands face disproportionate health risks associated with changes in temperature and precipitation, 38 climate variability, and extremes (Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in Chapter 16; Key Risk 4 in Section 39 15.3.9, Figure 15.5). Climate change is projected to increase the current burden of climate-related health 40 risks (Weatherdon et al., 2016; Ebi et al., 2018; Schnitter et al., 2019). Health risks can arise from exposures 41 to extreme weather and climate events, including heatwaves; changes in ecological systems associated with 42 changing weather patterns that can result, for example, in more disease vectors, or in compromised safety 43 and security of water and food; and exposures related to disruption of health systems, migration, and other 44 factors (see Cross-Chapter Box ILLNESS in Chapter 2; McIver et al., 2016; Mycoo, 2018a; WHO, 2018). 45 46 Extreme weather and climate events, particularly TCs, floods, drought, and heat waves can cause injuries, 47 infectious diseases, and deaths (Box 15.1; Schütte et al., 2018). For example, category 5 TC Winston hit Fiji 48 on 20 February 2016. During the national state of emergency (7 March and 29 May 2016), the World Health 49 Organization portable toolkit for an early warning alert and response system (EWARS in a Box) was 50 deployed within 24 hours; it recorded 34,113 cases of the nine syndromes among 326,861 consultations in a 51 population of about 900,000; 48% of cases were influenza-like illnesses, 30% were acute watery diarrhoea, 52 and 13% were suspected cases of dengue. There also were 583 cases of Zika-like illness (1.7% of all cases) 53 and two large outbreaks of viral conjunctivitis (total of 880 cases). During TC Maria in Puerto Rico, there 54 were more deaths per 100,000 among individuals living in municipalities with the lowest socioeconomic 55 development and for men 65 years of age or older (Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018); this excess risk persisted for 56 at least a year after the event. The first human cases of leptospirosis in the U.S. Virgin Islands occurred in Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-24 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2017 after TC Irma and Maria. TCs also can affect treatment and care for people with non-communicable 2 diseases, including exacerbation or complications of illness and premature death (Ryan et al., 2015). 3 4 Heat-related mortality and risks of occupational heat stress in small island states are projected to increase 5 with higher temperatures (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Mendez-Lazaro et al., 2018). Higher temperatures 6 also can affect the productivity of outdoor workers (Taylor et al., 2021). Climate change, urbanization, and 7 air pollution are risk factors for the rise of allergic diseases in Asia and the (Pawankar et al., 2020). 8 9 Tropical and sub-tropical islands face risks from vector-borne diseases, such as malaria, dengue fever, and 10 the Zika virus. El Niño events can increase the risk of diseases such as Zika virus by increasing biting rates, 11 decreasing mosquito mortality rates, and shortening the time required for the virus to replicate within the 12 mosquito (Caminade et al., 2017). By combining disease prediction models with climate indicators that are 13 routinely monitored, alongside evaluation tools it is possible to generate probabilistic dengue outlooks in the 14 Caribbean and early warning systems (Oritz et al., 2015; Lowe et al., 2018). Projections suggest that more 15 individuals will become at risk of dengue fever by the 2030s and beyond because of an increasing abundance 16 of mosquitos and larger geographic range (Ebi et al., 2018). Projected increases in mean temperature could 17 double the dengue burden in New Caledonia by 2100 (Teurlai et al., 2015). In the Caribbean, Saharan dust 18 transported across the Atlantic can interact with Caribbean seasonal climatic conditions to become respirable 19 and contribute to asthma presentations at the emergency department (See Table 15.5; Akpinar-Elci et al., 20 2015). 21 22 Ciguatera fish poisoning (CFP) is a foodborne illness caused by toxic dinoflagellate algae that proliferate on 23 degraded coral reefs and that can contaminate reef fish; symptoms can remain for a few weeks to months. 24 CFP occurs in tropical and subtropical regions, primarily in the South Pacific and Caribbean, but wherever 25 reef fish are consumed (Traylor and Singhal, 2020). In the Caribbean Sea, increasing ocean temperatures are 26 expected to stabilize or slightly decrease the incidence of CFP because of shifts in species distribution of 27 dinoflagellates associated with CFP (Kibler et al., 2015). CFP is endemic in the Cook Islands and French 28 Polynesia, where incidence is associated with sea surface temperature anomalies (Zheng et al., 2020). In the 29 Canary Islands, tropicalization trends due to climate change are expected to increase CFP occurrence in the 30 future (Rodriguez et al., 2017). In addition, in the Caribbean, increased density of Sargassum algae, possibly 31 due to ocean temperature impacts on ocean currents compounded by agricultural pollution, may lead to 32 increased respiratory illnesses (Resiere et al., 2018; Resiere et al., 2019; Resiere et al., 2020). 33 34 Climate driven changes in the ability to access locally grown or harvested food, either through 35 environmental degradation or changes in extreme event magnitude and/or frequency, can increase 36 dependence on imported food and increase rates of malnutrition and non-communicable diseases 37 (Springmann et al., 2016; WHO, 2018; Savage et al., 2019; Lieber et al., 2020). Projections suggest that 38 local food accessibility could be reduced by 3.2% in the low- and middle-income countries of the Western 39 Pacific (including the Philippines, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and other Pacific islands) by 40 2050, with approximately 300,000 associated deaths possible (Springmann et al., 2016). A climate change- 41 related 20% decline in coral reef fish production in some Pacific Island countries by 2050 could exacerbate 42 the population growth-driven gap between volume of fish needed for nutritional security and fish available 43 through sustained harvest (Bell et al., 2013; Cauchi et al., 2019; Savage et al., 2019)). 44 45 Heavy reliance on aquifers and rainwater harvesting in small islands, particularly atolls, coupled with 46 overcrowding, population growth, and contamination increase the risk of waterborne disease (McIver et al., 47 2014; Strauch et al., 2014; McIver et al., 2016). For example, seasonal rainfall in Kiribati is associated with 48 waterborne disease (such as diarrhea, cholera, and typhoid fever). Future projections indicate increases in the 49 number of days of heavy rainfall by 2050, suggesting future increases in risk in heavily populated areas 50 (McIver et al., 2014). Damage to water and sanitation services can cause infectious disease outbreaks, such 51 as the cholera outbreak that occurred in Haiti following TC Matthew (Raila and Anderson, 2017; Hulland et 52 al., 2019). 53 54 Evidence is emerging of the mental health impacts of climate change. Tuvaluans are experiencing distress 55 because of the local environmental impacts caused or exacerbated by climate change, and by hearing about 56 the potential future consequences of climate change (Gibson et al., 2020). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-25 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.4.3 Water Security 2 3 Climate change impacts on freshwater systems frequently exacerbate existing pressure, especially in 4 locations already experiencing water scarcity (Section 15.3.3.2 and Cross-Chapter Box INTERREG in 5 Chapter 16; Schewe et al., 2014; Holding et al., 2016; Karnauskas et al., 2016), making Water Security a 6 Key Risk (KR4 in Figure 15.5) in small islands. Small islands are usually environments where demand for 7 resources related to socio-economic factors such as population growth, urbanisation and tourism already 8 place increasing pressure on limited freshwater resources. In many small islands, water demand already 9 exceeds supply. For example, in the Caribbean, Barbados is utilising close to 100% of its available water 10 resources and St. Lucia has a water supply deficit of approximately 35% (Cashman, 2014). On many 11 Mediterranean islands, water demand regularly outstrips supply as a result of low average precipitation 12 coupled with increasing water demand from economic activities such as irrigated agriculture and tourism 13 (Hof et al., 2014; Papadimitriou et al., 2019). 14 15 Population growth plays a strong role in projected future water stress (Schewe et al., 2014). Combining 16 projected aridity change (fractional change compared to historical climatology) with population projections 17 derived from SSP2, shows that the SIDS with high projected population growth rates are expected to 18 experience the most severe freshwater stress by 2030 under a 2°C warming threshold scenario (Karnauskas 19 et al., 2018). For several SIDS (e.g., Belize and Jamaica), increasing aridity change is a prominent 20 exacerbating factor, but for others (e.g., the Solomon Islands and Comoros) population growth is the main 21 factor. A 1°C increase in temperature (from 1.7°C to 2.7°C) could result in a 60% increase in the number of 22 people projected to experience a severe water resources stress in 2043­2071 (Schewe et al., 2014; 23 Karnauskas et al., 2018). Research on Jamaica concluded that the ability of rainwater harvesting to meet 24 potable water needs between the 2030s and 2050s will be reduced based on predicted shorter intense 25 showers and frequent dry spells (Aladenola et al., 2016). 26 27 28 The Caribbean and Pacific regions have historically been affected by severe droughts (Peters, 2015; FAO, 29 2016; Barkey and Bailey, 2017; Paeniu et al., 2017; Trotman et al., 2017; Anshuka et al., 2018) with 30 significant physical impacts and negative socio-economic outcomes. Water quality is affected by drought as 31 well as water availability. The El Niño related 2015-16 drought in Vanuatu led to reliance on small amounts 32 of contaminated water left at the bottom of household tanks (Iese et al., 2021). The highest land disturbance 33 percentages have coincided with major droughts in Cuba (de Beurs et al., 2019). Drought has been shown to 34 have an impact on rainwater harvesting in the Pacific (Quigley et al., 2016) and Caribbean (Aladenola et al., 35 2016), especially in rural areas where connections to centralised public water supply have been difficult. 36 Increasing trends in drought are apparent in the Caribbean (Herrera and Ault, 2017) although trends in the 37 western Pacific are not statistically significant (McGree et al., 2016). 38 39 Areas where a freshwater lens is thinner are most likely to be impacted by multiple climate stressors, and 40 these areas tend to be in coastal zones where populations are likely to be most concentrated (Holding et al., 41 2016). In Barbados, where groundwater is relied upon for food production, urban use, and environmental 42 needs, higher food prices are expected in the future if informed land use management and integrated water 43 resources policy implementation are not implemented to manage groundwater in the short term, even with 44 modest climate change threats (Gohar et al., 2019). 45 46 15.3.4.4 Fisheries and Agriculture 47 48 Fisheries provide small islands with opportunities for economic development, revenues, food security and 49 livelihoods (Bell et al., 2018). Ten Pacific Island countries and territories derive between 5% and >90% of 50 all government revenue (except grants) from access fees paid by industrial tuna-fishing fleets, mainly from 51 distant-water fishing nations (Bell et al., 2018; SPC, 2019). Under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario 52 (RCP 8.5), the total biomass of three tuna species in the waters of ten Pacific SIDS could decline by an 53 average of 13% (range = -5% to -20%) due to a greater proportion of fish occurring in the high seas (Bell et 54 al., 2021), meanwhile projected increases have been anticipated for Ascension Island and Saint Helena in the 55 South Atlantic (Townhill et al., 2021). Additionally, seafood plays an important role in achieving food 56 security in many islands. In the Pacific, fish protein is estimated to make up 50-90% of animal protein 57 consumption in rural areas, and 40-80% in urban areas (Bell et al., 2009; Hanich et al., 2018) with similar Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-26 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 values reported for some Indian Ocean and Caribbean islands (e.g. Maldives, Antigua and Barbuda). It has 2 been suggested that island nations may need to retain more of their tuna catch rather than relying solely on 3 coastal fisheries to achieve food security in the future (Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5; 4 Bell et al., 2015; Bell et al., 2018). Furthermore, small island fisheries can be severely impacted by extreme 5 events such as TCs, yet rapidly recovering pelagic fisheries can help to alleviate immediate food insecurity 6 pressures in some circumstances, helping to build resilience (Pinnegar et al., 2019). 7 8 Observed impacts of climate change on fish and fisheries in small islands include declines in reef-associated 9 species due to coral bleaching or cyclone damage (Robinson et al., 2019; Magel et al., 2020), oceanic-scale 10 shifts in the distribution of large pelagic fish and hence their fisheries (Erauskin-Extramiana et al., 2019), 11 changes to the size structure or breeding behaviour of species (e.g. (Asch et al., 2018)(Sections 3.3.3.2 and 12 3.4.3.1)). Many studies of future fisheries productivity in a changing climate suggest that yields will fall as a 13 result of ocean productivity reductions, local species extinction and/or migration (Nurse, 2011; Asch et al., 14 2018; Robinson et al., 2019). Asch et al. (2018) provided future projections for biodiversity and fisheries 15 maximum catch potential in Pacific Island countries and territories. These authors concluded that 9 of 17 16 Pacific Island entities (Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Niue, 17 Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu) could experience 50% declines in maximum catch 18 potential by 2100 relative to 1980­2000 under both an RCP 2.6 and RCP 8.5 scenario (medium confidence). 19 In Wallis and Futuna, maximum catch potential was projected to increase slightly (around 10%) by 2050, 20 later declining by the year 2100. Similar projections have now been provided for all countries worldwide, 21 including Pacific, Caribbean, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean small islands (Cheung et al., 2018). 22 The small islands that show the largest anticipated decrease in fisheries maximum catch potential by the end 23 of the century (according to an RCP4.5 and RCP 8.5 scenario) included the Federated States of Micronesia, 24 Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Tokelau, Tuvalu, São Tomé and Príncipe, whereas some other small islands such as 25 Bermuda, Easter Island (Chile), and Pitcairn Islands (UK), might actually witness increases in fish catch 26 potential (medium confidence) (Cheung et al., 2018). Monnereau et al. (2017)showed that for the fisheries 27 sector, small island states are generally more vulnerable to climate change impacts compared to continental 28 least developed countries or coastal states because of their increased reliance on fisheries, the exposure of 29 coastal communities to potential climatic threats and their limited adaptive capacity. 30 31 Projected impacts of climate change on agriculture and fisheries pose serious threats to dependent human 32 populations (Ren et al., 2018; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2019), making the risk caused to livelihoods a Key 33 Risk in small islands (KR7 in Figure 15.5). On small islands, despite biophysical commonalities (e.g., size 34 and isolation), differences in economic status and level of dependence on agriculture and fisheries produce 35 dynamic climate impacts (Balzan et al., 2018). Climate change is impacting agricultural production in small 36 islands through slow-onset stressors such as rising average temperatures, shifting rainfall patterns, sea level 37 rise and extreme events like TCs. For example, TC Pam, a Category 5 cyclone, devastated Vanuatu in 2015 38 and caused losses and damages to the agriculture sector valued at USD 56.5 million (64.1% of GDP) (Nalau 39 et al., 2017) and TC Winston Winston in 2016 resulted losses and damages on the agriculture sector in Fiji 40 valued at USD 254.7 million (Iese et al., 2020). In 2017, total loss and damage associated with hurricane 41 Maria (category 5) amounted to 224% of Dominica's 2016 GDP (Barclay et al., 2019). Losses and damage in 42 agriculture often led to people eating imported processed foods affecting their diet and nutrition (Haynes et 43 al., 2020).Small Islands' communities are also witnessing the indirect effects of the covid-19 pandemic on 44 agricultural systems (Hickey and Unwin, 2020). However, the limited diversity of agriculture production and 45 reduced household incomes are contributing to low diet diversity (Iese et al., 2020). Bell and Taylor (2015) 46 assessed the effects of climate change on specific sectors of agriculture in the Pacific islands region and 47 found that, by 2090, staple food crops of taro, sweet potato, and rice are expected to suffer from moderate to 48 high impact. Among export crops, coffee is expected to sustain the most significant impact due largely to 49 increased temperatures in the highland areas of Papua New Guinea ­ a high production area (Bell et al., 50 2016). Livestock is an important protein source in some small islands and is particularly vulnerable to 51 changes in temperature through heat stress (Bell and Taylor, 2015; Lallo et al., 2018). With the concentration 52 of island people along (often reef-fringed) coasts, there is a comparatively large dependence on nearshore 53 marine foods and coastal agricultural systems (Ticktin et al., 2018). 54 55 In the Caribbean, additional warming by 0.2°­1.0°C, could lead to a predominantly drier region (5%­15% 56 less rain than present-day), a greater occurrence of droughts (Taylor et al., 2018) along with associated 57 impacts on agricultural production and yield in the region (Gamble et al., 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-27 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2019; Nicolas et al., 2020). Crop suitability modeling on several commercially important crops grown in 2 Jamaica found that even an increase less than +1.5 °C could result in a reduction in the range of crops that 3 farmers may grow (Rhiney et al., 2018). 4 5 Sugar yield in Fiji could decline by 2­14% under projected scenarios (McGree et al., 2020). Farmers in some 6 small islands have utilised Indigenous knowledge systems built on local ontology to sharpen their sensitivity 7 to environmental conditions (Shah et al., 2018). However, projected climate change across the Pacific could 8 undermine climate-sensitive agricultural livelihoods and exacerbate food insecurity challenges (McCubbin et 9 al., 2017; Campbell et al., 2021). 10 11 Projected climate impacts on island agroecosystem services could accentuate a myriad of social and 12 ecological risks (Campbell, 2021). Without proactive farm management practices, the projected impacts of 13 climate change on drought patterns is a major threat to cocoa pollination services (Arnold et al., 2018). Many 14 tropical island agroforestry crops are completely dependent on insect pollination and it is therefore important 15 to understand the climatic drivers of changing conditions related to pollinator abundance. Coastal 16 agroforestry systems in small Pacific islands are vital to national food security but native biodiversity is 17 rapidly declining (Ticktin et al., 2018). Biodiversity loss from traditional agroecosystems is a major threat to 18 food and livelihoods security in SIDS (UNEP, 2014a). Additionally, while coastal-lowland salinisation and 19 more-frequent flooding attributable to SLR have impacted coastal agriculture on some islands (Cruz and 20 Andrade, 2017; Wairiu, 2017), stronger TCs can sometimes shock island terrestrial food production 21 warranting reconfiguration (Mertz et al., 2010; Duvat et al., 2016; Chakrabarti et al., 2017). Calls to conserve 22 associated environments and to make terrestrial food production on islands more resilient to climate-driven 23 shocks underscore concern about future food security (Connell, 2013; de Scally, 2014). Implicit in the latter 24 is reversing the decades-long loss of Indigenous knowledge about food production in many island societies 25 and incorporating it into future strategies (Mercer et al., 2014b; Janif et al., 2016). 26 27 15.3.4.5 Economies 28 29 Small-island economies vary greatly in their nature, history/trends, and viability under a changed climate. As 30 elsewhere, few small island economies are overseen by governments that are adequately prepared for the 31 economic impacts of climate change over the next few decades (Connell, 2013; Hay, 2013). In particular, the 32 lack of diversity that characterizes most small-island economies means they are especially vulnerable to 33 global (climate-driven) shocks (Cross-Chapter Box DEEP in Chapter 17), be these the impacts of extreme 34 events or more gradual longer-term change, which makes the maintenance of traditional mechanisms for 35 coping with such shocks in many island societies all the more important (Granderson, 2017; Wilson and 36 Forsyth, 2018; Nunn and Kumar, 2019b). As a result, the risk from climate change to economies constitutes 37 a Key Risk (KR7 in Figure 15.5) in small islands. 38 39 Many island environments have been commercially exploited by external interests for much of their recent 40 history. This is especially common for timber, the wholesale removal of forests, especially on tropical 41 islands, exposing land to heavy rain that leads to denudation and increases lowland sedimentation (Wairiu, 42 2017; Eppinga and Pucko, 2018). Negative aspects of both processes will be exacerbated by climate change, 43 demonstrating the practical need for reforestation in many island contexts (Thomson et al., 2016).Some 44 small-island economies are sustained by extractive industries such as mining, creating dependencies that lead 45 to their environmental impacts being downplayed (Tserkezis and Tsakanikas, 2016; Shepherd et al., 2018). It 46 is important to address these impacts as they will add to negative impacts of climate change (Clifford et al., 47 2019). 48 49 Many small-island economies are sustained by tourism and have invested heavily in associated infrastructure 50 and capacity building (Cannonier and Burke, 2018). Some rural island communities have become dependent 51 on tourism to the point that it would be difficult to revert to subsistence living (Lasso and Dahles, 2018). 52 Coast-focused (beach-sea) tourism in island contexts is already being impacted by beach erosion, elevated 53 high SST causing coral bleaching, and associated marine-biodiversity loss, as well as more intense TCs 54 (Tapsuwan and Rongrongmuang, 2015; Parsons et al., 2018; Wabnitz et al., 2018). The Covid-19 pandemic 55 travel disruption significantly affected Caribbean islands tourism sector by reducing incomes that would 56 have been used to enhance climate resilience (Sheller, 2020). Many tourism interests downplay the impacts 57 and future risks from climate change (Shakeela and Becken, 2015), a position that may be borne out by Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-28 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 sustained/rising demand for small island vacationing in some locales (Katircioglu et al., 2019). A way 2 forward is for island tourism to emphasize its low-carbon and sustainable attributes, and to encourage 3 smaller-scale eco-friendly holiday opportunities (Lee et al., 2018), in other words for island nations to 4 embrace a `blue economy' in line with SDG14 to conserve and utilise their oceans for sustainable futures 5 (Hampton and Jeyacheya, 2020; Hassanali, 2020). 6 7 Given the high cost of imported goods, especially foodstuffs, larger island jurisdictions are striving to 8 transform their economies to favour locally produced or locally constituted materials that employ local 9 people and reduce their cost of living. The exposure of this component of island economies varies, yet 10 manufacturing/commercial operations are usually found in the lowest-lying areas, often on reclaimed lands. 11 This makes them especially vulnerable to rising sea level, part of a larger issue around the disproportionate 12 exposure of infrastructure on small islands to climate change (Fakhruddin et al., 2015; Kumar and Taylor, 13 2015). 14 15 It is challenging to disentangle the role of climate change from that of globalisation and development in 16 recent changes to human livelihoods on small islands, given that the latter have characterised many ­ 17 especially SIDS ­ within the last few decades. However, recent climate change is clearly implicated in 18 livelihood deterioration in many island contexts (Hernandez-Delgado, 2015; Nunn and Kumar, 2018). For 19 example, livelihood impacts of climate-driven stressors (including shoreline/riverbank erosion, flooding and 20 erratic rainfall) in three Mahishkhocha island-chars (river-mouth sand islands of Bangladesh) have been 21 amplified by inadequate/misguided policy (Saha, 2017).The subordination of IKLK in favour of external 22 adaptation strategies has accelerated livelihood decline in many island contexts (Wilson and Forsyth, 2018). 23 Although economic and financial development has the potential to reduce environmental (and livelihood) 24 degradation in SIDS (Seetanah et al., 2019), it is also clear that uneven development can steepen core- 25 periphery disparities, especially in archipelagic contexts, resulting in deteriorating rural/peripheral 26 livelihoods at the expense of improving urban ones (Wilson, 2013; Sofer, 2015) and increased rural-urban 27 migration (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Connell, 2015). 28 29 15.3.4.6 Migration 30 31 Climate-related migration is considered to be a particular issue for small islands because changes in extreme 32 events and slow-onset changes affect increasingly highly exposed and vulnerable low-lying coastal 33 populations, therefore causing a threat to small island habitability (KR9 in Figure 15.5) (Storey and Hunter, 34 2010; Kumar and Taylor, 2015; Duvat et al., 2017b; Weir and Pittock, 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; 35 Mycoo, 2018a; Rasmussen et al., 2018). A typology of climate-related migration is provided in Cross- 36 Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7. It is assumed that climate-related migration will increase in small 37 islands, however, as is the case globally, the causes, form and outcomes are highly context specific. Types of 38 climate-related migration occur across a continuum of agency from involuntary displacement at one end to 39 voluntary movement to strategically reduce risks and planned resettlement at the other end (Section 15.5.1, 40 also see Chapter 7; Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Betzold, 2015; McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; 41 Gharbaoui and Blocher, 2016; Stojanov et al., 2017; Weir, 2020). 42 43 Studies do not provide sufficiently robust evidence to attribute the various forms of migration to 44 anthropogenic climate change directly on small islands or to accurately estimate the current number of 45 climate-related migrants (see Chapter 7). Climate events and conditions strongly interact with other 46 environmental stressors and economic, social, political and cultural reasons for migrating (robust evidence, 47 high agreement) (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Campbell and Warrick, 2014; Laczko and Piguet, 2014; 48 Marino and Lazrus, 2015; Connell, 2016; Weber, 2016b; Stojanov et al., 2017; Cashman and Yawson, 49 2019). 50 51 Despite difficulties with attribution, the literature establishes that climate variability and extreme events and 52 broad environmental pressures have contributed to some degree to human mobility on small islands over 53 time (medium evidence, high agreement) (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Campbell, 2014a; Campbell and 54 Warrick, 2014; Donner, 2015; Kelman, 2015a; Connell, 2016; Stojanov et al., 2017; Barnett and McMichael, 55 2018; Martin et al., 2018) and these studies can provide analogues from which to inform climate-migration 56 responses (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Kelman, 2015a; Connell, 2016). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-29 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Similarly, studies do not provide robust evidence to project how the full range of climate drivers may 2 influence migration patterns on small islands into the future, although studies are emerging that estimate 3 populations affected as a consequence of projected SLR. Rasmussen et al. (2018) estimated current 4 populations of the world that are potentially subject to permanent inundation from projected local mean SLR 5 associated with global mean surface temperature stabilisation targets of 1.5°C, 2.0°C, and 2.5°C occurring at 6 2100. For the affected land area and population, this analysis included a subset of 58 SIDS, as defined by the 7 United Nations, for which the results are shown in Table 15.4. 8 9 10 Table 15.4: Global mean sea level rise (SLR) at 2100 projections and associated population of SIDS exposed to 11 permanent inundation for global mean surface temperature stabilisation targets of 1.5°C, 2.0°C and 2.5°C. Rasmussen 12 et al. (2018) Stabilised Warming at 1.5°C 5th­95th 2.0°C 5th­95th 2.5°C 5th­95th 50 50th 50th a 2100 Percentile Global-mean SLR (cm) b 48 28­82 56 28­96 58 37­93 by percentile SIDS population exposure (thousands) by 400 300-560 420 300-640 430 320-630 c percentile 13 Table Notes: 14 (a) Above pre-industrial level. 15 (b) Values are centimeters above 2000 current era baseline. 16 (c) Potentially affected population due to local mean SLR. Local mean SLR projections used for individual SIDS take 17 account of variations from the global mean due to factors such as glacial isostatic adjustment, gravitational changes 18 from ice melting, deltaic subsidence and tectonic movements. 19 20 21 The aggregate figures of population that could potentially be affected by permanent inundation shown in 22 Table 15.4 and Figure 15.3 mask important differences in relative exposure between individual SIDS. 23 Further, population affected by permanent inundation does not take into account the change in the frequency 24 of ESL events and associated water-level attenuation (as per Vafeidis et al., 2019), nor does it account for 25 adaptation measures that may alleviate impacts, future population growth, or the extent to which populations 26 could adaptively migrate (Section 15.5.3). However, Rasmussen et al. (2018)'s analysis shows that 27 comparatively small changes in mean sea level can result in large increases in the frequencies of ESL events 28 and, hence, the risk of coastal flooding of inhabited land, suggesting many areas of SIDS may become 29 uninhabitable well before the time of permanent inundation (see also studies referenced in Section 30 15.3.3.1.1). A similar conclusion is drawn by Kulp and Strauss (2019) who show that land area home to 10% 31 or more of the population of many SIDS is at risk of chronic coastal flooding or permanent inundation by 32 2100. 33 34 Duvat et al. (2021a) employed an integrated systems approach to analyse future risk to habitability in atoll 35 islands, taking into account changes in various ocean and atmospheric climate drivers and a moderate 36 adaptation scenario (i.e., adaptation responses that remain similar in nature and magnitude to currently 37 observed responses). They found that, compared to present-day risk, additional risk to habitability in Male, 38 Maldives, and Fogafale, Tuvalu, is minimal under a low emissions scenario (RCP2.6) at 2050, although it 39 may become moderate for Male and high for Fogafale by 2090. Under a worse case emissions scenario (RCP 40 8.5), future risk to habitability in these two urban islands may increase slightly in 2050, but may increase to 41 moderate-to-high (for Male') and high-to-very high (for Fogafale) by 2090. 42 43 Even where settlement locations and livelihoods remain secure, an increase in health diseases, decrease in 44 the availability of potable water, and increasing exposure to extreme events may reduce habitability (Section 45 15.3.4.9.2; Campbell and Warrick, 2014; Storlazzi et al., 2018). For example, the Fijian coastal community 46 of Vunidogoloa made the decision to relocate in response to regular inundation during high tides. Raising 47 houses on stilts and constructing a seawall failed to prevent regular flood damage to buildings and the entire 48 community eventually relocated as a `last resort' adaptation measure to a site within customary land. The 49 availability of customary land for the new site was a key factor of success in this relocation example Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-30 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 although this will not guarantee success in every case as relocation may expose communities to new risks 2 (McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a). 3 4 15.3.4.7 Culture 5 6 Small island societies have developed IKLK based responses to living in dynamic environments susceptible 7 to climate variability and extremes, which are based in broader systems of culture and heritage (high 8 confidence) (Barnett and Campbell, 2010; Lazrus, 2015; Nunn et al., 2017b; Bryant-Tokalau, 2018b; Nalau 9 et al., 2018b; Perkins and Krause, 2018). As expanded upon in Section 15.6.5 cultural resources are thought 10 to play an important role in climate change adaptation on small islands through contributing to adaptive 11 capacity and resilience (McMillen et al., 2014; Petzold and Ratter, 2015; Nunn et al., 2017b; Warrick et al., 12 2017; Falanruw, 2018; Mondragón, 2018; Neef et al., 2018; Parsons et al., 2018; Perkins and Krause, 2018; 13 Hagedoorn et al., 2019; 2020a) (robust evidence, medium agreement). Thus, loss of culture (KR8 in Figure 14 15.5) threatens adaptive capacity. 15 16 Some studies from the Pacific suggest that climate-migration linked to reduced habitability (Section 17 15.3.4.6) can have particularly severe cultural implications in a small island context where community 18 solidarity and cohesion linked to place-based identity are important aspects of adaptive capacity (Hofmann, 19 2014; Lazrus, 2015; Warrick et al., 2017). In Federated States of Micronesia, land is owned through the 20 matrilineal system and hence puts women in the centre of decision-making. The deterioration and loss of 21 land (through saltwater intrusion, flooding, drought, erosion) not only can lead to economic deprivation but 22 it also compromises cultural identities: "Where land signifies political, social, and economic well-being, 23 becoming bereft of land cuts off an important thread of people's sense of belonging" (Hofmann, 2017, p. 82) 24 particularly for Chuuk women. Land degradation and loss involves the "interruption to the matrilineal 25 transmission of land" (Hofmann, 2017;p. 82), the loss of identities, relationships, and their customary 26 authority. 27 28 The unquantifiable and highly localised cultural losses resulting from climate drivers are less researched and 29 less acknowledged in policy than physical and economic losses (Karlsson and Hovelsrud, 2015; Thomas and 30 Benjamin, 2018a). In the Bahamas, prolonged displacement of the entire population of Ragged Island 31 following Hurricane Irma (2017) highlighted the cultural losses that can result from climate-induced 32 displacement from ancestral homelands. Threats to identity, sense of place and community cohesion resulted 33 from displacement, although all were important foundational features of the Islanders' self-initiated 34 rehabilitation efforts and eventual return. Nonetheless, non-economic losses were not accounted for by 35 policy addressing displacement (Thomas and Benjamin, 2018a). In the case of Monkey River Village in 36 Belize, coastal erosion is threatening the community's cemetery. Residents place significant spiritual and 37 emotional value on the cemetery which serves important community functions, and thus, threats to it are 38 perceived to be serious and necessary to be taken into account in any planned response (Karlsson and 39 Hovelsrud, 2015). A similar situation exists on Carriacou in the West Indies where culturally and historically 40 significant archaeological sites are being lost due to coastal erosion caused by a combination of sand mining 41 and extreme climate-ocean events exacerbated by SLR (Fitzpatrick et al., 2006). 42 43 Population and settlement concentration in coastal areas and high exposure to climate-driven coastal hazards 44 on small islands mean that threats to tangible cultural heritage (archaeological sites, buildings, historic sites, 45 UNESCO World Heritage Sites etc.) are high (Marzeion and Levermann, 2014; Reimann et al., 2018), 46 although few studies examine this issue specifically in a small island context. On the island of Barbuda, 47 archaeological sites containing important information on historical ecology and climatic shifts are at risk 48 from coastal erosion and hurricanes. This loss of heritage represents identity loss, as "learning about the past 49 is a crucial exploration of self that grounds and connects people to places" (Perdikaris et al., 2017)(p. 145). 50 Loss and damage to heritage sites may also impact tourism and thus have significant economic impacts for 51 narrow small island economies (Section 15.3.4.5). 52 53 15.3.4.8 Transboundary Risks/Issues 54 55 Inter-regional transboundary impacts are those generated by processes originating in another region or 56 continent well beyond the borders of an individual archipelagic nation or small island. Intra-regional 57 transboundary impacts originate from a within-region source (e.g., the Caribbean). Some transboundary Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-31 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 processes may have positive effects on the receiving small island or nation, though most that are reported 2 have negative impacts (Table 15.5). 3 4 5 Table 15.5: Summary of inter- and intra-regional transboundary risks and impacts on small islands 6 [INSERT TABLE 15.5 HERE] 7 8 9 [START BOX 15.1 HERE] 10 11 Box 15.1: Key Examples of Cumulative Impacts from Compound Events: Maldives Islands and 12 Caribbean Region 13 14 Cumulative Impacts of the Compound Events of the 1998-2016 Period in the Maldives Islands 15 16 Between 1998 and 2016, the Maldives Islands were affected by three major climate events, including the 17 1997-1998 ENSO event, the 2007 flood event and the 2016 ENSO event, and by one tectonic event, the 2004 18 Indian Ocean Tsunami (Morri et al., 2015). These events illustrate the cumulative and cascading risks that a 19 series of events may cause in reef-dependent atoll contexts (Figure Box15.1). 20 21 22 The 1997-1998 ENSO event was severe in the Maldives and as a result the living coral cover dropped to 23 <10% (Bianchi et al., 2003). Recovery was still in progress in 2004 when the tsunami caused further 24 (although not quantitatively assessed (Gischler and Kikinger, 2006)) damage to the reef ecosystem. Post- 25 1998 recovery ultimately took 15 years, (i.e., longer than following the 1987 ENSO event, after which 26 recovery had only taken a few years) and also longer than in the neighbouring undisturbed Chagos atolls, 27 thereby suggesting the alteration of the recovery capacity of the reef ecosystem by human-induced reef 28 degradation and climate change (Morri et al., 2015; Pisapia et al., 2017). Mid-2016, a new ENSO event 29 occurred, which reduced living coral cover by 75% (Perry and Morgan, 2017). Future recovery of the reef 30 ecosystem, which is critical to both current livelihoods and economic activities (especially diving-oriented 31 tourism and fishing) and to long-term island persistence, will mainly depend first on the frequency and 32 magnitude of future bleaching events, which are expected to increase due to ocean warming, and second on 33 the highly variable effects of anthropogenic disturbances locally (Perry and Morgan, 2017; Pisapia et al., 34 2017; Duvat and Magnan, 2019b). 35 36 Additionally, the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Magnan, 2006) and the 2007 flood (Wadey et al., 2017) 37 caused damage totalling 62% of the country's GDP (Luetz, 2017). The tsunami also downgraded the 38 Maldives (now a middle-income country) to the Least Developed Countries category and caused within- 39 country migration, with 30,000 people (9.6% of the country's population) displaced (Republic of Maldives, 40 2009). These successive events, which had cumulative devastating effects on the reef ecosystem and 41 cascading effects on health and well-being, livelihoods and economy, highlighted the risk posed by limited 42 recovery time to the whole social-ecological system as well as the detrimental effect of local human 43 disturbances on reef recovery. 44 45 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-32 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure Box15.1.1: Cascading and cumulative impacts of the compound events of the 1998-2016 period in the Maldives 3 Islands. 4 5 6 Cumulative Impacts of the 2017 Hurricanes in the Caribbean Region 7 8 Among the 29 Caribbean SIDS, 22 were affected by at least one category 4 or 5 TC in 2017. These events 9 highlighted how the pre-cyclone high exposure and vulnerability of these islands and their populations has 10 caused a "cumulative community vulnerability" (Lichtveld, 2018, p. 28) that has amplified the impacts of 11 these TCs, which will in turn increase the long-term vulnerability of affected islands. The exposure of these 12 islands over their entire surface, combined with the concentration of people, and infrastructure, utilities and 13 public services in flood-prone coastal areas, inadequate housing, limited access to healthy food and 14 transportation, and unpreparedness explains widespread-to-total devastation (Shultz et al., 2018; Briones et 15 al., 2019). The destruction of transport systems (Lopez-Candales et al., 2018) and island supply chains (Kim 16 and Bui, 2019), which heavily depend on ports, roads, power and communications, made rescue logistically 17 complex, explaining the lack of freshwater, food supplies, medications and fuel on some islands for several 18 weeks after the event. This cumulative vulnerability caused "cascading public health consequences" (Shultz 19 et al., 2018, p.9), including delayed (i.e., over the next year) mortality, physical injury during the clean-up 20 and recovery phase, and increased the risk of chronic, vector-borne, contaminated water-related diseases, and 21 mental sequelae (Kishore et al., 2018; Ferre et al., 2019). 22 23 The loss of mangroves (Branoff, 2018; Walcker et al., 2019; Taillie et al., 2020) and terrestrial forests 24 (Eppinga and Pucko, 2018; Feng et al., 2018; Hu and Smith, 2018; Van Beusekom et al., 2018) exacerbated 25 the cyclone-induced economic crisis. In the most affected islands, the destruction of buildings and 26 outmigration generated a significant loss of tangible (e.g., museums) and intangible (e.g., traditional artistry) 27 cultural heritage (Boger et al., 2019). Prolonged displacement of entire island populations (e.g., Ragged 28 Island, the Bahamas; Barbuda) caused "non-economic loss and damage", including threats to health and Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-33 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 well-being, and loss of culture, sense of place and agency (Thomas and Benjamin, 2019), which may further 2 exacerbate the long-term vulnerability of concerned communities. 3 4 In early 2020, while island communities were still recovering from the 2017 hurricanes, the COVID-19 5 pandemic caused the closure of global transportation, with devastating socioeconomic impacts on tourism- 6 dependent Caribbean economies (Sheller, 2020), illustrating how compounding crises increase island 7 vulnerability to both climate and non-climate related events. 8 9 [END BOX 15.1 HERE] 10 11 12 [START BOX 15.2 HERE] 13 14 Box 15.2: Loss and Damage and Small Islands 15 16 Loss and damage has a range of conceptualizations (Section 1.4.4.2; Cross-Chapter Box LOSS in Chapter 17 17) and is a critical issue for many small islands, closely related to issues of climate justice (Section 15.7). 18 Small islands are already experiencing an array of negative climate change impacts while climate risks are 19 projected to increase as global average temperatures rise (Section 15.3, 16.2; Cross-Chapter Paper 2). 20 Barriers and limits to adaptation also contribute to greater levels of both economic and non-economic loss 21 and damage for small islands (Sections 15.6, 16.4). 22 23 For SIDS in particular, loss and damage has negative implications for sustainable development (Benjamin et 24 al., 2018). The costs of loss and damage, particularly from extreme events, can deplete national capital 25 reserves (Noy and Edmonds, 2019). Thomas and Benjamin (2017) show how loss and damage can lead to an 26 `unvirtuous cycle of climate-induced erosion of development and resilience'. In this cycle, addressing loss 27 and damage strains limited national resources, diverting public funding and other resources to address 28 negative climate impacts. This in turn reduces resources and capacities which could be allocated to 29 adaptation, building resilience and sustainable development, thereby increasing vulnerability to climate 30 change and leading to further loss and damage where the cycle begins again. The cascading and cumulative 31 impacts of extreme events experienced in Pacific and Caribbean SIDS exemplify that this cycle may already 32 be in effect. 33 34 In addition to the strain on national resources that loss and damage currently presents, credit ratings of SIDS 35 have recently begun to include vulnerability to climate change, which may have negative impacts on their 36 abilities to borrow external funds, attract foreign investment or access concessional financing (Buhr et al., 37 2018; Volz et al., 2020). Costs of addressing loss and damage may also affect the ability of SIDS to repay 38 external debt, thus endangering eligibility for future access to funding (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016; Klomp, 39 2017; Shutter, 2020). These factors may place SIDS in situations where they face mounting costs of climate 40 change with eroding capacities and resources to address loss and damage. 41 42 In the international policy arena, small islands - as part of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) - have 43 been strong advocates for including loss and damage in the United Nations Framework Convention on 44 Climate Change (UNFCCC); highlighting the increasing and irreversible risks that climate change poses for 45 islands in particular (Roberts and Huq, 2015; Adelman, 2016; Mace and Verheyen, 2016). AOSIS, along 46 with other developing countries and groups, have advocated that there is a pressing need for finance and 47 resources to address loss and damage as well as greater integration of loss and damage in the UNFCCC and 48 the Paris Agreement, including in capacity building, technology and the global stocktake (Benjamin et al., 49 2018; Nand and Bardsley, 2020). 50 51 52 [END BOX 15.2 HERE] 53 54 55 15.3.4.9 Key Risks in Small Islands 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-34 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.3.4.9.1 Key Risk approach 2 This section builds on cross-chapter work led by Chapter 16 of the WGII AR6 Report aimed at identifying 3 and assessing Key Risks across sectors and regions (Section 16.5 and Supplementary Material 16.A.2). Key 4 Risks (KRs) are the risks of most pressing concern that are caused or exacerbated by climate change in a 5 given region. A KR is defined as a `potentially' severe risk, which can either be already severe or projected 6 to become severe in the future, as a result of (i) changes in associated climate-related hazards and/or the 7 exposure and/or vulnerability of natural and human systems to these hazards, and/or of (ii) the adverse 8 consequences of adaptation or mitigation responses to the risk. In line with the guidelines used in the WGII 9 AR6 Report, the identification of KRs in small islands is based on the chapter authors' expert judgment, 10 using scientific literature and five types of criteria: (1) Importance of the affected system or dimension of the 11 system, which is a value judgment left to readers to make; (2) Magnitude of adverse consequences, based on 12 their pervasiveness, degree and irreversibility, and on the potential for impact thresholds and cascading 13 effects across the system; (3) Likelihood of adverse consequences, although this probability is rarely 14 quantifiable for small islands due to limited downscaled data at a small island level; (4) Temporal 15 characteristics of the risk, including its period of emergence, persistence over time and trend; and (5) Ability 16 to respond to the risk, with the severity of the risk being inversely proportional to this ability. 17 18 15.3.4.9.2 Key Risks in small islands 19 Slow onset climate and ocean changes, and changes in extreme events, are expected to cause and/or to 20 amplify nine KRs in small islands, through both direct (e.g., decrease in rainfall will increase water 21 insecurity) and indirect, that is, cascading effects: for example, loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem 22 services will increase water insecurity, which will in turn cause the degradation of human health and well- 23 being (Figure 15.5, Table 15.6 and Table 16.A.4 in Chapter 16 Supplementary Material). 24 25 These KRs include loss of marine and coastal biodiversity and ecosystem services (high confidence) (KR1; 26 for details on KR coverage, see Section 15.3.3.1); submergence of reef islands (low confidence) (KR2; 27 Section 15.3.3.1.1); loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services (high confidence) (KR3; Section 28 15.3.3.3); water insecurity (medium-high confidence) (KR4; Section 15.3.4.3); destruction of settlements and 29 infrastructure (high confidence) (KR5; Section 15.3.4.1); degradation of human health and well-being (low 30 confidence) (KR6; section 15.3.4.2); economic decline and livelihood failure (high confidence) (KR7; 31 Sections 15.3.4.4 and 15.3.4.5); and loss of cultural resources and heritage (low confidence) (KR8; Section 32 15.3.4.7). 33 34 Risk accumulation and amplification through cascading effects from ecosystems and ecosystem services to 35 human systems will likely cause reduced habitability of some small islands (high confidence) identified as 36 the overarching KR (KR9). Habitability is understood as the ability of these islands to support human life by 37 providing protection from hazards which challenge human survival; by assuring adequate space, food and 38 freshwater; and by providing economic opportunities, which contribute to health and well-being; recognizing 39 that both supportive ecosystems and socio-cultural conditions (i.e. beliefs and values, institutions and 40 governance arrangements, sense of community and attachment to place) play a critical role in habitability 41 (Duvat et al., 2021a). The reduction of island habitability is expected to cause increased migration, along the 42 above-mentioned involuntary displacement to planned resettlement spectrum (Section 15.3.4.6), which may 43 eventually lead to population movements from exposed areas and depopulation of some islands. This risk is 44 the highest for atoll nations, where some islands might become uninhabitable over this century (Section 45 15.3.4.6; Storlazzi et al., 2018; Duvat et al., 2021a). Despite a lack of literature assessing the risk of reduced 46 habitability in non-atoll islands, the latter are also expected to experience decreased habitability, especially 47 in their coastal areas. 48 49 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-35 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Figure 15.5: Key Risks in small islands. KR1 to 8 are interconnected as shown by arrows, which causes risk 3 accumulation leading to reduced island habitability. The main interconnections are shown in this figure: for example, 4 loss of marine and coastal and terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem services (KR1 and KR3, respectively) are 5 projected to cause the submergence of reef islands (KR2), water insecurity (KR4), destruction of settlements and 6 infrastructure (KR5), degradation of human health and well-being (KR6), economic decline and livelihood failure 7 (KR7), and loss of cultural resources and heritage (KR8). Importantly, Key Risks result from both direct effects (e.g. 8 decrease in rainfall will increase water insecurity) and indirect effects (e.g. loss of terrestrial biodiversity and ecosystem 9 services will increase water insecurity, which will in turn cause the degradation of human health and well-being). 10 11 12 15.4 Detection and Attribution of Observed Impacts of Climate Change on Small Islands 13 14 As highlighted in AR5, detection of climate change impacts on the fragile environments of small islands is 15 challenging because of other non-climate drivers that affect small islands. Determination of attribution to 16 incremental change of climate drivers is also challenging because of the natural climate variability. 17 Therefore, there is limited scientific literature on observed impacts and attribution. A synthesis of findings 18 on the impacts of climate change (Sections 15.3.3 and 15.3.4) shows that there is more information on 19 impacts on ecosystems compared to human systems. There is high confidence in attribution to climate 20 change of impacts on the coastal and marine as well as terrestrial ecosystems (Hansen and Cramer, 2015; 21 Shope et al., 2016; van Hooidonk et al., 2016; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2017; Hughes et al., 2017b; Mentaschi 22 et al., 2017; Shope et al., 2017; Vitousek et al., 2017; Wadey et al., 2017; Ford et al., 2018; Hughes et al., Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-36 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2018; IPCC, 2018; Storlazzi et al., 2018; Bindoff et al., 2019) and medium confidence in attribution to 2 climate change of impacts on livelihoods, economics and health (Figure 15.6; McIver et al., 2016; Eckstein 3 et al., 2018; Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018; Schütte et al., 2018; WHO, 2018). 4 5 6 7 Figure 15.6: A comparison of the degree of confidence in the detection of observed impacts of climate change on 8 tropical small islands with the degree of confidence in attribution to climate change drivers. 9 10 11 As Figure 15.6 shows there is high confidence that climate change causes changes in terrestrial ecosystems 12 as well as coral reef bleaching through increases in sea surface temperature and submergence and flooding of 13 coastal areas through sea level rise and increased wave height. With respect to casualties, settlements and 14 infrastructure loss and damage, economic and livelihood loss, although confidence in detection is high, there 15 is at present medium confidence in the attribution to climate change. Medium confidence in attribution 16 frequently arises owing to the limited research available on small island environments. 17 18 19 15.5 Assessment of Adaptation Options and Their Implementation 20 21 Since AR5, small islands have experimented with new adaptation options, which has increased the lessons 22 learnt from on-the-ground practices in these settings. Figure 15.7 shows some of the adaptation options that 23 are being experimented with in small islands. This section covers most common adaptation actions and 24 approaches across small islands and assesses the many constraints, enablers and limits to adaptation. 25 Adaptation plays also a key role in climate resilient development and the insights emerging from small 26 islands on this topic are discussed after the adaptation section. 27 28 15.5.1 Hard Protection 29 30 Seawalls have been a popular coastal protection measure on islands (Figure 15.7). An analysis of National 31 Communications shows that 28% of coastal protection actions are seawalls, followed by breakwater 32 structures and coastal protection units (Robinson, 2017a). Coastal protection infrastructure has been heavily 33 invested, for example in the Caribbean region (Mycoo, 2014b) and Cuba (Mycoo, 2014a). A similar situation 34 applies in many Indian Ocean islands, where coastal protection strategies are manifested by hard shoreline 35 structures, many of which are proving challenging to maintain (Naylor, 2015; Betzold and Mohamed, 2017; 36 Magnan and Duvat, 2018). In the Pacific the situation is different given that many islands have been 37 occupied for millennia by indigenous communities with extant knowledge for coping with adversity 38 (Granderson, 2017). The latter generally favours `soft' shoreline structures for coastal protection although 39 the building of seawalls has been rapid, especially in urban islands (Umeyama, 2012; Duvat, 2013; Magnan Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-37 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 et al., 2018; Morris et al., 2018), and also in some rural islands (e.g., Tubuai, French Polynesia (Salmon et 2 al., 2019)). 3 4 Many rural communities have uncritically emulated structures in urban contexts built and maintained with 5 external finances. As a result, in many Pacific SIDS, seawalls have collapsed without additional funding 6 available for repairs (Nunn and Kumar, 2018; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Nunn et al., 2021). Similar 7 cases have been recorded along the coast of Puerto Rico (Jackson et al., 2012) while on Indian Ocean islands 8 (e.g., Seychelles), the shorelines are littered with broken seawalls and groynes (Duvat, 2009). In Samoa, 9 seawalls close to Apia need constant investments to remain viable. 10 11 On small islands, another widespread issue with seawalls and other hard shoreline structures is that they 12 invariably shift problems of shoreline erosion and lowland inundation elsewhere (Donner and Webber, 13 2014). Even surrounding entire islands with such structures, as has happened on Male' (Maldives), is not a 14 long-term solution because of incidences of localised seawall collapse that can spread quickly if not 15 addressed immediately (Naylor, 2015). Hard structures for coastal protection will become increasingly 16 ineffective in the future, demonstrating the need for adaptation along most island coasts to become more 17 transformative than has been the case over the past few decades. In the Bahamas, it has been suggested that 18 coastal protection structures and strategies are implemented through "a rather piecemeal approach of single 19 projects and small patches, partially resulting in maladaptation by further increasing processes of erosion" 20 (Petzold et al., 2018)(p. 95). In the village of Lalomalava, Samoa, national adaptation funding was spent on 21 erecting a seawall to protect the village, but the wall was not long enough to protect the whole village, 22 leading some families and properties to face increasing impacts from large waves (Crichton and Esteban, 23 2018). 24 25 15.5.2 Accommodation and Advance as Strategies 26 27 In most small island contexts, the costs of adaptation through accommodation are prohibitive so that it has in 28 most cases not been contemplated as a widespread option. However, accommodation measures such as the 29 raising of dwellings and key infrastructure like coastal roads above ground level have been implemented to 30 reduce the impacts of flooding in some islands (Figure 15.7). In the most populous islands of the Tuamotu 31 atolls, French Polynesia, where between 48 and 98% of dwellings have already experienced flooding since 32 the 1980s, elevated houses with floors built 1.5 m above ground level are subsidised by the Government as 33 part of Risk Prevention Plans (Magnan et al., 2018). Despite this incentive, the opposition of the local 34 authorities and population to these plans (which also include constraining setback guidelines) considerably 35 limited implementation, hence elevated houses only represent 7% of the total housing stock. In the 36 Philippines (Tubigon) and Indonesia (Jakarta area) residents have elevated their houses by building stilted 37 houses or raising the floor using coral stones to face increased flooding (Jamero et al., 2017; Esteban et al., 38 2020). Also, in Puerto Rico houses have been raised to address flooding (Lopez-Marrero, 2010). 39 40 In some small island settings, land reclamation (i.e., land gain through infilling) has been implemented for 41 decades to allow for infrastructure construction and to address land shortages arising from high population 42 growth. For example, land reclamation in Port of Spain, the capital city of Trinidad, has long been used as a 43 solution space to meet land for housing, industrial development and infrastructure provision (Mycoo, 44 2018b). Likewise, one third of the land area of Male', the capital island of the Maldives, results from land 45 reclamation (Naylor, 2015). Land reclamation is also common in Pacific atoll countries and territories, where 46 it occurs both in urban islands facing high population pressure, such as South Tarawa, Kiribati (Biribo and 47 Woodroffe, 2013), Funafuti Atoll, Tuvalu (Onaka et al., 2017), and Rangiroa Atoll, French Polynesia (Duvat 48 et al., 2019b), and in rural islands, e.g., Takapoto and Mataiva atolls, French Polynesia (Duvat et al., 2017b). 49 In some cases, land reclamation has paved the way for land raising, which is increasingly considered to adapt 50 to SLR in small islands contexts (Figure 15.7). For example, since the 1990s, the capital area of the Maldives 51 has been expanded through the construction of a large new island, Hulhumale', which is still under 52 construction and is built 60 cm higher than Male' to take into account SLR (Hinkel et al., 2018; Brown et al., 53 2020). More generally, in the Maldives, the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami has boosted island raising as part of 54 the "safe island development programme" (Shaig, 2008). Recent studies suggest that land and island raising 55 have some potential in small islands, especially in urban high-value areas where this can generate substantial 56 revenues through the sale or lease of new land, and therefore leverage public adaptation finance (Bisaro et 57 al., 2019). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-38 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 15.5.3 Migration 3 4 Migration, including planned resettlement, is increasingly occurring in small islands to intentionally respond 5 to or prepare for climate change impacts (Figure 15.7; Magnan et al., 2019). There is currently limited 6 evidence and low agreement in the literature as to whether migration of various types is an effective strategy 7 to adapt to localised impacts of climate change, as outcomes are highly context specific (Donner, 2015; 8 McNamara et al., 2016; Hermann and Kempf, 2017; McMichael et al., 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a; 9 Tabe, 2019; Bertana, 2020; Weir, 2020). 10 11 In-situ adaptation options are frequently the preference of communities over resettlement (Jamero et al., 12 2017) and in many documented cases, relocation ­ both planned and autonomous ­ is an adaptation option of 13 last resort due to high economic and socio-cultural cost (McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Jamero et al., 14 2017; Crichton et al., 2020). In small islands, there is medium evidence and high agreement that the degree 15 of migrant agency and choice in decisions about whether to move, where, when and how is an important 16 determinant of success and therefore `adaptiveness' (see Cross-Chapter Box MIGRATE in Chapter 7; 17 McNamara and Des Combes, 2015; Hino et al., 2017; McMichael et al., 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 18 2019a; Bertana, 2020) . Two case studies of community relocation in Fiji (Denimanu and Vunidogoloa 19 villages) recommend that participatory inclusion of all social groups in the relocation planning process, 20 including in planning for livelihood sustainability in new locations, should be ensured in future planned 21 community relocation to foster positive adaptive outcomes (Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019a). 22 23 There are few examples of highly `successful' and therefore adaptive international resettlement or relocation 24 in response to environmental pressures in history. For example, the experiences of Gilbertese resettled in the 25 Solomon Islands highlight that tensions with host communities over land and resource rights and limited 26 knowledge of new environments (such as where communities previously reliant on marine resources are 27 resettled in high island locations) can create new vulnerabilities (Donner, 2015; Weber, 2016a; Tabe, 2019). 28 Even where gradual international relocation is supported and planned through policy as in the case of 29 Kiribati's "migration with dignity" strategy, strong cultural connection to land and uncertainty about life in 30 receiving communities in Australia and New Zealand means that many remain opposed to indefinite or 31 permanent migration (Allgood and McNamara, 2017; Hermann and Kempf, 2017). The same challenges 32 could apply where domestic migration occurs between significantly different cultural, social and physical 33 environments. However, planned migration for employment or education can reduce exposure in sending 34 locations and spread risk through expanding economic opportunities and providing remittances, thus having 35 inadvertent adaptation outcomes (Campbell, 2014a). Policies which support migration for employment by 36 the most vulnerable - those that may wish to migrate but lack the resources to do so - may offer an adaptive 37 strategy to environmental pressure, particularly where these incorporate adequate preparedness for life in 38 host communities (Luetz, 2017; Curtain and Dornan, 2019; Drinkall et al., 2019). Research from the 39 Maldives suggests that women and men do not possess equal capacities to use mobility as a strategy to adapt 40 to climate change, with women less able to employ migration as an adaptation strategy due to gender roles, 41 social expectations, economic structures, political laws and religious doctrines, and gender norms and 42 cultural practices (Lama, 2018). 43 44 Forced relocation, involuntary displacement and low-agency migration (for example, due to low migrant 45 financial resources, or limited participation in migration planning) is commonly associated with unsuccessful 46 outcomes and can therefore be considered an impact of climate change rather than an adaptation strategy 47 (Weber, 2016a; Thomas and Benjamin, 2017; Tabe, 2019). Resettlement of households, communities and 48 larger island populations is increasingly discussed in the context of loss and damage when in-situ adaptation 49 limits are thought to be reached. Limited data and research relating to adaptation limits, transformational 50 adaptation, tolerable and intolerable risk levels in small islands, and limited ability to directly attribute 51 climate change to migration decisions (in the context of both slow onset changes and extreme events) mean 52 that policy applications are currently limited (Thomas and Benjamin, 2018b; Handmer and Nalau, 2019; 53 Nand and Bardsley, 2020). 54 55 15.5.4 Ecosystem-based Measures 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-39 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Small islands have focused increasingly on ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA) approaches and other Nature- 2 Based Solutions that bring benefits both for the ecosystems and communities (Figure 15.7; Giffin et al., 3 2020). There is robust evidence on implementation of EbA approaches across small islands, yet medium 4 agreement on the exact benefits of these activities (Mercer et al., 2012; Doswald et al., 2014; Nalau et al., 5 2018a) given the difficulties in quantifying benefits and the absence of monitoring and evaluation 6 frameworks (Doswald et al., 2014). Traditionally, EbA activities, especially at national and regional scales, 7 have predominantly focused on restoring or conserving coastal and marine ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, 8 mangrove forests and seagrass meadows), with less emphasis upon the services provided by natural inland 9 forests (Mercer et al., 2012). Incorporation of forests is however increasing, in most cases as components of 10 ridge to reef (Figure 15.4) (or DDR) projects (limited to medium evidence), and is geared towards integrated 11 watershed management to establish downstream water security, erosion control and ultimately to protect the 12 health of coral reef ecosystems (Förster et al., 2019). 13 14 Additionally, some islands are constructing climate-smart development plans such as improved management 15 of existing and newly established protected areas, restoration of riparian zones, urban forests/trees, sub urban 16 and peri urban home gardens, and improved agroforestry practices towards increasing resilience to changing 17 climate conditions, wildfires as well as decreasing food insecurity (e.g., Pedersen et al., 2016; McLeod et al., 18 2019). Paired terrestrial and marine protected areas have shown that forest conservation and rehabilitation 19 yield better outcomes for coral health as forests stabilize soils and prevent erosion and sequester groundwater 20 pollutants (limited to medium evidence, high agreement) (Carlson et al., 2019). The success of protected 21 areas is however undermined by weak governance due in part to limited financial resources which 22 undermine management and the enforcement of regulations governing activity within them (Schleicher et al., 23 2019). 24 25 Since the 1990s, artificial reefs have been increasingly used in small islands to support reef restoration and 26 reduce beach erosion, especially in the Caribbean region (e.g., Dominican Republic, Antigua, Grand 27 Cayman, Grenada) and Indian Ocean (Maldives, Mauritius) (Fabian et al., 2013; Reguero et al., 2018). They 28 have been more or less successful in reducing the destructive impacts of extreme events, depending on their 29 technical characteristics and the local context. For example, while it resisted the waves generated by 30 hurricanes Georges and Mitchell in 1998, the artificial reef (Reef Ball breakwater type) implemented at Gran 31 Dominicus Resort, Dominican Republic, did not prevent significant beach erosion. In contrast, the coral reef 32 restoration project implemented to "build a beach" on the resort island of Ihuru, North Male' Atoll, Maldives, 33 was successful as it allowed beach expansion and prevented the erosive impacts of the 2004 Indian Ocean 34 Tsunami on the beach (Fabian et al., 2013). 35 36 Over the past decades, beach nourishment has been implemented in small islands either to reduce beach 37 erosion (e.g., in tourist areas), or to protect critical human assets (e.g., roads) that are highly exposed to 38 storm waves. It has been increasingly used to maintain beaches in the islands of the Maldives (Shaig, 2011), 39 and in Barbados (Mycoo, 2014b). However, islands have limited sand stocks and sediment extraction can 40 aggravate risks and/or accelerate ecosystem degradation if implemented without the necessary precautions. 41 42 In designing and implementing EbA, IKLK have high relevance especially amongst Pacific small islands as 43 many communities are remote and still rely on ecosystems for their livelihoods (Nalau et al., 2018b; Narayan 44 et al., 2020). In Fiji, IKLK have informed EbA projects by identifying native species suitable to strengthen 45 the coastal environment to reduce coastal erosion and flooding in the villages (Nalau et al., 2018b). Whole- 46 of-island approaches, like Lomanu Gau in the Gau Island in Fiji, try to foster integrated management 47 practices in small islands that are based on shared governance of resources, and understanding the 48 interlinkages between sectors and ecosystems (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016). In the Caribbean, EbA 49 approaches are somewhat absent in national and regional programmes and plans, yet at the local scale EbA 50 strategies are used increasingly with implementation mostly led by NGOs (Mercer et al., 2012). 51 52 EbA approaches have many benefits but also face several challenges and limits. Biophysical limits can make 53 some EbA and Nature-based Solutions ineffective: coral reefs are unlikely to withstand increased 54 temperatures, reducing the effectiveness of coral reef based EbA options under higher temperature scenarios 55 (Barkdull and Harris, 2018; Cornwall et al., 2021). Likewise, many other coastal and marine ecosystems, 56 such as mangroves, face severe limitations with increasing sea levels and other climate impacts (Morris et 57 al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2021). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-40 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 3 4 Figure 15.7: Adaptation measures implemented to reduce coastal risks in small islands. Panel 1 provides examples of 5 implementation of different types of measures aimed at reducing coastal erosion and flooding. The measures include no 6 response (no intervention, widespread in small islands), hard protection through the construction of engineering-based 7 structures, accommodation through dwelling and infrastructure raising, planned retreat, advance (i.e. especially island 8 raising) and ecosystem-based measures, in three small island regions, the Indian and Pacific Oceans and Caribbean. It 9 highlights the prevalence of no response, hard protection and the increasing use of ecosystem-based measures. Based on 10 the example of two beach sites in Mauritius (Mon Choisy in the north and Saint-Félix in the south), panel 2 shows that 11 the measures used at a given coastal site evolve over time (e.g., from no response to hard protection, and then planned 12 retreat and ecosystem-based measures) and that recent DRR (Saint-Félix) and adaptation (Mon Choisy) projects often 13 combine several types of measures, including retreat and ecosystem-based measures (Duvat et al., 2020a). Together, 14 panels 1 and 2 emphasize the diversity and increasing complexity of the measures implemented in small islands. 15 16 17 15.5.5 Community-based Adaptation 18 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-41 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Community-based Adaptation (CBA) is best described as a "community-led process based on meaningful 2 engagement and proactive involvement of local individuals and organisations" (Remling and Veitayaki, 3 2016)(p. 380). Enabling CBA projects to succeed relies on gaining a good understanding of the socio- 4 political context within which the communities operate, including such key issues as land tenure 5 arrangements and ownerships, gender, and decision-making processes that operate on the ground (Nunn, 6 2013; Buggy and McNamara, 2016; Crichton and Esteban, 2018; Delevaux et al., 2018; Nalau et al., 2018b; 7 Parsons et al., 2018; McNamara et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020).This also includes the broader 8 and often more urgent development issues that impact on communities' wellbeing (Piggott-McKellar et al., 9 2020). Community-based projects demonstrate in the Pacific that communities' vulnerabilities, priorities and 10 needs might be a better and more effective entry point for climate adaptation than framing projects solely 11 around climate change (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; Weir, 2020).This is supported by a recent review of 12 32 CBA initiatives in the Pacific where initiatives that were locally funded and implemented were more 13 successful than those with external international funding (McNamara et al., 2020). Initiatives that integrated 14 EbA and climate awareness raising also performed better (McNamara et al., 2020). 15 16 While CBA approaches to adaptation projects can increase community ownership and commitment to 17 project implementation, these can also face challenges. In Pele Island, Vanuatu, implementation of CBA 18 projects has experienced significant failures due to elite capture of project management, internal power 19 dynamics within communities, and different priorities of communities living across the island that were 20 supposed to be all responsible for implementing whole-of-island projects (Buggy and McNamara, 2016). 21 Similarly, in Samoa, consultations with community leaders led to the misplacement of a revetment wall that 22 increased flooding in the area against engineering advice (McGinn, 2020). Also, community-scale might not 23 be always the best fit if the best scale to leverage adaptation is across catchment or whole-of-island scale 24 (Buggy and McNamara, 2016; Remling and Veitayaki, 2016). 25 26 15.5.6 Livelihood Responses 27 28 Communities across small islands are adapting to the impacts of climate change across a range of livelihood 29 activities. Coastal fishers have adapted by employing several activities ranging from diversification of 30 livelihoods to changing fishing grounds and considering weather insurance (Blair and Momtaz, 2018; 31 Lemahieu et al., 2018; Karlsson and McLean, 2020; Turner et al., 2020). In Antigua and Vanuatu, fishers 32 have undertaken adaptation in response to increases in air and ocean temperature, increases in wind and 33 changes in rainfall. In Antigua, adaptation strategies amongst coastal fishers have included investments in 34 improved technologies and equipment, changing fishing grounds, and seeking better training and education 35 (Blair and Momtaz, 2018). In Efate (Vanuatu) the majority (87%) of the fishermen used livelihood 36 diversification as an adaptation strategy whereas 53% also searched for new fishing areas as a result of the 37 changing conditions (Blair and Momtaz, 2018). In Southwest Madagascar, due to deteriorated reef 38 conditions, coastal fishermen now go further offshore to catch fish or have adapted their fishing techniques, 39 while others closer to the tourism markets, have opted for livelihood diversification (Lemahieu et al., 2018). 40 Coastal fishers in the Dominican Republic have also diversified their livelihoods and use local knowledge in 41 changing fishing practices and locations depending on environmental conditions (Karlsson and McLean, 42 2020). In the future, increased inland rainfall could for example provide new areas for inland aquaculture in 43 the Solomon Islands as an adaptation strategy and also reduce pressure from coastal fishing (Dey et al., 44 2016). 45 46 In the agricultural sector in Jamaica, adaptation strategies include varying expenditure on inputs (e.g., 47 fertilizers, chemicals, labour), diversifying cropping patterns, expanding or prioritising other cash crops (e.g., 48 fruits and vegetables), engaging in small-scale livestock husbandry (Guido et al., 2018), and investing in 49 irrigation technologies due to increased drought and infrequent rainfall (Popke et al., 2016). In many higher 50 elevation islands within the Pacific, including Vanuatu and Fiji, communities continue to use to varying 51 degrees traditional adaptive strategies designed to reduce their vulnerability to tropical cyclones. These 52 include planting a diversity of different crops within household and communal gardens, locating gardens in 53 different areas within their customary lands to ensure that not all crops are destroyed due to an extreme 54 event, and the storage, and preservation of certain foodstuffs (so-called famine foods) (Campbell, 2014b; 55 McMillen et al., 2014; Le Dé et al., 2018; Moncada and Bambrick, 2019). 56 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-42 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Given changes in climatic conditions, in Puerto Rico women in the coffee industry are now forming their 2 own "micro-clusters" of complementary activities, such as rebuilding of public spaces, running 3 environmental education programmes for children, and opening new commercial enterprises (e.g., coffee 4 shops, and food products) that do not rely on traditional coffee supply chains or government assistance 5 (Borges-Méndez and Caron, 2019). Such alternative livelihood strategies parallel those undertaken by 6 Pacific women working on various local-level climate change adaptation and environmental projects 7 throughout small island nations of the Pacific. Women report testing and using adaptive strategies informed 8 by IKLK, but which are being modified to suit the changing environmental conditions they are encountering 9 and those projected in the future. This includes harvesting rainwater during droughts, planting native plants 10 along coastlines to prevent erosion and flooding, developing plant nurseries, experimenting with growing 11 salt-tolerant (taro) crops, and relocating crop cultivation inland (McLeod et al., 2018). 12 13 The tourism sector is increasingly a major source of cash-based livelihoods across small islands. Despite the 14 high vulnerability and sensitivity of island tourism to climate change at a national scale (Scott et al., 2019), 15 there is evidence from the South Pacific that local tourism operators' adaptive capacity is high due to socio- 16 cultural factors. In Samoa, adaptive capacity consists of accommodation providers' social networks, 17 resources, past experiences and understanding of environmental conditions, and remittances as a form of 18 informal insurance (Parsons et al., 2017). The adaptive capacity of Tongan tour operators is strengthened by 19 high climate change awareness, strong social networks and remittances as well as perceived high resilience 20 against climate change (van der Veeken et al., 2016). 21 22 Evidence from Vanuatu shows that climate risk to tourism destinations is influenced by multiple, 23 interconnected economic, socio-cultural, political, and environmental factors suggesting that holistic 24 approaches are needed to reduce risk and avoid negative knock-on effects (Loehr, 2019). Tourism can 25 strengthen mechanisms that reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity of the wider destination, 26 such as providing adaptation finance, investing in education and capacity building, and working with nature 27 (Loehr, 2019).Examples include numerous EBA initiatives in the Caribbean including Marine Protected 28 Areas in St. Lucia and Jamaica (Mycoo, 2018a). In Vanuatu, tourism businesses are engaged in establishing 29 Marine Protected Areas to address multiple risks from climate change, population growth and development 30 (Loehr et al., 2020). In the Seychelles, coral restoration programmes and mangrove reforestation are 31 promoted through public-private partnerships, generating new opportunities for wetland-tourism livelihoods 32 (Khan and Amelie, 2015). 33 34 The willingness of tourism businesses to finance adaptation measures varies. Islands have developed 35 building codes which consider impacts from sea level rise but these are often not enforced enforced (Hess 36 and Kelman, 2017). In cases where tourist resorts have been part of climate adaptation projects, such as 37 funding for hard coastal protection infrastructure, the resort owners find that these diminish the aesthetics of 38 the beach destination (Crichton and Esteban, 2018). Adaptation taxes and levies imposed on tourism can 39 provide funding (Mycoo, 2018a) as The Environmental Protection and Tourism Improvement Fund Act, 40 2017 of British Virgin Islands shows (Smith, 2017). A lack of interaction between tourism and climate 41 change decision makers is a commonly identified issue (Becken, 2019; Mahadew and Appadoo, 2019; Scott 42 et al., 2019). A number of adaptation measures are recommended in the literature such as increasing climate 43 change research, education and institutional capacities; product and market diversification away from coastal 44 tourism to include terrestrial-based experiences and heritage tourism, and mainstreaming adaptation in 45 tourism policies and vice versa (e.g., to include appropriate planning guidelines for tourism development, 46 coastal setbacks and environmental impact assessments (Mycoo, 2018a; Becken et al., 2020) Thomas et al., 47 2020; van der Veeken et al., 2016). 48 49 15.5.7 Disaster Risk Management, Early Warning Systems and Climate Services 50 51 Disaster risk management (DRM) investments in small islands are commonly framed as reducing climate 52 change-driven risk and contributing to sustainable development (Johnston, 2014; Mercer et al., 2014a; 53 Kuruppu and Willie, 2015). Examples include strengthening the capacity of National Meteorological and 54 Hydrological Services (NMHS ) to deliver effective (WMO et al., 2018); nurturing community-based DRM 55 to build social capital (Blackburn, 2014; McNaught et al., 2014; Gero et al., 2015; Handmer and Iveson, 56 2017; Chacowry et al., 2018; De Souza and Clarke, 2018; Currenti et al., 2019; Cvitanovic et al., 2019; Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-43 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Hagedoorn et al., 2019), as well as processes that integrate IKLK with science (Hiwasaki et al., 2014; Carby, 2 2015; Bryant-Tokalau, 2018a; CANARI, 2019). 3 4 Many small islands, especially those with the highest risks and the least resources, remain highly challenged 5 in building and sustaining integrated, people-centred, end-to-end early warning systems that are fully 6 functional across the four interrelated components of EWS. Warning dissemination and communication, and 7 disaster preparedness and response capacities are particular components of EWS requiring strengthening in 8 SIDS (WMO, 2020). More recent assessments of early warning capabilities in the Caribbean highlight 9 improvements in EWS for weather, water and climate over time (WMO et al., 2018; Mahon et al., 2019). 10 However, progress has been uneven across hazards, governance levels and spatial and temporal scales, with 11 more advanced development of some sub-systems and EWS pillars than others. Significant progress has 12 been made in the area of detection, monitoring, analysis and forecasting of severe weather systems but there 13 is a need to strengthen this area for other climate-related hazards such as wildfires, localised intense rainfall, 14 floods, as well as heatwaves and droughts which become more important in a changing climate. Assessments 15 also point to specific deficiencies including significant gaps in the area of disaster risk knowledge - 16 particularly the development of risk assessments, the variable capacity for interpreting scientific warning 17 products across states, as well as effective communication of warning messages to populations at risk 18 (Lumbroso et al., 2016; WMO et al., 2018). 19 20 There is increasing recognition and commitment at global (Section 3.6.3.2.4; WMO, 2014; UN, 2015c; UN, 21 2015b; UN, 2015a), regional (CCCCC, 2012; CDEMA, 2014; SPC, 2016; SPREP, 2017; CIMH et al., 2019) 22 and national levels (SPREP, 2016a; WMO, 2016a) of the importance of climate services in supporting 23 adaptation decision making in small islands (medium evidence, high agreement). A number of SIDS-focused 24 climate service programmes have emerged, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific (Group, 2015; Martin et 25 al., 2015; SPREP, 2016b; WMO, 2016b; WMO, 2018a; WMO, 2018b) and at least one SIDS ­ Dominica - 26 has been prioritised as a pilot implementation country under the Global Framework for Climate Services 27 (WMO, 2016a). As is the case globally, climate services focused on decision-making at seasonal (3­6 28 month) timescales has thus far been the focus of investment in small islands. Less attention has been given to 29 investments in and assessments of climate services for decision making at longer timescales (Vaughan et al., 30 2018). 31 32 Studies from the Caribbean (Dookie et al., 2019; Mahon et al., 2019) and Indian Ocean (Hermes et al., 33 2019), have found that NMHSs and regional intergovernmental bodies face capacity challenges in 34 translation, transfer, and facilitation of the use of climate information to various end user groups. In many 35 small island contexts a gap remains between investments in data quality and information services and uptake 36 and use in risk reduction by policy and decision makers (Dookie et al., 2019). Bringing policy makers and 37 users together to guide investments in climate information services is recommended, as is provision of 38 dedicated resources to develop applicable tools and products that turn data and information services into risk 39 reduction measures (Dookie et al., 2019; Haines, 2019). 40 41 Many of the outlined Key Risks (Section 15.3.4.9) can be addressed through the variety of adaptation 42 options outlined in the previous sections in the context of small islands (Table 15.6, Supplementary Material 43 15.1). Whereas some of these adaptation options are widespread (e.g., hard protection, reforestation or the 44 creation of MPAs), others (e.g. accommodation, health awareness raising and training) have been little 45 experimented with to date in small island contexts. Although most of these adaptation options provide 46 diversified co-benefits to small island communities, there is still limited evidence with regard to their 47 effectiveness in reducing climate change impacts. While some of them respond directly to a Key Risk or a 48 number of Key Risks (Table 15.6), others can be understood as overarching options that, for example, build 49 adaptive capacity of communities and organizations and enable these actors to respond to a variety of Key 50 Risks in an effective manner (see Supplementary Material 15.1). 51 52 53 Table 15.6: Adaptation options per Key Risk in small islands. This table summarizes risk-oriented adaptation options, 54 their level of implementation, enablers and effectiveness in reducing exposure and vulnerability, co-benefits and 55 disbenefits in small islands. For Key Risk 2 (submergence of reef islands), not included, adaptation options are the 56 same as for Key Risk 5. 57 [INSERT TABLE 15.6 HERE] Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-44 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 3 15.6 Enablers, Limits and Barriers to Adaptation 4 5 Since AR5, more literature has emerged on barriers, limits and enablers to climate change adaptation across 6 small islands. Here, we cover barriers, limits and enablers as they relate to key themes across small islands 7 and adaptation. 8 9 15.6.1 Governance 10 11 Specific governance-related barriers for effective adaptation include: lack of coordination between 12 government departments and sectors and limited policy integration (Scobie, 2016; Robinson, 2018b), lack of 13 ownership of adaptation implementation in cases where communities or national governments have not been 14 part of the adaptation decision process (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; Prance, 15 2015; Nunn and Kumar, 2018; Parsons and Nalau, 2019), and difficulties in integrating IKLK in adaptation 16 initiatives. Specific barriers to effective sustained adaptation in the Pacific include variable climate change 17 awareness among decision-makers, and the preference for short-term responses rather than longer-term 18 transformative ones (Nunn et al., 2014). These barriers also stem from donors' preferencing their own 19 priorities that do not necessarily fit the country priorities or context (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Kuruppu 20 and Willie, 2015; Prance, 2015), which has led to increasing calls for effective community/cultural 21 engagement in adaptation, especially through CBA and EbA (Nalau et al., 2018b). In cases where recovery 22 efforts are framed as purely a matter of infrastructure other important aspects, such as livelihoods and 23 gender, are more easily overlooked in adaptation (Turner et al., 2020). 24 25 In the Caribbean small islands such as Jamaica and St. Lucia, and also in the Pacific, barriers to 26 mainstreaming adaptation include competing development priorities, the absence of planning frameworks or 27 `undetected' overlaps in existing frameworks, serious governance flaws linked to the prevalence of 28 corruption and corrupt people in political and public life, and insufficient manpower and human resources, 29 linked to countries' financial capacity (Robinson, 2018b). In addition, the lack of strong governance 30 mechanisms for urban planning have contributed to urban sprawl and expansion that has increased the 31 number of informal settlements, which together with population growth are driving Caribbean small islands 32 to their limits (Enríquez-de-Salamanca, 2018; Mycoo, 2018a; Mycoo, 2018b). In the Pacific, only a few 33 countries have embedded climate change adaptation in existing legislation despite the overall regional 34 agreement to A New Song for Coastal Fisheries - Pathways to Change: the Noumea Strategy' to improve 35 coastal fisheries management in a changing climate (Gourlie et al., 2018). Many climate change specific 36 initiatives across small islands have a unidirectional focus on climate risks and shift limited resources away 37 from other important development objectives (Baldacchino, 2018). Local level plans are often overlooked: 38 for example, in Mauritius, local level climate adaptation plans are currently nearly non-existent while district 39 councils have rarely been successful in even accessing international adaptation finance (Williams et al., 40 2020). In Samoa, several national level programs on adaptation have had difficulties in engaging with the 41 local level even if the decision-making powers on actual land management sit within the communities 42 (McGinn and Solofa, 2020). 43 44 Adaptation governance is also complicated further by the multitude of stakeholders involved, with differing 45 agendas and priorities. In the Bahamas, private properties have significant say in how and what adaptation 46 measures they decide to pursue and are not well regulated, with the tourism sector in particular dominated 47 mainly by external investors (Petzold et al., 2018). Social organisations, such as the churches, that have 48 significant influence in many Oceanic countries, are engaging in climate change discussions and governance. 49 Many churches report, however, being constrained to act on climate adaptation due to lack of financial 50 resources, low levels of professional knowledge on adaptation, and their members not perceiving climate 51 change as an urgent risk (Rubow and Bird, 2016). Actors such as military services in the Indian and Pacific 52 Oceans also control a high number of assets in vulnerable locations and will need to integrate climate 53 information into adaptive planning in the future (Finucane and Keener, 2015). 54 55 Low technical capacity, and poor data availability and quality are reported as limiting adaptation in 56 Caribbean small islands such as Dominica, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (Smith and Rhiney, 2016; 57 Robinson, 2018a) and Trinidad and Tobago (Mycoo, 2020). These factors are, however, secondary to the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-45 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 lack of finances, which is seen as a fundamental limit (Charan et al., 2017; Robinson, 2018a; Williams et al., 2 2020). This was also reported in the Seychelles, despite its success with innovative financing streams and 3 being a leader in the Indian Ocean in this regard (Robinson, 2018a). 4 5 Limited regional cooperation across sub-national island jurisdictions (jurisdictions with semi-autonomous 6 status) along with limited regional-scale climate information are also stymying action (Petzold and Magnan, 7 2019). This is a concern given the need for pooled governance in response to capacity constraints across 8 small jurisdictions (Dornan, 2014; Kelman, 2018). There is also an insufficient understanding of the role of 9 regional and international actors such as the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre and the Global 10 Environment Facility, respectively (Middelbeek et al., 2014). Sometimes external pressure and, for example, 11 trans regional trade agreements are "useful for reducing unsustainable local socio-political arrangements" as 12 seen in the Solomon Islands regarding fisheries management within the concept of Blue Economy (Keen et 13 al., 2018, p. 338). Similarly, in Samoa, the World Bank's Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR) and 14 Adaptation Fund's Enhancing Resilience of Samoa's Coastal Communities to Climate Change, illustrate 15 successful examples of multi-level governance due to their programmatic and pragmatic approaches versus 16 project-based approaches (McGinn and Solofa, 2020). Enabling factors in these programmes relate to 17 strategic placements of funds and responsibilities in the relevant ministries, alignment with national priorities 18 and pre-existing plans, pooling funding to fill existing finance gaps, and increased awareness across scales 19 and departments of synergies and gaps between different initiatives (McGinn and Solofa, 2020). Initiatives 20 such as the Pacific Adaptive Capacity Framework (Warrick et al., 2017) and regional strategies such as the 21 Framework for the Disaster and Climate Resilient Development in the Pacific (FRDP) enable the localising 22 of climate adaptation into cultural contexts in an integrated manner (SPC, 2016). 23 24 Countries including the Seychelles and Maldives have developed national climate change plans that 25 recognize linkages to food security, health and disaster risk reduction, although these-face significant 26 resourcing issues when it comes to implementation (Techera, 2018). National level plans, such as National 27 Adaptation Plans of Action (NAPAs), increasingly could include local government engagement and have a 28 stronger focus on urban centres and adaptation (Mycoo, 2018a). Building codes act as supportive enablers 29 for adaptation governance: requiring more hurricane-resistant housing in the Caribbean, including incentives 30 for informal settlements to build in a more resilient manner, can achieve multiple development and 31 adaptation outcomes (Mycoo, 2018a). In Dominica, a Climate Resilience Executing Agency of Dominica 32 (CREAD) established in 2019, aims to enable stronger climate resilience by bringing all sectors and services 33 together for more effective coordination (Turner et al., 2020). Improvements in cross sectoral and cross 34 agency coordination are creating opportunities for improved disaster preparedness and resilience measures in 35 Vanuatu (Webb et al., 2015). A range of mechanisms also exists in the tourism industry: adaptation taxes 36 and improved building regulations could reduce risk drastically for example in the Caribbean region (Mycoo, 37 2018a). 38 39 15.6.2 Health-Related Adaptation Strategies 40 41 The term `health systems' refers to the organisation of people, institutions, and resources that work to protect 42 and promote population health. The two components of health systems are public health and health care; 43 adaptation is needed in both to develop climate-resilient health systems (WHO, 2015). Adaptation measures 44 focus on each of the building blocks of health systems, including leadership and governance; a 45 knowledgeable health workforce; health information systems; essential medical products and technologies; 46 health service delivery; and financing. Many small island states have policies to manage climate-sensitive 47 health risks, although Ministries of Health are largely unprepared to adapt to a changing climate because few 48 programmes take climate change into account (McIver et al., 2016). Particularly vulnerable groups, such as 49 Indigenous peoples, are often inadequately represented in adaptation planning processes and implementation, 50 resulting in less effective interventions (Jones, 2019). 51 52 A range of climate-sensitive diseases pose threats to island communities. A vulnerability and adaptation 53 assessment conducted in Dominica identified vector-, water- and food-borne diseases and food security as 54 priority threats from climate change (Schnitter et al., 2019). Short-term adaptation options include 55 strengthening solid waste management and enforcing current legislation; increasing public awareness; 56 training health sector staff; improving the reliability and safety of water storage practices; improving climate 57 change and health data collection methods and enhancing environmental monitoring; enhancing the Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-46 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 integration of climate services into health decision-making; strengthening the organisational structure of 2 emergency response; and ensuring sufficient resources and surge capacity. Longer-term adaptation options 3 include developing early warning and response systems for climate-sensitive health risks; enhancing data 4 collection and information flow; increasing the capacity of laboratory facilities; and developing emergency 5 plans. For example, rainfall is the best environmental predictor of malaria in North Guadalcanal, Solomon 6 Islands, leading to the development of an early warning tool that could increase resilience to climate change 7 (Smith et al., 2017; Jeanne et al., 2018). 8 9 In small island states, water, sanitation, and hygiene infrastructure are particularly vulnerable to climate 10 change, with impacts on the burden of diarrheal diseases. The resilience of types of sanitation infrastructure 11 in urban and rural households in the Solomon Islands differ under scenarios of increased rainfall and 12 flooding versus decreased rainfall and drought, reinforcing the centrality of taking the local context into 13 account during adaptation decision-making (Fleming et al., 2019). Healthcare facilities, including hospitals, 14 clinics, and community care centres, are vulnerable to extreme weather and climate events, such as flooding 15 and TCs, and to climate-related outbreaks of infectious diseases that overwhelm their capacity to provide 16 critical services (WHO, 2020). These facilities may lack functioning infrastructure and trained health 17 workforce, and be predisposed to inadequate energy supplies, and water, sanitation, and waste management 18 services. Adaptation is needed to build resilience and contribute to environmental sustainability. 19 20 Many major health care facilities in small island states are in exposed coastal areas and have limited ability 21 to provide health services during disasters when services are most needed (WHO, 2018). For example, in 22 Vanuatu, TC Pam in 2015 severely damaged two hospitals, 19 health care centres, and 50 healthcare 23 dispensaries in 22 affected islands (Kim et al., 2015). A Smart Hospital Initiative in the Caribbean focuses 24 on improving hospital resilience, strengthening structures and operations, and installing green technologies 25 to reduce energy consumption and provide energy autonomy during extreme events and disasters 26 (https://www.paho.org/en/health-emergencies/smart-hospitals). 27 28 15.6.3 Adaptation Finance and Risk Transfer Mechanisms 29 30 In the majority of small island developing states there is a high dependence on international financing to 31 support adaptation to slow and rapid onset events (Robinson and Dornan, 2017; Petzold and Magnan, 2019). 32 However, funds tend to be geared towards supporting sectoral-level adaptation initiatives for vulnerable 33 natural resource sectors such as water, biodiversity and coastal zones (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015). 34 Considering low income small islands such as Comoros, Haiti, and São Tomé and Príncipe, international 35 modalities do little to address the root causes of vulnerability or to support system-wide transformations 36 (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015). Although countries like Trinidad and Tobago have amassed oil wealth, the 37 profits are not invested in a way that benefits environmental goals (Middelbeek et al., 2014). In Mauritius, a 38 lack of financial resources for climate change adaptation has been recognised as a specific impediment in 39 district council level (Williams et al., 2020). 40 41 Although small island jurisdictions have seen increased flows of adaptation finance through mostly top-town 42 arrangements, they face large implementation difficulties (medium evidence, high agreement) (Weir and 43 Pittock, 2017; Magnan and Duvat, 2018). There are growing concerns among policy- and decision-makers in 44 small islands about the current levels and forms of adaptation finance, and about countries' experience with 45 accessing it (Robinson and Dornan, 2017). In the Caribbean, 38% of flows were concessional loans and 62% 46 were grants (Atteridge et al., 2017); the situation in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans is starkly different-- 47 nearly 75% of the flows were in the form of concessional loans and grants accounted for the remaining 25% 48 (Canales et al., 2017). This raises questions about fairness and justice for small islands having to finance 49 adaptation to climate impacts to which they have made a negligible contribution. In the Pacific, 86% of aid 50 was delivered as project-based support (Atteridge and Canales, 2017), that can undermine the long-term 51 sustainability of adaptation interventions (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; 52 Atteridge and Canales, 2017). Direct budget support was rare (Atteridge and Canales, 2017), signalling the 53 importance of works such as Rambarran (2018) that support cross-regional lesson-learning by, for example, 54 showcasing the experience of Seychelles with successfully devising innovative financing mechanisms for 55 supporting adaptation and conservation goals, and reducing its public debt. Regional catastrophe risk 56 insurance schemes however, such as Pacific Catastrophe Risk Insurance Company under the World Bank's 57 Pacific Catastrophe Risk Assessment and Financing Initiative (PCRAFI) Program are trying to enable a Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-47 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 regional effort in increasing accessibility to insurance (PCRAFI, 2017) as does the Caribbean Catastrophe 2 Risk Insurance Facility, although these funds are still rather small compared to the needs across the countries 3 (Handmer and Nalau, 2019). 4 5 Microfinance is increasingly viewed as a positive mechanism to improve access to climate adaptation 6 funding (Di Falco and Sharma, 2018). In the Caribbean, a significant barrier in accessing climate finance 7 relates to bureaucratic structures, which means that money intended for communities does not reach them 8 (Mycoo, 2018a). Many adaptation projects even at the community level have upfront costs that need to be 9 supported, especially in communities where there is little hard cash in use (Remling and Veitayaki, 2016). 10 Despite such challenges, communities in the Pacific region have used "cashless adaptation" for a long time 11 that involves trading of services and items as a form of Indigenous microfinance (Nunn and Kumar, 2019b). 12 Social networks also function as a source of informal microfinance where extended family members send 13 back remittances from overseas to their families and communities especially after disasters. In Samoa 14 Indigenous tourism operators receive remittances from overseas family members (Crichton and Esteban, 15 2018; Parsons et al., 2018), with similar processes observed among atoll communities in the Solomon 16 Islands (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014), Vanuatu (Handmer and Nalau, 2019) and Jamaica (Carby, 2017). 17 However, the role of migration and remittances is still poorly understood; it is difficult to quantify the 18 informal flows and understand the extent they support effective adaptation (limited evidence, high 19 agreement) (Campbell, 2014a; Parsons et al., 2018; Handmer and Nalau, 2019). 20 21 In Old Harbour Bay, Jamaica's largest fishing village, a high number of community members engaged in the 22 fishing industry, particularly vendors and scalers, do not own the material assets needed to fully benefit from 23 these livelihood activities (Baptiste and Kinlocke, 2016). Developing a broader asset portfolio by increasing 24 access to such assets via adaptation finance investments could reduce vulnerability across the community. 25 This could function as an effective livelihood-based adaptation strategy for the most vulnerable such as 26 women, who are part-time employed and in peripheral roles in the fishing industry (Baptiste and Kinlocke, 27 2016). In Belize and the Dominican Republic, many coastal fishers for example use informal credit from 28 food stores or captains to enable them to withstand financial losses that are often incurred during bad 29 weather and extreme events (Karlsson and McLean, 2020). 30 31 In Vanuatu, discussions are ongoing on increasing insurance availability for TCs and droughts, but 32 standardisation of housing designs to get insurance can become difficult where the costs make it prohibitive 33 and run counter to traditional building designs and materials (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016). Empirical 34 evidence from Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and St. Lucia indicates that there are also other factors why people 35 do not take insurance, including "the cost of premiums (44 %), lack of trust in insurance companies (27 %), 36 having never considered insurance (26 %), a lack of need for insurance (25 %) and a lack of knowledge of 37 insurance (22 %)" (Lashley and Warner, 2013, p. 108). Increasing trust could be addressed by seeking out 38 domestic banks or credit unions with whom people are already engaging with, while also using social 39 marketing campaigns to raise awareness of weather-related insurance to address knowledge gaps and lack of 40 awareness of these tools (Lashley and Warner, 2013). In Dominica, many coastal fishers are suspicious of 41 insurance schemes given past experiences of not being paid out on time or having to disclose catch data 42 (Turner et al., 2020). Yet, insurance is not capable of addressing all kinds of loss and damage accruing from 43 climate impacts and should be used as an adaptation strategy in combination with other strategies (Lashley 44 and Warner, 2013). 45 46 Insurance cover is a critical question in small islands. For example, in Vanuatu, some companies do not 47 "cover storm damage from the sea or high tides...which is not helpful for properties damaged by a tropical 48 cyclone's storm surge" (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016)(p. 6). There is also limited access to insurance schemes 49 due to lower demand in small markets (Petzold and Magnan, 2019) especially when many people do not 50 have high cash-based incomes and likely cannot pay insurance premiums (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016). In 51 Saint Lucia and Grenada (via the Caribbean Oceans and Aquaculture Sustainability Facility), discussions are 52 ongoing with regard to national level parametric insurance, underpinned by financing from the US State 53 Department, to help fishing communities recover more quickly following the passage of TCs in the future 54 (Sainsbury et al., 2019; Turner et al., 2020). Likewise, (Reguero et al., 2020) have suggested a resilience 55 insurance mechanism that could in theory reduce climate related losses and damages through investments in 56 nature-based adaptation projects (e.g. coral reef restoration and potentially mangrove restoration). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-48 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 15.6.4 Education and Awareness-Raising 2 3 A significant barrier to effective climate adaptation is the lack of education and awareness around climate 4 change both among the general public, for example in the Bahamas (Petzold et al., 2018) and among 5 decision-makers in the more remote rural communities (Nunn, 2013; Mycoo, 2015). Increasing knowledge 6 on adaptation options and needs can increase adaptive capacity that is underpinned by "the ability of 7 individuals to access, understand and apply the knowledge needed to inform their decision-making 8 processes" (Cvitanovic et al., 2016 p. 54). This should however also be seen as a collective effort (Hayward 9 et al., 2019). 10 11 Workshops and training are seen as crucial at the local scale to build communities' capacity to take action 12 and to integrate climate change considerations to the broader development processes (Remling and 13 Veitayaki, 2016), although purely workshop-based short-term capacity building in adaptation has been 14 questioned (Conway and Mustelin, 2014; Lubell and Niles, 2019). More interactive community engagement 15 strategies could include "participatory three-Dimensional modelling (P3DM), participatory video, 16 development of photo journals, and civil society plans" (Beckford, 2018, p. 46) that enables broader 17 engagement. In Fiji, Laje Rotuma youth EcoCamps have been used to engage younger Fijians to understand 18 adaptation and increasing environmental stewardship with good outcomes (McNaught et al., 2014). In Palau, 19 Camp Ebiil provides a culturally-based platform for younger generations to learn about nature and culture in 20 an interactive camp (Singeo, 2011). Vanuatu's Volunteer Rainfall Observer Network in turn engages 21 volunteers to record their rainfall observations, demonstrating the use of IKLK that can be integrated with 22 contemporary weather forecasting (Chand et al., 2014). Likewise, initiatives such as ePOP Petites Ondes 23 Participatives aim to develop a citizen network to share environmental information (e.g., via minivideos on 24 smartphones). Across the Pacific, projects such as the European Union Pacific Technical Vocational 25 Education and Training on Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Adaptation Project (EU PacTVET), 26 have sought to increase capacity of Pacific islanders in disaster risk management and climate adaptation 27 (Hemstock et al., 2018). 28 29 In Fiji, a study on adaptive behaviour and intention to invest in more adaptive portfolios found that the intent 30 for adaptive behaviour increased with the supply of climate information (Di Falco and Sharma, 2018). In the 31 Pacific, high performing CBA initiatives included climate awareness raising that equipped people with 32 knowledge to understand occurring environmental changes and what to do (McNamara et al., 2020). Lack of 33 information can increase community vulnerability. Remote Indigenous farming communities in St Vincent, 34 in the Caribbean, for example have already observed decreased rainfall and increases in temperatures, but 35 they have been largely excluded from agricultural training that includes information in how to improve 36 agricultural strategies in times of climatic shocks and how to prepare for changing climatic conditions (Smith 37 and Rhiney, 2016). In the Bahamas, cultural background, income and education levels impact the extent that 38 people are aware of climate risks (Petzold et al., 2018) . In Dominica, access to information critical to 39 fisheries is noted as a significant challenge, including data collection, its management and human resources 40 in building capacity to process and use this information for evidence-based decision making (Turner et al., 41 2020). 42 43 The Caribbean Climate Online Risk and Adaptation tool has been developed to assist the tourism industry in 44 producing "climate-sensitive developments" (Mackay and Spencer, 2017,p. 55). Though some authors 45 conclude on the low climate awareness/understanding among small islanders (Middelbeek et al., 2014; 46 Betzold, 2015; Petzold et al., 2018), others indicate that many Caribbean islanders are acutely aware of past 47 storm events (i.e., social memory) and have a certain degree of self-reliance, which creates the capability to 48 multi-task and cope with limited resources (Petzold and Magnan, 2019). There is, however, a disconnect 49 between knowledge, attitudes and practices--knowledge sharing and learning need to be improved along 50 with the take-up of an evidence-based decision-making approach (Lashley and Warner, 2013; Petzold et al., 51 2018; Saxena et al., 2018). 52 53 15.6.5 Culture 54 55 Culture can be defined as "material and non-material symbols that express collective meaning" (Adger et al., 56 2014, p. 762) and includes worldviews and values, how individuals and communities relate to their 57 environment, and what they perceive to be at risk and in need of adaptation (McNaught et al., 2014; Nunn et Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-49 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 al., 2014; Remling and Veitayaki, 2016; Nunn et al., 2017bGranderson, 2017; Neef et al., 2018; Oakes, 2 2019). In small islands, culture plays an important role in individual and community decision-making on 3 adaptation both as an enabling factor and as a barrier (robust evidence, high agreement) (Nunn et al., 2017b; 4 Parsons et al., 2017; Neef et al., 2018; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020). The concept of Vai Nui as the 5 interconnectedness of Pacific Islanders continues to support the collective agency to plan and undertake 6 adaptation efforts in the region (Hayward et al., 2019). In Samoa, the principles of Fa`asamoa (the Samoan 7 way of life) impacts on how decisions are made, including the role of the aiga (extended family) that is a 8 web of local, national and transnational kinship networks (Parsons et al., 2018). Traditional village council 9 structures and land stewardship enables an expanded range of coastal adaptation options in Samoa, including 10 potential relocation, but at the same time may limit participation of all social groups in adaptation decision 11 making (Crichton et al., 2020). In Dominica, in the aftermath of Hurricane Maria (2017), social capital in the 12 form of transboundary nearby island networks enabled some communities to recover faster from the disaster 13 including access to more livelihood opportunities and assets (Turner et al., 2020). 14 15 Yet, culture is often overlooked in adaptation policies and plans. For example, in the National 16 Communications of 16 SIDS, only one country (Cook Islands) reported adaptation actions that addressed 17 social issues, culture, and heritage (Robinson, 2018b). Externally-driven adaptation efforts in rural small- 18 island communities that exclude community priorities, ignore or undervalue IKLK, and are based on secular 19 western/global worldviews (Donner and Webber, 2014; Prance, 2015; McNamara et al., 2016; Nunn et al., 20 2017b; Schwebel, 2017; Mallin, 2018; Nunn and McNamara, 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2019b) are often 21 less successful (high agreement, medium evidence). The World Bank Kiribati Adaptation Program (KAP) for 22 example builds mainly on western knowledge and science despite consultations with the Kiribati 23 communities (Prance, 2015). Yet, in many contexts most land and knowledge is embedded in traditional 24 governance and culture while adaptation plans and decisions are made elsewhere on how that land should be 25 used and what knowledge is used (high agreement) (Nunn, 2013; Prance, 2015; Charan et al., 2017; Nalau et 26 al., 2018a; Parsons et al., 2018; McGinn and Solofa, 2020). 27 28 In Kiribati, communities often use different timescales to evaluate the need for adaptation. I-Kiribati 29 culture's core concept of time is short- and medium term (Prance, 2015), which should be considered in 30 adaptation policy and planning processes especially at the household and community level (Donner and 31 Webber, 2014). Key stakeholders, especially community leaders, should be included and empowered to help 32 design and sustain adaptation (Baldacchino, 2018; Weiler et al., 2018). Focusing on values-as-relations (e.g., 33 island communities' relationship with the environment and each other) could diversify the values considered 34 in adaptation decision-making processes (Parsons and Nalau, 2019). Indeed, those Pacific islands with a 35 more island-centric approach to climate adaptation tend to have overall more successful adaptation policies 36 in place (Schwebel, 2017). 37 38 The cultural context and sources of knowledge are myriad and diverse in small islands. Community 39 members often use both IKLK as well as western scientific-based weather forecasts to take actions to 40 prepare for extreme weather events (Chand et al., 2014; Johnston, 2015; Janif et al., 2016; Granderson, 2017; 41 Kelman et al., 2017), with specific examples from Niue, Tonga, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands (high 42 agreement, high evidence) (Chand et al., 2014; Chambers et al., 2017; Chambers et al., 2019). In Samoa, 43 people keep particular areas reserved for disaster times such as TC seasons (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015) 44 while in Vanuatu IKLK indicators for tropical cyclones include mango trees flowering early and turtles 45 going further inland to lay their eggs (Chand et al., 2014). IKLK are however not evenly distributed within 46 communities due to IKLK being traditional intellectual property of particular roles in the villages (e.g., 47 weathermen in Vanuatu), and not available to other community members or external actors directly (Chand 48 et al., 2014; Prance, 2015). In Tongoa Island, Vanuatu, communities are finding however that their IKLK- 49 based seasonal calendars are out of sync given the changes in climatic conditions (Granderson, 2017) while 50 erosion of IKLK remains a concern across most small island nations (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015; 51 Granderson, 2017; Beckford, 2018). 52 53 Not all IKLK and other knowledge are necessarily helpful and IKLK can lead to maladaptation (Mercer et 54 al., 2012; Beckford, 2018). Elders from the Chuuk State (Federated States of Micronesia, (Elders from Atafu 55 Atoll, 2012), for instance, assign blame for changeable weather patterns, destructive typhoons, and loss of 56 biodiversity to people's failure to maintain and employ their IKLK. Fatalism (belief that disasters are God's 57 will) is still reported as a major cultural barrier to adaptation. In Maldives fatalism decreases direct Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-50 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 adaptation action and influences perceptions of climate risks (Shakeela and Becken, 2015) while Indigenous 2 communities in St Vincent do not prepare for hurricanes or climatic shocks for the same reason (Smith and 3 Rhiney, 2016). In Oceania, Christianity and the church play an important role in how issues, such as climate 4 change, are communicated and thought about (Rubow and Bird, 2016; Nunn et al., 2017b), including the 5 Noah and flood story used as a justification that there is no need to worry about sea level rise (Rubow and 6 Bird, 2016). New emerging forms of eco-theology (theology that connects humans with land, sea and sky) 7 however situate climate change as part of environmental stewardship (Rubow and Bird, 2016) making 8 churches active partners in caring for the environment. 9 10 Many studies also now demonstrate the value in considering multiple systems of knowledge through 11 collaborative and co-production projects and strategies, which allow for culturally-situated knowledge, 12 values, and practices to be positioned at the heart of sustainable climate change adaptation (high agreement) 13 (Chambers et al., 2017; Plotz et al., 2017; Beckford, 2018; Malsale et al., 2018; Parsons et al., 2018; Suliman 14 et al., 2019). In the Caribbean context, Beckford (2018) suggests the establishment of Caribbean Local and 15 Traditional Knowledge Network, a shared regional platform makes IKLK more available for climate 16 adaptation and community resilience projects where appropriate. Likewise, Indigenous research 17 methodologies are emerging that introduce more culturally grounded concepts and methods into how 18 research is conducted and decolonise mainstream research in the Pacific Islands (Suaalii-Sauni and Fulu- 19 Aiolupotea, 2014). 20 21 Despite widespread international evidence that the impacts of climate change and disaster events often 22 negatively affect women (and gender minorities) more than men (McSherry et al., 2014; Aipira et al., 2017; 23 Gaillard et al., 2017), attention to gender equality as a concept is still only "embryonic in climate change 24 adaptation in the Pacific" and although recognised in some policies and project designs, it is not well 25 supported by on-the-ground actions or well monitored (Aipira et al., 2017, p. 237). Many Pacific small island 26 climate change adaptation policies do not mainstream gender across the activities (Aipira et al., 2017), with 27 women's groups being excluded from climate grants due to patriarchal formal and informal governance 28 structures, lack of resources, lower access to educational and training schemes, and no track record (or 29 receiving grants or meeting grant milestones) (McLeod et al., 2018). However, Pacific women identify 30 several strategies that enable them to adapt to climate change more effectively. These include the recognition 31 and support of women's IKLK by governments, researchers, and NGOs; increasing women's access to 32 climate change funding and support from organisations to allow them to meet the requirements of 33 international climate change grants; and specific education and training to women's groups to allow them to 34 develop strategic action plans, mission statements, learn financial reporting requirements, as well as general 35 leadership and institutional training (McLeod et al., 2018). Such and other measures could enable a broader 36 representation and participation in adaptation processes despite cultural constraints (Table 15.7 on Enabling 37 Conditions). 38 39 40 Table 15.7: Enabling Conditions and Factors for Adaptation in Small Islands 41 [INSERT TABLE 15.7 HERE] 42 43 44 15.7 Climate Resilient Development Pathways and Future Solutions in Small Islands 45 46 Synergies exist between climate resilient development pathways and implementation of SDGs in small 47 islands because development decisions and outcomes are strengthened by consideration of climate and 48 disaster risk (Robinson, 2017b; Hay et al., 2019a). However, monitoring progress of SDGs is challenging for 49 small islands, in part due to large numbers of indicators and inadequate data. Literature on SDG 50 implementation is generally lacking for small islands as is the integration of climate risk into infrastructure 51 decisions. 52 53 Decisions that are optimal for adaptation may not be acceptable in the wider development context within 54 which they operate. In the Pacific region, where 67% of infrastructure is located within 500 metres of 55 coastline and commercial, public and industrial infrastructure are particularly vulnerable due to the location 56 of urban centres (Kumar and Taylor, 2015). Yet the Parliamentary Complex in Samoa was redeveloped at Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-51 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 the original site due to cultural and historical factors despite strong evidence of the need to relocate (Hay et 2 al., 2019b). 3 4 Energy transitions in the Pacific islands demonstrate development synergies such as reduced dependency on 5 volatile fossil fuel markets, increased resilience to weather related disasters and less need for investment in 6 large scale centralised energy systems (Dornan, 2014; Cole and Banks, 2017; Weir, 2018; Weir and Kumar, 7 2020). However, high and rapid energy transition ambitions can lead to trade offs for rural electrification 8 (Box 18.4; Dornan, 2014; Cole and Banks, 2017; Hills et al., 2018). 9 10 Tourism system transitions can enable the sector to contribute to climate resilient development pathways 11 through managing climate risks and improving ecological, economic and social outcomes for small islands 12 (medium evidence, high agreement) (Loehr, 2019; Mahadew and Appadoo, 2019; Loehr et al., 2020; Sheller, 13 2020). 14 15 There is a clear role for local governments to work closely with the informal private sector to achieve a 16 'trifecta' of climate change adaptation, economic development and disaster risk reduction, especially for 17 women (McNamara et al., 2020). Yet, many cities and local governments in the Pacific region are severely 18 resource constrained (Kelman, 2014; Kiddle et al., 2017; Keen and Connell, 2019; Nunn and McNamara, 19 2019). 20 21 Broader innovation in climate resilient development policy making has taken place in the Pacific (Hay et al., 22 2019a) and Caribbean (Mycoo, 2018a). The Pacific region is bringing together disaster risk management, 23 low carbon growth and climate change adaptation with broader development efforts for the first time (SPC, 24 2016). Improvements in cross sectoral and cross agency coordination are creating opportunities for improved 25 disaster preparedness and resilience measures in small islands (Webb et al., 2015; Nalau et al., 2016). 26 Further integration between development priorities and risk management in national budgetary and 27 development processes is necessary, as is continued investment in coordination mechanisms (Hay et al., 28 2019a). 29 30 Early research on the response to COVID-19 indicates that existing disaster response mechanisms in the 31 Caribbean islands have assisted in rapid responses to COVID-19 (Hambleton et al., 2020). Many small 32 islands are highly dependent on tourism for their economies and are facing worsening crises associated with 33 climate-related disasters and more recently COVID-19 disruptions of travel (Sheller, 2020). The adaptive 34 capacity and innovations demonstrated by SIDS during COVID-19, moving beyond dependence on 35 `extractive' international tourism, demonstrate the potential benefits of diversified and sustainable 36 economies (and ecologies) for the enhanced resilience of both human and ecological communities (Sheller, 37 2020). 38 39 In the context of small islands, climate justice research is expanding beyond initial debates about nation- 40 states responsibilities for the causes and responses to climate change, to demonstrate complex and dynamic 41 intergenerational and multiscalar dilemmas of climate justice (Ferdinand, 2018; Sheller, 2018; Baptiste and 42 Devonish, 2019; Look et al., 2019; Douglass and Cooper, 2020; Kotsinas, 2020; Sheller, 2020). In Caribbean 43 SIDS, research highlights how intersecting external and internal socio-economic and political processes are 44 allowing marginalised populations to become increasingly socially and economically disadvantaged and 45 politically marginalised, which in turn heightens climate vulnerability and impedes sustainable development 46 efforts (Baptiste and Devonish, 2019) (Moulton and Machado, 2019; Gahman and Thongs, 2020; Rhiney, 47 2020; Duvat et al., 2021b). Inequity extends to how development and disaster aid were coordinated and 48 distributed within various nations after Hurricanes Irma, Maria and Harvey in 2017. 49 50 51 15.8 Research Gaps 52 53 Despite intensive study many knowledge gaps remain due to the complexity of biophysical and social 54 interactions, and the local and regional diversity of small islands. Research and data gaps exist in four areas: 55 island-scale data availability; ecosystem services data; vulnerability and resilience, and adaptation (Table 56 15.8). 57 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-52 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 Table 15.8: Research Gaps in Small Islands 3 [INSERT TABLE 15.8 HERE] 4 5 6 [START FAQ15.1 HERE] 7 8 FAQ 15.1: How is climate change affecting nature and human life on small islands, and will further 9 climate change result in some small islands becoming uninhabitable for humans in the near 10 future? 11 12 Climate change has already affected and will increasingly affect biodiversity, nature's benefits for people, 13 settlements, infrastructure, livelihoods and economies on small islands. In the absence of ambitious human 14 intervention to reduce emissions, climate change impacts are likely to make some small islands 15 uninhabitable in the second part of the 21st century. By protecting and restoring nature in and around small 16 islands as well as implementing anticipatory adaptation responses, humans can help reduce future risks to 17 ecosystems and human lives on most small islands. 18 19 Observed changes ­ including increases in air and ocean temperatures, increases in storm surges, heavy 20 rainfall events, and possibly more intense tropical cyclones - are already reducing the number and quality of 21 ecosystem services, thereby causing the disruption of human livelihoods, damage to buildings and 22 infrastructure, and loss of economic activities and cultural heritage on small islands. Widespread observed 23 impacts include severe coral reef bleaching events, such as that associated with the 2015­16 El Niño season, 24 the most damaging on record worldwide. Additionally, the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season was unusually 25 characterised by sequential severe tropical cyclones that resulted in widespread cyclone-induced damage to 26 ecosystems from the very interior of small islands to those of the ocean waters that surround them as well as 27 damage to human settlements and economic activities within the whole Caribbean region. Although 28 knowledge is limited regarding long term increases in tropical cyclone intensity, studies have shown that 29 heavy rainfall and intense wind speed of individual tropical cyclones were increased by climate change. The 30 combination of various climate events, such as tropical cyclones, extreme ocean waves, and El Niño or La 31 Niña phases, with sea-level rise causes increased coastal flooding, especially on low-lying atoll islands of the 32 Indian and Pacific Oceans. 33 34 The expected increased risk of such impacts under further climate change is significant. For example, some 35 low-lying islands and areas may be extensively flooded at every high tide or during storms. As a result, their 36 freshwater supplies and soils would be repeatedly contaminated by saltwater, with adverse cascading 37 consequences for freshwater and terrestrial food supplies, biodiversity and ecosystems, and economic 38 activities. It is unlikely that these locations would remain habitable unless such impacts are mitigated 39 through reduction of heat-trapping greenhouse gas emissions or adaptation solutions that are acceptable for 40 the populations of these islands. Acceptable adaptation options may be limited in these locations. 41 Additionally, drought intensity may challenge freshwater security in some regions such as the Caribbean. 42 Likewise, remote atoll islands where inhabitants rely on reef-derived food and other resources and that are at 43 high risk of widespread coral reef degradation may become uninhabitable. Strategies to reduce risk may 44 include substituting the consumption of vulnerable inshore reef resources by developing onshore aquaculture 45 (fish farming), or promoting access to tuna and other pelagic fish, and/or importing food to meet nutritional 46 needs. However, adoption of these strategies will depend on the acceptance of their local populations. 47 48 The intensity and timing of such impacts will be more severe under high warming futures compared to low 49 warming futures accompanied by ambitious adaptation. Tailored, desirable and locally owned adaptation 50 responses that incorporate both short- and long-term time horizons would certainly help to reduce future 51 risks to nature and human life in small islands. Among the short-term measures frequently employed to 52 address sea-level rise and flooding are seawalls. Long-term measures include ecosystem-based adaptation 53 such as mangrove replanting, relocation of coastal villages to upland sites, creation of elevated land through 54 reclamation, revised building codes as part of a broader disaster risk reduction strategy, shifting to alternative 55 livelihoods and changes in farming and fishing practices. 56 57 [END FAQ15.1 HERE] Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-53 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 2 3 [START FAQ15.2 HERE] 4 5 FAQ 15.2: How have some small-island communities already adapted to climate change? 6 7 Faced with rising sea levels and storm surges along their coastal areas which have significantly threatened 8 people's safety, buildings, infrastructure and livelihoods, Small Island communities have already embarked 9 on the use of different adaptation strategies. These include reactive adaptation, which deals with short-term 10 measures, and anticipatory adaptation, which takes action in advance to lessen climate change impacts in 11 the long run. Reactive measures have proven not always to be effective. In contrast, anticipatory measures 12 hold much promise for future adaptation. 13 14 The majority of people living on small islands occupy coasts, so the most widespread threats to people's 15 livelihoods are those from sea-level rise, shoreline erosion, increased lowland flooding, and salinization of 16 groundwater and soil. Humans can either adapt reactively or anticipate coming changes and prepare for 17 them. Given the diversity of small islands across the world, and their capacities to adapt, there is no single 18 solution that fits all contexts. 19 20 Coastal livelihoods in particular are already impacted by climate impacts. Coastal fishers have adapted to 21 these changes in environmental conditions by diversifying livelihoods, expanding aquaculture production, 22 considering weather insurance, building social networks to cope with reduced catches and availability during 23 extreme storms, switching fishing grounds, and changing target species. Similarly, farmers have diversified 24 livelihoods to more cash- and service-based activities such as tourism, changed plant species that thrive 25 better in altered conditions, and shifted planting seasons according to changes in climate. 26 27 A typical reactive adaptation along small-island coasts involves the construction of hard impermeable 28 structures such as seawalls to stop the encroachment of the sea. Yet such structures, especially along rural 29 island coasts, often fail to prevent flooding during extreme sea levels or extreme-wave impacts, and can 30 inadvertently damage nearshore ecosystems such as mangroves and beaches. In the Caribbean, Indian Ocean 31 islands and some Pacific islands, there are numerous examples of coastal engineering structures that have 32 been destroyed already or are in grave danger from the encroaching sea. In many instances, citizens and 33 governments are unable to access external advice or funding, communities have built such structures without 34 assistance or knowledge of expected future sea level rise. 35 36 In contrast, anticipatory adaptation, which anticipates expected future impacts and acts in advance, requires a 37 longer-term view as well as some understanding of future climate-change impacts in particular contexts. 38 Along small-island coasts, anticipatory adaptation typically involves recognising that sea level will continue 39 rising and that problems currently experienced will be amplified in the future. One strategy for anticipatory 40 adaptation in response to sea level rise and flooding is relocation, which is the movement of coastal 41 communities away from vulnerable (coastal-fringe) locations to sites that are further inland. . Coastal setback 42 policies have been applied to hotels in some islands such as Barbados. In coastal locations where the risks of 43 rising sea level, flooding and erosion are very high and cannot effectively be reduced, `retreat' from the 44 shoreline is the only way to eliminate or reduce such risks. 45 46 Where relocation is successful, it is most commonly driven and funded by governments and non-government 47 organisations, often within a specially designed policy framework. The Government of Fiji, for example, has 48 introduced a relocation framework that specifically develops guidance on relocation processes, with several 49 villages already having relocated. Evaluations to date recommend thorough cost-benefit analyses of 50 relocation be undertaken before this strategy is pursued. Relocation is often viewed as a `last resort' 51 adaptation option because of high cost and because some socio-cultural aspects of life cannot be maintained 52 in locations separated from customary land. The Bahamas relocated a community on Family Island from the 53 shoreline to an inland location and the community of Boca de Cachón in the Dominican Republic was 54 relocated to higher ground. The Navunievu community (Bua, Fiji) has mandated that every young adult 55 building their family home in the village should do so upslope rather than on the regularly flooded coastal 56 flat where the existing village is located. Over the next few decades, this will result in the gradual upslope Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-54 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 migration of the community, an example of autonomous adaptation. Such creative community-grounded 2 solutions hold great promise for future adaptation on small islands, where they are undertaken inclusively. 3 4 Anticipatory adaptation has been aligned with disaster risk reduction in some small islands. For example, 5 Jamaica adopted such an approach in relocating three communities. Recognising that a proactive approach is 6 needed, Jamaica developed a Resettlement Policy Framework aligned with the National Development Plan 7 and based on vulnerability assessments of communities at risk of climate change and disaster risk. A 8 resettlement action plan was developed for the Harbour Heights community using community engagement to 9 design successful planned relocation. In some islands revised building codes are implemented as an 10 anticipatory adaptation measure. As part of the build-back-better strategy hurricane resistant roofs are being 11 built to cope with strong winds associated with tropical cyclones. 12 13 Ecosystem-based adaptation can be a low-cost anticipatory adaptation measure that is often used in small 14 islands. It is referred to as a `no-regret' or `low-regret' strategy because it is low-costing, brings co-benefits 15 and requires less maintenance in contrast to hard engineering structures. Ecosystem-based adaptation is used 16 at different scales and in different sectors such as to protect fisheries, farming and tourism assets, and 17 integrates various stakeholders from national to local governments and non-governmental agencies. Many 18 islands have implemented ecosystem-based adaptation such as watershed management, mangrove replanting 19 and other nature-based solutions to strengthen coastal foreshore areas that are subjected to coastal erosion 20 and flooding caused by sea level rise and changing rainfall patterns. For example, mangroves have been 21 planted on several cays in Belize and pandanus trees have been planted near the coastlines of the Marshall 22 Islands. Agroforestry is another example of ecosystem-based adaptation. Planting trees and shrubs in 23 combination with crops has been used to increase resilience of crops to droughts or excessive rainfall run- 24 off. Case studies show that people living on islands benefit even further from using ecosystem-based 25 adaptation. Their health improves as well as their food and water supply, while risks of disasters caused by 26 extreme events are reduced. 27 28 29 15-55 Total pages: 107 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Figure FAQ15.2.1: Adaptation options for rural coastal communities in small islands 2 A ­ In many places today, coastal communities which have been established for hundreds of years are being more 3 regularly inundated than ever before as a result of rising sea level. B ­ By the end of this century, sea level in such 4 places may have risen one meter or more, making many such settlements (largely) uninhabitable, underscoring the need 5 for effective (anticipatory) adaptation. C ­ One option is in-situ adaptation, popular because it is cheaper and less 6 disruptive than other options; it is typically characterised by mangrove replanting, seawall construction and raising of 7 dwellings. D ­ A second option is for communities to incrementally relocate upslope by building all new houses further 8 inland. E ­ A third option is complete relocation of a vulnerable coastal community with external support upslope and 9 inland. 10 11 [END FAQ15.2 HERE] 12 13 14 [START FAQ15.3 HERE] 15 16 FAQ 15.3: How will climate related changes affect the contributions of agriculture and fisheries to 17 food security in small islands? 18 19 Agriculture and fisheries are heavily influenced by climate, which means a change in occurrence of tropical 20 cyclones, air temperature, ocean temperature and/or rainfall can have considerable impacts on the 21 production and availability of crops and seafood and therefore the health and welfare of island inhabitants. 22 Projected impacts of climate change on agriculture and fisheries in some cases will enhance productivity, 23 but in many cases could undermine food production, greatly exacerbating food insecurity challenges for 24 human populations in small islands (also see Cross-Chapter Box MOVING PLATE in Chapter 5). 25 26 Small islands mostly depend on rain-fed agriculture, which is likely to be affected in various ways by 27 climate change, including loss of agricultural land through floods and droughts, and contamination of 28 freshwater and soil through salt-water intrusion, warming temperatures leading to stresses of crops, and 29 extreme events such as cyclones. In some islands, crops that have been traditionally part of people's diet can 30 no longer be cultivated due to such changes. For example, severe rainfall during planting seasons can 31 damage seedlings, reduce growth and provide conditions that promote plant pests and diseases. 32 33 Changes in the frequency and severity of tropical cyclones or droughts will pose challenges for many 34 islands. For example, more pronounced dry seasons, warmer temperatures, greater evaporation could cause 35 plant stress reducing productivity and harvests. The impacts of drought may hinder insects and animals from 36 pollinating crops, trees and other vegetative food sources on tropical islands. For instance, many agroforestry 37 crops are completely dependent on insect pollination, and it is, therefore, important to monitor and recognize 38 how climate change is affecting the number and productivity of these insects. Coastal agroforest systems in 39 small islands are important to national food security but rely on biodiversity (e.g., insects for pollination 40 services). Biodiversity loss from traditional agroecosystems has been identified as one of the most serious 41 threats to food and livelihood security in islands. Ecosystem-based adaptation practices and diversification of 42 crop varieties are possible solutions. 43 44 The continuous reduction of soil fertility as well as increasing incidences of pests, diseases, and invasive 45 species contribute to the growing vulnerability of the agricultural systems on small islands. Higher 46 temperatures could increase the presence of food or water borne diseases and the challenge of managing 47 food safety. Changes in weather patterns can also disrupt food transportation and distribution systems on 48 islands where indigenous communities are often located in remote areas. 49 50 Impacts of climate change on fisheries in small islands result from ocean temperature change, sea-level rise, 51 extreme weather patterns such as cyclones, reducing ocean oxygen concentrations and ocean acidification. 52 These combined pressures are leading to the widespread loss or damage to marine 53 habitats such as coral reefs but also mangroves and seagrass beds and consequently of important fish species 54 that depend on these habitats and are crucial both to the food security (a high proportion of dietary protein is 55 derived from seafood) and incomes of island communities. Shifting ocean currents and warming waters are 56 also changing the distribution of pelagic fish stocks, especially of open-water tuna, with further 57 consequences for both local food security and national economies, where they are often highly dependent on Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-56 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 income from fishing licenses (e.g., 98% of Gross Domestic Product in Tokelau, 66% of national income in 2 Kiribati). 3 4 Climate change is projected to have profound effects on the future status and distribution of coastal and 5 oceanic habitats, and consequently of the fish and invertebrates they support. High water temperature causes 6 changes in the growth rate of fish species as well as the timing of spawning and migration patterns, with 7 consequences for fisheries catch potential. Some small island countries and territories are projected to 8 experience more than 50% declines in fishery catches by 2100. Other small islands such as Easter Island 9 (Chile), Pitcairn Islands (UK), Bermuda, and Cabo Verde may actually witness increases in catch potential 10 under certain climate scenarios. Food shortages are often apparent in small islands, following the passage of 11 catastrophic tropical cyclones. Access to pelagic fisheries can help to alleviate immediate food insecurity 12 pressures in some circumstances, whereas aquaculture (fish farming) is being viewed as a longer term means 13 of diversifying incomes and enhancing resilience in many Caribbean and Pacific islands. 14 15 [END FAQ15.3 HERE] 16 17 18 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-57 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Large Tables 2 3 Table 15.2: A small subset of projected changes in basic climate metric. Med=Mediterranean; NC=no change General Metric Specific Specific Comments Reference Phenomenon Location projections projections 2040-2060 2080-2100 Trend RCP RCP RCP RCP 4.5 8.5 4.5 8.5 Bowden Hotter, Monthly mean Specific to et al. Caribbean especially in temperature 1.2C 1.6C 3.0C the East compared to 1971- 2000 NA Lesser (2020) rise rise rise Antilles Cantet et al. (2014) Low- Average annual confidence, East temperature 1.5-2C 2.5C Chou et Atlantic Hotter NA NA specific to compared to 1971- rise rise al. (2020) Sao Tome 2000 and Principe Average maximum Air Hotter, daily temperature 1.6- Specific to Varotsos 2-2.5C Temperature Med especially in during summer 1.9C NA NA Sicily, Crete et al. rise summer compared to 1970- rise and Cyprus (2021) 2000 Average temperature 0.5- 1.0- 1.0- 2.0- Consistent Lough et Pacific Hotter compared to 1986- 1.5C 2.0C 2.0C 4.0C in tropical al. (2016) 2005 rise rise rise rise lattitudes Global Hotter Heat index compared 1C Equatorial, small to 1986-2005 rise coastal and islands 1.5C 1.3C 2.8C continental Harter et rise rise rise islands al. (2015) hotter than oceanic 100% more High natural El variability More Cai et al., Ninos, limits frequent Frequency compared (2014); NA NA NA 73- statistical extreme to ~1900-1999 Cai et al. 100% significance events (2015b) more in related ENSO Pacific La patterns Ninas Inconclusive Amplitude change 0.02C 0.01C 0.04C 0.04C Specific Cai et al., change in compared to 1979- drop rise drop rise projections (2018); variability 2005 are not Beobide- statistically Arsuaga significant et al. (2021) Slightly Total rainfall 5% 8% Significant East wetter, more compared to wet/dry rise/ rise/ Cantet et NA NA local Caribbean extreme season compared to 10% 15% al. (2014) variability seasonality 1971-2001 drop drop Precipitation Stennett- West/ North Drier Annual rainfall Up to Specific to Caribbean Brown et compared to 1986- 9% 327% Puerto Rico al. (2017); 2005; consecutive dry NA less NA more and US Bowden days compared to rain dry Virgin et al. 1961-1990 days Islands (2020) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-58 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Low- Monthly rainfall 10- 10- confidence, East Inconclusive Chou et compared to 1971- 25mm 25mm NA NA specific to Atlantic change al. (2020) 2000 rise drop Sao Tome and Principe Wetter, Low- confidence, Sa'adi et Annual average specific to al. (2017) Borneo West especially 2% 6% 3% 8% Pacific rainfall compared to after mid- rise rise rise rise 1971-2005 century Central Drier, more Total rainfall Low- Pacific extreme compared to 1975- 15% 20% 17% 30% confidence, Timm et seasonality 2005 drop drop drop drop specific to al. (2015) Hawaii Drier during 0.2 Average change in Southwest the wet mm Lazenby daily rainfall Low Indian season, NA NA NA per et al. compared to 1971- confidence Ocean especially day (2018) 2000 south of 10S drop Specific to Annual mean 70- Malta; no Drier, but 60-150 Varotsos precipitation 100 significant Med highly mm NA NA et al. compared to 1960- mm change in varied drop (2021) 1990 drop Sicily, Crete and Cyprus Confidence Global Slightly Mean annual limited by small wetter, precipitation islands highly compared to 1986- <1% <1% 1.8% 3.2% Harter et variable 2005 high rise rise rise rise al. (2015) standard deviation 30- More storms 60% Specific to North in the west, Frequency compared rise/ Arabian sea/ Bell et al. Indian Ocean NA NA NA fewer in the to 1990-2013 20- Bay of (2020) east 40% Bengal drop Fewer 20- South storms, Storm/category 4-5 40% Indian Ocean fewer strong frequency compared NA NA NA drop/ Bell et al. (2019a) storms in to 1979-2010 0-20% east drop Slightly Storm density more and compared to 1970- 15- Kossin et stronger 2000; poleward shift Tropical Northwest 40% 10-40N, al. (2016); storms at NA NA NA in annual mean of Cyclones Pacific increasingly location of maximum rise; 140-170E Chand et 0.2° al. (2019) high intensity compared to latitudes 1980-2005 0-20% Southwest South/North Bell et al. Less Storm density drop/ and low- frequent Pacific up to (2019a) latitude compared to 1970- NA NA NA 20- storms 20N, 100- Chand et Pacific 2000 30% 140E al. (2019) drop Less Storm frequency No data for Northeast 2-13% Bell et al. frequent Pacific compared to 1970- NA NA NA Southern storms drop (2019b) 2016 Hemisphere Central More and Mean annual 31%/ Yoshida North stronger TC/category 4-5 Pacific storms composition Specific to NA NA NA 88% et al. Hawaii rise (2017) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-59 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report compared to 1979- 2010 Minor/major cyclones 12% Specific to Slightly Cantet et Caribbean compared to 1984- NA drop/ NA NA lesser fewer storms al. (2021) 2013 NC Antilles More storms and slightly Storms per decade Specific to Yoshida East more 0-3 compared to 1979- NA NA NA latitude et al. Atlantic frequent rise 2010 >15N (2017) intense storms Decreased frequency Frequency of storms González- Alemán et Extratropical 12% al. (2019) Med but compared to 1986- NC NA NA cyclone drop increased 2005 intensity 1 2 3 Table 15.3: Percentage of selected islands classified as refugia for biodiversity at increasing levels of warming. While 4 protected land is still `protected' this table demonstrates the difficulty of protecting lands which might be `more 5 resilient' to climate change under increasing levels of warming and current land use practices. Derived from current and 6 future projected distributions of ~130,000 terrestrial fungi, plants, invertebrates and vertebrates (Warren et al., 2018a). 7 Refugia =areas remaining climatically suitable for >75% of the species modelled (Warren et al., 2018b). Projections: 8 based on mean impacts from 21 CMIP5 climate model patterns (no dispersal) and elevationally downscaled to 1km 9 under interpolated warming levels derived from RCP 2.6, 4.5, 6.0 and 8.0 (Warren et al., 2018a). First column-set = % 10 island/island chain classified as a refugia based on climate alone ; second column-set = % natural land projected to be 11 climate refugia -- illustrating potential refugia `space' already lost to habitat conversion. Colour Key: white > 50%; 12 yellow = 30%-50%; red = 17%-30% and dark red <17% of land classified as refugia. Island(s) Climate °C Climate + Land Use °C 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 Aegean Islands 98 89 85 68 39 19 12 6 66 62 60 50 32 16 11 6 American Samoa 100 100 100 100 83 52 39 25 39 39 39 39 34 24 18 11 Andaman Nicobar 100 95 90 46 7 2 1 0 92 88 84 45 7 2 1 0 Balearic Islands 99 97 95 82 26 6 4 2 29 28 28 25 13 6 3 2 Bangka 100 100 97 3 1 0 0 0 20 20 19 1 0 0 0 0 Barbados 94 67 53 25 5 0 0 0 10 7 6 3 1 0 0 0 Borneo 98 92 89 60 25 14 10 6 67 62 60 43 24 13 10 6 Bougainville 92 81 77 62 39 28 24 19 87 77 74 58 37 27 23 18 British Indian Ocean 100 100 94 0 0 0 0 0 47 47 47 0 0 0 0 0 Territory Corsica 72 61 57 43 29 18 15 10 64 53 50 38 26 16 13 8 Crete 91 83 80 68 52 35 27 20 51 47 46 42 35 26 22 17 Cuba 97 94 92 69 14 4 3 1 48 46 45 36 10 4 3 1 Cyprus 53 51 49 44 32 20 14 8 48 46 44 37 24 14 9 6 Dominica 79 66 63 51 41 28 20 14 79 66 63 51 41 28 20 14 French Polynesia 100 100 100 100 100 81 68 54 38 38 38 38 38 32 28 23 Galapagos 91 82 79 67 50 27 18 13 93 88 86 74 54 33 21 14 Grenada 73 49 43 29 18 10 6 3 71 48 43 29 18 10 6 3 Guadeloupe 91 71 64 27 19 13 9 6 57 46 42 26 19 13 9 6 Guernsey 100 52 41 0 0 0 0 0 13 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 Hispaniola 77 60 54 35 22 15 12 9 55 43 40 28 19 13 11 8 Indonesia 95 87 81 54 28 17 14 11 60 55 51 36 23 15 12 10 Jamaica 77 65 61 47 31 17 10 5 64 54 51 40 27 15 9 4 Java 91 74 65 37 24 17 13 10 27 24 22 18 14 11 9 7 Kiribati 100 55 38 14 0 0 0 0 15 12 12 5 0 0 0 0 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-60 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Madagascar 98 90 87 70 47 28 22 13 84 77 73 58 37 21 16 10 Maldives 100 38 1 0 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Marajo 100 58 33 0 0 0 0 0 91 55 33 0 0 0 0 0 Marshall Islands 100 99 99 55 22 0 0 0 46 46 46 15 10 0 0 0 Mauritius 100 100 100 100 100 100 92 74 27 27 27 27 27 27 25 23 Micronesia 100 100 100 78 59 31 16 6 86 86 86 72 56 29 15 6 Montserrat 61 43 39 27 20 9 9 4 56 38 35 23 17 9 7 4 Nauru 100 100 97 0 0 0 0 0 11 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 New Caledonia 100 100 99 97 89 62 45 31 76 75 75 74 69 53 41 28 New Guinea 95 84 73 47 32 25 22 19 86 76 67 43 30 23 21 18 Northern Mariana 100 100 99 95 58 29 19 11 49 49 49 46 35 22 16 9 Islands Orinoco Delta 100 31 9 0 0 0 0 0 93 29 9 0 0 0 0 0 Palau 100 79 73 21 0 0 0 0 74 59 55 17 0 0 0 0 Palawan 86 70 64 36 21 12 9 6 55 47 44 31 20 12 9 6 Philippines 90 74 66 41 27 16 12 8 34 30 28 21 15 10 8 6 Prince Edward 100 100 100 100 100 97 9 0 35 35 35 35 35 33 2 0 Puerto Rico 84 66 59 41 25 15 11 7 63 52 49 36 24 14 11 7 Saint Lucia 77 50 45 29 14 6 3 1 72 50 45 29 14 6 3 1 Saint Vincent & the 73 57 50 37 27 18 13 8 63 50 44 34 23 15 10 5 Grenadines Samoa 100 100 100 99 89 67 56 46 34 34 34 34 31 24 22 20 Sardinia 95 87 83 65 34 16 10 5 41 38 37 31 22 12 8 4 Seychelles 100 100 98 83 57 25 16 9 25 25 25 22 18 8 6 5 Sicily 93 84 80 60 35 18 11 7 16 15 15 13 10 7 6 4 Singapore 100 100 100 98 9 0 0 0 14 14 14 13 3 0 0 0 Solomon Islands 93 79 74 48 28 15 10 6 92 78 73 48 28 15 10 6 Sri Lanka 98 94 89 64 23 11 7 5 47 46 44 36 16 7 5 4 Sulawesi 86 75 71 58 44 33 28 23 60 54 52 46 38 30 26 21 Sumatra 96 90 87 65 24 16 13 11 40 37 36 30 18 13 11 9 Sumba 98 90 86 70 49 23 11 4 36 33 31 26 18 9 4 2 Timor 92 84 80 66 48 30 22 15 11 10 9 8 7 5 4 3 Trinidad and 88 24 16 6 3 1 0 0 64 20 14 6 3 1 0 0 Tobago Tuvalu 100 100 100 34 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 Wallis and Futuna 100 100 100 65 32 11 3 0 35 35 35 33 21 7 1 0 1 2 3 Table 15.5: Summary of inter- and intra-regional transboundary risks and impacts on small islands Transboundary Small Island examples Reference Risks/Issues Large ocean waves from Unusually large deep ocean swells generated from sources Hoeke et al. (2013); distant sources in the mid and high latitudes by extratropical cyclones Smithers and Hoeke (ETCs) cause considerable damage on the coasts of small (2014); Shope et al. islands thousands of kilometres away in the tropics. (2016); Canavesio Impacts include inundation of settlements, infrastructure, (2019); Wandres et al. and tourism facilities as well as coastal erosion. These (2020) waves can propagate to and influence reef islands in equatorial areas not usually exposed to high energy Jury (2018) waves. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-61 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Examples of extratropical swell waves causing flooding and inundation have been reported throughout the Pacific (French Polynesia, Fiji, Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands). Modelling of future wave climates has been carried out for 25 tropical Pacific islands, and results suggests that December­February extreme wave heights will decrease for most islands by 2100 under both an RCP4.5 and RCP 8.5 scenario, although the frequency of the large winter wave events may increase around the Hawaiian Islands. In the Caribbean, northerly swells affecting the islands have been recognised as a significant coastal hazard. They cause considerable seasonal damage to beaches, marine ecosystems, and coastal infrastructure throughout the region. Transcontinental dust clouds The transport of airborne Saharan dust across the Atlantic Prospero and Lamb and their impacts into the Caribbean has been intensively studied. In the (2003); Goudie (2014); West African Sahel, where drought has been persistent Schweitzer et al. since the mid-1960s, analysis has shown that there have (2018); Goudie (2020) been remarkable changes in dust emissions since the late 1940s. Variability in Sahel dust emissions may be related Middleton et al. (2008); not only to droughts, but also to changes in the North Martins et al. (2009); Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), North Atlantic sea surface Akpinar-Elci et al. temperatures and the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (2015); Sakhamuri and (AMO). The frequency of dust storms has been on the rise Cummings (2019) during the last decade. Forecasts suggest that their incidence will increase further. Transboundary movement of Saharan dust into the island regions of the Caribbean and the Mediterranean has been associated with human health problems including asthma cases in the Caribbean, cardiovascular morbidity in Cyprus, and pulmonary disease in the Cape Verde islands. Influx of Sargassum from Since 2011, the Caribbean region has witnessed van Tussenbroek et al. distant sources unprecedented influxes of the pelagic seaweed Sargassum. (2017); Oviatt et al. These extraordinary sargassum `blooms' have resulted in (2019) mass deposition of seaweed on beaches throughout the Lesser Antilles, with damage to coastal habitats, mortality Franks et al. (2016); of seagrass beds and associated corals, as well as Putman et al. (2018) consequences for fisheries and tourism. This recent phenomenon has been linked to climate change as well as the possible influence of nutrients from Amazon River floods and/or Sahara dust. Large-scale changes in the Ocean warming and other climatic phenomena (e.g., El Bell et al. (2018); SPC distribution of fisheries Niño Southern Oscillation events and Indian Ocean (2019); Oremus et al. resources Dipole) have been linked to observed oceanic shifts in (2020); Bell et al. tuna distribution with significant impacts on revenue for (2021); Townhill et al. vulnerable small island states that depend on fisheries (2021) licences (e.g., 98% of national income in Tokelau, 66% of national income in Kiribati). The projected eastward redistribution of skipjack and yellowfin tuna due to climate change is expected to reduce the total tuna catch within the combined EEZs of the 10 Pacific Island Countries and territories (PICTs) where most purse-seine activity occurs by approximately 10% by 2050. Projected increases in tuna biomass have been anticipated for Ascension Island and Saint Helena in the South Atlantic. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-62 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Movement and impact of The spread of invasive alien species (IAS) is regarded as a Russell et al., 2017) introduced and invasive significant transboundary threat to the health of species across boundaries biodiversity and ecosystems worldwide. Vorsino et al. (2014); Taylor and Kumar The extent to which IAS (both animals and plants) (2016b) successfully establish themselves at new locations in a changing climate will be dependent on many variables, Johnston and Purkis but non-climate factors such as transmission pathways, (2015); van den Burg et suitability of the destination, ability to compete and adapt al. (2020) to new environments, and susceptibility to invasion of host ecosystems are deemed to be critical. Modelling studies have been used to project the future `invisibility' of small island ecosystems subject to climate change and therefore to anticipate marine and terrestrial habitat degradation in the future. Evidence suggests that hurricanes may have hastened the spread of highly invasive Indo-Pacific lionfish (Pterois volitans) throughout the Caribbean in recent years. Two IAS, the Common Green Iguana (Iguana iguana) and Cuban Treefrog (Osteopilus septentrionalis) were reported in the Caribbean island of Dominica, following the passage of TC Maria in 2017. Observations 7 months after the hurricane, within close proximity to ports, suggest that these animals were stowaways on ships or within relief containers. Spread of pests and Increased climate instability has contributed to the Cao-Lormeau and pathogens within and emergence and spread of serious diseases carried by Musso (2014); between island regions mosquitoes such as dengue, chikungunya and zika. The Caminade et al. (2017); incidence and severity of mosquito-borne diseases have Pecl et al. (2017); Filho increased significantly in Pacific, Indian Ocean and et al. (2019) Caribbean islands during the past 10 years, which calls for a better understanding of how climate change is shaping Maynard et al. (2015); disease prevalence and transmission. Randall and van Woesik (2015) Rising sea temperatures are thought to increase the Bebber (2019) frequency of disease outbreaks affecting reef-buildings. Of the range of bacterial, fungal and protozoan diseases known to affect stony corals, many have explicit links to temperature. Global projections suggest that disease is as likely to cause coral mortality as bleaching in the coming decades at many localities, with effects occurring earlier at sites in the Caribbean compared to the Pacific and Indian oceans. Model hindcasts suggest that climate- driven changes in sea surface temperature, as well as extreme heatwave events have all played a significant role in the spread of white-band disease throughout the Caribbean. Global food security is threatened by climate-related increases in crop pests and diseases. Black Sigatoka disease of bananas has recently completed its invasion of Latin American and Caribbean banana-growing areas. Infection risk has increased by a median of 44.2% across the Caribbean since the 1960s, due to increasing canopy wetness and improving temperature conditions for the pathogen. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-63 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Human migration and Currently there is limited empirical evidence that long- Campbell (2014a); displacement term climate change is driving transboundary human Melendez and Hinojosa migration from islands, however following Hurricane (2017) Maria, Puerto Rico witnessed "depopulation" of 14% in only 2 years as a result of emigration to the US mainland. Transboundary risks to island While SIDS are a diverse group of nations, most share Connell (2013) food security. COVID-19 such characteristics as limited land availability, insularity, caused disruptions to food susceptibility to natural hazards that make them Islam and Kieu (2020); supply and disaster risk particularly vulnerable to global environmental and Sheller (2020) management operations economic change processes leading to regional food insecurity. The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) has established a transboundary Framework for Action on Food Security, that promotes cooperation, investments, research and development, capacity-building, and adaptation to mitigate climate change threats. 1 2 3 Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-64 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 15.6: Adaptation options aimed at reducing Key Risks in small islands. Key Risks Risk-oriented adaptation options Evidence and Implementation Key enablers Reduction of Co-benefits Disbenefits agreement exposure and vulnerability MPAs; paired terrestrial Medium Widespread Strong governance and Reduces the For biodiversity, and MPAs evidence, across small low islands, with sufficient financial ecosystem food supply, EbA measures (15.4.4) agreement climate with regard resilience being resources exposure to economics, human to climate a target of some change MPAs human health and well- adaptation and benefits disturbances, being increasing their resistance and resilience to climate events Active restoration of Limited Mostly small- Funding: adaptation Reduces the Improved water coastal and marine vulnerability quality; reduction ecosystems evidence, scale: replanting taxes and levies of natural in coastal erosion ecosystems and flood risks; low of mangroves, imposed on tourism; by increasing economic benefits their agreement seagrasses and blue bonds; public- resilience KR1. Loss of with regard beach private partnerships marine and to long-term vegetation; coastal biodiversity success transplantation and of corals; beach ecosystem Hard protection (15.5.1) services nourishment Hard structures designed Medium Artificial reefs Funding: adaptation Uncertainty For food supply, to enhance marine evidence, and environmental biodiversity medium taxes and levies, with on reduction economies agreement limited evidence of direct reinvestment in of exposure (tourism), human conservation and management and health and well- vulnerability being of marine ecosystems; reduces the exposure of population and infrastructure to coastal risks Diversifying livelihoods Diversifying fisheries Limited to Examples in the Improved governance Reduces Sustainably (15.5.6) livelihoods (e.g. to medium Caribbean region and cooperation (e.g. exposure and managed fisheries, aquaculture and tourism), evidence, and in the through regional vulnerability improved food and Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-65 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report changing fishing grounds medium Pacific and strategies); weather of livelihoods income security, through the greater economic and/or target species agreement Indian Oceans insurance to enhance diversification and social of income and resilience resilience spreading of risks; targeting less offshore pelagic species reduces exposure of coastal habitats to overfishing Reef-to-ridge ecosystem Improved land use as a Limited Mostly in the Improved governance Reduces the Improved management (Figure driver of marine ecosystem evidence, Caribbean region exposure of ecosystem 15.4) health, including better medium and Pacific coral reefs to protection services management of forests, agreement human (e.g. against nutrients and waster water degradation, flooding, upland catchments increasing landslides and their mudflows), resilience biodiversity, human health and livelihoods Decreased deforestation Limited to Mostly in the NDC, external and For example, Increased (15.5.4) medium evidence, Caribbean region long-term funding, increase in connectivity KR3. Loss of high terrestrial agreement and Pacific engagement of local forest extent, between forest biodiversity and landowners and reduction in fragments, reduced ecosystem services resolution of land human erosion, improved ownership issues, exposure to water supply and gender sensitive natural quality, improved participation disasters human health and (hurricanes, sanitation, landslides), improved improvement livelihoods and soil in health; decreased vulnerability poverty; supports assessment global mitigation scores Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-66 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Increased reforestation Towards habitat Medium Relatively NDC, funding, Generally Increased DRR; (native species) (15.5.4) connectivity, heterogeneity evidence, widespread, with technical assistance, limited fewer floods and and diversity high examples in the supply materials, evidence, lack landslides; reduced agreement Caribbean region provision of land, of long-term erosion; increased and Pacific awareness raising, monitoring human health and enforcement of well-being; policies, sense of increased quality shared responsibility, of ecosystem inclusion of Indigenous services; increased knowledge and local adaptive capacity; knowledge, social supports global capital mitigation EbA (15.5.4) Agroforestry and other Medium Widespread in NDC, shared access Limited Improved climate the Caribbean change awareness, silvicultural/agroecological evidence, region and and benefit, local examples, increased well- Pacific Ocean being, improved practices (e.g. climate- high knowledge and some gender equity, improved smart agriculture) agreement training, farmers, increases in productivity and livelihoods private sector for adaptive developing technology, capacity financing, data availability; political, institutional and socioeconomic conditions Watershed Reforestation, slope Medium Widespread (e.g. Less socially and Yes, through DRD, improved evidence, management/conservation revegetation high in the Caribbean politically acceptable improved climate change agreement (15.5.4) region and than engineering water awareness, Pacific Ocean) solutions; security, increased water communication and reduced security and trust between adaptation quality, reduced stakeholders; costs, reduced run-off and sustainable financing vulnerability sedimentation, mechanisms; island to drought increased well- remoteness barrier to being and financial logistical stability implementation Ridge-to-reef ecosystem Improved land use as a Medium See above See above Limited but evidence, slowly management (Figure driver of terrestrial high increasing agreement evidence to 15.4) ecosystem health date Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-67 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Increasing the Establishment of new PAs, Very limited Low degree of Conservation of larger Yes, Improved water May facilitate security, improved movement of connectivity of Protected forested migration evidence, new areas of forest habitat especially if coastal ecosystem Invasive Alien health, greater Species Areas (Pas) across corridors across high implementations surrounding PAs, landscape resiliency and recovery from elevation/climatic elevation/climatic agreement due to terrain reforestation of connectivity wildfires, reduced pollution, DRR gradients to facilitate gradients, improving limitations degraded areas, is improved climate-driven landscape connectivity by combined with increasing and (migration redistribution of species permanent protection of competition enforcement of forest corridors) (Figure 15.4) stepping stones from human land cover within PAs, use needs; large policies towards the variation in PA coordination of coverage among conservation islands actions/partnerships, incorporation of `Other Effective area-based Conservation Measures' (OECMs) Eradication of Invasive Robust Widespread Integration of changing Yes, positive Food security, A few native Alien Species (IAS) evidence, (>700 islands) (15.3.3.3) high climate conditions demographic protection of species harmed agreement within ongoing and ecosystem health by eradication prevention, control and distributional and services, process eradication strategies, responses of increased prevention via ongoing native species livelihood security vigilance and following biosecurity via eradication of quarantine, control and IAS monitoring of incoming cargo and goods into islands Rainwater harvesting Robust h Widespread Socio-cultural and Yes Biodiversity Dependent on (15.3.4.3) evidence, across small financial (watershed mode of high islands (e.g. protection); health; implementation. agreement Jamaica, economic (reduced Nothing KR4. Water Barbuda, dependence on mentioned in insecurity Solomon public supply); the chapter. Islands) food security Desalination (15.6.1) Limited Relatively Financial Yes Health; economic Energy evidence, limited (e.g. high Maldives) (reduced intensive agreement dependence on (carbon public supply) footprint) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-68 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Reforestation (15.5.4) Medium Examples Governance - whole- Yes, through Economic Dependent on Protected Area evidence, supporting (agroforestry); mode of Management (terrestrial) high reported in the of-island approaches wetland- biodiversity implementation. (15.5.4) agreement oriented (watershed Nothing Caribbean and foster integrated tourism restoration); food mentioned in Hard protection (15.5.1) Medium security; disaster the chapter. evidence, Pacific (e.g. Fiji, management practices risk reduction KR5. Accommodation (15.5.2) high Destruction agreement Papua New in small islands of Medium Guinea) settlements agreement, limited Widespread Financial/governance Yes, through Biodiversity (forest and evidence across small infrastructure with regard islands (e.g. soil conservation); to climate Samoa, Jamaica, Advance with land change Haiti, Grenada) stabilization disaster risk raising and/or through the adaptation creation of artificial and success and reduction islands (15.5.2) Limited sequestration Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute evidence with regard of pollutants to climate change Widespread in External funding; Reduces Limited evidence Beach loss; adaptation of co-benefits erosion and success both urban and socio-cultural (meets exposure in acceleration; ecosystem Limited rural areas of the the preference of the some places degradation evidence through with regard Caribbean, population); political- but not in material to climate extraction; change Pacific and institutional (e.g. others; increased SLR adaptation impacts (driven by Indian Oceans supported by business- increases population as-usual approach of vulnerability coastal risks); technical (requires materials and skills) Relatively Technological, Limited Maintains the limited functionalities of financial, institutional, evidence to coastal systems and allows their sociocultural date maintenance through landward migration, under SLR Limited (e.g. Technological, Reduces Offers new land for Widespread Hulhumale', Maldives) financial, institutional, population economic ecosystem sociocultural, high exposure development, destruction, potential in urban where high generates revenues increased (compared to rural) standard as in through sale or negative areas Hulhumale', lease of land in impacts of SLR Maldives urban areas 15-69 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Migration including growth in the planned resettlement Maldives) (15.5.3) Limited Village-scale Participatory inclusion Reduced New livelihood Loss of cultural evidence, heritage, low planned of all social groups; exposure opportunities impacts on agreement receiving with regard resettlement financial (for small and locally; has communities to climate change supported by remote communities); created new adaptation government social-cultural vulnerabilities policy/legislation connections; strong at some in the Pacific governance locations by frameworks; enabling bearing legislation; land significant availability or economic ownership; conditions cost, in receiving locations; impacting technical support social capital and reducing access to services EbA measures (15.4.4) Medium Increasingly Environmental/physical Limited Biodiversity agreement, strengthening; medium experienced; conditions; social evidence to increased food evidence supply; increased includes acceptability; technical date human health and well-being artificial reefs, capacities (enhanced by beach external support); nourishment and funding; inclusion in vegetation national adaptation (including policies mangrove) restoration Increasing public Limited Few examples Financial and human Primarily Increased water awareness of health risks evidence resources to implement reduces security associated with climate options; early warning vulnerability KR6. Health change; providing and response systems; degradation training to health sector integrating climate staff; improving services into health reliability and safety of decision-making water storage practices systems; public uptake (15.6.2) and buy in; improving health data collection systems Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-70 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 15-71 Circular migration Limited Examples in Labour and education Yes on Job and education (15.5.3) opportunities in evidence Tuvalu from Funafuti, Tuvalu, and Namumea for migrants overseas with regard outer to capital Atoll, Tuvalu to climate atoll and change locations adaptation overseas (mostly driven by economic or social factors) Diversifying livelihoods Limited to Observed in the Use of ndigenous Yes in Reduction of Greater catch (15.5.6) medium pressure on putting evidence, Caribbean region knowledge and local documented previous fishing increasing low areas pressure on fish agreement and Pacific knowledge and places (e.g. stock changing fishing areas; Antigua, investment in Vanuatu, technology and Madagascar, education Dominican KR7. Republic) Economic decline and Improved technology & Limited Examples in the Investments in Yes in New technologies livelihood equipment/training evidence, and education (15.5.6) medium Caribbean region technologies and documented strengthening failure agreement and Pacific education (e.g. places irrigation technologies, growing salt-tolerant crops and relocating crop cultivation in Jamaica) Livestock husbandry Limited Limited (e.g. Farm inputs and No evidence Investments in (15.5.6) evidence small-scale investments in to date. farm inputs livestock technologies and Limited husbandry in education examples of Jamaica) successful livestock husbandry only in Jamaica Adaptive Limited Limited (e.g. in Tourism income; Yes, reduces Generates finance/education evidence, Puerto Rico, opportunities (e.g. (15.5.6) medium women engage investment in education risk and for wetland agreement in new tourism) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute and capacity building; avoids negative Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report commercial working with nature knock-on enterprises that and EbA effects do not rely on traditional coffee supply chains or government assistance) Product/Market Diversity of crops, Medium Examples in the Availability of crops Reduces Increases food diversification (15.5.6) Caribbean region and land, new markets gardening in different evidence, and Pacific vulnerability security and areas, storage and high to tropical improves nutrition; preservation of foodstuffs, agreement cyclones in increases income engagement of women in Fiji and security new commercial Vanuatu; new enterprises markets in Puerto Rico Adaptation in tourism Limited Limited (e.g. in Tourism regulations Limited policies (15.5.6) evidence, the British and policies that evidence in high agreement Virgin Islands, mainstream climate reducing policies like change adaptations; vulnerability adaptation taxes taxes and levies and levies imposed on tourism imposed on tourism can provide funding for adaptation measures) Integrating Indigenous Medium Reported in the Use of IKLK for Yes, can Can increase Reports from Knowledge and local evidence, Pacific and knowledge (IKLK) with high Caribbean preparing for disasters reduce climate change Vanuatu western science to agreement provide integrated and understanding vulnerability information and its indicates that approaches to climate change (15.6.5) environmental change; when IK LK understanding in IK LK are at KR8. Loss of social networks in supports communities, and times inaccurate cultural resources sharing information robust increase culturally (eg seasonal and heritage and helping others; adaptation; appropriate climate calendars, ecotheology increasing No, can adaptation biophysical people's awareness of increase weather the environment vulnerability indicators) due if IKLK no to climate longer change provides Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-72 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Hard protection (15.5.5.1) accurate 1 information Medium Widespread in External funding; Reduces Limited evidence Beach loss; agreement, of co-benefits erosion limited protecting socio-cultural exposure in acceleration; evidence ecosystem with regard cultural sites and (generally meets the some places degradation to climate through change villages in both preference of the but not in material adaptation extraction; and success urban and rural population); political- others; increased SLR impacts areas of the institutional (e.g. increases Caribbean, supported by business- vulnerability Pacific and as-usual approach of Indian Oceans coastal risks); technical (requires materials and skills) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-73 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report 1 Table 15.7: Enabling Conditions and Factors for Adaptation in Small Islands Enabling Conditions and Factors for Adaptation Enabler Example Reference Knowledge (Indigenous, Local, External) IKLK in developing Using IKLK in identifying Indigenous vegetation Crichton and Esteban (2018); Nalau (e.g., ecosystem-based adaptation) to reduce et al. (2018b) erosion (Samoa, Vanuatu) adaptation strategies (soft protective structures; disaster Pacific storm prediction, disaster preparedness Chand et al. (2014); Kuruppu and preparedness) Willie (2015); Granderson (2017) Shared resource governance and understanding of linkages between sectors and ecosystems based Remling and Veitayaki (2016) on IKLK (e.g., Lomanu Gau village initiative (Fiji) Increased access to climate Increased access to climate information Di Falco and Sharma-Khushal information increasing individuals will and capacity to (2019) support/take adaptive actions (Fiji) Dissemination of adaptation skills and McNaught et al. (2014) significance to youth (e.g., Ecocamps in Fiji) Pacific women's improved participation in McLeod et al. (2018) adaptation processes via training, access to information and decision-making Improved climate data quality, management and Martin et al. (2015); Hermes et al. Increased access to climate associated observation, modelling and (2019) information (continued) information services Caribbean: Improved climate data quality, Trotman et al. (2018) management and associated observation, modelling and information services SPREP (2016a) Provision of user-tailored products and services Loehr (2019); Mahadew and through knowledge co-production processes Appadoo (2019); Loehr et al. (2020); Sheller (2020) Economy and Finance Rambarran (2018) Economic diversification and Tourism system transitions/cooperation from shifting to CRDPs tourism sector Innovative financing models that enable adaptation (e.g., Seychelles) Finance models for adaptation Parametric fisheries insurance products to increase fishery resilience funded by Caribbean CCRIF (2019) Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (Grenada and Saint Lucia) Transregional trade Revised socio-political arrangements for better Keen et al. (2018) agreements/associated fisheries management (Solomon Islands) pressure Maldives land raising on Hulhumale Bisaro et al. (2019) Economic viability via revenue from sale of new land "Safe island development programme" after 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in the Maldives Shaig (2008) Government subsidies Tuamotu's government subsidy of raised houses Magnan et al. (2018) Co-investments and Tuvalu use of beach nourishment in collaboration Onaka et al. (2017) cooperation between agencies with JICA (donors, governments) Blair and Momtaz (2018) Diversification of livelihoods Coastal fishers' diversification of livelihoods into as basis for economic activity the tourism sector (Vanuatu and Madagascar) Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-74 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Fishermen varying fishing practices and locations Karlsson and McLean (2020) depending on environmental conditions (e.g., Dominican Republic) Governance Improved governance arrangements: Cross- Webb et al. (2015); Nalau et al. Changed governance sectoral and cross-agency coordination (e. g. (2016) arrangements resulting in Vanuatu) improved coordination Turner et al. (2020) Agency explicitly tasked with coordinating Changed governance sectors and services for climate resilience across McGinn and Solofa (2020) arrangements resulting in government (Dominica) improved coordination (continued) Efficient and coordinated distribution of climate New strict/explicit building adaptation support across national projects and codes departments (e.g., Samoa) Caribbean infrastructure (esp. housing and hotels) Mycoo (2018a) now must be built to withstand strong hurricanes Pacific Adaptive Capacity Framework Warrick et al. (2017) Localising climate adaptation Framework for the Disaster and Climate Resilient SPC (2016) plans, frameworks and Development in the Pacific (FRDP) policies Island-centric adaptation policy and planning Schwebel (2017) Social and cultural Support of social networks in hurricane recovery, access to livelihood opportunities (e.g., Turner et al. (2020) Social networks and capacity Dominica) in disaster recovery Increased Indigenous resilience and adaptive Petzold and Ratter (2015); Parsons et capacity via social networks and capital (e.g., al. (2018) Samoa) Informal credit for fishermen at food stores Karlsson and McLean (2020) during and after disasters (e.g., Belize and Dominican Republic) Social networks and Community-level fundraising (e.g., Samoa, Birk and Rasmussen (2014); Carby traditional familiarity with Solomons, Jamaica) (2017); Crichton and Esteban barter/microfinance (2018); Parsons et al. (2018); Nunn and Kumar (2019a) Maintenance of home Circular migration between Tuvalu and overseas Marino and Lazrus (2015) community Empowerment of the Relocations of villages (Fiji) Marino and Lazrus 2015) migrating individuals 1 2 3 Table 15.8: Research Gaps in Small Islands Research Gap Elaboration There is a lack of oceanographic (e.g. tidal), meteorological, high resolution topographic and bathymetric data, as well as future sea-level and wave climate projections for most islands, which severely constrain modelling studies and therefore improved understanding of future coastal flooding, erosion, and rates of saline intrusion into aquifers (Giardino et al., 2018; Lal and Datta, 2019) Unavailability of There is a need for further developing context-specific numerical models, especially through the adequately inclusion of sediment transport, production and delivery (Shope and Storlazzi, 2019), coastal downscaled and marine ecosystems' responses (Beetham et al., 2017), and various societal responses (e.g., climate data engineering and ecosystem-based solutions (Giardino et al., 2018)) under different climate change and SLR scenarios. The complexity and specificities of small island environments and unavailability of robust baseline data considerably challenge modelling studies in small islands contexts, as reflected by the serious limitations of global modelling impact studies for these (Mentaschi et al., 2018; Vousdoukas et al., 2020). Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-75 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Data and model developments are therefore urgently needed to assess the future habitability or exploitability of the islands that are the most critical to small island countries and territories, and to help identify and promote appropriate (especially in technical terms) solutions. Adequately downscaled Regional Climate Model (RCM) data (sub-5 km2) is also required to conduct modelling assessments for small island terrestrial ecosystems. This is particularly needed for islands with complex topography which could be important in providing much- needed climate refugia for the survival of narrow range species such as endemics (Balzan et al., 2018). Such spatial data could be used to maximize the potential of islands to deliver critical ecosystem services (Katovai et al., 2015; Balzan et al., 2018). Widely used WorldClim data may not be suitable when applied to the small island context (Box CCP1.1) Without such data, robust ecosystem based adaptation strategies such as climate-smart protected area planning and management under changing climate conditions cannot be developed. Thomas and Benjamin (2017) highlighted the lack of data as an area of concern related to assessing loss and damage at 1.5°C. Understanding loss and damage also requires more detail on island-specific losses and damages accruing from anthropogenic climate change impacts. At the moment, such assessments are limited, and most of the small islands have not yet documented these factors in their national adaptation plans or policies (Handmer and Nalau, 2019). There is a need for specific studies also on biophysical variables and species (e.g. impact of temperature rise on mangroves); long term impacts of ocean acidification on species, including relationship to disease outbreaks, and changing breeding grounds of marine species and impacts on fisheries and marine-based livelihoods; incorporating biophysical feedback and interconnectivity of environments into models; and more detailed datasets (e.g. bathymetry, coastal assets) (World Bank, 2016; McField, 2017; Wilson, 2017). There is need for new research that investigates the variability of vulnerability within and between islands and states, typologies of best practice (Oculi and Stephenson, 2018), frequency of knowledge sharing among islands and regions (Foley, 2018), identification of regional framework mechanisms, and mapping the complex impact and hazard interactions at a regional scale (Duvat et al., 2017b; Neef et al., 2018; Scandurra et al., 2018; Thiault et al., 2018). Research needs to also examine resilience-building efforts within the four domains of islandness (boundedness, smallness, isolation, and littorality) to effectively capture subjective nuances associated with climate development efforts on islands (Kelman, 2018). Research gaps in place-based assessments of social service bundles coupled with policy actions (Balzan et al., 2018) highlight the need for new knowledge to strengthen communication, collaboration and networks between academia, donors, the private sector, community and government (Allahar and Brathwaite, 2016; Schipper et al., 2016) so as to improve understanding of vulnerability and resilience in small islands. A paucity of research exists currently on the vulnerability of island ecosystem services to climate change (Balzan et al., 2018). While there is rich scientific evidence on the pressures of habitat loss and degradation, impacts of natural hazards and invasive species, far less is known about the interactions of these factors with adaptive capacity and livelihood conditions on Vulnerability and islands. In small island contexts, there is a specific need for assessing the effectiveness and cost Resilience of ecosystem - and community-based solutions where the latter have been implemented (Filho et al., 2020). The design of generic assessment methods and tools is required to allow for comparative analyses that will, in turn, provide useful guidance for the promotion of context- specific adaptation strategies (Blair and Momtaz, 2018). For many of the small islands, especially SIDS, the economic valuation of marine and coastal ecosystem services ­ coastal protection, fisheries, tourism - is of great importance, as well as the subsequent losses in these sectors and related livelihoods due to climate change impacts (Waite et al., 2014; Schuhmann and Mahon, 2015; World Bank, 2016; Layne, 2017; Duijndam et al., 2020). There are few integrated modelling studies to inform future habitability of differentiated small island types and how these models can inform decision support processes for ridge to reef stewardship (Povak et al., 2020). Existing studies (Rasmussen et al., 2018) have progressed knowledge since AR5, but island-specific analyses are required to robustly estimate the future ability of land to support life and livelihoods, taking into account multiple climate-drivers, future population exposure, and adaptation responses. More research is also needed in understanding how ecosystem benefits are modified under changing climate conditions and how these benefits can be quantified (Doswald et al., 2014). For example, many small islands lack comprehensive (and disaggregated) data related to food security which makes it challenging to attribute climate impacts on local food systems (Taylor et Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-76 Total pages: 107 FINAL DRAFT Chapter 15 IPCC WGII Sixth Assessment Report Adaptation al., 2019). Balzan et al. (2018) highlight the importance of quantifying the role of biodiversity in delivering key ecosystem services and demonstrate how such data could provide insights on the 1 interrelatedness of island ecosystems and transboundary service benefits. 2 3 In the last decade or so, there has been a significant increase in climate-related financing for small island states. However, monitoring and tracking of funding and metrics to evaluate overall impact are lacking (Boyd et al., 2017; Mallin, 2018). Research into adaptation costs could benefit from the inclusion of indirect effects of climate change such as psychological costs (Vincent and Cull, 2014; Gibson et al., 2019) but to date this research is missing. Greater effort could also be placed on quantifying the relationship between adaptation costs and adverse events (Adelman, 2016). There is also a need for overall land use planning guidelines in small coastal communities, including small islands (Major and Juhola, 2016). The usefulness and utility of insurance mechanisms for building resilience to climate hazards require up to date information on assets at risk (Tietze and van Anrooy, 2018) and further exploration of adaptation measures in small island contexts (Baarsch and Kelman, 2016). Additionally, the differences between theoretical adaptation practices and observed results from actual implementation, along with the integration of IKLK and external knowledge are currently not well understood (Mercer et al., 2014b; Kelman, 2015b; Saint Ville et al., 2015; Robinson and Gilfillan, 2016; Robinson, 2017b). Documenting experience-based knowledge of adaptation projects and programme implementation could fill important data gaps. At the project design stage, paucity of climate finance data is a barrier to accessing climate finance (Bhandary et al., 2021). Although studies examining the association between climate and weather extremes, events and conditions and mobility in small islands have increased since AR5 (Birk and Rasmussen, 2014; Kelman, 2015a; Connell, 2016; Stojanov et al., 2017; Barnett and McMichael, 2018), few studies robustly examine attribution of migration of small island populations, communities and individuals to anthropogenic climate change and other non-climate migration drivers. Biophysical, socio-economic and in-situ adaptation threshold that force small island populations to migrate remains under-explored (Barnett, 2017; Handmer and Nalau, 2019). The implications of forced and voluntary immobility (Allgood and McNamara, 2017; Farbotko, 2018; Suliman et al., 2019), the socio-economic, health, psychological and cultural outcomes of climate migrants, and gender dimensions of climate migration all remain under-researched. Limits to adaptation is still a largely under-researched topic globally (Nalau and Filho, 2018) and specifically in small island contexts, as are the linkages between adaptation limits, loss and damage and transformative adaptation (Thomas et al., 2020). In terms of projected risks and adaptation responses, further work is needed to improve knowledge of commonalities, differences, successes, and failures of natural and human adaptation responses (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015). One of the failings of current literature on limits to adaptation revolves largely on the use of barriers for sector-specific or small-scale scenarios, that provide an understanding only for that particular scenario and does not identify common constraints (Kuruppu and Willie, 2015). Research gaps on loss and damage include: how to assess the economic costs of loss and damage; mechanisms to develop robust policies in small island contexts; specific data on experienced loss and damage across socio-economic groups and demographics; monitoring and tracking of slow onset events (Thomas and Benjamin, 2017; Thomas et al., 2020) and the non- economic aspects including sense of place, health and community cohesion (Thomas and Benjamin, 2019). More studies are needed on the role that organisations (international, national and regional) play in adaptation efforts ­ their effectiveness at achieving desired outcomes, roles and accountability (Robinson and Gilfillan, 2016; Scobie, 2016; Mallin, 2018). It is also important that the impacts of socio-political relations inter-state are researched (Belmar et al., 2015) and more focus on climate justice (Baptiste and Devonish, 2019; Moulton and Machado, 2019; Gahman and Thongs, 2020) and gender are similarly needed (Mcleod et al., 2018). Given the high number of place-specific case studies in adaptation literature, more reviews are needed that synthesise key lessons and principles of adaptations in small island contexts from this knowledge. Further research is also needed to capture the lessons from COVID-19 response in small islands and how these could enable more robust adaptation and climate resilient development transitions as has been suggested at a broader scale by Schipper et al. (2020). There is also little to no information on impacts upon terrestrial and freshwater biodiversity from the relocation of coastal human populations inland due to SLR. Do Not Cite, Quote or Distribute 15-77 Total pages: 107